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BlackOUT: from Senegal to Brazil

the importance of being *Branco*

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Alla mia famiglia,
il mio tutto.

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ABSTRACT

Questo lavoro è una ricerca che ha come obiettivo lo studio di un preciso fenomeno migratorio il quale iniziò ad affermarsi, in maniera più solida e distintiva, all'alba della decade attuale. L'anno 2010 ha comunque un significato puramente marginale nella disamina degli avvenimenti, in quanto serve esclusivamente a fissare il periodo generale attorno al quale un maggior numero di migranti senegalesi si spinse alla volta dei confini dello sterminato paese d'oltreoceano. Infatti, il flusso migratorio dal Senegal al Brasile possiede delle radici decisamente recenti che hanno assunto una determinata importanza anche alla luce di particolari condizioni sociali, inerenti tanto al paese di partenza quanto a quello di destinazione, le quali hanno permesso così di tratteggiare i connotati di un definito sentimento.

L'analisi del flusso in questione ha quindi anche e soprattutto delle finalità socio antropologiche in quanto, a prescindere dalla mera esegesi del percorso intrapreso dai migranti senegalesi, questo studio ha intenzione di evidenziare, alla luce delle relazioni sociali fra i due popoli, la persistenza di un razzismo convinto che si annida dentro i confini del territorio brasiliano. Un'analisi che mira a delineare i perché e le conseguenze che discendono da questo sentimento e che, principalmente, sfociano in temi i quali, necessariamente e forzatamente, hanno risvolti antropologici. Un razzismo che quindi va oltre il sentimento xenofobo sebbene il confine tra i due sia in realtà decisamente labile.

L'espressione razzista è un sentimento che sfugge a ogni logica razionale e che, con fare angoscioso, esacerba il già flebile animo umano a prescindere da ogni retorica culturale. La stessa retorica infatti non ha nessun tipo di legame con questo male di vivere, un male che inasprisce di fronte al diverso, al non ugualmente abile, colpevole solo nel possedere diverse quantità di pigmento nella pelle. La ricerca non vuole tacciare di questo male il popolo brasiliano, allo stesso tempo però, attraverso diverse analisi statistiche e racconti in prima persona, estrapola una quantità importante di dati che esprimono, chiaramente, un'indissolubile incontrovertibilità: il "bianco" in Brasile gode, volente o nolente, di determinati vantaggi strutturali.

Detto ciò, lo studio in questione si basa comunque sulla correlazione fra due paesi tanto distanti quanto apparentemente senza nessuna specifica reciprocità. Una ex

colonia francese, il Senegal, ed una ex colonia portoghese, il Brasile, hanno apparentemente un'esclusiva matrice comune, cioè aver subito una dominazione coloniale. Nonostante ogni discrepanza associativa, lo studio propone alcune somiglianze in essere fra i due che si riflettono in una migrazione e nell'incontro tra due popoli che diviene paradossalmente un non-incontro. Un non-incontro che diviene il microcosmo che aiuta ad analizzare in maniera più ampia le incongruenze brasiliane. Allo stesso tempo bisogna ricordare come il vasto territorio brasiliano sia la nazione "più nera" al di fuori dell'Africa e di come lo stesso paese abbia da sempre rappresentato una sorta di "paradiso razziale" quindi di incontro di diverse culture unite da un desiderio comune: il quieto vivere. Durante questo percorso però quest'espressione e questo pensiero saranno ribaltati.

Dal punto di vista strutturale la tesi è suddivisa in tre capitoli, ognuno dei quali analizza e discute delle tematiche che hanno a che fare, geograficamente, con due diverse aree: quella dell'Africa occidentale francofona, dove sorge il Senegal e quella brasiliana, sfogo finale di questo flusso.

Il Senegal con in particolare tutti quei paesi, limitrofi e non, appartenenti comunque alla stessa area geografica e protagonisti, loro malgrado, delle sofferenze inflittele dalla precedente colonizzazione francese, sono i protagonisti principali della prima sezione di questo lavoro. La stessa infatti si concentra tanto sulle origini quanto sull'importanza che i colonizzatori ebbero per lo sviluppo economico e politico di questa porzione del continente africano. Un obiettivo chiaro sarà quello di definire in una maniera quanto più precisa possibile i contorni di quest'area che ospita il Senegal. Essa conta infatti oggi sedici stati, tutti facenti parte dell'Organizzazione Economica degli Stati dell'Africa Occidentale (ECOWAS) ad esclusione della Mauritania. Di questi quindici stati ben nove, compreso ovviamente il Senegal, hanno subito una dominazione territoriale e culturale da parte dell'impero francese. L'analisi di queste dinamiche inerenti al peso esercitato su questi territori, sia in passato che oggi, dallo stato francese ha una rilevante importanza nello studio in questione. Il Senegal è infatti uno dei paesi più ricchi non solo dell'Africa occidentale ma di tutta l'Africa sub-Sahariana, allo stesso tempo determinate politiche non hanno permesso lo sviluppo di un paese che, ancora oggi, vive all'ombra dello stato d'oltralpe, un paese che sebbene potrebbe avere un futuro

non possiede un proprio presente, un paese che costringe la propria gioventù a cercare fortuna altrove.

Un dato statistico interessante per una migliore disamina riguarderà l'anno di indipendenza di tutte le ex colonie francesi dell'Africa occidentale. Tutti questi paesi infatti, ad esclusione della Guinea, ottennero l'indipendenza nello stesso anno, cioè nel 1960. Questo dato, oltre ad essere alquanto singolare, lascia molti dubbi inerenti allo stesso processo di indipendenza. Tutti i moti rivoluzionari infatti si susseguirono in maniera tranquilla e pacifica quasi come se lo stato francese ne avesse assecondato la riuscita. Questo dato diventa ancora più interessante e di rilievo se comparato alla situazione che ne seguì negli anni avvenire. Infatti dagli anni settanta del secolo scorso un termine assume un significato particolare che induce determinate riflessioni: Francofonia. Difatti, se da un lato lo stesso potrebbe quasi rappresentare una promozione culturale ed imparziale di un'organizzazione che esclusivamente avrebbe lo scopo di promuovere la solidarietà tra i paesi africani (ma non solo) di lingua francese, dall'altro lato la realtà, secondo chi scrive, è decisamente diversa. Essa servì alla Francia per perseguire i propri fini politici ed economici nelle sue ex colonie mascherandoli sotto la finzione di una promozione culturale degli stessi. La politica neocoloniale seguì quindi alla fine di una dominazione coloniale che, per motivi esclusivamente storici, non poteva essere più tollerata da un mondo in fase di ristrutturazione che usciva devastato da due conflitti mondiali che ne avevano occluso le vie respiratorie. Una sezione fondamentale inerente questo paradigma sarà quella che analizzerà la moneta attuale di gran parte degli stessi stati (fra cui il Senegal) cioè il CFA ("Franc Communauté Financière Africaine"). Il CFA rappresenta uno dei motivi principali per i quali il Senegal, ma non solo, sebbene sia un territorio ricco di materie prime, costringe quasi il 50% dei suoi giovani fra i 20 e i 40 anni ad emigrare verso altri lidi, fra cui appunto il Brasile. Infatti, come verrà ampiamente trattato è una moneta che dipende da un cambio fisso con l'euro che non permette una ripresa economica degli stati africani dove essa è la moneta attuale. Il CFA è la moneta europea in Africa nera.

La ricerca tratterà anche della storia migratoria del Senegal, una storia che racconta di un popolo da sempre migrante con particolare evidenza assegnata al periodo delle due guerre mondiali, dove i nativi senegalesi venivano impiegati come mozzi nelle navi mercantili francesi o nel reparto della fanteria.

Durante il percorso si sottolineano anche i perché che stanno dietro alla scelta del Brasile come meta finale del viaggio di molti senegalesi. Si evidenzierà come la destinazione europea rimanga quella principale ovviamente, per chiari motivi di distanza geografica, allo stesso tempo Il Brasile ha avuto un fascino sempre maggiore per molti senegalesi, sia per motivi dovuti a grandi eventi associati al territorio brasiliano appunto sia per la presenza di una forte industria del pollame con una maggiore richiesta di manodopera islamica. Si evidenzia infatti come il 97% circa della popolazione senegalese sia di fede islamica e come quindi sappia rispondere ad una domanda di una precisa lavorazione di un prodotto. Allo stesso tempo è nota una presenza di “reti” familiari tra gli stessi migranti. Molti di loro sono stati attirati in Brasile attraverso il richiamo di altri senegalesi già presenti in Brasile, che hanno quindi spinto i primi ad intraprendere questo viaggio.

Il secondo capitolo diviene il perno della ricerca in quanto, oltre ad analizzare in maniera accurata il fenomeno migratorio in questione, permette una piena immersione nella realtà brasiliana. Il paese infatti oggi presenta al suo interno una situazione alquanto complessa, un paese fortemente nero che si è sempre creduto bianco. Si valuta come la visione idilliaca di *melting pot* culturale e sociale del Brasile sia un mito sfalsato dalla realtà. Siamo abituati infatti a pensare al Brasile come ad un paradiso razziale, un *Eldorado* in cui popoli di origine e culture differenti convivono in armonia. Questo mito però subisce una brusca frenata quando viene svuotato dalla sua effimera concretezza attraverso dati che presentano la realtà sia passata che odierna. Oggi il paese occupa infatti, a livello globale, il secondo posto fra quelli che possiedono le maggiori disparità sociali fra i vari membri della popolazione. Affinché quindi sia permessa un’analisi effettiva della spiegazione di queste parole, si esamina la progressività storica Brasiliana che ha condotto oggi il paese a questa situazione di forte disuguaglianza fra bianchi e non. Il capitolo infatti indaga in maniera dettagliata l’evoluzione storica e culturale dello stato brasiliano. Alcune dinamiche odierne infatti assurgono un chiaro significato soprattutto alla luce dei trascorsi del paese.

La storia del Brasile è una storia alquanto travagliata, un paese prima colonia portoghese che si è successivamente reso indipendente perseguendo talune teorie, inerenti all’evoluzione della razza, tipiche del positivismo francese ed europeo dei primi anni del 900. Eurocentrismo e positivismo hanno chiaramente influenzato la politica

culturale e sociale della nascente repubblica brasiliana (1889), una politica fondata su un progetto di “sbiancamento” della popolazione attraverso le unioni miste. Il nascente governo infatti fu condizionato dalle tendenze europee che consideravano l’Europa centro politico ed economico del mondo. Da questo sentimento ne scaturì quindi una tendenza sempre maggiore nel conformarsi al vecchio continente attraverso una politica nazionalistica. Questa politica si tradusse, a fine diciannovesimo secolo, in autoritarismo, aggressività e razzismo appunto attraverso la considerazione della razza bianca come quella superiore in ogni connotato.

“Un Brasile bianco in 100 anni”, questa affermazione poteva ergersi a ipotetico slogan che il governo tramava sottobanco. Infatti, lo stato brasiliano favorì, tra la fine del diciannovesimo e l’inizio del ventesimo secolo, una politica d’immigrazione basata su teorie razziste con un progetto che avrebbe dovuto appunto portare alla sparizione della popolazione di origine africana nel giro di circa un secolo. Allo stesso tempo negli anni trenta del vecchio secolo, lo stesso governo promuoveva la valorizzazione del meticcio a paradigma nazionale dando vita al famoso dogma del Brasile come “democrazia razziale”. Oltre quindi ad un viaggio della speranza dalle coste senegalesi fino al remoto territorio brasiliano, i giovani africani respireranno, una volta giunti a destinazione, una situazione di forte disagio.

Il terzo e ultimo capitolo discute le attuali condizioni sociali per quanto riguarda le ineguaglianze esistenti tra i bianchi e i *pardos* (mulatti e neri) in Brasile. Una parte che ha il compito di focalizzare e completare la ricerca. Si esamineranno in maniera dettagliata le marcate differenze che esistevano e che esistono ancora oggi nel territorio “verdeoro” tra questi due gruppi. Come già accennato, il gruppo sociali dei “bianchi” presenta vantaggi strutturali rispetto agli altri gruppi sociali in Brasile. Questo diviene paradossale nel momento in cui si riprendono i dati emersi dall’ultimo censimento effettuato dall’Istituto Brasiliano di Geografia e Statistica (IBGE) nel 2010 il quale ha evidenziato che la popolazione brasiliana non-bianca ha superato numericamente quella bianca. Nonostante questa presenza maggiori di brasiliani “neri” o “*pardi*”, gli stessi oggi riferiscono di condizioni di vita peggiori rispetto ai brasiliani di pelle bianca. Come già sottolineato però, nonostante sia un paese fortemente nero, la popolazione si rispecchia in una discendenza bianca e quindi di origine europea.

I dati reali riguardo le disuguaglianze sociali presenti all'interno del paese dimostrano infatti come gli stessi gruppi etnici subiscano differenti trattamenti a seconda appunto del loro colore. Quattro diverse categorie sono utilizzate per dare conferme statistiche in relazione a queste disparità, cioè aspettative di vita, istruzione scolastica, salario pro capite e tasso di disoccupazione.

Dopo aver imposto quindi questo *imprinting* che mira a sottolineare come le divergenze sociali, a discapito della popolazione nera in Brasile, siano un problema reale e non fittizio, si presenta il metodo usato per fornire una realtà di fondo a quanto già ampiamente dimostrato nella prima parte dello stesso. Viene infatti riportato un questionario rivolto a quei senegalesi che vivono oggi nella regione meridionale di Rio Grande do Sul. Lo scopo dello stesso risponde a diverse esigenze, la prima delle quali è quella di considerare la realtà africana in Brasile attraverso un diretto background offerto dalle risposte ottenute dagli informatori senegalesi che, vivendo oggi in Brasile, affrontano, loro in prima persona, la realtà vissuta dalla popolazione nera in questo territorio così lontano dalla culla africana. Questa realtà senegalese, infatti, ha lo scopo di fornire informazioni utili per un necessario approfondimento inerente alle condizioni sociali oggi vissute in Brasile sia dalla popolazione non bianca che, più in particolare, dalla popolazione nera di discendenza africana che, da sempre, ha abitato questo paese sebbene non ne sia mai stata parte integrante.

INTRODUCTION

This research is built on the study of a specific migratory phenomenon that has begun to establish, in a more distinctive way, in 2010. In essence, the migration flow from Senegal to Brazil definitely has current roots. Nevertheless, the mere analysis of the migration serves the purpose to introduce primarily anthropological purposes. This is because, along both the pure exegesis of the route taken by Senegalese migrants and the real reasons which *pushed down* on their *movement*, this study ultimately wants to focus on the continuous existence of a vibrant racism against the Afro-Brazilian population (*pardos* and *pretos*). This racism hides itself in the boundaries of the Brazilian territory. Social inequalities suffered by Afro-Brazilians (black and brown) will be therefore investigated along with the whites' structural advantages in Brazil. This is in fact the central purpose of the thesis. Figures, data and information are employed to give materiality about these words. It has been observed and studied an extreme inequality in numbers in Brazil. The country faces an huge gap between the richest and the rest of the population. At the same time, even if the last 2010 census show more than 50% of Brazilians define themselves as black or mixed raced, in contrast the poorest section of society was 76,3 African-Brazilian and 23,7% white.¹ This inequality is analyzed during this work, the reasons arising from these differences are investigated on the other hand.

A comparative study analysis between Senegal and Brazil is therefore the instrument used to depict the present situation in the vast overseas country. Senegalese, being part of that Afro-Brazilian population, act as key players. For its part, Brazil represents the final environment, meeting place of two different ways of looking at the world although a mediation would always be possible.

A personal interest in socio-cultural and demo-ethnic-anthropological studies about African sub-Saharan community, with particular reference to that area in the western part of such continent, will lead to an analysis that outlines the reasons for this migration

¹ Data Popular Institute (2012) "Data Popular Class A-Class E" in <http://www.ebc.com.br/instituto-data-popular> (accessed 05.03.2018)

and the consequences that necessarily culminate in issues that have anthropological interpretations.

The study of social structures of two different countries, Senegal and Brazil in the specific case, is a dated and modern discipline at the same time. Its main goal is the examination of the relationship based on two conceptual pillars: *culture* and *society*. However, the study is mainly shaped on the migration issue, something often argued nowadays, hence it is necessary to clarify some phenomena like *migration*, *emigration* and *immigration* which represent key concepts for the aim of the thesis.

John Lewis defines a *migrant* as “a person staying in or leaving a certain place in a way other than birth or death.”² Migration is in fact the movement of people from one place to another. It is a global phenomenon but it is not a recent issue. A distinction can be made between two different *types* of migrations:

- International migration: passing the country’s borders, that is when, for example, moving from Senegal to Brazil;
- Internal migration: moving within the same country, for example, from the south to the north side (Sicily-Veneto, in Italy).

However, a more semantic explanation of the expression *migration* is needed. It embraces two other terms: *emigration* and *immigration*, two similar words with a subtle but important difference. *Migration* word can be considered “an umbrella term that covers both ‘immigrate’ and ‘emigrate’.”³ At the same time the thesis puts also a different a different emphasis describing the idea of movement rather than departure and arrival points. Furthermore, it is important to clarify the difference between *migrant* and *emigrant*. In the case of *migrant*, he seems to be subjected to a perpetual migration, while in the case of *emigrant*, it underlines the *disconnection* from the country of origin and the move can be both temporary and permanent.⁴ However, migration, together with birth and death, is the third process in contributing to the change of a country’s population, both in size, social and cultural aspects.

² Lewis, J., (1982) “Human migration. A Geographical Perspective”, Palgrave Macmillan: London, p. 7.

³ Writing explained, “Emigrate vs. Immigrate: What are the differences between Immigration and Emigration?”, <http://writingexplained.org/immigrate-vs-emigrate-what-are-the-differences-between-immigration-and-emigration> (accessed 05.03.2018)

⁴ Treccani, “Differenza fra ‘migrante’ ed ‘emigrante’”, http://www.treccani.it/magazine/lingua_italiana/domande_e_risposte/lessico/lessico_395.html. Treccani is a national and cultural Institution officially recognized by the Italian State.

However, after having briefly analyzed the current topic of migration, it is worth pointing out the key points of this work. The general investigation is in fact based on the correlation between two countries as distant as without any apparently reciprocity. Nevertheless, despite being Senegal a former French colony and, on the contrary, Brazil a former Portuguese one, these two countries have a common *point* that stands out. It is not possible to ignore that both countries suffered a colonial domination during their evolutionary history. Nonetheless a more general *connection* should be recalled. Brazilian history, in effect, has based its economic development on a slave African workforce for about 4 centuries since it has been discovered in 1500.

Hence, the study proposes the *narrative* of such migration that, in the end, will serve the purpose to analyze Brazilian racial inequalities through the background *offered* by Senegalese who are living in Brazil nowadays.

From a structural point of view, the thesis is subdivided into three chapters, each of which analyses and deals with subjects that involve, geographically speaking, two different areas: Western Africa, where Senegal expands, and Brazilian area that is as the final place of the migration flow as the main *core* of this work.

Furthermore all research is based on sources. Example of sources used include books, official reports, journal and academic articles, newspapers, government and online documents. However, primary references have been provided through a survey to which twenty young Senegalese have replied. These Senegalese represent therefore the direct background of this thesis because all of them are living in Brazil nowadays. This survey that is carried out in the last chapter provide a direct line between what this research has analyzed and the reality showed up through their answers.

The first chapter "*Senegal in West Africa: history of colonialism and forced migration*", first introduces and analyses, even from a geographical point of view, one of the two researched countries, Senegal. After giving a general and brief overview on the Senegalese territory, next pages indeed will be focused on the origins of colonialism in this region of the African continent. This first half of the chapter provides some information concerning how and when colonial rules briefly emerged both in this area and in a more general African sense.

However, in the next paragraph will then be provided a review on all the West-African countries which suffered French colonial dominion and then to the neo-colonialism

phase from the second half of XX century. This is a focal point to try to give a hint of what problems and dynamics affect the area. This part is strongly focused on the dominion that French had always in these territories. Indeed, even today, *Paris* occupied a primary role both in Senegal and in the other French-speaking countries in West Africa through the power of the CFA currency, the common currency of 14 African states, mostly former French colonies. This is an important aspect which will be strongly underlined in the chapter. Senegal floats in a *mid-state* which does not allow its population to reach a decent level of life also because of the French politics.

The last part of this section, where the main role will be given to a specific and detailed analysis of Senegal, becomes a clear link to the second chapter. That pages will resume Senegal's migration history which is essential to grasp both the essence of this country over the years and the purpose of the study.

The habits, the various and particular ethnic groups relating to Senegal and the several migration phases faced by its population will be studied and will *offer* the portrait of this portion of Africa. Then it provides tables which will underline all the international countries with more than 5,000 Senegalese migrants in 2010. The last paragraph of the chapter deals with the reason for Senegalese destination's choice of Brazil. All the dynamic concerning this issue are analyzed and a better overview will be shown.

After having provided both a general overview of the history of Senegalese out-migration and a precise analysis of today's condition in Senegal, the second chapter "*Senegal in Brazil: the reality beyond migration*" is the mid-point of the project which will conduct to the final focus. It will analyze in a detailed way the migration flow from Senegal to Brazil and will allow the reader to have the first contact with Brazilian reality. This contact is fundamental to achieve the final goal of the thesis. After a general introduction, in effect, the second country subject of this study is introduced, Brazil.

