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The role of the United Nations in Peacekeeping: the case of Cyprus and the UNFICYP

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Abstract

Il 4 marzo 2024 ricorrerà il 60° anniversario dall'inizio della presenza della forza delle Nazioni Unite a Cipro (UNFICYP). L'intervento dell'Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite (ONU) nel costruire e mantenere la pace sull'isola tra le due comunità coesistenti è stata oggetto di dibattito per decenni. Difatti, l'ONU ha presidiato diverse proposte e tentativi di negoziati tra le comunità Greco Cipriota e Turco Cipriota, ottenendo scarsi risultati. Il ruolo dell'UNFICYP a Cipro si è evoluto e modificato dalla sua prima istituzione in poi. Esso è rimasto attivo, sebbene con modalità diverse, nel tentativo di costruire una pace duratura e un contesto sicuro per il futuro dei Ciprioti di entrambe le comunità.

La presenza esemplare dell'UNFICYP deriva dal fatto che è una delle prime missioni di pace intraprese dalle Nazioni Unite, e una delle più longeve. Per questo motivo, la seguente tesi di laurea magistrale si propone di condurre un'analisi approfondita sullo specifico caso di Cipro, con l'obiettivo di rispondere alla domanda di ricerca: "Quanto è stata efficace l'UNFICYP nel mantenere la pace a Cipro?".

La presenza dell'ONU sull'isola ha dovuto affrontare numerose questioni e sfide nel passato. Dal momento che la questione è irrisolta, oggi la presenza internazionale si interfaccia sia con questioni passate che con questioni attuali di recente sviluppo.

Per l'elaborazione di questa tesi, e per lo sviluppo di argomentazioni valide, sono stati impiegati metodi qualitativi e quantitativi di ricerca. Il lavoro ha comportato la raccolta di dati attraverso la ricerca d'archivio, l'analisi del contenuto di documenti ufficiali, risoluzioni, e report delle Nazioni Unite. Fu di supporto una lettura critica di libri scritti da autori esperti del caso, articoli accademici e pagine web ufficiali. Inoltre, la ricerca sul campo ha supportato il lavoro di raccolta dati, per merito dalla mia personale esperienza di vita a Cipro, grazie alla quale ho potuto interfacciarmi con l'attuale realtà cipriota.

Per essere in grado di rispondere alla domanda di ricerca, ed entrare nel vivo del caso studio, è necessario comprendere il ruolo delle Nazioni Unite nella risoluzione di conflitti attraverso le operazioni per la costruzione e per il mantenimento della pace.

Nella prima parte di questo lavoro, dunque, un'attenta analisi è stata rivolta all'ONU, in quanto una delle più importanti organizzazioni internazionali con la missione di mantenere la pace e la sicurezza a livello globale.

L'organizzazione è composta da Stati e, in quanto tale, la sovranità degli Stati è il fondamento e il fulcro del sistema. Sin dalla pace di Westfalia nel 1648, un nuovo ordine internazionale è stato stabilito, dove gli Stati hanno la responsabilità di proteggere le loro popolazioni e la sicurezza umana. Tal volta che uno stato viene meno a questo dovere, l'intervento umanitario

è considerato un modo appropriato per intervenire in salvaguardia dei diritti umani. L'importanza dell'ONU deriva proprio da questa responsabilità, la responsabilità di proteggere, in quanto è uno dei principali organi con questo mandato, essa agisce attraverso mezzi diplomatici e umanitari. I mezzi dell'ONU sono descritti nella Carta delle Nazioni Unite, documento fondante dell'organizzazione che contiene riferimenti sia ai diritti degli Stati che a quelli degli individui. Ciononostante, è importante sottolineare che le operazioni di mantenimento della pace si sono sviluppate attraverso la pratica e le riforme, anche a causa del mancato riferimento diretto al mantenimento della pace nella Carta delle Nazioni Unite. Di conseguenza, per arrivare ad un'analisi più comprensibile del caso di studio della UNFICYP, la comprensione dei principi guida su cui sono basaste le operazioni di pace è cruciale.

In particolare, i mandati delle missioni si basano su principi di consenso delle parti, imparzialità sostenuta dalle forze, e l'uso della forza solo in casi di auto difesa. L'imparzialità e neutralità giocano un ruolo cruciale nelle operazioni di pace e sono fondamentali nel caso di Cipro, in quanto presuppongono il mantenimento del consenso e la cooperazione delle parti, poiché la credibilità e la legittimità non devono essere minate.