After a short geographical in-depth analysis of this territory, the first part will deal with the study of the different Brazilian historical phases which constructed the modern Brazilian national identity. Indeed, it was a long-term process created on imperialistic European theories only in XIX century after the achievement of independence in the year 1822.

The country has a tangle internal ethnic situation, a “black” country that always thought to be “white”. Many indeed think of Brazil as a “racial paradise”, a happy *Eldorado* where people of different cultures live together without any problem or any kind of racism. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to understand that the Brazilian cultural and social *melting pot’s* idyllic vision is an untrue myth.

Globally speaking, Brazil ranks second on the scale of social inequality among members of the G20. In order to give evidence to that words, Brazilian historical phases will be studied following slavery’s analysis.

Theoretical studies’ analysis will show that the Brazilian State at the end of the XIX century has encouraged European immigration which should have marked the gradual black disappearance and the creation of a total white population in Brazil by 100 years. After this, the merely flow of migration from Senegal to Brazil will be analyzed. Indeed, in 2010, Senegalese migration to Brazil was still a marginal *outflow* which had less than 1,000 units officially registered.

Then next pages will focus on a detailed study of that phenomenon through an analytic explanation of the journey undertaken by the young Senegalese natives that brought them from the coastlines of Dakar to the remote Brazilian overseas ones.

After having analyzed the different stages of this path, a whole paragraph will be dedicated to those cities that hosted and which are still hosting the majority of Senegalese in Brazil. The majority of them live today in the capital of the southern *estado* of Rio Grande Do Sul, Porto Alegre. All the reasons which have led to this choice will be analyzed in these last paragraphs of chapter.

Then, the third chapter of this work, “*Afro-Brazilians and Senegalese: an overview on the today’s social situation in Brazil*” will carry out the main investigation of this project. As its title suggests, it deals with current social condition of Brazil concerning Afro-Brazilians (*pardos* and *pretos*).

The first paragraph deals with a brief remind of the concept of racial democracy, developed at the beginning of the third decade of last century, and how the racial issue became of national interest since the end of the first half of XIX century. It will take into consideration the overall Brazilian population by race through the last 2010 IBGE census (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) and will be discussed the results.

In the central part of this chapter, actual data regarding social inequalities existing in the country will show how people are differently treating according to the color of their skin. This 'imprinting' will underline once again that these social inequalities are a real problem for the country.

The second section of the chapter indeed faces how this current state of affairs is really experienced by black Afro-Brazilians through a detailed overview of the Senegalese background in Brazil over the last years. At this point, the method used to give practical effect to the project will be explained.

A survey is employed to carry out the investigation. It is an analysis based on "Senegalese-Brazilian" people, it initially reached out to them using social networking platforms and only then online interviews were carried out. It will give a true outline on Senegalese people living in Brazil through their own answers. Senegalese background will be able to give more information to study, in a more depth way, the reality regarding life condition of both *white* and *black/pardo* (mixed race of *whites* and *blacks*) population in Brazil.

1. SENEGAL IN WEST AFRICA: HISTORY OF COLONIALISM AND *FORCED* MIGRATION

'O scarrafone 'o scarrafone
ogni scarrafone è bello a mamma soja,
e se hai la pelle nera
amico guardati la schiena,
io son stato marocchino
me l'han detto da bambino
Viva viva 'o Senegal.⁵

The relationship between colonialism and migration has always gone hand in hand. The migratory phenomena has always existed and will always exist, nevertheless, this chapter will try to relate these flows both in relation to European colonial empires in West Africa and the following neo-colonial phase from 1960s. At the same time, Senegal will be investigated in greater detail through the analysis of that West African area which was subjected to French colonial rule. Having said that and given the overarching objective of this thesis, that is the overall study of Senegalese migration to Brazil and then investigate racial inequalities experienced by *Afro*-Brazilians, the focus will primarily be on the *country of departure*, Senegal.

Senegal, a country in the western part of the African continent, will be indeed the geographical focus of this chapter, also in relation to the West African area, where this land expands, and where this country has its *roots*.

⁵ 'O *Scarrafone* is a piece of music composed by Pino Daniele in 1991. He decided to *stage* the southerners' condition migrated in the north of Italy.



Figure 1. Senegal's geographical position⁶

The Republic of Senegal has been a semi-presidential republic since June 20, 1960, as result of the agreement signed with France on April 4, 1960. First, Senegal merged with the French Sudan to establish the Mali Federation. It broke up on August 20 of the same year, when Senegal and French Sudan (renamed the Republic of Mali) each proclaimed total independence. Found at the cusp of West Africa, it has always been a bridging point and intersection for freight and passengers transiting between Africa, Europe and South America.

The land of *Teranga*⁷ has a land mass of 197,161 square kilometres (about forty-five times smaller than Brazil), and in almost the entire central part of the country there are tinder-dry and semi-arid conditions. In fact, as we move outward beyond the coastal strip, the population becomes more spars. The climate has always been a main theme not to underestimate in Senegal, and more in general in the Sub-Saharan area, because provoked many droughts over the centuries with also consequences of internal migration from the country sides to Dakar, Conakry or Touba, the three main Senegalese cities, as will be largely analysed in the next paragraphs.

⁶ Senegal's position in Africa, https://growinafrica.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/senegal_16_11_2010.gif

⁷ The land of *Teranga* is another name for the country of Senegal. In fact, *Teranga* is a Wolof word (language of Senegal, the Gambia and Mauritania) which means hospitality.

According to the data available into the *Worlometers* database, the total population consists of about 16.2 million people⁸ in 2018 (about thirteen times less than Brazil). It experienced changes over the centuries because of migratory phenomena, as will be analysed.

Before proceeding to a more in-depth and believable analysis of the Senegalese dynamics, it is necessary, at this point, to clarify the area where Senegal expands. Moreover, only after a further but general analysis of the West African area in relation to that countries which suffered the French colonial rule, will this chapter start to take shape by observing the relevant factors which have pushed Senegalese both out of Senegal and in relation to Brazil as their final destination.

⁸ *Worlometers* provides live world statistics on population, government, economics and so on, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/senegal-population/> (accessed 07.05.2018)

African colonization is, more broadly, the general historical process of colonial settlement of the African continent realized by some European empires (see Figure 3.) from the 11th century to the second half of XX century. The first stage of its history is known as “classical antiquity”. In ancient times, people from Southern Europe and Western Asia colonized North Africa, while people from Southeast Asia colonized Madagascar. In the Middle Ages, North and East Africa was further colonized by people from Western Asia. Thereafter, the African continent was a port basin in XVI century, especially for French, British, Portuguese and Dutch that had ships along significant maritime routes which picked up African goods and products (gold, coffee, precious stones, ivory) to resell in Europe. At this stage, it is worth pointing out the common practice of *slave trade* as well, which started the brutality of its *business* following the previous Arabian example. From now, more than 11 millions of slaves from internal tribes were *swept up* and then sold on to slave traders.¹⁰ Many slaves were deported through the Atlantic ocean and offered to large American landowners during XVIII century.

However, the situation of Africa (and West Africa as well) until 1884 was as follows:



Figure 3. Africa before the 1884 Berlin Conference¹¹

¹⁰ The “slave traders” were usually known as “slaver”, mainly Portuguese, Arabs or Boers.

¹¹ “African map before the 1884 Berlin conference to divide Africa”, developed by University of Florida Map and Imagery Library – Africa in <http://www.themapdatabase.com/zoom.php?image=http://www.themapdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/olneys-150x150.jpg> (accessed 02.10.2018)

The second stage of Africa's colonial history is specifically known as "European colonialism" from the second half of XIX century. This last part of *occupation* is indeed also called *modern colonialism or imperialism* which has represented a true division of Africa conducted by France and United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, by Portugal, particularly with reference to West Africa.¹² As shown in Figure 3, many West African territories were still independent at the sunset of XIX century although Senegal was already a colony.

In the mid-15th century, the Portuguese landed on the Senegal coastline, followed by traders representing other countries, including the French. Various European powers—Portugal, the Netherlands, and Great Britain—competed for trade in the area from the 15th century onward. In 1677, France gained control of what had become a minor departure point in the Atlantic slave trade—the island of Gorée next to modern Dakar, used as a base to purchase slaves from the warring chiefdoms on the mainland.¹³

As stated, Senegal became a French dominion since 1677. From this date to 1960, the country suffered about three centuries of tyrannical exploitation from the French empire. However, more in general the European exploitation of West Africa appears with its destructive intensity from the end of XIX century.

1.1 The (West) African *scramble*: the modern colonialism's phase

The European colonialism in West Africa reached the peak from the second half of XIX century to mid XX century. Colonialism based on slave trade slightly decreased now and the so called "modern colonialism" started to develop.

The 1884 Berlin Conference initiated by Bismarck to establish international guidelines for the acquisition of African territory, formalized this "New Imperialism". Between the Franco-Prussian War and the Great War, Europe added almost 9 million square miles (23,000,000 km²)—one-fifth of the land area of the globe—to its overseas colonial possessions.¹⁴

¹² Pakenham, T., (1992) "The Scramble for Africa", Abacus: United States.

¹³ Ross, E.S. (2008) "Culture and Customs of Senegal", Greenwood Press: Westport.

¹⁴ Al Tinawi, M., (2015) "The impact of colonization on the African writer's psychological behaviour", Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences: Taif University, published by European Centre for Research Training and Development UK.

This *new colonialism* was more focused on exploitation of resources concerning the former colonies. The *colonial penetration* in Africa occurred in the period following explorative missions which gave a good measure of geological resources of these territories. This expansion was a veritable “race to colonies”, as the term *scramble* refers. In fact, many European countries dispatched military contingents to occupy that territories which was still *free* and only inhabited by small tribes. Many lands were both forcibly occupied and diplomatically where the tribes preferred not to struggle. In some cases, the tribes preferred to enslave themselves to colonizers than to other nearby tribal tribes. The occupied territories were declared colonies and all the populations started to be culturally and politically submitted to the various European empires.



Figure 4. Africa’s colonization in 1914¹⁵

As shown in Figure 4, from about 1885 to 1914 the African situation changed completely, above all in relation to West Africa. French, mainly, but also the United Kingdom empire took possession of this West Africa area located to the south of Saharan desert. The dominion imposed to black indigenous populations created a sort of reverence in relation to colonizers. Many Indigenous were enlisted in the European armies, at the same time, from the XIX to the mid-XX century the doctrine of “white

¹⁵ “Africa, 1914. Colonizing countries”, developed by The Metropolitan Museum of Art in <https://blackpast.org/gah/partition-africa> (accessed 02.10.2018)

supremacy” was taken for granted by scientists and political leader in Europe¹⁶. The European colonial troops often feared tribes through ruthless and atrocious system such as destruction of villages, physical pain, mass executions or large deportations only to quell their rebellions. French rule in West Africa even wiped out entire populations who have fought against French dominance. Hence, native populations were integrated to the political and economic European power but subdued to white colonial rules. At the end, colonialism has led to the impoverishment of the colonized countries both in economic terms and in cultural ones, as well as inability to have proper political independence for colonies, as will be analysed in the next paragraph in relation to French West Africa and Senegal.

2. From decolonization to neo-colonialism: an *unusual* independence phase in West-African French former colonies

The West African area was indeed the most severely affected by French colonial empire. At one point, all 16 states were colonies of other countries: French (9 countries), English (5 countries) or Portuguese (2 countries). However, it is worth pointing out the area of the countries that, such as Senegal, experienced French dominion. Therefore, it is relevant the awareness of the phase related to both the obtaining independence and the burden which had neo-colonialism¹⁷ in these countries, particularly with regard to Senegal.

¹⁶ For example in the four volume “*Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines*” (1853-1855), Arthur de Gobineau wrote about the superiority of whites over black people.

¹⁷ Neo-colonialism is the control of less-developed countries by developed ones through indirect means. It was first used after World War II in relation to the continuing dependence of former African colonies.

Table 1.1 System of government and independence year of each former colony from the French motherland¹⁸

<u>FRENCH COLONIES</u>	INDEPENDENCE	CURRENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
BENIN	1 August 1960	Presidential republic
BURKINA FASO	5 August 1960	Semi-presidential republic
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	7 August 1960	Presidential republic
GUINEA	2 October 1958	Presidential republic
MALI	From France: As Mali: 22 September 1960	Semi-presidential republic
MAURITANIA	28 November 1960	Semi-presidential Islamic republic
NIGER	3 August 1960	Semi-presidential republic
<u>SENEGAL</u>	from France: 4 April 1960 withdrawal from Mali: 20 August 1960	Semi-presidential republic
TOGO	27 April 1960	Presidential republic

As already referred, European colonialism was a relevant factor for the development of this area. The European colonial empires, and above all the French one, began a slow decline since the end of the World War II and, at the same time, national movements arose across this area.

As shown in table 1.1, all former French countries obtained independence in the year 1960, except for Guinea (1958). Until the late 1960s, these former colonies was in general suffering from an obvious shortage of socio-demographic data. On the other hand, the situation started to improve from the 1970s onward with as the development of institutes and external financial support provided by French state as the launching of large international projects. Overall, the decolonization process occurred without particular troubles between the former colonies and the French states, also because it was more a colonizer's choice than a real attempt of this colonies to gain their independence, maybe forced by the historical period. Nevertheless, only two countries faced large Civil conflicts since 1960: Ivory Coast (two Civil war) and Mali. The *Ivorian Civil Wars* (2002-2007 and 2010-2011) was caused both by an attempted coup d'état (1st internal War) and by the declaration of two governments following the 2010

¹⁸ Oxford Research Encyclopedias, "African History", <http://africanhistory.oxfordre.com/>. Calculation by author.

presidential election. Hence, if the first five years of civil war were caused by an enormous dissatisfaction which had driven to the brink of the total country annihilation and to a coup made by a group of military, the second serious crisis runs on other components. In fact, the outgoing president Gbagbo did not accept the result of the presidential elections. Ouattara, the “international” legitimate winner came to power thanks to intervention by the United Nations. The current situation is peaceful nowadays. Generally, the territory has always represented an important destination country for Senegalese¹⁹ and many of them still live today on the shores of the administrative centre of Ivory Coast, Abidjan.

On the other hand, the second conflict experienced by a former French colony was *The Malian Civil War* (2012-ongoing). It was caused by a *Coup d'état* of the Azawad rebels and Islamist groups. In 2013 a multinational force led by United Nations stepped in. The conflict is still going on nonetheless.

However, Senegal has experienced a peaceful phase following the de-colonization period. The only dispute has originated from the *Casamance conflict*, the on-going 21 year Civil conflict which has experienced the main *surge* from 1982 to 2014 when has been waged between the government of Senegal and the Movement of Democratic Force of Casamance (MFDC).



Figure 5. Map of Senegal and its southern region of Casamance²⁰

¹⁹ “Focus Migration” provides information on migration, refugee flows and integration in different countries, in <http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/Senegal.2636.0.html?&L=1> (accessed 03.05.2018)

²⁰ “La mediazione di Sant'Egidio per la pace in Casamance prosegue con l'apprezzamento del Segretario Generale dell'ONU” (2014) in <http://www.notizieitalianews.com/2014/07/la-mediazione-di-santegidio->

The region of Casamance is placed in the south of Senegal which, although connected in the East to Senegal, is separated from the rest of the country by the Gambia. The principal ethnic group of the region are the *Jola* (Christians or animists religion), on the contrary the majority of Senegalese are Muslim. The *Diola*, another ethnic group of this region, they felt they did not benefit sufficiently from the region's richness and that Dakar, the capital, reaps most of the profit from the region's products with the result that the *MFDC* movement asked for independence of the Casamance region because of the differences from the rest of Senegal. Political, geographical, cultural and economic factors have all had a play in causing this conflict which had the goriest years from 1992 to 2001 with the deaths of thousands. Furthermore, *Casamançais* complain that Dakar has failed to develop infrastructure and to invest in the region's resources and industries.

Because of the geographic isolation, many Casamançais have questioned their political allegiance to the north, and to Senegal in general. Culturally, the dominant tribe of Senegal -the *Wolof*²¹- are a small minority in the south compared to the *Dialo*, *Mandingue* and other tribes. Thus, there is a lack of ethnic cohesion between north and south in this sense.²²

Sixty-thousand of Casamance have left the country, according to World Bank Database. Nevertheless on 1 May, 2014 , the leaders of the *MFDC* declared cease-fire after several talks between their forces and the president of Senegal, Macky Sall. Hence, this situation should be stressed also in relation to the emigration from Senegal. At the same time, it is also worth mentioning that Senegal has been involved in a list of war outside Senegal and it is involved yet in some of them (Yemen or ECOWAS military intervention in Gambia).

At this point, it will not deny as what it called "Francophonie" had the huge impact on the history of this area which experiences a large international emigration, synonym with strong inequalities between these projects and true reality.

[per-la-pace.html](#) (accessed 17.07.2018). Peace negotiations under the auspices of Saint Egidio community took place in Rome on 14 December 2012.

²¹ As enshrined in the Constitution of Senegal, also in relation to *Wolof*: " La langue officielle de la République du Sénégal est le Français. Les langues nationales sont le Diola, le Malinké, le Pular, le Sérère, le Soninké, le Wolof et toute autre langue nationale qui sera codifiée".

²² Keller, R., and Bowen, D.L., (2013) "Senegal and its Civil War in Casamance", Journal of undergraduate research, BYU-Brigham Young University: Brigham.

2.1 French cultural dominion in West Africa following decolonisation

The term *Francophonie* raises two main ideas in the period following the independence. Many times it has been said about how the term represents an unpretentious and impartial cultural promotion's organization which encourages solidarity between French-speakers, acting in the name of and on behalf of educational and cultural issues. On the other hand, the term represents also a different kind of organization which acts following French political ends to pursue neo-colonial economic ties with regard to the exploitation of former colonies.

These aspects feel strong ties among them. Educational facilities has always played a major part in shaping as political role as cultural influence that France had in the former colonial properties. All West African-French colonies became independent in 1960 (excluding Guinea in 1958), as already reported. The 1960s were indeed years where *Paris* paves the way for a common neo-colonial policy by concluding cooperation agreements with ex-colonies.

Tali accordi davano vita ad un vero e proprio "système coopératif franco-africain" in materia d'insegnamento, che si traduceva in sistemi d'istruzione pressoché identici, tutti basati sul modello francese.

Tramite la cooperazione culturale la Francia poteva intervenire in particolare sull'insegnamento superiore, che era la sfida strategica maggiore per Parigi. Si mirava infatti a formare quadri e dirigenti che sarebbero diventati parte di un'élite fedele alla metropoli.²³

This French community was the first expression of this kind of bond which acted on cultural dependence as well as financial one. Dependence and collaboration were two sides of the same coin which put *Paris* and *Francophonie* into the foreground of this new strategy to have fully control over ex-African colonies. The ideological relevance of the French language then raised a positive reconversion on the colonial endeavour which supported the French civilizing mission's idea in the post-colonial politics. The French definition of *langue de civilisation* turned into *langue de culture* because the term *civilization* referred to a past and too *strong* hierarchical system. The French system acted "well" on the emancipation issue which made former colonies feel to be independent on the one hand, and it served French neo-colonial interest of dominion

²³ Gorgeri, C., (2018) "Conseguenze politiche della Francofonia Culturale: spunti di riflessione", *Storia e Futuro* is an online historical journal in <http://storiaefuturo.eu/conseguenze-politiche-francofonia-culturale-spunti-riflessione-unesperienza-in-senegal/> (accessed 17.07.2018)

on the other, as could be seen from words pronounced by Senegalese president of independence, Leopold Sedar Senghor²⁴ in 1962 when many asked him why he preferred writing in French:

Parce que nous sommes des métis culturels, parce que si nous sentons en nègres, nous nous exprimons en français, parce que le français est une langue à vocation universelle, que notre message s'adresse aussi aux français de France et aux autres hommes, parce que le français est une langue « de gentillesse et d'honnêteté. » (L. S. Senghor : Poèmes, Seuil, Paris, p. 166)²⁵

Hence, French state was gradually obtaining cultural dominion, something of more *penetrative* than a mere official colonial rule.

Initially, *Paris* paid specific attention to create a multilateral French organization founded on cultural basis because seemed to be afraid of being accused of neo-colonialism. At the same time, former colonies needed economic aid to promote a first kind of internal development since their economy had always relied heavily on French State. Furthermore, French support resulted in progress, communication and possibility to be part of intergovernmental organizations. Hence, African prime ministers thought that French support could be both a source of income and a way to have a major burden in international relations. As referred, French aid represented an apparent emancipation *instrument* for ex French colonies in the period immediately following the 1960 independence.

However, the first Francophone institution was created in 1961 (Union Africaine et Malgache), later replaced by the "Organisation commune africaine e malgache" (Ocam) in 1965. Subsequently, the creation of the "Agence de coopération culturelle et technique" (Acct) was fundamental for the development of a major French influence in these territories. *Acct* is the *ancestor* of the recent "Organisation internationale de la Francophonie" (Oif). Nevertheless, the *Acct*²⁶ was largely criticized. On the contrary, Senegalese president Senghor was one of the major *supporter*. The president believed

²⁴ The Prime Minister was one of the most well-known representative of the "negritude" movement as well. His words had indeed not only personal significance but also a wider range of meaning related to all the Senegalese population as black African inhabitants.

²⁵ Makward, E., Ravell-Pinto, T., Songolo, A., (1998) "The Growth of African Literature. Twenty-five years after Dakar and Fourah Bay", Africa World Press, p. 135-136.

²⁶ 45 % of the *Acct* budget was financed by France although they were afraid of being accused of neo-colonialism, however the bond of dependence that former colonies had with France was evident.

that French language was the most important neutral *tool* to the cultural and economic resources' circulation (Mortimer, 1972, p.299-300).

However, another major event for *Francophonie* was the *ex post* migrants' regularisation on April 18, 1956 realized by French State, once working regular status has been rigorously ascertained. The consequences were that former colonies' migrants grew in the following years. This law was caused by the Algerian War (1954-1962) which put a brake on the Algerian influx to France causing lack of manpower. Nevertheless, the *Ford* approach system goes into crisis in 1970s and migrants workers were affected by this phenomenon. Legal economical immigration's borders are then closed down both the families and workers. The phenomenon was irreversible.

Also worth nothing is that France started to take a stand in West Africa from 1970s also because of this situation that, stopping immigration, it could have weakened French control in former colonies. Hence, cultural Francophonie was turning in political Francophonie step by step, as referred by Jean de Broglie: "Il faut le dire ouvertement. La francophonie sera finalement politique, ou elle ne sera pas." (Tetu, 1997, p.241).

This process has been continued²⁷ by the French president *Mitterand*²⁷ in 1980s who strengthened French institutions in its former colonies. Those are indeed the years in which the power of French in West Africa is measured by the migration issue. However, the border closure and the stop of regularization decided at this stage has further increased the power of French in this area which has always imposed its will. In more general terms, *Francophonie* acted hiding behind the myth of neocolonialism, trying to reach a positive cultural influence in West African countries and, at the same time, approaching all the dynamics of these countries in the period following the independence. As will be better discussed in the next paragraph, the situation has been always kept tabs on and all the African politics have been strongly influenced by French State. Hence, French cultural dominion turned more and more to political one, showing its real face above all from the early XXI century.

²⁷ *Mitterand* was President of France from 1981 to 1995, the longest time ever for any French president.

2.2 French political influence in West Africa area nowadays: the situation of Senegal

As already referred, 15 out of 16 countries in West Africa are members of ECOWAS, nevertheless the most important organization in relation to Senegal is the *Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine* (UEMOA) which represents an economical entity ratified in 1994 and constituted by eight West African states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, *Senegal*, Togo and Guinea Bissau (from 1997). It cannot be that hard to recognize that all these countries were former French colonies.

However, according to the *World Bank*, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire²⁸ are the two most performed States of the *UEMOA*. Senegal shows its dynamics through significant investments in large-scale public works projects, including both building the first turnpike, between Dakar and the national airport, and the realisation of the first railway between Dakar and Bamako. At the same time, the port of Dakar is in a unique and special position that could be a model way to serve the hinterland which experiences a difficult moment for missing connections with the main cities.²⁹ Although this proposals, the UEMOA member countries have always faced two-speed development of rural areas and, indirectly, of the main cities as well.

However, at the same time Senegal faced no trouble internal situation at the dawn of the second decade of the 21st century. According to World Bank, in fact, the State's description of Senegal is as follow.

Political context:

Senegal has been one of the most stable countries in Africa. Its current President, Macky Sall has been elected in March 2012. In 2016, its political system was strengthened by a constitutional referendum that slashed presidential mandates from 7 to 5 years.³⁰

Economic overview:

[...] in 2014 the Government of Senegal adopted the new Plan Senegal Emergent (PSE) designed to help the country get out of a cycle of low-growth and weak poverty

²⁸ Even if, globally, Ivory Coast is the name of the country, in 2013 the president of the country requested that it officially be called *Côte d'Ivoire* by everyone, even those with English as a first language.

²⁹ The World Bank, "The World Bank in Senegal", in: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/senegal>

³⁰ "The World Bank in Senegal", <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/senegal/overview> (accessed 02.04.2018).

reduction. Greater competitiveness, punctual progress in structural reforms, and a favorable external environment all mean economic growth has recently accelerated, reaching about 6.5% in the past 2 years and making Senegal one of the best performing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.³¹

Social context:

Simulations based on the evolution of per capita GDP suggest that poverty may have decreased by 6% to 3% from 2011 to 2015, driven by improvements in rural areas and agricultural expansion.³²

Nevertheless, although this encouraging situation in every field, from the political to the social one, more than 50 % of Senegalese from 20 to 40 years migrated in 2016.³³ At this point, many asked why Senegal experiences this dramatic situation which lead many young guys to migrate trying to help their family to *survive* even if its general situation does not recall any emergence points. Hence, the economic point of view cannot be underestimate at this stage because it is the main indicator concerning the *strength* and independence which own every country. So, it is worth pointing out the Senegalese currency nowadays: the FCFA.

2.2.1 The CFA Franc: French monetary imperialism in (West) Africa

The CFA Franc (“Franc Colonies françaises d’Afrique” earlier, “Franc Communauté Financière Africaine” since independence’s years) is the common currency of 14 African states, mostly former French colonies. The states include:

- Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, **Senegal** and Togo, which make up the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), whose central bank is the *BCEAO* (XOF) ;
- Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad, which form the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), whose central bank is the Bank of Central African States, BEAC (XAF).

³¹ WB, *op. cit.*

³² WB, *op. cit.*

³³ Willekens, F., Zinn, S., Leuchter, M. (2017) “Emigration Rates From Sample Surveys: An Application to Senegal”, Volume 54, Issue 6, Demography Journal: The Pennsylvania State University, p. 2159-2179.




Figure 6. The Central and West African Monetary Unions³⁴

However, although the *XOF* and *XAF* are separate currencies, they are effectively interchangeable as they hold the same monetary value against other currencies. In theory, however, the French government or the monetary unions using the currencies could decide to change the value of one or the other.³⁵ Many words have been pronounced in relation to this currency and about how the African development would have been slowed down by the CFA.

We must have the courage to say there is a cord preventing development in Africa that must be severed.³⁶

On 11 August, 2015, speaking at the celebrations marking the 55th anniversary of the independence of Chad, President Idriss Deby declared the above. The 'cord' he was

³⁴ Gulde, A.M., Tsangarides, C.G., "The CFA Franc Zone", in <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Books/Issues/2016/12/31/The-CFA-Franc-Zone-Common-Currency-Uncommon-Challenges-21115> (accessed 16.07.2018)

³⁵ Nubukpo, K., Ze Belinga, M., Tinel, B., Dembele, D.M., (2016) "Sortir l'Afrique de la Servitude Monétaire. À qui profite le franc CFA", La Dispute-SNEDIT: Sète (France).

³⁶ "Le moment est venu de revoir en profondeur les accords monétaires avec Paris" (2017), in: http://www.seneweb.com/news/Economie/idriss-deby-quot-le-moment-est-venu-de-r_n_206797.html

referring to is now over 71 years old. The CFA Franc was in fact created on 26 December, 1945, following the Bretton Woods Conference. *Paris* had colonies at the time, therefore it had the issuing currency power in relation to its African territories. Hence, the exchange rates became too overvalued at 1 CFA = 1,70 FRF in 1948, so that the recovering of these African markets was nipped in the bud:

Ciò favorì le classi agiate e l'alta borghesia, ma non permise un adeguato e differenziato sviluppo (sempre per la questione dei fondamentali macroeconomici differenti delineati dalla Teoria Valutaria Ottimale di Mundell), per non contare l'impossibilità di esportare i propri prodotti, troppo cari in quanto il prezzo era troppo alto (e tutt'ora lo è, in quanto legato all'Euro).³⁷

A fixed rate of exchange has been begged by France and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to impose the devaluation of 50% in 1994 which led to disastrous social, political and economic consequences in these territories, according also to Serge Michailof, former World Bank executive:

Il faut rompre avec la parité fixe du Franc CFA. Les variations du taux de change entre euro (FRF avant) et dollars pénalisent les pays de la zone franc. La politique monétaire de la zone franc ne peut pas se faire à Frankfurt. Il faut qu'on arrive à sortir de là. Donc la solution la plus pratique, c'est de garder la zone franc, de garder les deux zones monétaires et de raccrocher le franc CFA non pas à l'euro mais à un panier de monnaies dans lequel il y a l'euro, mais aussi le yuan, le dollar, peut-être la livre sterling. Ça donnerait de la souplesse et ça permettrait de toucher à la parité sans grand dommage.³⁸

However, the CFA Franc is part of the so-called *Franc Zone*³⁹, that was a zone closely linked to *French Franc* (FRF) until its complete substitution by Euro,⁴⁰ as already said. The first unclear thing is that the two currencies are released not only by two completely different institutions (BCEAO and BEAC) but also they are graphically different as well. Furthermore, the currencies are neither interchangeable (despite the ratio 1 XOF = 1 XAF) so that XOF Franc currency has not value in XAF Franc countries and vice-versa.

³⁷ Vella, T., (2015) "TRATTATO SULL'EURO AFRICANO: IL FRANCO CFA PARTE PRIMA" in: <https://scenarieconomici.it/trattato-sulleuro-africano-il-franco-cfa-parte-prima-di-tancredi-vella-attivista-m5s-di-brescia/>

³⁸ Michailof, S. (2018) "Afrique: Parité Fixe – Le Franc CFA divise les économistes à Brazzaville" in Association des Banen du Benelux: <http://www.camer.be/67545/12:1/afrique-parita-fixe-le-franc-cfa-divise-les-ecomomistes-a-brazzaville-africa.html> (accessed 17.07.2018).

³⁹ The Franc Zone includes not only 14 Sub-Saharan countries but also the Comoros (a "sovereign" archipelago island nation in the Indian ocean) and France as well. It is an appendage of the French economy.

⁴⁰ Euro and CFA are directly linked by a Currency Report of: 1 EUR= 655,957 CFA

Secondly, it is a merely administrative point of view: the economic and financial monetary administration of the two African Central Banks. The *BdF* (Banque de France) is in the Establishment both of BCEAO and of BEAC through four French members that held veto power so that any single French member can block any resolution in the council on one hand, and they can manage the economical politics of these states on the other hand (inflation rates, discount rates, and also other kind of rates).⁴¹ Thirdly, the centralisation of foreign exchange reserves, a kind of neo-colonial restriction of African countries. Since 2010, under the agreement with the French government, the two central banks have been required to deposit 50% of their foreign exchange reserves in a special French Treasury operating account. This means that these countries must deposit 65% to France for each *entering* assets (ex. 1 billion € = 500 million € to deposit in a guaranteed fund managed by the Bank of France) so that they do not have the possibility to access their money and France swindled these countries out of their resources which could be essentials in countries not exactly prosperous. Furthermore, if, for example, Senegal could reclaim “their” money, it is possible through loans but with interest payments.⁴²

The following question is inevitable: why does the French State possess such an important role within States that are being proclaimed *sovereigns*?

Furthermore, in more than 70 years, the CFA franc has come under a lot of criticism. Opponents of this common currency say it is proof of "colonial survival". Main others criticism are:

1. The French franc no longer exists, why does the CFA franc still exist? Why cannot CFA banknotes - made only in France - be made in Africa? Finally, the BCEAO, like the BEAC in Central Africa are now independent of the States and they will become a ministry of a foreign country, the French Ministry of Finance to manage the CFA franc.
2. The insurance mechanism offered by the French Treasury to the franc zone is a mechanism that makes it possible to insure against the failures of economic and political governance in Africa but this is not a mechanism that can allow Africa to start its structural transformation. Linking with the euro, a strong currency, would prevent states from offering competitive prices at the expense of exports.⁴³

⁴¹ Vella, T., (2015) “TRATTATO SULL’EURO AFRICANO: IL FRANCO CFA PARTE PRIMA”, *op. cit.*

⁴² Banque de France, in:

https://www.banquefrance.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/Eurosysteme_et_internationale/zonefr/i127gb.pdf

⁴³ Sylla, N.S., (2018), “The CFA Franc: French Monetary Imperialism in Africa”, Review of African Political Economy in: <http://roape.net/2017/05/18/cfa-franc-french-monetary-imperialism-africa/>

Despite all, West African States and Senegal especially have reached a constant deadlock nowadays. Nevertheless, the CFA XOF Franc (which is the one in relation to Senegal as well) is used by more than 102 million people, a huge amount of assets of course. Many African political activists conduct indeed *lost* battles against both this currency and the international power that *Paris* possesses still today. One of them is undoubtedly known as Kémi Séba (Stellio Gilles Robert Capo Chichi), an activist born in French but from Benin's parents. After being oppressed in France because of the power of his denunciation's speech, he lived in Senegal from 2011 to 2017 when he was expelled, after several days of imprisonment, because set fire to a 5,000 CFA banknote (equivalent to €7,47) on August 19, in protest over "FrancAfrique" – France's continued political and economic influence over its former African colonies. The activist and writer as well was arrested after a complaint by the BCEAO, which prints the CFA. After this, Senegal's interior ministry expelled him on 7 September, 2017, many said after French pressure on Senegal's government.

Per farla breve, conduco da diversi mesi, insieme alla mia équipe, una campagna attiva di protesta inerente la denuncia sia del neocolonialismo in Africa sia di uno dei suoi più fedeli vassalli, all'occorrenza, il franco CFA. Una moneta unica, realizzata dall'oligarchia francese e controllata dalla banca di Francia la quale, da un punto di vista economico, mantiene l'Africa così detta "francofona" racchiusa entro un'enclave coloniale.

Combattere il franco CFA è stato, per noi, l'occasione di iniziare una battaglia nei confronti del neocolonialismo e così scalfire la lettura storica del grande libro della sovranità, del diritto all'autodeterminazione dei popoli. Ma soprattutto, la lotta per la sovranità monetaria. Verrebbe in seguito la lotta in nome della sovranità militare – per quale ragione le nazioni occidentali posseggono delle basi militari dentro i nostri confini territoriali, ma noi non ne possediamo alcuna in Occidente? - sovranità culturale, sovranità politica, sovranità spirituale.⁴⁴

No matter how this dominion really developed and reached its strength nowadays. The time has come for people and for these populations to achieve independence, the real one; so that they are permitted to take the next step in the direction of freedom. Undoubtedly, this is one of the main dynamics which underpin the departure of thousands of Africans and Senegalese not only to Europe but also to Brazil or many other world countries as well.

⁴⁴ Seba, K., (2018) "L'Afrique Libre ou la mort", New African Cultures Edition: Africa, p.22. Translation by author.

3. Senegal: the reasons for migration over the time

Senegal was one of the African countries that has suffered the most as a result of French colonialism over the years which led to over-exploitation and progressive drying up of the land.

The first relevant mass movement of people from Senegal, and generally from West Africa, has developed from the systematic exploitation of manpower. Slave trade caused the forced displacement of millions of men and women for more than three centuries. Dakar and the island of Goreé were the starting point of this “flow”.⁴⁵ As will be largely analysed in the next chapter, Brazilian economic power has been *deeply* marked by African work force.

Initially, the first real Senegalese emigration has been characterized by rural exodus, or rather a mass movement to major cities such as Dakar and its surroundings. Indeed, the colonizers created and strengthened these new urban centres (Dakar, Conakry) which were the first attractive hub, caused by the urbanization phenomena, from the second half of XIX century to the second half of the XX century. According to the researchers, departures were motivated by economic factors. The exodus was indeed the result of a country’s positive economical evolution in stark contrast to negative situation lived in countryside.⁴⁶

However, in general terms, the French colonial rule suffered by Senegal increased the Senegalese migratory flow. It led to a change relating not only the migrant status of some people categories but also of entire *groups*: for instance, the ethnic group of the *Tukulor*, in Senegal, left their land in droves to move out to Dakar in search of earnings in the 20th century.⁴⁷ They were the so-called *Navetanes*⁴⁸, all of whom *disappeared* with the collapse of the peanut production in the 1980s. These internal migrants were *small* merchants (Baol-baol’s⁴⁹ typical figure) who went into *small* scale trade.

⁴⁵ UNESCO in <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/26>

⁴⁶ Todaro, M.P., (1996), p. 138-148.

⁴⁷ Diop, B., A., (1965) “Société toucouleur et migration”, Université de Dakar/institut Français d’Afrique: Dakar.

⁴⁸ *Navetanes* comes from the Wolof Language. It literally means “rainy season” considering that they migrated from June to October, the period from sowing to final harvest. Source: Ike Udogu, E., & Zack-Williams, A., B., (2009) “African Mosaic: Political, Social, Economic and Technological Development in the New Millennium”, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne.

⁴⁹ *Baol-Baol* literally means in Wolof ‘from the region of Baol’. This region of Senegal is not highly urbanized, and generates many small-scale traders who, despite their rural roots, are known to be savvy

The key concept is that the European market and the European monetary policy, led by Francophone organizations (*Acct* and *Oif* later), forced the creation of this internal flow with the creation of a two-speed country.⁵⁰

In the period between the two World Wars, it is noted the first important international flow. Senegalese were clearly French *allied*. In fact, they were recruited to fight for the infantry. But, at the same time, many young people escaped to non-African French countries to dodge the draft imposed by French during the first World War. According to Bredeloup⁵¹, a large part of Senegalese population established indeed in a vast number of non Afro-French cities between 1940s and 1950s. They felt the displacement as a necessity, a way to escape. They migrated also to study up with or to escape from the patriarchal gerontocracy system, very frustrated with this orderliness. Others migrated to work even if they should have been collide with overpopulation, unemployment, criminality or prostitution that were prevailing in other African countries. However, as reported by Crowder, they have shown capacity for adaptation by handling the new situations to their own advantage⁵². These migrations were only temporary and rarely permanent nevertheless.

Years later then, it is critically important the signature of the *Convention on Establishment* between Senegal and France on June 22, 1960, after having achieved the independence. According to Jean-Claude Gatron⁵³, the present treaty had such a development in regard of the “free” displacement of local citizens between Senegal and France and vice-versa:

En droit moderne, le terme de « *convention d'établissement* » désigne deux réalités distinctes que l'on ne saurait confondre. Dans la terminologie classique du droit international, la convention (ou traité) d'établissement détermine l'entrée et la condition des ressortissants d'une des hautes parties contractantes sur le territoire de l'autre. Il s'agit, le plus souvent, d'un traité bilatéral qui contient l'énumération des droits — et des limites des droits — reconnus aux étrangers en ce qui concerne

and street smart when it comes to business in the city (Ilda Lindell, “Africa’s informal workers. Collective agencies, alliances and transnational organizing in urban Africa”).

⁵⁰ The colonial system had invasive consequences on the farmers’ activities, as well. French forced their products and their work model in Senegal, for instance the farming of peanut in the country so that the population had to adapt, as reported by the British historian Michael Crowder (1968, “West Africa Under Colonial Rule”).

⁵¹ Sylvie Bredeloup is an anthropologist, PhD in “*École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales*” (African Center for studies, Paris), and Urban Planner (*École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées*), HDR, director of the research at IRD.

⁵² Crowder, M., (1968) “West Africa Under Colonial Rule”, Hutchinson: London.

⁵³ Jean-Claude Gatron is the Professor of the Law Faculty of Dakar and Director of E.N.A. of Senegal.

l'exercice des professions libérales et commerciales, leur statut en matière sociale ou fiscale, leurs droits acquis, leur participation aux activités de l'État (marchés publics, concessions, autorisations administratives principalement).⁵⁴

The Convention was one the main reason for which migration to Europe, clearly in particular to France, was favoured. There are mainly three reasons to explain this phenomenon of migration to Europe even though other African countries were located closer. The first reason is referred to higher economic conditions in Europe compared to the African ones. In addition, European better living conditions is another explanation of the phenomenon. A third reason, it could be traced both in the political conflicts and the severe drought which struck many African destination countries since the second half of 1960s. At the same time, the western industrialized countries' need (Italy and Spain in particular) of non-European manpower has contributed greatly to increase Senegalese emigration.

Indeed, Senegal out-migration to Europe became common compared to out-migration to other African countries, although migration towards this area remained quite prevalent throughout the 1960s and the 1970s (Table 1.3). Regional migration turned into international one and the *urban stop* often served as a preparation *passageway* to longer and out-Senegal journey. This was the first Senegalese *wave* which encountered social and economic positive conditions in Europe, particularly in France.

However, the situation started to change in the second half of 1970s. In the period following of the 1973 *oil crisis*, restrictive European immigration policies made more difficult for Senegalese citizens to reach Europe. Nevertheless, because of these growing restrictive measures adopted not only by France but also at European level, Senegalese were gradually forced to adapt to such limitations. In addition to restricted European policies, Senegal encountered a series of difficulties between the two decades (70s and 80s). Indeed, Senegal experienced both a series of drought⁵⁵ and the collapse of the international *market* of peanuts (main Senegalese product) which was another major problem. Moreover, a series of failed liberalization policies (also encouraged by *IMF* and *World Bank*) and the reduction in education funding, caused by social unrest, forced the

⁵⁴ Gatron, J.C., (1964) "*Annuaire français de Droit International*", in: http://www.persee.fr/doc/afdi_0066-3085_1968_num_14_1_1511, p.654/655.