Un confronto tra le operazioni di pace è essenziale per comprendere l'evoluzione delle operazioni, dall'istituzione dell'ONU fino ad oggi. E' meritevole di un'analisi anche la necessità di riforme a causa di limiti, come la possibilità del Consiglio di Sicurezza e dei membri permanenti di vincolare risoluzioni tramite il sistema di veto. In particolare, è da notare come alcuni periodi storici, ad esempio il periodo della Guerra Fredda e del suo contesto politico, abbiano influenzato numerosi mancati interventi proprio a causa di questo sistema.

Entrando nel vivo del caso di Cipro, il contesto storico permette di comprendere le radici su cui si sono stanziate le prime tensioni tra le comunità.

La storia dell'isola è stata influenzata dal dominio di potenze esterne, e l'influenza straniera, motivata da una posizione strategica di Cipro nel Mar Mediterraneo, ha contribuito all'inizio della separazione in diverse società. In particolare, l'impero Ottomano a Cipro, ha influenzato significativamente la composizione delle comunità, dal momento che il governo si basava su una struttura organizzata dove era garantito un grado di autonomia e divisione in base a caratteristiche sociali, politiche e religiose. Diverse aspirazioni politiche hanno dunque origini in questo periodo.

Ciononostante, i sentimenti nazionalistici delle comunità sono emersi in tempi diversi, influenzando profondamente il conflitto. Nello specifico, i Greco-Ciprioti aspiravano all'unione con lo Stato greco *(enosis),* mentre i Turco-Ciprioti cercavano l'autonomia politica, e divisione *(taksim).* I sentimenti nazionalistici vennero importati da Grecia e Turchia nelle rispettive

comunità e, durante il periodo in cui Cipro fu colonia inglese, la corona contribuì alla divisione tra le comunità, attraverso la politica di governo "divide et impera" (Ker-Lindsay, 2014).

Le tensioni si intensificarono con l'indipendenza dalla corona britannica nel 1960. Lo stesso anno, quando la Repubblica di Cipro fu istituita, la struttura accordata era complessa, e il potere fu diviso tra ciprioti greci e turchi con un rapporto 70:30. I nuovi accordi di sovranità di Cipro dipendevano da tre importanti trattati firmati al momento dell'indipendenza: il Trattato di Garanzia, il Trattato di Alleanza e il Trattato di Stabilimento.

Tuttavia, gli accordi sono stati firmati in una situazione di preoccupazione e sfiducia, in cui i colloqui si sono sviluppati con grande difficoltà e la comunicazione tra le due comunità è stata probabilmente impostata con entrambe le parti spinte unicamente dai propri interessi.

Fu in questo contesto che fu richiesto un urgente intervento da parte dell'ONU, in quanto la pace e la sicurezza internazionale erano a rischio per le crescenti tensioni etniche.

L'UNFICYP fu dunque istituita il 4 marzo 1964 attraverso la Risoluzione 186 e operando sotto il mandato del Consiglio di Sicurezza. Dopo circa sei mesi dall'inizio dell'operazione a Cipro, U Thant, in qualità di Segretario Generale delle Nazioni Unite, presentò il rapporto S/5950 per il Consiglio di Sicurezza sull'UNFICYP, e dalle sue osservazioni trasparve che la forza ricevette una grande responsabilità senza un mandato chiaro e preciso (UNSC, 10/09/1964).

Un anno dopo, il report S/6253 fu presentato dal Rappresentante Speciale del Segretario Generale, Galo Plaza Lazo, e le sue raccomandazioni si concentravano sulla necessità che le due parti e i loro rappresentanti si incontrassero per discutere una soluzione (UNSC, 26/03/1965). Per Galo Plaza, il dialogo tra le due comunità doveva concentrarsi sull'ascolto e sull'azione nel rispetto delle preoccupazioni di entrambe le parti. Il dialogo doveva essere aperto al compromesso, se necessario.

Nel mentre, numerose risoluzioni richiamarono le parti a colloqui intercomunitari, ma le violenze e tensioni soprattutto verso la comunità turco cipriota negli anni seguenti continuarono a crescere. Con esse, e con l'adozione di diverse risoluzioni dell'ONU, la forza UNFICYP si allargò, includendo un controllo del disarmo e gli accordi per garantire la sicurezza interna.

Quando la giunta militare greca prese il controllo dell'isola con un colpo di Stato, la Turchia decise di invadere Cipro in supporto del Trattato di Garanzia. Questa decisione fu motivata dal fatto che si temeva l'*enosis* e che la comunità turco-cipriota sembrava in pericolo a causa dei continui combattimenti.

Un cessate il fuoco permanente fu indetto dalle Nazioni Unite e fu raggiunto in modo definitivo solo alla fine del 1975, ma a quel punto si era giunti ad una divisione *de facto* dell'isola, e ad una occupazione del 36% dell'isola da parte delle forze turche. Le conseguenze dell'invasione

furono diverse. Tra queste, il numero elevato di sfollati e i movimenti di Ciprioti Greci e Ciprioti Turchi causarono problemi presenti ancora oggi e legati alle rivendicazioni di proprietà e alla libertà di movimento e di insediamento.

Successivamente, nel 1983, la parte settentrionale dell'isola fu dichiarata Repubblica Turca di Cipro del Nord (TRNC). Da allora, è riconosciuta solo dalla Turchia, e Cipro è divisa in modo che ogni comunità ha autorità e giurisdizione sul proprio lato e non può intervenire nell'altro.

In seguito all'intervento turco venne adottata la Risoluzione 367, in cui il Consiglio di Sicurezza chiese ancora una volta il rispetto dell'integrità di Cipro e gli sforzi diplomatici vennero nuovamente sollecitati per i negoziati. Inoltre, venne richiesta cooperazione con la forza di pace. Nel corso degli anni seguenti, diversi tentativi per una riunificazione sono stati fatti sotto l'egida dell'ONU, con risultati fallimentari. Tra questi, nel 2004, il Segretario Generale delle Nazioni Unite, Kofi Annan, propose una riunificazione tramite soluzione federale. Ma anche il Piano Annan fu respinto. Dopo il fallimento del piano Annan, i tentativi dell'ONU di riaprire il dialogo ebbero scarsi risultati dal momento che le posizioni politiche delle comunità in temi quali la sicurezza, la proprietà e governo, erano in costante contrasto, impedendo la costruzione di un dialogo sincero. Nel 2017 seguirono i colloqui di Crans-Montana, e dopo il loro fallimento, non avendo trovato punti di forza comuni per colloqui formali, il Segretario generale delle Nazioni Unite ha tentato di riavviare i negoziati su Cipro in molte occasioni.

Anche se il mandato dell'UNFICYP viene rinnovato ogni anno, i nuovi tentativi di negoziazione sembrano lontani e i compromessi tra le due comunità non dimostrano progressi. Dal punto di vista civile, i ciprioti intervistati e il clima generale dimostra scetticismo su una soluzione futura nel breve periodo, ed è stato osservato come la parte civile sia assente dal coinvolgimento diretto nei processi di risoluzione del conflitto. Inoltre, l'efficacia dell'operazione di pace dell'ONU a Cipro è oggi messa a dura prova anche dallo sviluppo di nuovi problemi, come la scoperta di nuove risorse nell'isola, la crescente militarizzazione delle parti e le diverse situazioni economiche di crisi. Oltre alle nuove sfide, la situazione è modellata da fattori radicati nel conflitto, tra essi la sicurezza, il problema delle proprietà, e la questione della pace sociale tra le due comunità.

La sicurezza è l'obiettivo primario delle forze di pace delle Nazioni Unite e per mantenerla l'organizzazione utilizza una serie di strumenti e mezzi come la creazione di zone cuscinetto. Nel caso di Cipro, la salvaguardia della zona cuscinetto, area geografica di divisione delimitata dalla cosiddetta *Linea Verde,* è tra le attività più importanti di cui l'UNFICYP si è occupata sin dal suo primo intervento sull'isola negli anni Sessanta. Tra le attività svolte, c'è il sostegno all'ordine pubblico, il monitoraggio delle manifestazioni, il supporto alla risoluzione delle

controversie tra le due comunità e la regolamentazione delle attività civili. Tuttavia, l'efficienza complessiva della zona cuscinetto è limitata da alcuni fattori, tra cui le violazioni e i possibili incidenti nell'area. Sebbene, la sicurezza sia uno degli elementi di maggior successo dell'UNFICYP e, come dimostrato da un confronto con il passato, è ora più efficiente, le tensioni tra le comunità e l'aumento delle violazioni militari nell'ultimo periodo sono motivo di preoccupazione.

Rispetto al problema delle proprietà, è importante riconoscere come la questione sia passata gradualmente dall'essere un aspetto trattato indirettamente nei primi tentativi di negoziazione delle Nazioni Unite, fino a diventare un aspetto affrontato nel piano Annan e che sarà centrale nel caso di una futura negoziazione di successo. Tuttavia, la possibilità di inefficienza in termini di diritti di proprietà e diritti dei rifugiati, potrebbe essere causata da una mancanza di volontà di compromesso da parte delle due parti.