⁵⁵ Drought was a Senegalese constant (but also of Sahelian area) over the years.

country to encounter a period of acute financial and political stress. This produced a large work migration towards Dakar because the capital was both the most productive center (and the only one) of the country and the easiest solution to try to embark on an international journey. Migrants were mostly young between the ages of 20 and 40 years old. Beyond the *Tukulor*, also the *Serer*⁵⁶ people migrated. It was mainly a male migration and only *Tukulor* women followed their husband in Dakar⁵⁷. This was the second Senegalese *wave* to Europe which is commonly known as “bassin arachidier”⁵⁸. This migration suffered more severe condition of entry to Europe because of economic crisis and widespread unemployment in the host countries.

Therefore, Senegalese emigration is marked by three main destinations at the end of 1980s: Senegalese urban cities, nearby African countries and Europe, particularly France.

Now in the early '90s, Senegal experienced a dramatic economic and social condition. Increasing unemployment, a considerable reduction in purchasing power and the increase in the cost of living that ruined middle and low income groups. Therefore emigration started to be the most efficient living strategy. In those years, Senegalese emigrant was skilled and learned. He worked in public administration or had successfully obtained university qualification (Bachelor or Master) and later decided to remain in the host country, despite European countries implemented more restrictive measures to obtain entry-visa. All these measures increased the number of illegal migrants. Yet, African countries are not more a requested destination for Senegalese (civil conflicts, unemployment, non-existent middle-class) and USA or Canada started to be countries which offered both more working possibilities and less racism feelings that were becoming a reality in Europe. Furthermore, it should be recalled that between 2001 and 2002 some projects on criminal law aspects of the irregular immigration were analyzed by some European commission countries which led to the Seville Summit in 2002. Then later on, Europe also implemented the border management through a tighter control of the inward migration particularly towards Southern Europe in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attack. As a result, migrants faced a general rise in *xenophobia* in various destinations, which made these journeys even harder to realize. It may be concluded

⁵⁶ Serer are the third Senegalese ethnic group. They represent about 15% of the Senegalese population.

⁵⁷ Diop, B., A., (1965) *op. cit.*

⁵⁸ Louga, Diourbel and Kaolack were the mainly cities where the migrants came from.

that Senegalese migrants started to look around to other destinations. At the same time Senegalese emigration to Europe is still a reality in the early 2000s.

According to MAFE Working Paper and via the Global Bilateral Migration Database, the table below shows the countries with more than 5,000 Senegalese migrants in the year 2000.

Table 1.2 Senegal's international migrants over the world (1960-2000)⁵⁹
Countries with more than 5,000 Senegalese migrants in 2000

		1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
World		79,598	127,443	213,314	313,544	335,948
African Countries	Gambia	19,077	23,284	40,150	68,127	98,366
	Mauritania	7,544	12,615	21,095	36,662	40,517
	Côte d'Ivoire	10,550	16,310	20,916	21,962	24,478
	Gabon	1,121	2,770	5,194	9,585	14,586
	Mali	15,258	14,978	14,703	14,433	11,380
	Congo	6	24,265	15,268	10,551	8,638
	Guinea-Bissau	5,734	6,028	6,337	6,669	6,407
	Total	59,290	100,250	123,663	167,989	204,372
	Percentage increase in the decade	-	+ 69,08 %	+ 23,35 %	+ 35,84 %	+ 21,65 %
Western Countries	France	2,183	5,231	53,476	70,016	54,000
	Italy	583	893	3,888	42,592	49,590
	Germany	734	826	723	1,202	17,526
	USA	116	344	948	2,786	10,262
	United-Kingdom	250	914	1,837	137	9,530
	Spain	-	-	-	720	9,192
	Total	3,866	8,208	60,872	117,453	150,100
	Percentage increase in the decade	-	+ 112,31 %	+ 641,61 %	+ 92,95 %	+ 27,79 %

⁵⁹ MAFE Working Paper 21, "New patterns of migration between Senegal and Europe" in: <https://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/fichier/rte/29/WP%2021.pdf>, p.7. Calculation by author.

According to these data, it should be noted that migration to Western countries decreased in percentage points in the decade between 1990-2000. If it is not considered data referred to USA (the only non-European country between them) which has already quadrupled the number of Senegalese compared with previous decade (from 2,786 units in 1990 to 10,262 in 2000), the total amount of the Senegal's population in Europe has raised by *only* 25,171 units (+ 21,95 % as compared to the previous decade). An increase which compared with the figures of the other decades is well below. This confirms that European polices slowed down this migration flow since the latter part of the 1990s.

As concerns out-migration to other West African countries percentage remains more or less similar, with an increase or a decrease in proportion to internal difficulties passing in Senegal and depending on the period under consideration.

Nevertheless, as always, tables show one-sided truth. In fact, they can help to find the reasons that are hiding behind them. Although the distance, many Senegalese migrants preferred changing final destination and only France, Italy and Germany were preferred (outside the African country) as compared to United States. So that means that not only Senegalese changed destination but also they got returned from Europe, a situation which will be analyzed better in the next part of this work, that is the negative feeling of migrants, no sense of integration which push them to rethink about other paths.

To end this section, it analyzes the decade up to 2013.

Table 1.3 Senegalese emigrational volume per country of destination⁶⁰

DESTINATION	PRESENCE	PERCENTAGE
FRANCE	29.000	17,6
ITALY	22.777	13,8
MAURITANIA	16.364	10
SPAIN	15.746	9,5
GAMBIA	9.105	5,5
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	7.890	4,8

⁶⁰ Agence Nationale de Statistique et de la Démographie, Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat, de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage (2013).

GABON	7.835	4,8
CONGO	6.467	3,9
MOROCCO	5.928	3,6
MALI	4.833	2,9
GUINEA-BISSAU	2.622	1,6
CANADA	1.980	1,2
CAMEROON	1.596	1
OTHER DESTINATIONS	32.758	19,8
TOTAL	164.901	100

Hence, at the turning point of the first decade of the new millennium, West African countries and South Europe ones were the larger final destinations for Senegalese migrants. Nevertheless, it is in the "other destinations" that Senegalese migration to Brazil shall be incorporated.

Overall, three different Senegalese migration phases may be distinguished at the end of the first decade of the XXI century:

- 1) Migration from the countryside and rural areas to major urban areas (Dakar, Conakry);
- 2) Migration to international urban centres. First to other African countries, then gradually to Europe (mainly France, Spain and Italy) but also to USA (from the late '90s);
- 3) Starting of a simultaneous flow from Senegalese rural areas to Dakar where was easier to embark on a journey to international cities abroad.

After having *drawing* the situation, according to official figures provided by many Migration Databases, the Senegalese migration to Brazil was a marginal *outflow* which had less than 1000 units officially registered in 2010.

3.1 The reasons for Senegalese destination's choice in Brazil in the 2010s

Since the early 2010s the phenomenon of migration from Senegal to Brazil starts to emerge in a more structured manner. Senegalese migration to Brazil is characterized by

the search of better economic and living conditions which Senegal was never able to provide fully to its citizens, also for external influences.

However, Europe has always been the first main international destination. Nevertheless, the global economic crisis in 2008 seriously affected Europe two years later. The crisis markedly decreased employment opportunities. Small and medium-sized enterprises experienced bankruptcy and Europeans suffered high levels of unemployment. The crisis, combined with measures to reduce illegal immigration, made Europe as less attractive destination for Senegalese migrants.

At this stage, it should be pointed out some reference's point of Senegalese migrants.

Table 1.4 Senegalese emigrational volume per reason for movement⁶¹

Main reasons	Presence	Percentage
Work	121.089	73,4
Education	20.056	12,2
Family reasons	11.326	6,9
Marriage	5.490	3,3
Health reasons	976	0,6
Unspecified	5.965	3,6
Total	164,901	100

Working reasons to send out money to family is clearly on the top. More than 7 out of 10 Senegalese migrate to find better working or living condition. Senegalese are therefore economic migrants, they look for better situation both for them and for their family who live still in the country of origin. Ties with their homeland is a main characteristic of Senegalese migration; it is not only an individual decision but a collective one. At the same time, Senegalese ethnic groups had a strong organization's capacity. As Crowder analysed, the formation of associations outside their borders and their strong union are some central aspects. United by a strong sense of connection,

⁶¹ Agence Nationale de Statistique et de la Démographie, *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat, de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage* (2013).

they met in the various cities, often gathered by ethnic groups, almost like to recreate their family model outside Senegal.

Thus, in early 2000s Brazil was not still an ongoing destination. Nevertheless, it has found new economic stability with the president Lula by the elections in 2003. At the same time, Brazil needed competent manpower since early 2010s and above all during the two-year period 2014-2015.

Secondo quanto dichiarato recentemente dalla Confederazione nazionale dell'Industria (Confederação Nacional da Indústria, CNI), il Brasile presenta un forte fabbisogno di manodopera: nello specifico, l'obiettivo è quello di reperire 570mila lavoratori nel 2014 e altrettanti nel 2015.

I settori dove la domanda è più forte sono quelli delle costruzioni, l'industria alimentare e della ristorazione, l'automotive, l'industria dei macchinari industriali e della produzione di minerali non metallici.⁶²

Moreover, the Brazilian State has made visa process easier to obtain in order to simplify entry of foreign works.

Yet, the 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil has generated more than 1 million jobs in the period of five years 2010-2015 that have kept the Brazilian economy going. Clearly, this event pushed many Senegalese to embark on this journey thanks also to the favourable opinions of those Senegalese who were already integrated into the Brazilian system. As has already been mentioned, the feeling of belonging is a *trait d'union* between Senegalese and their culture, their traditions and above all their family relationships in their country of origin. It is really important as in Senegal as outside the native land.⁶³ At this point, a further aspect will be considered which assumes special importance in relation to Brazil's destination for Senegalese: religion.

⁶² Câmara Ítalo-Brasileira de Comercio, Indústria e Agricultura, http://www.assocamerestero.it/forte_richiesta_di_manodopera_specializzata_in_brasile_nel_biennio_201415.asp?ln=&idtema=1&idtemacat=1&page=informazioni&index=1&idcategoria=87302

⁶³ Senegalese associationism is a strong factor which allowed the creation of many groups of Senegalese outside Senegal and therefore it allows a sort of ongoing communication between Senegalese in the world.

3.1.1 “O mouridismo”: the black Islam

Over 95% of Senegalese are Muslim and represent about 12 million of the total population.⁶⁴ Catholicism represents only less than 4 percent. The Christian population comprises about 448,000 thousand people. Religion is another critical and influence factor in Senegalese migration to Brazil. Senegal is indeed part of that Western sub-region countries (from Guinea to Mauritania), area where some values are based on the importance of Islam as a cultural base and rice in agricultural activities and as a staple food for populations.⁶⁵

However, The *Mouride brotherhood* is the most large Islamic organization mostly diffused in Senegal. *Muridiyya* together with *Qādiriyya* and *Tijāniyya* are indeed the three Senegalese brotherhoods, nevertheless the *Mouride* gathers more than one third of the total population of Senegal, mainly of Wolof⁶⁶ ethnicity. It is estimated that approximately 33% of Muslim Senegalese are part of this confraternity. The religion was defined “Black Islam” because it began in Senegal at the end of XIX century. At the same time, most of the cities with a large Senegalese immigrant population have a *Keur Serigne Touba* (Residence of the Master of Touba), a seat for the community which accommodates meetings and prayers while also being used as a provisional residence for newcomers. This aspects underlines, once again, the strong *associationism* of Senegalese culture, the need to come together trying to carry Senegal and its positive vibes wherever they are in the world. It is definitely more something to feel Senegal closer than a character of possession in relation to the region where they are placed.

However, the peculiarity of Mouridism is based on work’ sanctifying which has a role as important as praying: “Travaille comme si tu ne devais jamais mourir, et prie comme si tu devais mourir demain.”⁶⁷ From this perspective, the world of work helps them finding freedom from guilt. The importance of this branch of Muslim religion is that

⁶⁴Index Mundi, “Senegal Demographics Profile 2018”, https://www.indexmundi.com/senegal/demographics_profile.html (accessed 13.05.2018)

⁶⁵ Coste, J., (1997) “Cereal trade and agricultural policies in the western sub-region (The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal) What are the regional dynamics? Club du Sahel:p.217.

⁶⁶ Wolof is a language of Senegal, The Gambia and Mauritania, and the native language of Wolof people. They are the largest people group of Senegal, and make up 35% of the population speak Wolof as their first language and about 80% understand it, according to World Bank Database.

⁶⁷ Bamba, Cheikh Ahmadou (1852-1927) has been the spiritual leader of the Mouride brotherhood. He declared this statement during many conferences in his life.

many Senegalese in Brazil are disciples and celebrate the Mouridism. In fact, the majority of Senegalese migrants are both Wolof speakers and devotees of this religion.⁶⁸ At this point, it is important to underline that one of the most *pull factor* of attraction of Brazil lies in the Brazilian Poultry industry. This industry is in fact one of the most efficient and successful in the world and is seeking to develop new markets beyond Brazil. The industry's strategy includes providing a product which meets the requirements of consumers in many different countries. These include Muslim countries where the method of production must meet certain religious standards and principles to be acceptable to consumers.⁶⁹ To succeed in Muslim countries, the Brazilian poultry business and other meat production industries required specialist employees who could prepare the product in accordance with religious requirements. Senegal has the highest proportion of Muslims in West Africa and Senegalese could provide these specialist skills and knowledge to Brazilian industry.

WORLD'S LARGEST PRODUCERS (thousands of tons)					
	YEAR			VARIANCE	
	2014	2015	2016	14/15 (%)	15/16 (%)
EUA	17,299	17,966	18,365	3.86	2.22
Brazil	12,692	13,080	13,480	3.06	3.06
China	13,000	13,025	13,100	0.19	0.58
EU	10,330	10,600	10,845	2.61	2.31
India	3,725	3,900	4,200	4.70	7.69
Russia	3,260	3,550	3,650	8.90	2.82
Mexico	3,025	3,100	3,160	2.48	1.94
Argentina	2,050	2,060	2,100	0.49	1.94
Turkey	1,956	1,980	1,990	1.23	0.51
Thailand	1,570	1,650	1,650	5.10	0.00
Others	17,642	17,033	16,796	-3.45	-1.39
Total	86,549	87,944	89,336	1.61%	1.58%

Figure 7. World's largest chicken producer industries⁷⁰

As shown in *Figure 4*, Brazil's poultry industry is in fact a significant contributor not only to the Brazilian domestic economy but also to the country's overseas trade. This industry has been an undoubted *pull factor* to Brazil for Senegalese.

⁶⁸ Ray, B. "African religion, Symbol, Ritual and Community", Prentice Hall Inc.: New Jersey.

⁶⁹ Muslim consumers require a product prepared in accordance with the principles of their religion.

⁷⁰ Gomes, M., (2016) "Brazil's Poultry Industry", Reporter Brazil – Organization for Communication and Social Projects: Sao Paulo, p.3.

Furthermore, the sociological aspect of the Senegalese migration to Brazil should not be underestimated as well. Migrants had a vision of Brazil as a warm, hospitable country. Borrowing the “Imagined Communities” concept of Benedict Anderson⁷¹, migrants thought they could rebuild their community in Brazil, living side by side with their new Brazilian *neighbours* in harmony. Nevertheless, they failed to take into account the today’s reality of Brazil, as will be seen in the next chapter.

However, according to the Embassy of Senegal in Brazil, the official number of Senegalese in Brazil is 3466 in 2017.⁷² At the same time, 2014 Senegalese emigration to Brazil has been mainly constituted by men (82,9 %) that reached 98,4 % in 2017.⁷³ Women in effect are less likely to move for many reasons; such a long trip challenges one’s physical and health skills on one hand, men and women have traditionally had different roles in the African family and community on the other hand. Indeed, the idea of women in Africa is closely associated with family and home country, women cannot leave their town or village, seeking their fortune, this is strongly related to something desecrating, hence the men has to pack normally. Moreover, Senegalese strictly observe all their traditions and they migrate only when “forced” to do. At the same time, as already analysed in this chapter, the difficult situation experienced by their country and by West Africa more in general led Senegalese to consider Brazil as an attractive destination since earlier 2010s. According to this, in the next chapter will be analysed both the route followed by migrants to get to Brazil and the southernmost Brazilian region of *Rio Grande do Sul*, where the largest companies are located and which represented source of work for these migrants. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that the next chapter will primarily focus on Brazilian history which led to a better understanding of this country in relation to social inequalities suffered by Senegalese, and thus black population, in Brazil nowadays.

⁷¹ He was one of the most relevant political scientists. In 1983, he wrote his book “Imagined Communities” to analyze nationalism.

⁷² See Appendix I.

⁷³ UEBEL, (2017), p.200.

2. SENEGAL IN BRAZIL: the reality beyond migration

After having provided both an overview of the history of Senegalese out-migration with the explanation of reasons for Brazilian destination and a precise analysis of the today's condition of Senegal, also in relation to the French impact still today in the country, some further comments will be provided in this chapter analysing the other main country of the research: Brazil .

Hence, the first part of this chapter will briefly analyse Brazil from a general point of view. In fact, the Brazilian context will be the final stage of the migration where two *distinct* cultures will face a difficult process of rapprochement. Subsequently, the central part will be a social study about the Brazilian development history which created a particular reality that is experienced by Senegalese migrants in Brazil, nowadays. The last section will be completely dedicated both to the merely migratory path from Dakar to Brazil and to the southern region of Rio Grande do Sul where are concentrated the largest number of Senegalese.

1. Brazil: the small Continent

Brazil is indeed a land of many contrasts. It is the world's fifth-largest country by area and the sixth most populous that comes with vast social and environmental problems.




Figure 8. Detailed map of Brazil showing regions⁷⁴

The country shares common borders with all the South American countries except for Ecuador and Chile. It is bordered by French Guyana, Suriname, Guyana and Venezuela to the north, Colombia to the north-west, Peru and Bolivia to the west, Paraguay and Argentina to the south-west and Uruguay to the south. As will be seen in the last paragraphs of the chapter, Brazilian frontiers will be a relevant aspect related to the study of the migratory path from Senegal.

A first analysis of Brazil cannot fail to consider specific data both about the phenomenon of migration and of its citizens, bearing in mind that immigration is a key issue of the research. Hence, the total number of emigrants who have left Brazil (1.6 million) is more than twice of the total number of international migrants residing in the country (735.6 thousand), a difference in the total percentage of +117.50 %.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ "Largest and most detailed map and flag of Brazil" (2012), in: <http://www.mytripolog.com/2012/07/largest-most-detailed-map-and-flag-of-brazil/>

⁷⁵ Migration Data Portal, Brazil, "Key Migration Statistics", https://migrationdataportal.org/data?t=2010&i=impic_asyl&cm49=76 (accessed 20/03/2018)

Nevertheless, these large numbers of emigrants should be considered also in relation to the total population which consists of 210.9 million people in 2018.⁷⁶ On the other hand, the unemployment rate of total population comes to roughly 13,4 % with peaks of 29,9 % concerning youth employment which represent significant numbers, according to Migration Data Portal.

However, the country nowadays is a melting pot of different cultures nonetheless. According to World Population Review⁷⁷, the result of the census, in fact, indicates that:

92 million (48%) Brazilians were white,
83 million (44%) were brown,
13 million (7%) were black,
1.1 million (0.50%) were yellow
and 536,000 (0.25%) were indigenous.⁷⁸

This population's division is a first outcome about a country which experienced a *different* development history and that led to this situation nowadays, as will be seen in the next paragraphs. However, the percentage of the population living in urban areas is 85,9 %.⁷⁹ Brazil has indeed two of the world's great metropolises (Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo), and ten other cities have over a million inhabitants

The next sections will provide an accurate examination of the Brazilian history development both on the basis of the analysis of slavery and on the racial theories which influenced Brazilian identity from the second half of the 19th century.

⁷⁶ *Worldometers* provides live world statistics on population, government, economics and so on, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/brazil-population/> (accessed 10.07.2018)

⁷⁷ World Population Review is a journal of demography and population studies published since 1957. The official web page is: <http://worldpopulationreview.com/>

⁷⁸ World Population Review, "Brazil Population 2018", <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/brazil-population/> (accessed 21.03.2018)

⁷⁹ Migration Data Portal, Brazil, "Key Migration Statistics", *op. cit.*

2. Brazil: the creation of the *non-identity*

A historia do brasil da a ideia de uma casa edificada na areia.⁸⁰

The country had quite an *anarchic* development. Portuguese arrived in Brazil at the turn of the 16th century and suffered the Portugal's colonial rule.

Brazil was officially "discovered" in 1500, when a fleet commanded by Portuguese diplomat Pedro Álvares Cabral, on its way to India, landed in Porto Seguro, between Salvador and Rio de Janeiro.⁸¹

Hence, Brazil was a Portugal's colony over centuries but Portuguese point of view was quite different from the Spanish one, in fact they had not a plan to develop Brazilian *expanses* during their reign. Indeed, they was worried only about to defend the land from the French expansionistic will in the XVI century. At the same time, the colonization of Brazil experienced unexpected obstacles also because not many people wanted to move from Europe and only in the second half of the same XVI century, a first colonising contingent reached Brazil to manage the sugarcane plantation through slave labour. It was a political displacement rather than a social one. Portugal, in fact, needed to step up the sugarcane's international market. Nevertheless, the system collapsed soon, also because of many attacks suffered by colonizers from the natives.⁸²

However, Brazil, after more than III centuries of colonial rule, became independent from *Portugal* in 1822 with the creation of the Empire of Brazil. From the outset, the situation was rather troubled also due to the presence of many slaves within the country. As officially reported, in 1825 over 50 percent of the Brazilian population consisted of slaves.⁸³

From the end of the 17th Century, the Brazilian slave system came to depend upon a fine balance between a voluminous transatlantic slave trade and a constant number of manumissions. This equation meant that slave traffic could be intensified,

⁸⁰ De Abreu, C., (1998) "Chapters of Brazil's colonial history", Oxford University Press: New York.