Le Nazioni Unite si sono sforzate di trovare un compromesso tra la possibilità di bizonalità nel caso di Cipro e il diritto di proprietà. Eppure, il risultato, anche su questa questione, ha dimostrato che le parti non erano aperte al compromesso.

Per queste ragioni, la sezione Affari Civili dell'UNFICYP si occupa di promuovere un ambiente di dialogo pacifico tra le comunità di Cipro. Ma la costruzione della fiducia incontra alcuni limiti e sfide quando sono coinvolte le comunità locali.

Non solo il limite principale deriva da una divisione fisica dell'isola, ma è presente una divisione anche a causa di differenti tipi di narrazioni che ostacolano un dialogo di pace. La retorica utilizzata dalle comunità e dalle loro autorità, che affonda le sue radici nel conflitto passato, è ancora presente e contribuisce al sentimento di divisione e sfiducia. Nello specifico, la disinformazione è presente in luoghi dove gli individui dovrebbero sviluppare educazione di pace e di riunificazione, come le scuole. Per questo motivo, l'ONU richiama le parti a promuovere un'educazione di pace e a costruire dialogo intracomunitario attraverso eventi e scambi educativi, anche grazie al sostegno di progetti collaborativi proposti da organizzazioni non governative come la *Home for Cooperation*. Lo sforzo deriva dal bisogno di coinvolgere attivamente la società civile alla politica e alla pace, dato che le autorità si sono dimostrate incapaci di vedere il contesto multiforme e non hanno colto la necessità di trovare un compromesso attraverso un dialogo pacifico.

In conclusione, la situazione irrisolta e longeva del caso di Cipro, e i decenni di divergenze politiche, causano una riluttanza delle parti al dialogo. Per questo motivo, è stato discusso come preoccupazioni di sicurezza, interessi nazionali di proprietà e movimento, e scarsa volontà, influenzino l'efficienza dell'UNIFICYP. Nonostante il ruolo della forza per il mantenimento

della pace a Cipro è fondamentale nel monitorare la zona cuscinetto, garantire sicurezza e facilitare iniziative per la costruzione di una cultura di pace, lo sforzo per riavvicinare le comunità incontra riluttanza dalle parti.

Dato che le Nazioni Unite sono attivamente richiamate con costanti rinnovi del loro mandato, la speranza risiede nella possibilità che i numerosi sforzi per il mantenimento e costruzione della pace continueranno coinvolgendo maggiormente le parti ai negoziati, includendo anche la società civile. Il costante supporto dell'ONU, tramite assistenza umanitaria e tramite la ricerca di un terreno fertile dove le parti saranno aperte al compromesso, è un ulteriore speranza per il raggiungimento di una soluzione duratura e pacifica del caso.

Introduction

The 4th of March 2024 will be the 60th anniversary of the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Since 1964, the UNFICYP's mission has been to maintain peace and security on the island, and it was established after tensions increased in the 1960s between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. However, today it deals with a multifaceted context, which contributed to the debate on whether the force is efficient or not in its role of peacekeeping.

Precisely for this, this thesis aims to answer the research question: 'How effective has UNFICYP been in keeping peace in Cyprus?'.

The decision to research the specific case study of Cyprus was motivated by the fact that it is one of the first peacekeeping operations ever begun by the United Nations and one of the longest-living missions in the world. The role of the UNFICYP in Cyprus evolved and changed from its first establishment in 1964 onward, many resolutions were approved and were emblematic till the present.

Considering the Cyprus case study exceptional for the significance it has in the peacekeeping role of the UN, it is also a matter of extreme interest to my study career. Furthermore, it is particularly close to my heart as I had the opportunity to live, study and research for a semester on the island, thanks to the Erasmus+ program.

This thesis examines the efforts carried out by the UN, not only for peacekeeping but also for peacebuilding. It analyses the globality of the UNFICYP, as its role has been pivotal in the mediation of the case, and its neutral position has been promoting the search for a common ground where a lasting solution could be established.

Qualitative and quantitative methods have been employed in the processing of this paper. The work involved data gathering through critical reading, and archival research of UN documents, UN resolutions, reports, books, journal articles, and official web pages. Data analysis was fundamental through the examination of United Nations official documents on the work of the UN and then on the UN in Cyprus. Information was open to access through the United Nations Digital Library, where a vast number of official documents are available to anyone, making possible the analysis of resources which were relevant to the present work. The collection of data and information from the website of the United Nations Security Council has been helpful as well. Resolutions adopted in Cyprus in the entire 60-year period supported the study of the case.