⁸¹ "The New York Times" (2006),

https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/fodors/top/features/travel/destinations/centralandsouthamerica/brazil/riodejaneiro/fdrs_feat_129_9.html (accessed 08.05.2018)

⁸² Farah, A. G. V., (2014) "History of Colonial Brazil", <http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/history-of-colonial-brazil> (accessed 08.05.2018)

⁸³ Anderson, B., (1983), "Imagined Communities", Verso: London.

injecting larger numbers of enslaved Africans, without endangering the social order.⁸⁴

Despite the obtaining of independence though, slaves still suffered *legal* domination. Years later, the major *achievement* reached by the Emperor⁸⁵ was the abolition of slavery on May 13, 1888. Subsequently, landowners forcing the royal family back to Portugal “and founding Brazil's first republican government on November 15, 1889.”⁸⁶

Hence, following both independence and establishment of a constitutional democracy, Brazil had not yet *seized* a marked national identity as a result of a country's economic and social history which has been *sustained* by slave workforce over the years, as stated below:

How many free persons of color were there in Brazil before the end of slavery in 1888? According to the 1872 census, there were 4.25 million free blacks and mulattos in the country, and they accounted for at least three quarters of all African Brazilians (compared to a mere 262,000 or 6 percent of all African Americans in the U.S. South on the eve of emancipation). And more: free blacks and mulattos represented more than two fifths of the total Brazilian population.⁸⁷

This will be a key issue for a broader comprehension of Brazilian historical dynamics in the way that Brazilian identity was a long-term process created on imperialistic European theories only in XIX century, as will be seen in the next paragraph. At this time, in fact, Brazilian population was thus *de facto* a non-population, where almost half of people consisted of African slaves which condition had changed from a real inequality, laid by *law*, to an artificial equality determined by the “Golden Law”, the situation was not egalitarian for Black people however.

Nevertheless, many researches stated that the *Brazilian mentality* had not any preconceived inferiority's racism idea before slavery's abolition.⁸⁸ At this point, it should be referred that people's behaviour depends on where it has originated from rather

⁸⁴ Marquese, R.D.B., (2006) “The dynamics of slavery in Brazil: Resistance, the slave trade and manumission in the 17th to 19th centuries”, *Novos Estudos – CEBRAP*, vol.2, n.74, São Paulo, p. 107.

⁸⁵ Don Pedro II's daughter (Don Pedro II was the son of the Emperor Don Pedro who proclaimed Brazil's independence) was the one who adopted the law “Lei Áurea” (Golden Law) that abolished slavery in Brazil. Her grandfather, Don Pedro, was a Portuguese prince who opposed Portuguese domination.

⁸⁶ “The New York Times”, (2006) *op. cit.*

⁸⁷ Graham, R., (2016) “Free Afro-Brazilians in the 19th Century”, *Oxford Research Encyclopedias in Latin American History*, <http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-287> (accessed 09.05.2018)

⁸⁸ Skidmore, T.E., (1999) “Brazil: Five Centuries of Changes”, Oxford University Press: Oxford.

than current conditions, according to *path dependence* socio-economic theory.⁸⁹ Taking into account this theory, the next *Corossacz's* few lines provide an interesting interpretation.

...scopriamo che lo stato brasiliano alla fine del XIX secolo ha favorito una politica d'immigrazione basata sulle teorie razziste con il progetto di far sparire la popolazione di origine africana...⁹⁰

At this stage, Brazil therefore *launched* what is known as the *project of whitening*. The next paragraph will provide an explanation of this phenomenon and especially how Brazilian government powered a *white push's* plan up.

2.1 The Brazilian *branqueamento's* history

The last lines of the preceding paragraph have introduced the project *illicitly* launched by the *new* Brazilian government in the years immediately following the abolition of slavery. It is during these years that the idea of African inferiority really starts to develop. The supposed inferiority as of Africans as of their descendants becomes a problem for the *freshly* Brazilian State. Hence, the so-called *whitening project* was the idea elaborated to purify the population through the European immigration⁹¹.

As a matter of fact, many studies demonstrate how the concept of *branqueamento* (whiteness) did not exist in Brazil before the abolition of slavery.⁹² The development of the same concept occurred as part of the historical development not only of black people but of other racial categories including Indigenous and Asiatic as well. They were completely considered as inferior races and it was not possible the development of Brazil's identity following this path. However, *whiteness* has been defined as "...a condition of privilege. A structural advantage taken for granted naturally by who possesses it."⁹³ The Republican government created, indeed, a *white* social structure

⁸⁹ Greener, I., "Path dependence", in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/path-dependence> (accessed 09.05.2018)

⁹⁰ Corossacz, V. R., (2006) "Razzismo, meticcio, democrazia razziale – Le politiche della razza in Brasile", Rubbettino Editore: Catanzaro.

⁹¹ Skidmore, T.E., (2009) "Brazil, Five Centuries of Change", Oxford University Press Inc.: Oxford.

⁹² See *Path dependency* theory, note 76.

⁹³ Corossacz, V.R., (2012) "Razzismo e bianchezza in Brasile", University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, p.40.

Officially source:

which translated into a racial policy-making. For a better comprehension of racial ideas in Brazil, it should be recalled the influence of Europe, particularly with France, had in the political history of Brazil. This line of thinking leads inevitably to establish a logical relationship between *whiteness* and a vision of society based on *Eurocentrism*, which was one of the widespread European doctrines during the second half of XIX century and that was the main influenced doctrine for the government of Brazil.

Eurocentrism is the practice, conscious or otherwise, of placing emphasis on European (and, generally, Western) concerns, culture and values at the expense of those of other cultures. Eurocentrism often involved claiming cultures that were not white or European as being such, or denying their existence at all.⁹⁴

Ergo, *Eurocentrism* and French *Positivism*⁹⁵ influence as well were the major channels which introduced the racial project of white superiority. However, as referred, in order to achieve the Brazilian *whiteness* objective of the population, Brazil especially supported European immigration with a result that almost two million people settled in Brazil during the 19th and 20th century. Table 2.2 shows the most relevant native countries of migrants who migrated to Brazil from 1880 to 1969.

TABLE 2.1 Immigrants in Brazil by country of origin from 1880 to 1969⁹⁶

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	1880-1909	1910-1929	1930-1969	TOTAL	SHARE
PORTUGAL	519,629	620,396	464,055	1,604,080	31 %
ITALY	1,188,883	245,003	142,334	1,576,220	30 %
SPAIN	307,591	263,582	140,538	711,711	14 %
GERMANY	49,833	101,703	56,606	208,142	4 %
JAPAN	861	85,716	160,735	247,312	5 %

“...bianchezza come una forma di privilegio, un privilegio, o vantaggio strutturale, considerato acquisito naturalmente da chi lo possiede.”

⁹⁴ Education: Europe-Centered (Eurocentrism) vs African Centered (2012), <https://afroetic.com/2012/10/11/education-europe-centered-eurocentrism-vs-african-centered/> (accessed 24.03.2018)

⁹⁵ Araújo, M., Maeso, S., (2015) “Eurocentrism, Racism and Knowledge: Debates on History and Power in Europe and the Americas”, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke and New York.

⁹⁶ Lesser, Jeffrey (1999), “*Negotiating National Identity. Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil*”, Duke University Press: Durham & London.

MIDDLE EAST	31,061	79,102	30,301	140,464	3 %
OTHERS	171,498	266,598	232,939	671,035	13 %

Hence, when European migrants arrived in Brazil were ready to occupy the leading profession roles in industry and in public administration. The *superior* and *natural* position of the European population produced a sense of inferiority among the black population. They (Europeans) represented not only European society but also the European literary tradition which they claimed for themselves to the exclusion of other groups. Through this flow, the Brazilian government wanted to create an unequal society, in terms of social and economic development in Brazil, to reinforce the separation of whites from non-whites. It implemented in fact a strategy to create a clear, specific and Brazilian identity which excluded non-whites.

The *branqueamento's* theory was widely propagated and has represented a main Brazilian historical interpretation later on. It defined the starting point of the process of *miscigenação*⁹⁷ which should have marked the gradual black disappearance and the creation of a total white population in Brazil by 100 years⁹⁸. At the same time, focusing on the mixed race to create a white Brazil, the whiteness theory afforded the process of development of miscegenation between whites, black and Indigenous as well.

It should be marked that all black Afro-Brazilians faced one of the worst racist theories that history has always experienced, at the same time, it is peculiar to observe the rise of the *racial democracy's* myth which will be Brazilian culture's characterising factor since the 1930s, as will be seen in the next paragraph .

2.2 The Brazilian *white lie*: the rise of the myth of *racial democracy* through the promotion of *miscegenation* by Gilberto Freyre's work in the first half of XX century

As previously stated, the new Brazilian government conducted an effective policy strongly marked by racial approach since it came to power in 1889. Nevertheless, according to Andrews develops an incongruous understanding of Brazilian society.

⁹⁷ Miscegenation between Amerindians, descendant of African Slaves and white Europeans.

⁹⁸ De Lacerda, J.B., (1911) "Sur le métis au Brésil", Impr. Devouge: Paris.

During the first half of the 1900s, it was frequently described, both by native-born and foreign observers, as a 'racial democracy', in which blacks, mulattoes and whites lived under condition of juridical and, to a large degree, social equality.⁹⁹

According to this, it is necessary to referring to the *miscigenação* process which had a remarkable diffusion. Brazil, in fact, pursued at institutional level as a paradoxical as coherent approach related to the appreciation of *miscegenation* which covered the *whiteness* theory behind their policy. Indeed, although at European level *meta-race* was rather seen as degeneration of human one, in Brazil it was crucial factor to the attempt to reach the final *target* of creation of a white Brazilian identity. It was intended for a solution as necessary as periodical¹⁰⁰ which should have marked the black race's extinction, as stated above:

La soluzione venne espresso nella tesi del *branqueamento*, che faceva del meticciato non più la manifestazione della degenerazione della popolazione, ma il segno che questa stessa popolazione si stava sbiancando, perdendo gli "elementi inferiori" grazie alla presenza dell'"elemento superiore" bianco. Di fatto la teoria del *branqueamento* fu la strategia politica per pensare una nazione capace di svilupparsi e di raggiungere lo statuto di nazione civilizzata, in quanto destinata a eliminare gli elementi inferiori.¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, the history changed with Gilberto Freyre. He was who turned the negativity of miscegenation into a positive characteristic of the Brazilian identity (Ortiz, Renato, 1994:41). Freyre was indeed one of the most important author of the Brazilian national identity's history. In his major book "Casa-Grande & Senzala" analysed all the development that the miscegenation process had in Brazil.

The absence of a strong Brazilian national identity was a problem since the proclamation of independence, as already referred. A new sentiment of nationalism reawakened in the 1920s and 1930s through the efforts of writers such as Alberto Torres, Prado Junior, Buarque de Holanda, Simonsen as well as the above-mentioned Gilberto Freyre. The authors needed a culture which could be independent from the

⁹⁹ Andrews, G.R., (1996) "Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900-90: An American Counterpoint", Sage Publications, Ltd: Thousand Oaks, California, p.483.

¹⁰⁰ According to De Lacerda, black race were supposed to *extinguish* by the end of 20th century (see note 25).

¹⁰¹ Corossacz, V. R., (2006) "Razzismo, meticciato, democrazia razziale – Le politiche della razza in Brasile", *op. cit.*, p. 18.

European intellectual field. At the same time, the first Brazilian republic seemed very precarious in their eyes.

L'economia brasiliana di quel periodo era costituita da una giustapposizione delle differenti economie regionali, senza che ci fosse coordinazione tra di esse. Questa tendenza decentralizzatrice nella gestione economica è considerata dagli studiosi come una manifestazione della mancanza di integrazione nazionale di quel periodo. La fine degli anni Venti rappresentava infatti un periodo d'intensificazione del processo di industrializzazione, che richiedeva di regolare e ridefinire l'economia in modo da poter affermarsi sul mercato internazionale. La crisi della Prima Repubblica, che culminerà nel 1930 con l'arrivo al potere di Getúlio Vargas, era dunque il risultato di una lunga instabilità politica e economica.¹⁰²

These were the years in which the position of the intellectual developed in Brazil playing a fundamental role in the formation of Brazilian national identity. This *figure* became the main actor in the speech for the constitution of a state through national culture. In this period a strong interest in relation to the Brazilian *origins* develops in order to the formation of the cultural union of Brazil.

However, the 1933 work of Gilberto Freyre "Casa-Grande & Senzala" helps to re-think Brazil, its history and its national identity. The main actors of his work are the oppressed classes and not more the large-scale landowners. Indigenous and African slaves have always been recognised both as the inferior classes and culturally underdeveloped.

Il libro sconvolgeva tutti gli stili dell'epoca nella tradizione dei saggi di storia, poiché metteva al centro della ricostruzione storica del Brasile coloniale la vita sessuale dei padroni e degli schiavi delle grandi piantagioni. Nello svolgimento del libro, la figura del meticcio trova uno spazio centrale, attorno al quale si sviluppa l'idea del Brasile come nazione nata da un sistema armonioso di relazioni razziali, da un amalgama tra culture differenti.¹⁰³

"Casa Grande & Senzala" was difficult to evaluate in the literary production at that time. According to Candido, in Freyre there is a new approach about problems of biological character (race, sexual aspects, ecological equilibrium, nutrition). Freyre's analysis of Brazilian society is totally based on the reconsideration of the three main founding members of Brazil (whites, blacks and indigenous), in particular as regards the

¹⁰² Corossacz, V. R., (2006) "Razzismo, meticcio, democrazia razziale – Le politiche della razza in Brasile", *op. cit.*

¹⁰³ Corossacz, V. R., (2006) "Razzismo, meticcio, democrazia razziale – Le politiche della razza in Brasile", *op. cit.*

use and definition of the notion of race without, however, referring to biological principles.

Freyre è il primo autore brasiliano ad avere dato una connotazione culturale alla nozione di razza, con l'obiettivo di affermare che sono la cultura e l'ambiente a caratterizzare un determinato gruppo umano, e non la sua razza biologica.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, Freyre's analysis is also based on Brazilian interpretation of description of life's customs and habits in large-scale plantations. This combination of methodological news had great success, also according to the words of Skidmore:

[...] era la prima volta che i lettori ricevevano un esame erudito del carattere nazionale brasiliano con un messaggio disinibito di ottimismo: i brasiliani potevano essere orgogliosi della loro civilizzazione tropicale, originale, e etnicamente meticcia, i cui vizi sociali dovevano essere attribuiti principalmente all'atmosfera della monocultura schiavista che dominò il paese fino alla seconda metà del XIX sec.¹⁰⁵

The author proposed the analysis of the formation of the "person of mixed race" which Brazilian recognize each other nowadays. He was universally recognized how who carried out *miscegenation* from a racial problem to a positive cultural process also through other *expressions* such as *Samba*. However, the *miscigenação* process represented the Brazilian national identity and it affirmed the balanced character of relations between owner and slaves, before abolition, and whites and black after 1822 abolition.

Per Freyre il meticciato rappresentava l'unità nazionale: l'intera sua produzione intellettuale può essere vista come l'elaborazione dell'orgoglio nazionale di rappresentare una realtà *miscigenada* (mescolata), in cui vi è coesistenza di diverse culture. È necessario sottolineare quanto fosse importante per Freyre questa coesistenza in un unico omogeneo, la cultura brasiliana, di diverse tradizioni – portoghese, indigena e africana – senza che vi fosse eterogeneità: di fatto la valorizzazione del meticciato è una difesa della "mescolanza" contro l'eterogeneità, della dissoluzione di elementi diversi contro la separazione di questi in unità distinte.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Corossacz, V. R., (2006) "Razzismo, meticciato, democrazia razziale – Le politiche della razza in Brasile", *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁵ Corossacz, V. R., (2006) "Razzismo, meticciato, democrazia razziale – Le politiche della razza in Brasile", *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁶ Corossacz, V. R., (2006) "Razzismo, meticciato, democrazia razziale – Le politiche della razza in Brasile", *op. cit.*

Paradoxically, Freyre created the idea of Brazil as a country which represented an example of the peaceful coexistence between different “races”, Brazil as “heaven of races”, what was called “racial democracy” later. According to Guimarães, this definition was used in an article of 1944 for the first time by the French anthropologist Roger Bastide who reported his visit to Freyre, at the same time only in 1962 Freyre used this expression himself. Indeed, the author used “ethnic social democracy” in 1940s yet. Nevertheless, the perception of Brazil in 1950s developed on a double vision, Brazil as the *native land* both of the *miscigenação* and of racial relations on one hand, the presence of multiple discrimination towards blacks and Indigenous on the other hand. This is exactly the mid-point between racism and the myth of racial democracy, a double dimension which created the Brazil’ specificity. This is where *racial democracy* develops, a process used to describe the character of race relations in Brazil, as well as one of the founding myths of the Brazilian national consciousness. Over the years, it has *shaped* the popular perceptions, held not only by Senegalese migrants but also by many Europeans, have about Brazil. Few countries are subjected to as many pre-conceived notions as Brazil. The stereotype of Brazil as a poor but attractive country where a mosaic of races live together side by side has persisted and formed our view of Brazil. Hence, following the years of the *branqueamento*’s theory wanted by the new Brazilian government at the end of XIX century, Freyre, particularly, but also many others Brazilian academics, created the valorisation of miscegenation, and then “racial democracy” that is the perfect expression, which has constituted the focal point of the building process of a positive national identity: miscegenation as absence of racism represents the symbol of modern and civilized Brazil. Brazil becomes the social model to look up and to admire in the international consensus in the period following the end of World War II. Furthermore, miscegenation and “racial democracy” are the main actors of this “sea change”. They are expressions of modernization, a population who lives peaceably, despite racial differences. At the same time, this untrue vision becomes the major obstacle to achieve a fully-fledged democracy for both black citizens and descendants of the African slaves.

However, after having analysed both some social historical Brazilian dynamics and the *whiteness* project which led to the attempt made to build a totally “white Brazil”, which failed thanks to Freyre’s work and other Brazilian researchers but that formed the

expression of “racial democracy” which has coined an untrue conception of Brazil as perfect racial *match*, in the next paragraph will start by consider the correlation between African migrants and Brazil which will lead to Senegalese and to the region of Rio Grande do Sul where most of them live nowadays.

3. The study of the migration pattern from Senegal to Brazil

As stated in the previous paragraphs, Brazilian history developed following a racial pattern in relation to non-whites, especially against black people which just had suffered a colonial rule. However, the flow of Senegalese migrants to Brazil began to increase substantially from 2010. This year is critical for discussion of the phenomenon of Senegalese migration to Brazil.

As already analysed in the first chapter, Senegal could be described as a stable and free from internal conflicts and unaffected by external religious conflicts in 2010. The State provides free education. Moreover, they gave (and give also nowadays) everybody free healthcare but lack suitable medical diagnostic tools and doctors who have experience. Dakar, the capital, is an expensive city and moving inside the country costs a lot of money. In short, Senegal is a country that don't push young people out, at least on paper.

Nevertheless, many young people start to see in the Brazilian cultural identity a perfect match. As stated in the first chapter of this study, only two countries in the west African area were former Portuguese colonies (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau), therefore there is no apparently connection between Senegal and Brazil. The only consistency is slave trading in a more general African sense and which partly led Brazil to being a black population, as already been analysed.


The second half of this chapter analyses both the path taken by Senegalese to reach Brazil and the Brazilian place where they end this long journey. It should be noted that there has been a slight decrease in Senegalese migration to Brazil over recent years although the flow officially counted more Senegalese migrants in 2017 than in 2012 and 2013. But as far as exactly how many migrants are in Brazil, it is not clear because many are in the country illegally.

Before analysing the path of this migration, an overview on the recent burden of African migrants in Brazil is provided to have a wider view of the *black* presence in this territory.

3.1 The African presence in Brazil over the II decade of the 21st century

According to the U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR), in 2017 Brazil hosted close to 10,000 refugees and more than 35,000 asylum-seekers. UNHCR claims that the number of asylum-seekers will continue to increase over the two year period 2018-2019.

As reported, more than 70 % of the last group are applications from African migrants.



There were 137 -

Graphic 1. Senegalese Refugees and Asylum-seekers in Brazil in 2017¹⁰⁷

- asylum claims made to Brazilian immigration authorities in 2012, the year in which Senegal first appeared on the official register of countries of origin of asylum seekers. Despite all: “there is a gap of approximately 500 asylum claims already presented to the immigration authorities but yet not registered at the Committee’s data base¹⁰⁸”.

The figure below highlights the geographical distribution of asylum seekers in Brazil in 2012.

¹⁰⁷ UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, Graphic by author.

¹⁰⁸ UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency: “Asylum in Brazil – A Statistical Review (2010-2012)”, [http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/portugues/Estatisticas/Asylum_in_Brazil - A statistical review 2010-2012.pdf?view=1](http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/portugues/Estatisticas/Asylum_in_Brazil_-_A_statistical_review_2010-2012.pdf?view=1) (accessed 03.04.2018) UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, *op. cit.*




Figure 9. Geographical distribution of asylum claims by Brazilian regions between 2010 and 2012¹⁰⁹

In relation to the total number of claims for asylum for the period 2010-2012, 72% were made in the southern part and the remaining regions accounted for 28 percent of claims; at the same time the southernmost region of Rio Grande do Sul counted only 6% of the total. Nevertheless, it is an important issue because is in the southern part of Brazil where the *larger* companies are and where migrants work.

The next paragraph will finally study the path to reach Brazil from Senegal.

4. The route to get to Brazil

The majority of Senegalese migrants started their journey from the capital of Senegal, Dakar. The long journey from Dakar to Brazil has *revealed* many obstacles and a variety of possible routes. Nevertheless, evidence from migrants' accounts of their journey, obtained for this study, highlighted both two main different routes covered by Senegalese migrants to reach Quito and four main routes from Quito to reach Rio

¹⁰⁹ UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, *op. cit.*

Grande Do Sul, the southernmost region of Brazil where this research will be focused on.




Figure 10. Senegalese migration paths to Brazil¹¹⁰

The first route was the most commonly chosen during the first years of the migration phenomenon to Brazil, that is from about 2010 to about 2014:

...those migrants who enter irregularly... fly from Dakar (Senegal’s capital) to some European city – most of them go to Madrid (Spain). From Spain, where they do not need a transit visa, they usually take a flight to Ecuador – where they do not need a visa if they remain in the country within 90 days. As Ecuador is not a border country with Brazil, migrants tend to go to Peru (Lima), normally with the intervention of people smugglers – or coyotes – in the borders. The Brazilian entrance is made by Brasiléia, a small city in the northern state of Acre, on the border with Peru. In Brasiléia, they request the asylum visa.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ De César, F.P., (2018) “<<Tem que conversar, senão não vende, né?>>: A inserção de imigrantes senegaleses no comércio de rua de Santa Maria (RS)”, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹¹¹ Rangel., L.G. (2015), *op. cit.*

The research found that many Senegalese do not obtain a visa and enter Brazil illegally in this early period. Therefore, they are not officially registered by Brazilian police authorities. However, Spain and Ecuador represent two perfect transit itineraries for the migrants. According to the Spanish Embassy in Dakar, Senegalese do not need a visa to transit through a Spanish airport area and, at the same time, Ecuador permits entry to the country without a visa for a stay of up to 90 days. Then, with the assistance of the so-called international people traffickers, they reach Lima and then get to the *state of Acre* through the eastern Peru border (**Rota 4, Figure 10**). As explained by many Senegalese, they follow this path because the rainforest and other vegetation conceal them from detection. Therefore, they move to São Paulo, primarily. From São Paulo they take another bus to go down to the region of Rio Grande do Sul. According to STATISTA¹¹², 536 Senegalese migrants entered officially Rio Grande do Sul between 2007 and 2014, particularly from 2010, following this route also taken by Haitian (Dakar-Quito and then reaching Acre by the Peruvian *Carr. Rodovia Interoceanica*¹¹³).

esse é o trajeto de menor custo e que não exige visto de entrada. Por terra, frequentemente em Brasília (AC), Foz do Iguaçu (PR) e Uruguaiana (RS), os senegaleses, em seguida, podem ingressar no país como solicitantes de refúgio [...] Outra opção é a ida a Lima (Peru) e, de lá, o vô direto a Porto Alegre (RS). Essa opção, ainda assim, foi registrada como mais utilizada por senegaleses de maior poder aquisitivo e portadores de vistos permanentes.¹¹⁴

This was indeed the path followed by the first real flux of Senegalese to Brazil. This flow was obviously pushed by employment opportunities that Brazil offered also in relation to chances given by the *Football World Cup* organized in 2014, as already analysed in the first chapter.

Nevertheless, the Senegalese migrants began to follow a different path from about 2014, as mentioned above. Hence, according to the Senegalese Association in Porto Alegre¹¹⁵ (Brazil) where they are more than 1200 migrants, 90% of them have followed the following route. After flying from Dakar to Quito, migrants usually move to La Paz

¹¹² "STATISTA" is an international Statistics Portal with Statistics and Studies from more than 22,500 sources.

¹¹³ Herédia (2015), p. 118; Tedesco & De Mello (2015), p. 136.

¹¹⁴ De César, F.P., (2018) "<<Tem que conversar, senão não vende, né?>>: A inserção de imigrantes senegaleses no comércio de rua de Santa Maria (RS)", Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Centro de Ciências sociais e humanas-Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Sociais: Rio Grande do Sul, p. 33.

¹¹⁵ "Senegalese Association of Porto Alegre" has more than 2,700 followers on its Facebook page. It was created in 2014.

(Bolivia) passing Peru where, they head for Cobija (Bolivia) that is close to the border to the State of Acre (Brasiléia), they reach in fact the *state of Acre* through the northern Bolivian border (**Rota 1, Figure 10**). Nevertheless, they referred a change on the procedures for the entry in Brazil. In fact, they are officially registered by Brazilian authorities who ask them to fill in a form asking for refugee. Later, Federal police gives them a document named “protocolo” with which they can work and stay in the country legally. It is valid for one year but, if they show they are working they can renew it every six months. During this second flow there was a different working demand:

Nesse âmbito formal, a despeito do recente desaquecimento econômico nacional, têm-se de modo geral uma demanda de mão de obra especializada à indústria frigorífica, metalúrgica e de construção civil (HERÉDIA, 2015, p. 146). Além das oportunidades aí encontradas, é de destaque a atitude empreendedora de alguns dos imigrantes estabelecidos há mais tempo, especialmente na atividade comercial, normalmente iniciada individualmente na rua.¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, other 2 *Rotas* have been taken, even if only sporadically, by Senegalese from Quito to reach Rio Grande Sul. The first has been the path that from Cobija (reached from Lima) goes down for Bolivia reaching finally the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este where migrants pass the border between Paraguay and Brazil, entering Foz do Iguaçu, a Brazilian city in the Paraná’s state (**Rota 2, Figure 10**). From Iguaçu they can reach more easily Rio Grande do Sul. The second route was always from Cobija where migrants head for Paso de Los Libres (Argentina) where they enter Brazil through Uruguaiana, a Brazilian city in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (**Rota 3, Figure 10**). Nevertheless this two paths have been less *explored* because of both of higher costs and of the major difficulties to enter Argentina and Paraguay.

However, according to the founder of the *Associação Dos Senegaleses de Porto Alegre*, the approximate total cost of the migrants’ journey (from Dakar to RS) should be estimated between 12,000-16,000 R\$¹¹⁷, with reference to the paths above analysed. After having investigated about the path taken by, the next paragraph will analyse the region of Rio Grande do Sul where most Senegalese migrants are headed once they have reached Brazil.

¹¹⁶ De César, F.P., (2018) “<<Tem que conversar, senão não vende, né?>>: A inserção de imigrantes senegaleses no comércio de rua de Santa Maria (RS)”, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹¹⁷ 12,000-16,000 R\$ are about 2,700-3,600 €.

4.1 Rio Grande do Sul: geographical contextualization of the flow in Brazil

Rio Grande do Sul is a major agricultural and livestock region. Porto Alegre is the cosmopolitan capital of the state and also the region's main industrial area and port. The region is a fusion of different communities. The population of Rio Grande do Sul is indeed predominantly of European ancestry. Portuguese is the main language but German, Italian, including Italian dialects such as Venetian, are spoken due to early migration to the state from Veneto region in the XIX century. This region of Brazil is also known for its *Gaúcho* culture. The *Gaúchos* (cowboys) originated from Europe and arrived in Brazil in the fifteenth century to discover a lush, fertile land. These sprawling landscapes, then unoccupied, were the perfect place for farming. They focused on caring for livestock, capitalising on their experience and maximising the abundance of this new land. For centuries the staple food of the *Gaúcho* has been meat and not chicken, cooked *Churrasco*-style (barbecued).¹¹⁸

However, the region reaches also the top in many other sectors of activity as the first manufacturer of leather and footwear, the first centre for transport equipment production and for agricultural equipment. At the same time, Rio Grande do Sul is also the second centre for chemical and metal products, the second centre for rubber and plastics, second centre for machines, equipment and furniture, the second centre for beverage production. Furthermore, the region ranks top four in Brazil for food manufacture and for vehicle production as well.¹¹⁹ It is worth pointing out so how this region could be the perfect destination for migrants, not only Senegalese.

¹¹⁸ Love, J., L., (1971) "Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930", Stanford Univ. Pr.: UK.

¹¹⁹ EENI Business School & HA Independent University, "Doing Business in Rio Grande do Sul", in <http://en.reingex.com/Brazil-Rio-Grande-Sul-Business-Economy.shtml>



Figure 11. Location of the southern region of *Rio Grande do Sul* in Brazil¹²⁰

As shown in Figure 11, RS¹²¹ is placed in the southern *tip* of Brazil, it shares land borders with Uruguay to the south, Argentina and Paraguay to the southwest. The region shares the internal border with the state of Santa Catarina to the north.

As stated, migrants reached the Brazilian state of Acre, northernmost state bordered by Peru and Bolivia to the south and southwest. According to some migrant’s declarations, when migrants entering Acre: “La police nous recense et régularise notre situation. Après, j’ai pris un bus pour Sao Paulo pour la somme de 400 *reais* (environ 130 euros). Le trajet dure deux jours.”¹²² When they reached São Paulo city,¹²² they try to make contact with people who suggested them Brazil before leaving Senegal. Many of them move to the south of the State looking for work as a result. In fact, according to sources, the largest number of Senegalese migrants in Brazil were concentrated in the southernmost Brazilian region of *Rio Grande do Sul*, with particular reference to *Porto Alegre*. However, more than 1000 Senegalese migrants live in Porto Alegre nowadays, the most populous city of the region, in which the largest Senegalese association¹²³ in Brazil can also be found. At the same time, 1719 Senegalese have been admitted to

¹²⁰ Maps of World, “Cities in Brazil Map” in <https://www.mapsofworld.com/brazil/cities/>

¹²¹ RS stands for Rio Grande do Sul.

¹²² Hernandez, A., (2014) “Cheikh et Mor, des Sénégalais en quête d’un nouveau monde au Brésil” in <http://bresil2014.blog.lemonde.fr/2014/06/25/cheikh-et-mor-des-senegalais-en-quete-dun-nouveau-monde-au-bresil/> (accessed 11.05.2018)

¹²³ Associação Dos Senegaleses de Porto Alegre, It has more than 2,700 followers on its Facebook page. It was created in 2014.

Brazil in 2016, and 930 in 2017. However, 73 % of them settled down in Rio Grande do Sul¹²⁴.




Figure 12. Senegalese concentration of migrants in the region of Rio Grande do Sul¹²⁵

As shown in Figure 12, two Rio Grande do Sul’s areas are those where the largest numbers of Senegalese live. According also to some interviews with Senegalese migrants in RS, many of them work between three different cities: Passo Fundo, Serafina Corrêa and Caxias do Sul¹²⁶, mainly in the area of the city of Caxias.

¹²⁴ Cavalcanti, R.P. (2017) “How Brazil’s far right became a dominant political force” Conversation Trust Limited: UK, p.101; 120.

¹²⁵ De César, F.P., (2018) “<<Tem que conversar, senão não vende, né?>>: A inserção de imigrantes senegaleses no comércio de rua de Santa Maria (RS)”, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹²⁶ Caxias do Sul is also the second largest metal-mechanic hub in Brazil and one of the largest in Latin America, according to EENI Business School.




Figure 13. Route by car between Passo Fundo, Serafina Corrêa and Caxias do Sul

As shown above, the cities are not far apart and are located within a particular importance area of the region. As stated above, refrigeration, metallurgical and building industries are also highly concentrated market in this area which can permit more extended work solutions for these young migrants.

Overall, Rio Grande do Sul is the Brazilian state which received the large number of Senegalese immigrants since this flow started to develop to a greater extent. Many companies have also their headquarters located in this southern great area, as referred many of them dealt with chicken's production. However, according to *EENI Business School*, Rio Grande do Sul accounts for 7% of the Brazilian economy even if the region takes up only 3% of the Brazilian area. At the same time, it is the second largest commercial and industrial hub in Brazil. All of this underlines the importance of this centre in the Brazilian global economic landscape. Senegalese have therefore a better chance to achieve its own integration within a context that allows them more employment opportunities.

The next chapter will try to follow this *path* focusing on social inequalities between whites and blacks in Brazil through the Senegalese background of those who live in Brazil nowadays. A clear analysis will be carried out to highlight how African descendants deal

with persistently low conditions still today and how the skin colour is indeed an essential characteristic to identify the various social groups yet.

3. AFRO-BRAZILIANS AND SENEGALESE: AN OVERVIEW ON THE TODAY'S SOCIAL SITUATION IN BRAZIL

The third chapter of this work, as its title suggests, deals with a more accurate analysis of the racial situation experienced by Afro-Brazilians (*pretos* and *pardos*) ethnic group nowadays.

The first half debates both a briefly reflection recap on the Brazilian *racial democracy* development and the consequences of this feeling on the *black-pardo* population. The greater overall inequality of Brazilian society, and the worsening of that inequality since 1960, have struck particularly hard at the Afro-Brazilian population. On this matter, the many and numerous social inequalities suffered by this group of people are investigated, particularly with regard to the structural advantage *to have white skin*.

At the same time, the second section of the chapter faces how this current situation is really experienced by black population through a detailed overview of the Senegalese background in Brazil over the last years. This general framework has been obtained through the creation of a survey which was replied by twenty Senegalese who are still living in Brazil. Informants are Senegalese-Brazilian young people between the ages of 23 and 43 years old. During the development of this research project, it was striking to notice that the majority of interviewed people was part of the *Associação Dos Senegaleses de Porto Alegre*.

1. The *racial issue* in Brazil: *Black country vs White culture*. The deceptive nature of *racial democracy*

Brazil is one of the largest multi-racial societies in the world nowadays. Many ethnic groups have become even more closely interwoven since the abolition of slavery and the project of whiteness promoted by the first Republican government from 1889. Nevertheless this country experiences one of the highest levels of social inequality in the world. As a matter of fact, few countries *fall victim* as many stereotypes as Brazil did, as already widely referred in the previous chapter of this study. In fact, the myth of *racial democracy* has guided the development of Brazilian national consciousness since the first half of XX century creating a particular and uncommon combination of different cultures.




Figure 14. Main Ethnic Groups in Brazil¹²⁷

However, the *racial issue* became of national interest in 1930s. After the “whitening project” and the miscegenation phenomena promoted by the Brazilian government at the end of the 19th century. It is from the third decade of XX century that the conception of *what is Brazil* starts to follow two different *thought-paths*. Indeed, whilst on one hand the social theorist Gilberto Freyre suggested and defended that “miscegenation and

¹²⁷ Information taken from the following books: *Azevedo, A., (1971) “*O Brasil e suas regiões*”, São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional. *Adas, M., (1983)“*Panorama geográfico do Brasil*”, 1. Ed. São Paulo: Moderna. *Skidmore, T., E., (1992) “*Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*”, Duke University Press: Durham, North Carolina. *Coelho, M., A., (1996) “*Geografia do Brasil*”, 4. Ed. São Paulo: Moderna. *Reichmann, R., (1999) “*Race in Contemporary Brazil: From Indifference to Inequality*”, 1. Ed. Penn State University Press: Pennsylvania. *Gordon, J., R., (2016) “*Race and the Brazilian Body: Blackness, Whiteness, and Everyday Language in Rio de Janeiro*”, 1. Ed. University of California Press: Berkeley, California.

cultural amalgamation in colonial Brazil set the basis for the development of a unique and exceptionally modern variety of ethnic and social democracy”¹²⁸, on the other hand the 1930s and 1940s has been defined as the “Golden Age of Brazilian nationalism”¹²⁹ and, for the first time in Brazilian history:

From 1940 to the present, national censuses have documented persistent disparities between the white and non-white populations in education, vocational achievement, earnings, and life expectancy. Survey research has shown racist attitudes and stereotypes concerning blacks and mulattoes to be widely diffused throughout Brazilian society, and Afro-Brazilians report being the victims of subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, racism and discrimination.¹³⁰

Nevertheless, while Freye’s work may have its faults, it is a key step in the integration process as well as the racial relation’s project promoted by UNESCO in Brazil between 1951 and 1952. Despite that, UNESCO’s studies recognized the deceptive nature of *racial democracy* only in the 1980s when will show concrete evidence on the real existence of racism in this territory. At the same time, *Black Nationalism and Independence Movements* took hold over these years.

However, although Brazil launched the *whiteness* project to “extinguish” the Afro-Brazilian ancestry, as already referred in the previous chapter, the situation followed a different course of events than the new government thought. In fact, statistically speaking, the below table shows the progression of Brazilian population from 1940 to 2010 by the ten-yearly census¹³¹. Indeed, census is conducted regularly every decade and it is done through agents of IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística). It takes a lot of time but at the same time, it is quite accurate.

¹²⁸ Freye, G., (1933) “Casa Grande & Senzala”, Global Book Publishing: USA

¹²⁹ Burns, E. B., (1993) “A History of Brazil”, 3rd Ed. Columbia University Press: New York City.

¹³⁰ Andrews, G.R., (1996) “Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900-90: An American Counterpoint”, Sage Publications, Ltd: London, p.483.

¹³¹ No census information on race in the first half of XX century prior to 1940. Furthermore, the race question was removed from the 1970 census as well.

Table 3.1 Overall Brazilian population by race -- 1940 to 2010¹³²

Year	Afro-Brazilians (pardos/pretos)	White (brancos)	Other (indígenas and amarelos)
1940	14,762,601	26,185,060	288,654
1950	19,479,149	32,049,693	415,555
1960	27,083,579	43,369,222	539,542
1980	54,239,112	65,699,956	1,211,506
1991	69,712,334	75,750,642	1,454,483
2000	75,739,203	91,138,038	2,713,451
2010	97,171,004	90,628,080	2,956,715

The number of white people almost doubled the volume of the black population already in 1950, that is when the white population *counted* about 32 million people. At the same time, there has been an increasing number of people who declared themselves whites from the 1980 census.

However the last 2010 census demonstrated *black* population how the largest *race* in Brazil today. In addition, it must be pointed out how Afro-Brazilian community is a majority as nowadays as during the XIX century¹³³. Hence, despite the fact that Brazil's dwellers are mainly *blacks*, as nowadays as in the 19th century, Brazilian have always believed to be *white*. This is probably the most serious Brazilian contradiction, as many stated.

However, a general overview concerning Brazilian inequalities from the second half of twentieth century is now necessary before carrying out the survey prepared.

¹³² IBGE, "Censo demográfico 1940/2010; "Estatísticas do Século XX", Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2007 in the Anuário Estatístico do Brasil 1994, Rio de Janeiro: IBGE 54 (1994).

¹³³ In the year 1890, white people were 6,306,923, on the other hand the volume of the black population (Pardos and Pretos) counted 6,736,940 people (Bucciferro, 2013).

2. Racial inequality in Brazil: from the second half of XX century to present

Brazil has made major strides towards equality among races, yet large disparities remain. As previously broadly investigated, Afro-Brazilians suffered a condition of *supposed* inferiority even after the abolition of slavery in 1888. Even if in the first half of XX century this feeling was fictitiously covered by the myth of a land with a greater sense of unity and common purpose among its different ethnic groups, the situation *overthrew* following the 1964 military coup. The *coup* marked both the failure of the II Republic Era¹³⁴ and the beginning of a more evident racial feeling towards the Afro-Brazilian society, bearing in mind that the previously 30 years had already fixed the starting line of the first black movement which promoted the well-being of blacks.¹³⁵ This is just to emphasise the fact that although *blacks* realised their critical and social consciousness, their situation started to be effectively and visually marked by inequality at odds with white people. They did not advance from their *state's past*, on the contrary the condition worsened.

The race/color question was removed from the 1970 census; partial information is available from other sources for 1976, but statistics on racial inequality are generally unavailable until 1980. In the 1976 National Household Survey (PNAD), whites earned on-average 2.8 times more than blacks (3,433 Cr\$ to 1,210 Cr\$), and 2.0 times more than people of mixed-race (3,433 Cr\$ to 1,722 Cr\$); Silva (1985) estimates that 32.9% of the difference between white and mixed race individuals is attributable to discrimination, and 26.3% of that between blacks and whites.¹³⁶

However, the coup lasted 21 years and ended in 1985 with the establishment of the III Republic. In these last military dictatorship years, black civil society reemerged also with the creation of the *Movimento Negro Unificado* (MNU) in 1978. Many improvements followed:

the MNU adopted the term “negro” for both blacks and mulattos, and it lost the negative connotation it had during the First Republic (Domingues, 2007)...In the political spectrum, the *Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (PDMB) held majority control of the government after 1982 and created a state agency, the *Conselho de Participação e Desenvolvimento da Comunidade Negra*, directed towards protecting the rights of the black community.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ *Second Brazilian Republic* is the period of Brazilian history between 1946 and 1964.

¹³⁵ The Brazilian Black Front was founded in 1931.

¹³⁶ Bucciferro, J.R., (2015) “Racial Inequality in Brazil from Independence to Present”, p.23.