The UNFICYP official website has been useful to understand deeply the units that are part of the force and how they contribute to the mission. The United Nations News also played a key role in the research collection.

Furthermore, text analysis of books written by experts in the field supported the events' comprehension and the development of awareness. Academic Journals and News Outlets of reliable sources were used for the consideration of different aspects of the analysis.

Finally, field research was made feasible by the chance I had to live in Cyprus, discover the described places and meet the residents on both sides of the island. Therefore, participant observation was useful for the development of the arguments present in this work.

Although the conflict in Cyprus is considered recent, it has ancient roots. Historically, but also more recently, for reasons of strategic position and interests, the influence from outside actors has been present in Cyprus, contributing to the complexity of the case. The intervention of the United Nations happened in a context of very high inter-communal tension in 1964.

To understand the chosen case study and to answer the research question, this work will acknowledge the United Nations as one of the most important international organizations with the mission to build peace and keep it. In the specific, the legal foundation of the United Nations will be addressed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, where UN peacekeeping will be investigated as well.

The UN is considered the leading family of international organizations and possesses special powers, specialized agencies and international membership, which will be explained. The UN establishment owned broad aims regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations, cooperation in resolving international problems, and the promotion of human rights (UN Charter, Article 1, 1945).

After having explained the organization, paragraph 3 of the first Chapter (1.3) will consider the theory and the practice of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. The theory of peacekeeping includes three principles that need to be applied in each mission which are: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except for self-defence and defence of the mandate (DPKO, 2008). As for what concerns the practice, the difference between the operations mandated during the Cold War, when the organization first started to work, and the operations that occurred after the Cold War is notable. Due to the system of veto, and other features present during the period of the bipolar world, the Security Council of the United Nations, one of the main bodies of the organization responsible for taking resolutions and making intervention possible, has been blocked. After the Cold War, peacekeeping operations increased considerably with consequences also in the methods of intervention.

Decisive is the analysis of the factors that made the operations evolve, considering the case studies in their chronological moment.

The investigation of the peacekeeping operations will be carried out in paragraph 4 (1.4). Emblematic case studies will be approached, both as successes and failures, with the final aim of being able to compare them to the specific case study of this research, which is Cyprus.

UN peacekeeping faced several challenges, and always new challenges arise. As the organization failed to intervene in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and failed to protect the 'safe area' of Srebrenica in 1995 with the following massacre, the general credibility was undermined, and operations were seen negatively by international and public opinion and faced criticism. It will be argued that despite many failures, successes were also reached by the UN forces in other cases and in matters such as the prevention of full-scale conflicts and the protection of civilians. An eye to the present is important to fully comprehend the evolution of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). For what regards the situation in Ukraine and the Israel/Palestine conflict, the UN intervention is debated as well.

The Cyprus case study is addressed in Chapter 2. It has deep historical roots and the ancient origins of the case will be discussed as important for the present context (2.2). Cyprus' history is long and complex, as different cultures and civilisations intervened on the island since ancient times and influenced it in contemporary and modern history. Due to its strategic position, Cyprus has always attracted big powers. It has been ruled by Persians, Egyptians, Romans, Byzantines, Venetians, and Arabs.

In 1570 began Ottoman rule on the island, which lasted till the end of the 19th century. The idea of the Ottoman Empire that today the Greek Cypriots have is extremely negative, but according to Ker-Lindsay, the reality is more complex (Ker-Lindsay, 2011), it will be observed why and how.

At the end of the Ottoman Empire's rule on the island, the British Colonial rule started in 1878 and lasted till the independence of the island in 1960. Due to the different political aspirations of the two communities co-existing on the island, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, and the distant structures of their societies, a common ground for the establishment of a united Cyprus was absent. Nationalist elites from both communities emerged at different times but influencing deeply the conflict. Greek Cypriots pursued *enosis* or union with the Greek state. While Turkish Cypriots sought partition and political autonomy, through *Taksim.* After Cyprus gained independence from British rule in 1960, a constitution was written, and the structure of the new Republic was complex and fragile. Three important treaties were signed: the Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Establishment.

The two communities reacted differently to the independence, and tensions and violence grew between them, till the collapse of the constitution in 1964, and the establishment of the presence of a UN Peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) on the island (2.3). As fighting continued because negotiations were seen as impossible to achieve, the key event that changed the context completely was the Turkish invasion of the island which happened in 1974. The invasion happened after a coup by Greek nationalists who were aiming at the enosis. From that moment, the island is divided between the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRCN) in the north, a line of division, and the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus (RoC). The following attempts at negotiations are described in paragraph 3 (2.4).

Confidence in the United Nations suffered as the UN-led succession of attempts to pacify the island since 1974 was leading nowhere. A peak of confidence loss happened after the failure of the Annan Plan, a proposal that received a denial and which will be described. In any case, the efficiency of the UNFICYP was contested at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st.

Today, the emergence of new issues in Cyprus, and the persistence of old ones, keep challenging the force, and the feelings shared among people of both communities are sentiments of disillusion. The final paragraph of the second Chapter (2.5), will deal with the UN's ongoing relevance in the Cyprus issue.

In Chapter 3, or Discussion part, personal observations and field research are present, mostly related to my experience when crossing the buffer zone in May 2023 and confronting residents on both sides. Moreover, chapter 3 will finally delve into the efficiency of the UNFICYP through the analysis of three crucial aspects that are rooted in the case of Cyprus.

In the specific, the discussion part will focus on the three aspects chosen to evaluate the efficiency of the UN in bringing peace to Cyprus. The indicators for evaluation are border security, property issues, and the present societal peace between the two communities.

The issue of the security of the buffer zone will be discussed in paragraph 3 (3.2) of the chapter. Emphasized will be the UNFICYP's efforts to uphold security and sustain the ceasefire.

The mission of the UNFICYP expanded after the moment of invasion and a ceasefire was and still is supervised between the Green Line: the demilitarized buffer zone that divides the island. Since the buffer zone continues to separate the island and affect people's freedom of movement, its importance to civilian lives will also be explored.

The limits of the buffer zone will be examined as well, as the UNFICYP faces limitations in carrying out its mandate. The UNFICYP's limits are important to be observed to argue the overall efficiency of the UNFICYP in maintaining security.

A second issue worth analysis in the discussion of this paper is the property issue and its impact on refugees, presented in Chapter 3, paragraph 2 (3.3).

Along with inter-communal tension, movements started already in the 1960s, while the invasion of Turkey provoked unprecedented numbers of internally displaced persons. The problem of property disputes will be addressed as it is a core issue that must be present in a possible future solution. The role of the UNFICYP in mediating over territory and property will be explained, mostly evaluating in which way the Annan Plan directly addressed the problem and was close to finding a solution.

The unwillingness of both sides to make concessions is one of the reasons why property disputes and refugee rights seem not to be addressed efficiently yet. Generally, the lack of communities' concession to compromise limits the work of the UNFICYP, and it will be discussed how. The last paragraph of Chapter 3 (3.4) addresses the role of the UNFICYP in building bridges between the two communities. The nationalisms imported from mainland Greece and Turkey will be deepened, addressing the divisive narratives and the key role of historical schoolbooks in fostering divided societies.

The work of several units like the Civil Affairs Unit and the promotion of different projects and programmes will be examined, while the exemplary work of the NGO *Home for Cooperation* will be explored. At the end of this final chapter, it is argued that civil society must be prepared for peace, as political leaders have shown themselves incapable of understanding the complex situation and failing to see the necessity for negotiation and compromise.

The UNFICYP is constructing the bridges required for a future in which the two communities of Cyprus will cohabit without prejudice, human rights abuses, or mistrust among civilians. Moreover, as the recall of the UN Secretary-General has shown, the respect to the work of the force was recalled recently in the latest report of January 2024, together with the mention of the promotion of reconciliation (UNSC, 03/01/2024).

In the hope that the following findings will be helpful to others in further figuring out the case study, the work concludes with a critical examination of whether the United Nations has been efficient in keeping peace and building peace in the case of Cyprus and its unresolved *issue*.

1 Context of the case: UN Peacekeeping Missions & their background

1.1 Introduction

This first chapter focuses on the understanding of the United Nations (UN), as the UN is the leading family of international organizations, and it is the primary international body for the prevention, resolution of conflicts and maintenance of ceasefires and peace. A recognition of it is therefore needed for the entire scope of this thesis. The explanation of the legal foundation, structure, guiding principles and comparison between theory and practice, will help make possible a subsequent analysis of whether the case of the peacekeeping work has been successful in Cyprus.