¹³⁷ Andrews, G., (1992).

However, the last period from the last decade of XX century to nowadays, is still marked by social efforts to fight against discrimination and some law was introduced by the government for the progression in equality between races, nevertheless Brazilian society is still strongly marked by social inequality between whites and non-whites, as will be investigated in the next paragraph of the research. The aim is to provide some empirical evidence about black-white differentials in the distribution of income and wellbeing.

2.1 Trends in Racial Inequality

There is a broad effort to reduce racial inequality in Brazil and, over the past decade or two, it would appear having been successful.

Affirmative action was introduced under the Secretary of State for Human Rights in 2002, for example, and a new Secretary of Policy for the Promotion of Racial Equality was established in 2003. Disparities between races – formally defined as black (preto), white (branco), mixed-race (pardo), Asian (amarelo), and Indigenous (indígena) – have declined in terms of literacy (Paixão et al., 2010), level-of-schooling (Marteletto, 2012), and employment and earnings (ILO, 2007).¹³⁸

Nevertheless, according to official statistics, Brazil ranks second on the scale of social inequality among members of the G20. The tables below analyse relevant statistics about social distinction between different *ethnic* groups (whites and Afro-Brazilians) from the second half of XX century to the 2010's last census. The tables will be divided into four social categories and will be employed the official census data, wherever possible:

- Life Expectancy
- Years of Schooling
- Incomes
- Unemployment rate

Differences on life expectancy between whites (*brancos*) and Afro-Brazilians (*pardos* and *pretos*), are presented in Table 3.2.

¹³⁸ Bucciferro, J.R., (2015) "Racial Inequality in Brazil from Independence to Present", <http://sites.middlebury.edu/ehrgc/files/2015/04/Bucciferro.pdf>, p.2.

Table 3.2 Life Expectancy by Race¹³⁹

	1950	1960	1980	1990	2010
White	47.5	54.7	66.1	70.8	73.1
Afro-Brazilians	40.1	44.7	59.4	64	67
Difference	7.4	10	6.7	6.8	6.1

Life expectancy is probably the most important measure of health. It is strongly influenced by child and infant mortality and it is a measure that is used to consider the overall health of a community. It would be important to highlight also the differences as regards accessing treatment or other kind of considerations in this case.

As shown in Table 3.2, the first point is that the gap exist. The largest one between the two ethnic groups was in 1960, thereafter it moderately narrowed. Furthermore, the differential was still fairly high in 2010. More generally, Life Expectancy in Latin America was about 72 years old in 2013., according to “Our World in Data”¹⁴⁰. This underlines how Afro-Brazilians in worse condition than white population due to varying degrees of poverty as well.

However, next table is related to the sector of education over the period from 1976 to 2009 through 4 different referencing surveys.

Table 3.3 Average Years of Schooling by Race¹⁴¹

	1976	1986	1998	2009
White	4.5 years	5.4	6.8	9.1
Afro-Brazilians	2.7 years	3.9	4.7	7.6
Difference	1.8 years	1.5	2.1	1.5

¹³⁹ Data from the 1950 and 1980 censuses, as presented in Wood, Alberto, and Carvalho (1988), and Lovell (1999), who adds the 1960 figures; data for 2008 are from LAESER (2010; p. 197/9) based on the 1991/2000 censuses and Ministry of Health 1997- 2000 micro-data.

¹⁴⁰ Our World in Data (2013) in <https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy>

¹⁴¹ Figures from PNAD household surveys; the 1976 and 1986 figures are published in Hasenbalg and Silva (2000), and 1988-1998-2008 overlapping series in LAESER (2010).

The above pattern is relatively congruous throughout the period considered. Education has equally increased for all *races* since 1976 and continues to increase nowadays. Nonetheless, considering the active-age population in the same six metropolitan areas, white workers had, on average, 9.1 years of schooling, whereas black and brown ones only 7.6 years in 2009.

Another educational data is about illiteracy which was among black and mixed races at 13.7% in 2010, nearly triple that of whites at 5.9%.¹⁴² Furthermore, another data to take into consideration is about students enrolled in the University. Indeed, 97% of total were whites and just 3% were non-whites in 2009¹⁴³, considering that whites are only about half of the population, it sounds like something of incongruous. On the other hand, a growing Federal university's number has established:

A new law... reserves 50% of spots in Brazil's federal universities for students coming from public schools¹⁴⁴, low-income families and who are of African or indigenous descent. The number of posts reserved for black, mixed race and indigenous students will vary according to the racial make-up of each Brazilian state...
...Now the "quotas" are mandatory in all of Brazil's 59 federal universities, which have until 2016 to reserve half of their positions for affirmative action.¹⁴⁵

This *quotas* were introduced in 2002 for the first time in Brazil and represent a widely political project to promote racial equality conducted by black associations. By contrast, next table is strongly related to racial inequality since is mostly tied to earnings, in fact whites and earnings are on the same track in Brazil, as already stated by Corossacz whiteness' studies.

Ho scelto di studiare la bianchezza presso un gruppo sociale¹⁴⁶ che rappresenta quello che mi pare essere il fulcro della condizione della bianchezza in Brasile: una situazione di privilegio ed egemonia all'interno dei rapporti sociali tra gruppi di

¹⁴² IBGE-Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (2010).

¹⁴³ IBGE-Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, <https://censo2010.ibge.gov.br/en/noticias-censo.html?busca=1&id=1&idnoticia=1370&t=black-and-brown-workers-earn-50-of-the-income-white-ones&view=noticia>. Calculation by the author.

¹⁴⁴ Public schools suffer from structural investments by the State. They are not good paradoxically at preparing students to the entrance tests for Federal universities. Only students who can afford private schools, they can be enrolled in Federal universities.

¹⁴⁵ Carneiro, J., (2013) "Brazil's universities take affirmative actions", BBC in: <http://www.bbc.com/news/business-23862676> (accessed 22.05.2018)

¹⁴⁶ The investigation focuses on the white upper middle classes who live in the richest Rio de Janeiro area of Zona Sul.

colore, ma anche una condizione di normativa a partire dalla quale si definisce l'altro, il differente, il subalterno.¹⁴⁷

The main indicators of this study are presented below.

Table 3.4 Average monthly Income by Race¹⁴⁸

	1995	2001	2009	2015
White	R\$ 1,080	R\$ 1,270.25	R\$ 1,663.88	R\$ 1,589
African-Brazilians	R\$ 486	R\$ 647.50	R\$ 847.71	R\$ 898
Difference	R\$ 594	R\$ 622.75	R\$ 816.17	R\$ 691

As shown in Table 3.4, the average income usually earned by black or brown workers (R\$ 898) is almost half as that received by white ones (R\$ 1,589) in 2015. Moreover, for example, among those with a bachelor's degree, blacks earn significantly less than whites, according to IBGE. In fact, the income of blacks at all levels of educational attainment lags behind that of their white counterparts. At the same time, the point differential has decreased by about R\$ 150 from 2009 to 2015: "In 20 years, black people's income went from 45% of the value of white people's income, to only 57%. If the pace of progress by black people over the past two decades holds, they will only achieve income equality with whites, on the average, in 2089", according to calculations by *Oxfam Brasil*, based on the average of relative income growth for blacks compared to whites, from 1995-2015.

Another data concerning work category is the unemployment rate. The March 2009 edition of the Monthly Employment Survey (PME), show relevant irregularities between self-declared white workers and black or brown ones. The unemployment rate among

¹⁴⁷ Corossacz, V.R., (2012) "Razzismo e bianchezza in Brasile", in ANUAC which is the international peer-reviewed, open access journal of the Italian society of cultural anthropology (SIAC), Year I, Number 1, p.42/43.

Translation:

"I choose to study whiteness related to this specific social group (white upper middle classes) which represent, in my view, the cornerstone of the whiteness condition in Brazil; a privileged and hegemonic position in the social relationship between black and white groups, but also a normative condition under which the different, the subordinate is defined."

¹⁴⁸ Based on CPS, 2001; PNAD, 2001; IES, 2000/1; IBGE Census 2010 and Oxfam Brazil 1995-2015.

black and brown workers (10.1%) was higher than among white ones (8.2%). Although black or brown people account, together, for 45.3% of the active age population in the six metropolitan areas investigated by PME, they made up 50.5% of the unemployed population. However, next figure presents the Unemployment rate by race between 2005 and 2017.




Figure 15. Average National Unemployment rate by Age (16 years and over), Race¹⁴⁹

The figure shows how the 4 ethnic groups followed the same path in recent years although starting from a higher or lower point. Mixed races presented the highly percentage of unemployment reaching the top in 2009. However, general unemployment rate decreased in the last 7 years. Furthermore, as stated in the notes, this figure is not given by the national census, seen that the next census will happen in 2020. Hence, data from 2011 to 2017 have been investigated through the *Center for Global Policy Solution* which has calculated the Unemployment Data by Race and Ethnicity.

Every day, racial inequality got wider space in the world press because of disparities between races, which could be divided into 2 macro area of whites and non-whites, have become more and more evident in Brazil. As analyzed, the country has made many progress in a variety of different areas and the current situation is far better than 50 years, 30 years or 20 years ago, as well. Nevertheless, a better understanding of what

¹⁴⁹ Analysis of Bureau of Labour Statistics Current Population Survey, 2005-2017.

racial inequality will be in the next years, no one knows. Statistics or history events do not give glass half full to look at the bright side of an uncertain situation.

However, the next part will deal with the survey carried out to investigate better racism and social inequalities suffered by Afro-Brazilians through the general review offered by Senegalese who took part to the questionnaire.

3. Main research questions and method

As initially referred, a survey was created to investigate more specifically the phenomenon of migration from Senegal to Brazil. Furthermore, in light of the above paragraph, the section will ultimately analyze racial black inequalities in Brazil through an overview on the Senegalese answers' background who are still living there. Indeed, through the answers of the interviewees, the aim is to resume the focal points of the research which have been studied along this study.

Hence, this survey was an analysis based on *Senegalese-Brazilian* people. It is worth pointing out that all the Senegalese interviewees live or work nowadays in the southern region of Rio Grande do Sul, main Brazil's geographical center of this study. Hence, the midpoint of the survey is surrounded by the borders of this state.

However, the survey initially reached out to them using social networking platforms and only then online interviews were carried out through a telecommunication application software which enabled to make video calls via Web.

However, the goals of this research are indeed manifold and can be summarized as follows:

- To observe if Senegalese-Brazilians informants faced more than one emigration from Senegal;
- A better understanding both concerning Senegalese Visa validity to live in Brazil and what is their living standard;
- To determine Senegalese informants' feelings towards Brazil;
- To try to highlight some sociodemographic aspects of Senegalese-Brazilians and, at the same time, to analyze the period when they moved to Brazil;
- At what extent (if happened) Senegalese interviewees suffered racist violence or xenophobic episodes because of their skin color since they reside in Brazil;

- What feeling informants feel about their homeland and if they think of migration to Brazil just as a permanent or transitory relocation;
- To argue about general black situation in Brazil in relation to racism, in a much greater sense.

The information and collection of data have been obtained through the sending and replying to a survey based on certain selected questions.¹⁵⁰

The survey is composed of 20 questions:

- 12 multiple choice questions
- 8 open-ended questions

Firstly, questions enquired about the informants' sociodemographic information (gender, age, provenance city, etc.). A first step in the selection of questions was to know more about informants. The successive questions' survey serve the purpose to focus on informant migration history (period of time they migrated out from Senegal and both if they moved more than one time and if they are still living in Brazil). Another section is composed of questions about the reasons why they have left Senegal and to try to understand at what extent informants are emotionally tied to their mother country. Following questions refer to the racial issue, if they have never experienced these racial feelings by local population because of the color of their skin.

This survey conducted on Senegalese-Brazilian informants want to express a larger degree of relevance. Hence, many questions have been thought to carry out a research that could be gather a major sense referred indeed to the black population in Brazil. Furthermore, this study has thought of the questions to informants to plumb the depths of three different levels:

- Informants as part of the Senegalese country;
- Informants as migrants;
- Informants as part of the black population in Brazil.

¹⁵⁰ See Appendix II.

3.1 How the survey was conducted: step by step procedure

As previously stated, the survey is an analysis based on Senegalese-Brazilians living in Rio Grande do Sul, a derogatory standard which informants had to or have to *possess*. After having reviewing this *criterion*, it can be explained how the research was conducted. The first attempt to find the informants was a research on different websites (forum, communities, etc.) without having a great success. So, *Facebook* has been used, and Senegalese-Brazilian groups were searched on the social network. Two main *pages* with thousands of people as members have been found, but only one of these two groups replied, the “*Associação Dos Senegaleses de Porto Alegre*”.

A short message was published on the wall of the group in order to inform members about the reason of the subscription. Hence, the ‘Founding Members’ have been firstly contacted in order to be informed about what kind of research it was conducting. After all, they published it in the main page of the group.

The screenshot shows a Facebook post from the group "Associação Dos Senegaleses de Porto Alegre". The post is dated 7 AVRIL 09:25. It contains two blue text boxes with the following text:

Bonjour, je m'appelle Silvio et je suis un étudiant italien. J'écris ma thèse, pour terminer l'Université à Venise, sur le phénomène de la migration du Sénégal. J'ai créé ce questionnaire pour avoir une idée plus précise de votre émigration, mais aussi pour mieux connaître les conditions de votre intégration dans le pays où vous vivez. Merci pour votre aide, si vous souhaitez plus d'informations, vous pouvez me contacter 😊

J'ai crée aussi un questionnaire à faire pour la recherche. Le lien est: <https://goo.gl/forms/yCcO8bErRyvcirzJ3>

Below the text is a screenshot of a Google Form titled "Le Sénégal dans le monde". The form contains the following text:

Bonjour, je m'appelle Silvio et je suis un étudiant italien. J'écris ma thèse, pour terminer l'Université à Venise, sur le phénomène de la migration du Sénégal. J'ai créé ce questionnaire pour avoir une idée plus précise de votre émigration, mais aussi pour mieux connaître les conditions de votre intégration dans le pays où vous vivez. Merci pour votre aide, si vous souhaitez plus d'informations, vous pouvez me contacter sur mon mail: matteo@hotmail.it

* Required

Êtes-vous un homme ou une femme ? *

Homme

Femme

Quel âge avez-vous ? (écrivez ça en chiffre) *

Your answer

3.1 Message to the Senegalese page of Porto Alegre

Subsequently, a substantial part of this study has been conducted using a written method and forms. Data have been collected through the written questionnaire that has been sent to the informants. In order to gather data, an application of *Google, Google Forms*, has been used. It allows the insertion of questions and then it automatically

creates statistics on the basis of people's answers. A link that redirected the informants to the survey has been sent, and then, through this application, there was the possibility to revise people's answers in an individual or summary view. Thus, detailed statistics have been obtained.



The screenshot shows a survey interface with three questions. The first question is "1. Êtes-vous un homme ou une femme ? *". It has two radio button options: "Homme" and "Femme". The second question is "2. Quel âge avez-vous ? (écrivez ça en chiffre) *". Below it is a text input field labeled "La tua risposta". The third question is "3. Dans quelle ville du Sénégal êtes-vous né? *". It has five radio button options: "Dakar", "Touba", "Saint-Louis (Ndar)", "Thiès", and "Altro:". The interface is clean with a white background and green accents.

3.2 Individual view example



3.3 Summary view example

Hence, after having provided a general overview of what the study is, it will show and explain the results of this survey in the next sections.

4. Research analysis: results and statistics


In this section, a discussion on the survey's results has been provided. As it was anticipated, the questionnaire used to achieve the goals of this research is made up of twenty questions. Twelve of them are multiple choice questions, while eight questions are open-ended and optional. The answer to the latter depends on personal informant's knowledge on their Brazilian life experience or on the answers that they gave on racial feeling faced in Brazil.

4.1 Personal Information

The first part of the questionnaire deals with sociodemographic aspects.

Questions related to gender, age and hometown provide information about socio-demographic characteristics of informants. A first point of view to analyse before proceeding is the linguistic aspect, main perspective to seek out opportunities in a foreign context. In fact, it has also been analysed that many interviewees do not speak French but only Portuguese or Wolof. Furthermore, according also to the Senegalese Embassy in Brazil, many Senegalese-Brazilians¹⁵¹ do not have a higher level of education and this could explain why many of them do not speak French.

However, with regard to gender, the answers show a clear *statement*.




Graph 4.1.1 Informant's gender¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ They are Senegalese who are officially registered by the Senegalese Embassy in Brazil.

¹⁵² Original Translation: "Êtes-vous un homme ou une femme ?"

Twenty out of twenty of the interviewed people are male. On one hand, this element could be forced by the fact that the used *Facebook* platform has not allowed an ideal approach to the Senegalese women. On the other hand, yet in the first two chapters, it has been already analysed both how this is more a male migration than a female one and how the Senegalese displacement history was much more a male than a female migration. However, the same Embassy referred that more than 80 % of Senegalese in Brazil are male. Hence, this Graph confirms official statistics.

The answers to the number two question “*Quel âge avez-vous ?*” satisfy a clear need. Age is a key characteristic studied both to provide the average age group of informants who compiled the survey questionnaire and to examine more than one cultural variable, according to different age generations.




Graph 4.1.2 Informants' age¹⁵³

As Graph 4.1.2 shows, the majority of informants are in-between 23 and 31 year old range (fifteen persons), and only four (20 %) are over 32 years old. Indeed, this could confirm how young Senegalese are those who are “forced” to migrate to survive. Many of them in fact told privately that they send back to their families a part of the salary they earn in Brazil.

However, with regard to the geographical provenance (city), informational data are as follows.

¹⁵³ Original Translation: “*Quel âge avez-vous ?*”




Graph 4.1.3 Informants' Hometown in Senegal¹⁵⁴

As Graph 4.1.3 shows, 8 out of 20 of informants come from the capital of Senegal, Dakar (40 %), 45 % both from Diourbel and Touba and the last 15 % from Thiès. The fact that half of them are from Dakar can highlight what has been said in the first chapter, that is, the capital provides more opportunities for embarking on this journey. It is worth remembering that even if moving from Touba or Thiès to Dakar takes a lot of money due to the lack of appropriate connections.

However, the individual of the *Google* application allows to observe that people who answered they are not from Dakar are between the oldest informants who are 29 or more years old. At the same time, all young Senegalese between 23 and 27 years old are from Dakar. This data could be read through the analysis of an increasingly difficult embarking on this journey coming from the interior Senegalese regions because of conditions of extreme poverty. Many interviewees in fact express their bad feelings concerning their move to Brazil, leaving their family without some material help. This situation obviously is more complicated to the inland where poverty and social unrest go hand in hand. Hence, this could be a possible explanation about the link between age and hometown.

After having obtained information about their gender, age and birthplace, attention has been focused on the period during which interviewees emigrated from Senegal.


¹⁵⁴ Original Translation: "Dans quelle ville du Sénégal êtes-vous né ?"



Graph 4.1.4 “Informants’ period of migration from Senegal to Brazil”¹⁵⁵

Again pointing out that all Senegalese informants interviewed live in Brazil nowadays, the Graph above shows a clear and easily legible font. As explicitly marked, 95 % of informants’ answered they migrated to Brazil in the period between 2011 and 2018, only one answered he migrated between 2001 and 2010. As in the previous chapters widely argued, the migration from Senegal to Brazil is a quite recent migration which started to be *larger* from 2010 and also primarily associated to major event as the “FIFA World Cup” hosted by Brazil in 2014. Hence, this data could confirm this issue.

The following question enquires about informants’ migratory experience. Only two people faced more than one migration. At the same time, through the individual view of *Google*, both of them have lived in West Africa before moving to Brazil. However, question number six “*Dans quel pays vivez-vous maintenant*” confirms what has been said in these few lines, that is 20 out of 20 informants are currently living in Brazil.



Graph 4.1.5 “Current country in which informants are living”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Original Translation: “*Depuis quand vivez-vous hors du Sénégal ?*”

¹⁵⁶ Original Translation: “*Écrivez le nom de la ville précise où vous vivez maintenant*”


Hence, in order to understand more about them, interviewees were asked to specify the name of the city in the region of Rio Grande do Sul where are living nowadays, bearing in mind that many of them have been contacted by the *Facebook* page “*Associação Dos Senegaleses de Porto Alegre*” which counted 2,808 people¹⁵⁷ on May 30, 2018. The results are outlined below:

- Porto Alegre: 7 out of 20 (35 %)
- Chapecó¹⁵⁸: 4 out of 20 (20 %)
- Bento Gonçalves: 2 out of 20 (10 %)
- Caxias do Sul: 2 out of 20 (10 %)
- Guaporé – Passo Fundo - Serrafina Corrêa – Capinzal – Santa Maria: 5 out of 20 (25 %)

The answers to this question confirms that many of respondents live in Porto Alegre (35%) or in Chapecó (Poultry Industry).

4.2 Social Information

In order to know both reasons on informants’ migration and some feeling about their homeland, some questions focus on social aspects as well. With regard to social information about the reason why they emigrated from Senegal, data show that 95 % (19 out of 20) of interviewers answered in pretty obvious manner.



Graph 4.2.1 “Reasons why informants emigrated from Senegal”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ This does not mean that all 2,808 are Senegalese, however more than 60% percent are from Senegal, according to the founding members.