The legal foundation of the UN and its missions will be debated in paragraph 2 (1.2). An important part of this chapter will be dedicated to the theory and the theoretical framework, considering the principles and the guidelines, and contrasting them with the challenges that emerge when translating theory into practice (1.3).

Case studies as examples of where the expectations met or did not the reality will be analyzed in chronological order. The reforms and evolution of UN peacekeeping with its challenges and issues will lead to a final analysis of the contemporary challenges of the missions, with a mention of the current conflicts in need of peacekeeping operations (1.4).

The organization was created by states for states, and it is composed of principal and subsidiary organs. The institutions which are part of the UN are its central system, located in New York, specialized agencies, and Funds and Programmes (Curtis and Taylor, 2020). The structures and powers of the main bodies are enlisted in the UN Charter, the foundational document and constitution of the organization.

UN Peacekeeping Missions started in 1948 with the first mission United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East (United Nations, n.d. a). Since then, the UN employed its peacekeeping forces, generally after the decision of the UN Security Council, in more than 70 operations. Some of them were considered successes, while others were considered failures: the aspects influencing them will be discussed.

Right now, 12 peacekeeping operations are currently operating in the world. The UNFICYP in Cyprus is one of the longest-running ones (United Nations, n.d. a).

1.2 The United Nations

The United Nations is a membership-directed organization composed of states. Therefore, the sovereignty of states is the foundation of the organization, central to the system. One of the primary goals of the organization is to protect civilians and prevent deaths. The rights of people have become the rights of states meaning that even if the concept of sovereignty is central for the UN, so is the protection of individuals, regardless of the state they come from. For this reason, at times, it may appear challenging to respect the concept of sovereignty and non-interference.

As mentioned by Bellamy and Wheeler in Baylis' book, since the Westphalian system of security in 1648 states have had the responsibility to protect their populations and human security, as the Peace of Westphalia is considered the beginning of the 'modern' international order. Whenever a state fails in its duty to protect, humanitarian intervention is discussed to be an appropriate way to respond to violations of fundamental human rights. Moreover, whenever this happens, the state failing to its duty should lose sovereignty (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2020, 516).

According to the Responsibility to Protect principle, the international community has the responsibility to intervene in the violations of the four crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The UN is one of the principal organs with the mandate to do so, by intervening with diplomatic, humanitarian, and peaceful means (Bellamy and Wheeler, 2020, 521-522).

Considering the importance of state sovereignty as well as the respect for human rights, the UN seeks to balance the two concepts, considering an intervention when a state is failing in its duty to protect its population.

The Charter of the United Nations, as the founding agreement of the organization, contains references to both the rights of states and the rights of individuals and it is bound to the UN Member States (United Nations, n.d. b). At the time of the organization's charter foundation, the original members were 51 countries, while up to date the members have grown to 193 (United Nations, n.d. c), 193 members who, theoretically, must respect the document.

At the very beginning of the UN Charter, in the preamble, the first sentence 'We the people of the United Nations determined (…) to have succeeding generations from the scourge of war' is significant for the purposes and principles of the entire organization. The preamble goes on:

> (…) to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions

under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom (…) (UN Charter, Preamble, 1945).

Article 1(1) of the charter continues stating that the purpose of the UN is:

(…) to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; (UN Charter, Article 1, 1945).

In Article 2 sovereignty is mentioned, the article proclaims that based on Article 1 and pursuing the purposes of the entire organization, the UN (1) 'is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members' and that (2) all UN members must fulfil their obligations following the principles of the UN Charter.
Fundamental for the understanding is paragraph 7 of the same article, which states that:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (UN Charter, Article 2, 1945).

Chapter VI of the UN Charter is one of the most significant ones because it treats the 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes'. Article 33 states what is first to be carried out:

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call Upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means (UN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 33, 1945).

Chapter VII of the Treaty is equally meaningful, based on it, the Security Council has the authorization to respond to threats to international peace and security. After the Cold War, this

chapter started to be more used, addressing both civil war and international conflicts (Curtis and Taylor, 2020). Non-military action, as well as military action when it is necessary, is allowed and authorized, as it is explained in this chapter.

Article 41 explains how the organ may decide to intervene without the use of force when there is no need to involve it. The measures can include economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and complete or partial interruption of economic relations (UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 41, 1945).

However, article 42 allows the Security Council to consider action through sea, air or land whether the measures in Article 41 are inadequate. Actions must be taken with the scope 'to maintain or restore international peace and security' (UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42, 1945).

Plus, according to Article 99, whenever threats to peace and security happen, the Secretary-General may bring it to the attention of the Security Council (UN Charter, Article 99, 1945).