¹⁵⁸ Chapecó lies at the border between the states of Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. At the same time, all 4 interviewees work in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul.

¹⁵⁹ Original Translation: “*Pourquoi avez-vous change de pays ?*”

“*Pour chercher du travail*” (To find a job) was something just analysed in the first chapter when the research referred to the Senegalese migration history. Senegal indeed is a country *built up* through a migratory background where Senegalese changed town or country to find better work opportunities since XX century.

However, question number 9 is quite interesting “*Quel est votre travail en ce moment? Écrivez ça brièvement aussi votre entreprise*”. Answers are manifold.¹⁶⁰

Many of them answered that they are working in BRF, one of the biggest food companies in the world, as already seen in the second chapter. The company processes 1.7 billion poultry and 9.5 million pigs per year. It is the “largest producer of animal protein and largest exporter of poultry, it has a portfolio of more than 800 product.”¹⁶¹



Figure 15. BRF large-scale distribution in Brazil¹⁶²

Many indeed replied they are in the “frango” (chicken) sector of the company working “cortando carne o embalando em fim” in industrial kitchens, according to private answers.¹⁶³


The following question is quite controversial: “*Pendant combien de temps votre Visa est-il encore valable?*”

¹⁶⁰ See Appendix II.

¹⁶¹ Official BRF corporate website, “About BRF”, <http://brfingredients.com/en/about-us/> (accessed 22.05.2018)

¹⁶² Official BRF corporate website, *op. cit.*

¹⁶³ See Appendix II.



Graph 4.2.2 "VISA validity"¹⁶⁴

As Graph 4.2.2 shows, the plurality of informants' answers does not permit a clear point of view. However, according to various sources, the situation is primarily as follows:

When you arrive you just need to go to the federal police, fill a form asking for refugee. And they give you a document named (*protocolo*). With it you can work and do what you want. It is valid for one year or two. But after you can renew it.¹⁶⁵

Nevertheless, many also referred that this could change depending on the period under consideration. Hence, the fact that 30 % answered that they do not have a visa, it should not be seen as something particularly unusual. Indeed, the same Embassy of Senegal in Brazil referred that many are in the country illegally, especially who migrated to Brazil before 2013.


The following four questions (11-14) deal with informants' home country, Senegal. Question 11 asked if informants were aware about when would be returned to Senegal. Most of them (80 %) still do not know whether, and when, leaving Brazil to return home.¹⁶⁶

Questions number 12 and 13 are closely tied to each other.

¹⁶⁴ Original Translation: "Pendant combien de temps votre Visa est-il encore valable ?"

¹⁶⁵ This is referred to the conversation with a Senegalese working as "Analista de recursos humanos" at one of the 35 BRF Brazilians productive units.

¹⁶⁶ See Appendix II.



Graph 4.2.3 “Would you like to return to Senegal?”¹⁶⁷

In the question number 12, more than 60 % answer they would like to come back to Senegal, the other 40 % is undecided. The following question wondered “if yes, why would you like to return to Senegal?”. Many have made clear references to the family that is still living in Senegal.¹⁶⁸ In fact, in question 14, the survey asked for their families, if their parents are living with them in Brazil. 80 % answered “No”, the interviews are living in Brazil and their family is in Senegal.


4.3 Racial Inequality Information

As suggested by the *title* of this paragraph, questions 15-17 will try to analyse the racial issue suffered by Senegalese who, because of their skin tone, may provide a more general racial consideration on the Afro-Brazilians descendants who still today suffer inequalities in Brazil.

Question 15 indeed asked if informants have suffered racial episodes in Brazil. It focuses directly on the target.

¹⁶⁷ Original Translation: “*Souhaitez-vous rentrer au Sénégal ?*”

¹⁶⁸ See Appendix II.



Graph 4.3.1 "Have you ever experienced racist acts by the Brazilian population?"¹⁶⁹

Informants' answers are quite clear, as Graph 4.3.1 shows. Only 10% answered that they have never experienced racial episodes since they are in Brazil. At the same time, it could be as dramatic as obvious answer, following the process investigated during the *path* of this research.

The following question try to highlight more accurate elements in relation to the previous query. The survey wonders if respondents could briefly describe what happened (if happened) referred to racism faced. Many words recurring in the replies:

- Negro/Noir;
- Discriminação;
- Africain;
- Cor da pele/Couleur de peau;
- Blancs brésiliens.¹⁷⁰


According to this key words, many have mentioned words concerning as their skin colour as their origin. Some situation carried out by the survey tell about stories where the interviews were insulted while they were sitting at the bar or at the restaurant.¹⁷¹

Last question of the section is related to the relationship between Senegalese informants and local Brazilian population.

¹⁶⁹ Original Translation: "Avez-vous jamais subi des actes racistes de la part de la population brésilienne ?"

¹⁷⁰ See Appendix II.

¹⁷¹ See Appendix II.



Graph 4.3.2 “Did the local population help you in the integration process?”¹⁷²

More than 60% of respondents answered that Brazilian local population did not help them in the integration process since they migrated to Brazil.

Other 3 questions serve the purpose of catching a direct relationship with the informants.¹⁷³

5. One country but different units: Brazil in *black and white*

A main part of this survey enquires the *racial issue* suffered by Senegalese in Brazil. At the same time, it becomes useful to give a good measure of how is clearly related to the Afro-Brazilian community (*parda* and *preta*). Senegalese in fact served the purpose of this research acting as an intermediary between white Brazilians and Afro descendants who live in this territory nowadays. The perception of the Senegalese migrants might show a lot about the Brazilian identity itself and its self-perception. At the same time, efforts have been made to relate these two cultures even if paradoxically they belong to the same country, Brazil.

Having had the opportunity to exchange directly information and opinions with those who have been involved in the survey, it can be stated that Brazilian national unit is still a Chimera. Even if many *steps* have been realized to reduce inequalities between whites and non-whites ethnic groups, the situation is a *general work-in-progress*. Several interviewees describes Brazil the land of white people, revealing a reality that media try

¹⁷² Original Translation: “Est-ce-que la population locale vous a aidé dans le processus d'intégration?”

¹⁷³ See Appendix II.

to conceal: “Le problème est réel mais c’est inutile d’en discuter”, reporting words of a young Senegalese. The same pointed out the streets as the main source of racism, followed by the media and lastly, the professional environment.

Most of the statements from the people interviewed have shown that *miscigenação*, the process to distinguish the different ethnic groups, is a silent form of racism: “Nous sommes noirs et pauvres et ces sont synonymes de souffrance en Brésil”¹⁷⁴, according to the words of another 28 year old Senegalese who works in the chicken industry. At the same time, these words and this survey sound like a contradiction if one considers that, for the first time, non-white people (black or brown/mixed) are the majority of Brazil’s population, according to results of 2010 census. It is in fact the first time a census has found the white population to be below 50 %. Nevertheless, growing up as a white person is still a structural advantage in Brazil. The Brazilian government is strongly linked to a racist structure which establishes that privileges and power go along with the skin color. As widely analyzed, being white places you in a privileged position.

The value given to whiteness may be seen in different range of life. First, in terms of beauty standards, white aesthetics is hegemonic. White skin colour, straight or blonde hair, blue or green eyes and delicate features make up the prevailing idea of human beauty, which is entrenched in popular culture, and disseminated in mass media.¹⁷⁵ Such aesthetical superiority is, in fact, one of the distinguishing features of whiteness in Brazil, as many studies have highlighted. Also, the idea of intellectual and moral superiority - which is at the heart of "race" as a colonial construct to justify subjugation of indigenous and black people in Brazil - is deployed, up to this day, by white Brazilians to explain why they live more years, reside in the best neighbourhoods, earn more money or just occupy the most important positions in both the state and the market, among many other advantages they have as benefit.¹⁷⁶

In conclusion, Brazil is one of the most ethnically-diverse countries in the world and many Brazilians regard their nation as a "racial democracy" with no racism inside. Nonetheless black Brazilians - the descendants of African slaves brought over during

¹⁷⁴ Ely (fictitious name) is from Dakar. He has been living in Rio Grande do Sul since 2013.

¹⁷⁵ Gikandi, S., (2001) “Race and the Idea of the Aesthetic”, Michigan Quarterly Review, Volume XL, issue 2 in <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0040.208;g=mqrg;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1>

¹⁷⁶ Gikandi, S., (2001), *op. cit.*

Portuguese colonial rule - are much more likely to be poor and rarely reach the top levels of business or politics. It is clear thus that Brazilian racism is by and large supported by a pact of whiteness. While such a pact does not place barriers to the establishment of everyday relationships between whites and non-whites, hence the "racial democracy", it reinforces, in every instance, the idea of white superiority that legitimates the privileges that white people enjoy. White people are not only favoured in such racialised structure, but they have actively produced and strengthened it, simply by promoting the idea of racial democracy or through more direct mechanisms of discrimination.

CONCLUSIONS

This research has examined a *path* which finally should have allowed the analysis of some of the social inequalities suffered by Afro descendants within the Brazilian boundaries. By analysing the background offered by Senegalese presence in Brazil, the study has provided a cross section of the African reality in this territory. This community, generally named *Afro-Brazilian*, associates all those who are related to the black skin colour. In fact, according to as recent as not recent statistics, it has been demonstrated that there is and there has been a clear social evidence concerning a difference in treatment between black (*pardos* and *pretos*) and white people in Brazil. Hence, the research have tried to analyse both the Senegalese migratory flow to Brazil and the current social inequality that Senegalese (and more generally Afro-Brazilians) experience in the country nowadays. In order for a better examination, Brazil has been analysed to focus better on that historical part which has guided its evolution.

The first chapter has been dedicated to analysing one of the two main countries of this study: Senegal. It has been an analysis focused on the internal issues of this land which have pushed many young people out, forcing them to migrate both to Brazil and to Europe as well.

The chapter has been wondering what might be the main causes of this migratory phenomena considering that the country experiences a peaceful status overall nowadays. This is where the whole question results in the light of its far-reaching importance. As has been documented in the first part of this research, the burden of the *FRANC CFA*, Senegalese currency (as well as other 13 African countries), has been studied in relation to the French and European power in Africa. This first half asserts the following research question as the core of the enquiry into the reasons for the flow of migration from Senegal:

[...] le FRANC CFA. Une monnaie inique, fabriquée par l'oligarchie française et contrôlée par la Banque de France qui, d'un point de vue économique, maintient l'Afrique dite « francophone » dans un enclos colonial.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Seba, K., (2018) "L'Afrique Libre ou la mort", New African Cultures Edition: Africa, p.22.

This currency has indeed an instrumental and direct role concerning the emigration issue from Senegal.

On the contrary, the second half of the chapter has been based on the reasons for the Senegalese choice of Brazil as final destination. In fact, even if this flow has acquired a new significance only recently since 2010, at the same time it has a symbolic value also in relation to a widespread change concerning general emigration from West Africa. Nonetheless, Brazil is still a secondary destination, especially for the large geographical distance from Senegal, even if many Senegalese have preferred this place rather than closer spots. It has been investigated the importance of the Senegalese *Associationism*, many of them in fact migrate following the example of their friends or brothers whose, once they get to Brazil, report the local environment. The strong bond and pride which this community really harbours in relation to the native land is clearly visible. Tradition, culture, the different ways to behave are palpable and become spokesperson of a need of identity in relation to the country where they live. Senegalese love their native country, they would not want to migrate but, at the same time, they are forced to.

The second chapter has had a more descriptive role. In fact, it has been introduced the second main country of this study: Brazil.

The attention Brazil has received derives from its relatively harmonious transition from slavery, absence of legalized discrimination and overt racial tension, history of widespread miscegenation, and a resulting dynamic system of multiracial classification. These characteristics contributed to the widely view that the country was free of the segregation and discrimination against blacks. Brazil's image is quite different on the other hand, as widely expressed in Chapter two.

The development of Brazilian history had therefore a primary importance along the racist feeling in this territory. The creation of a strongly multi-ethnic society is not a synonym of integration between whites and non-whites in Brazil. The abolition of slavery, the project of *branqueamento* promoted by the first Republican government and the myth of "racial democracy" raised up through the work of Gilberto Freyre (Casa-Grande & Senzala) have created a particular reality experienced by the population nowadays. Even though the results from Brazil's 2010 census have shown that the white population dropped below 50% of the total for the first time, to about 48% and, on the other hand, 7,5% of Brazilians identified themselves as *pretos*, and 43% *pardos*, they are

considered as a minority in the country still today, in a cultural sense of the term. Even today, whiteness is a synonym of richness and upper middle class, blackness still has the proletariat's stigma. As analysed in chapter two, this unequal situation was created through an unprecedented development of the country which promoted the so-called "whitening project" to purify the population through the European immigration between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. In the period following the abolition of slavery (1888), non-whites started to be considered as inferior races, at the same time the new republican government founded a country on a white social structure

However, Whiteness doesn't simply refer to membership in a group that's defined by skin colour. Rather, it's a term used to refer to the economic and social privileges afforded to white individuals in Brazil. Furthermore, constructions of whiteness have changed over time, shifting to accommodate the demands of social change. Before the mid-19th century, the existence of more than one white race was commonly accepted, in popular culture. Indeed, there were several. Even if in Brazil there was slavery, black people were nonetheless classified as inferior, the situation changed from the end of the 19th century with both the creation of the new government and the positivist and eurocentrism theories developed in Europe which influenced the new Brazilian country.

Another factor which makes integration even more harder, it was the surface area of Brazil. Senegalese migrants are mainly in the southernmost region of Rio Grande do Sul. However before reaching this region, they crossed the Peruvian western border with the Brazilian region of Acre. The great extent of this land has almost created a territorial division of all ethnic groups making integration less easier as well.

The third chapter has finally analysed the social inequalities between whites and blacks (*pretos* and *pardos*) from four different point of view: Life expectancy, Years of schooling, Incomes, Unemployment rate.

Data have therefore been able to show up the Brazilian racial inequality of which was followed the historical development during the second chapter of this study.

This section of the research has demonstrated that Brazil's approach to the equal consideration of different ethnic groups is negative and inclusive, and based on the principles of White Universalism whom considers itself more suitable to occupy major roles in society. In effect, white supremacy is an ideology based on racist feeling that

white people are superior to people of other races. As widely examined, it has roots in scientific racism, and it often relies on no probative arguments. However, this part of the research has been carried out through the analysis of relevant statistics about social inequalities of the existing gap into four social categories (Life Expectancy, Education, Incomes, Unemployment Rate) between different ethnic groups (whites and Afro-Brazilians) in Brazil.

At the same time, the second half of this chapter dealt with a more direct approach to the research issue. A questionnaire has been carried out to describe directly the situation experienced by twenty young Senegalese who are living in Brazil nowadays. The survey is only concerned with interviewees working in the great area of the southern region of Rio Grande do Sul where the main companies are located. It is divided into different sections. The first few questions have analysed sociodemographic aspects related to the interviewees. Other questions concerning social information about the reasons for the Brazilian choice as final destination and questions about the validity of Visa or related to their native land as well. Furthermore, the last few questions have tried to provide a precise background on the racial situation in Brazil. Many answers have confirmed what the thesis had previously stated about a strong internal division between blacks and whites. Moreover, many of them stated to have suffered against them one racial episode at least during their years in Brazil. Workplaces, restaurants, on the streets are only few examples concerning places where the interviewees report racism because of the colour of their skin. These episodes revealed by many interviewees are as dramatic as unrealistic above all if many think about Brazil as the dreamful society and pleasant land, the perfect destination for every migrant. According to the paragraph 4.3 (Racial Inequality information), only 10% (2 out of 20) answered that they have never experienced racial episodes since they have been living in Brazil. On the contrary, 85% answered they experienced (or partially experienced) episodes of racism. A figure which merits further consideration about the current situation in Brazil.

However, in broad terms the questionnaire served as a general summary or final recapitulation of racial arguments carried out by this work. There has been an attempt to surround and verify all the notions expressed along this study through the answers given by the twenty Senegalese interviewed. Catching sight of their answers or their expectations have been thought a comparative analysis to all the argument dealt with.

This work has therefore tried to carry out a report which could unmask and reveal what hides this limitless territory. A land as big as difficult to interpret because of its history and its present as well. Brazil is a country that has offered a lot but at the same time has always presented some dangerous issues inside its borders.

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APPENDIX I

The Senegalese Embassy in Brazil reports me the official registered number of Senegalese migrants in 2017.

Visa - Embaixada do Senegal no Brasil

28 marzo 2018 21:12



INFORMATIONS SUR LE NOMBRE DE SENEGALAIS AU BRESIL

A: silv.occhino@gmail.com

Faisant suite a votre mail en date du 26 mars 2018,
Je vous communique le nombre de sénégalais recense jusqu'ici
Par l'ambassade.
Nombre de sénégalaise immatriculés en 2017 : **3466**

Bonne réception,


Sadikhe MBaye - Responsable de la Section Consulaire
Ambassade du Senegal à Brasília
SEN Avenida das Nações Lote 18
CEP: 70800-400 - Brasília / DF
Tel.: 55-61-3223.6110

APPENDIX II

LE SÉNÉGAL DANS LE MONDE


Salut, je m'appelle Silvio et je suis un étudiant italien. J'écris ma thèse, pour terminer l'Université à Venise, sur le phénomène de la migration du Sénégal au Brésil.. J'ai créé ce questionnaire pour avoir une idée plus précise de votre émigration au Brésil, mais aussi pour mieux connaître les conditions de votre intégration dans le pays Brésilien.

Merci pour votre aide.




3. Dans quelle ville du Sénégal êtes-vous né?

20 risposte



4. Depuis quand vivez-vous hors du Sénégal?

20 risposte




5. Si vous avez eu plus d'une expérience hors du Sénégal, écrivez ça brièvement votre histoire et les périodes de temps.

16 risposte

Non (3)
non (3)
Aucun
Mali, Burkina Faso et Togo
aucune
Je pas experience
oui
não
nunca
Beaucoup
Mauritanie jusqu'a 2011
en partie

6. Dans quel pays vivez-vous maintenant?

20 risposte




- Europe du Sud (Espagne, France, I...
- Europe du Nord (Allemagne, Anglet...
- Afrique de l'Ouest (Bénin, Burkina F...
- Autre région d'Afrique
- Argentina
- Brésil
- Équateur
- Pérou

▲ 1/2 ▼


7. Écrivez le nom de la ville précise où vous vivez maintenant

20 risposte



8. Pourquoi avez-vous changé de pays?

20 risposte




9. Quel est votre travail en ce moment? Écrivez ça brièvement aussi votre entreprise

20 risposte

Chef maçonnerie
Commerçant
Lavage
Je travaille comme aide avec un transporteur de matériels
cuisinier
lavager
produção
cosmetiques
BRF
Administrativo
production volailles
Collaborateur BrF
Promoteur immobilier
BrF administrateur cuisinier
cozinhar frango
Eu não trabalha agora
fazer frango
Bijouterie-ETS Serigne
Sondaeste, escavações e instalação de instrumentos de leitura
Usine de poulet, brf


10. Pendant combien de temps votre Visa est-il encore valable?

20 risposte




11. Est-ce-que vous savez déjà quand vous rentrerez chez vous, au Sénégal?

20 risposte



12. Souhaitez-vous rentrer au Sénégal?

20 risposte




13. Si oui, pourquoi?

12 risposte

pourquoi (2)
J'aimerais faire des cours de mécanique puis rentrer chez moi et tenter de travailler là
famille
esta minha familia
non
Poque la esta minha família
ma famille est la
j'aime le Sénégal
minha familia está la
Parce que oui
ma famille vis la

14. Est-ce que votre famille vit avec vous?

20 risposte



15. Avez vous jamais subi des actes racistes de la part de la population brésilienne?

20 risposte




16. Si oui, pouvez-vous nous raconter brièvement votre expérience

16 risposte

non (3)
J'ai une fois dans un grand restaurant ou j'étais le seul noir . Dès mon arrivée il y avait 2 adolescents se moquant de moi mais je fais comme si de rien n'était
discriminação
oui, le racisme des blancs brésiliens
Travaillant parce que je suis noire
les chefs nous maltraitent
en travaillant
porque sou negro
pela cor da pele
Quand je suis arrivé au Brésil je n'étais pas bienvenu
sou de cor
je subi racisme pour la couleur de peau
Jê ne croie pás cest chose
au restaurant, on disait qu'il était complet mais c'était faux

17. Est-ce-que la population locale vous a aidé dans le processus d'intégration?

20 risposte



18. Voulez-vous que ce questionnaire reste/soit anonyme?

20 risposte



20. Merci beaucoup pour votre aide. Auriez-vous un commentaire à formuler?

6 risposte

ok

rien

De rien

Jê veut entre connu par le monde intero

Non merci

De rien

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Ai miei genitori che mi hanno permesso di raggiungere questo traguardo senza, mai, avermi fatto mancare un solido supporto.

A mia nonna che ha sempre “pricatu” per me e che rappresenta la mia parte più bella.

A Martina che è sempre stata presente nel viaggio.

Ai miei più cari amici, quelli che ci sono e che ormai resteranno.

Al Prof. Beneduzi che, sebbene mi abbia fatto sudare, ha fatto in modo che venisse fuori il meglio di me.

Infine a me stesso, che ci sono sempre stato e che sempre sarò.

Che sia l’inizio e non la fine perché la vita è sollievo e giorni così ci aiutano a non dimenticarlo.