Three out of the five organs of the United Nations are the actors that may act and intervene in case of conflict: the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General. These actors are interrelated. However, the Security Council is the main executive organ that according to the fundamental UN Charter and Article 33 of Chapter VI, explained before, has the role of authorizing and addressing peacekeeping missions. The question that may arise is when the Security Council decides to bring a conflict to the attention of the UN and select it as needed for intervention. This happens when an issue is seen as a threat to international peace and security. However, through the years, some conflicts received more attention than others and consequently reached more resolutions (Wallensteen, 2002).

Having underlined how the rights of states and people happen to be dealt with in the moment of the institution of the entire United Nations organization, and having shortly mentioned the UN bodies, it should be also mentioned that there is something more when threats to peace and security are concerned, something not mentioned in the Charter but developed in the 1950s.

As Wallensteen in his book suggests, between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, there is something often imagined as a Chapter 6 ½ that gives new dimensions for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Wallensteen, 2002). It is known as the 'Uniting for Peace Resolutions' and is based on resolution 377 A (V) of the General Assembly.

Through the years, the Security Council has failed to intervene for peace and security because permanent members paralyzed it. For these reasons, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V) in November 1950, which states that the General Assembly recognize the

two first purposes of the United Nations as maintaining international peace and security, and therefore it can take measures in case there are threats to them.

In the specific, the Assembly (1):

> Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security (UNGA, 03/11/1950).

The paralysis of the Security Council is consequent to the right to veto that the permanent member countries, China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US, benefit. According to the right to veto, any resolution of the Security Council can be blocked by a permanent member (Wallensteen, 2002). The veto mechanism is powerful as it can prevent the UN from being a tool of domination by powerful states. For instance, for the fact that the major Cold War powers used to block resolutions that were opposite to their interest. As stated by Wallensteen, if the Soviet Union had chosen not to be part of the organization, during the Cold War, the UN would have been an instrument of Western powers against the Eastern bloc. Instead, as a permanent member, the Soviet Union inactivated the Council on several occasions using the veto power. It subsequently led to the increased power of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. In today's geopolitical context, the veto system is still a matter of debate.

In any case, the roles of the three organs kept changing since the 1950s but all three contributed 'to make the UN relevant for international conflict resolution' (Wallensteen, 2002).

Only in 2005, under the proposal of the Secretary-General, another body was established which complements the work of the General Assembly and the Security Council: the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This body, specifically, works for post-conflict recovery in countries where peacekeeping missions were present.

The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) is another working department of the UN which is responsible for coordinating and directing UN peacekeeping missions around the world. It mediates with the Security Council, the troops, financial contributors, and the parties involved in the conflict; all to implement the mandate of the Security Council (United Nations, n.d. d).

DPO has worked since the implementation of the first Peacekeeping mission which was in 1948.

Keeping in mind the legal framework on which the UN was founded, it is convenient to get into the thick of the United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection actions.

Peacekeeping protects civilians, helps to guarantee ceasefires and supports political processes to achieve lasting peace for countries (United Nations, n.d. e).

Specifically, PKOs protect individuals by separating combatants, reducing battlefield activities and 'policing, monitoring, patrolling, and enforcing civilian protection behind the battle lines' (Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon, 2013). The capacity of the organization to protect civilians is strictly dependent on the mission size and the number of peacekeepers sent on the ground.

The UN personnel is constituted by UN Military personnel, called the Blue Helmets, working together with the UN Police, and civilian observers (United Nations, n.d. f). To reduce and mitigate violence between civilians on the battlefield, Blue Helmets are called upon and are necessary in conflict zones and disputed borders. The Blue Helmets work for the promotion of a secure environment, where peace processes can take place, their support for lasting peace is sustained by their efforts with the local communities and the security authorities.

Today, the military personnel working in peace operations on the ground are 70,000 (United Nations, n.d. f).

More military troops are involved and deployed by the UN, less violence is committed towards civilians.

The unarmed observers, diversely from the Blue Helmets, are not mandated to use force to protect individuals. However, they have the mandate to monitor and report to an international audience the atrocities committed and the processes of the conflict (Hultman et al. 2013).

The first missions of UN peacekeeping were limited to resolving conflict utilizing peaceful means, without the use of force. The missions were carried out to maintain ceasefires, stabilize the situation on the battlefield and support political efforts for dialogue and solutions.

Peacekeeping missions changed when the Security Council appeared to be paralyzed by the rivalries of the Cold War and the operations evolved through the years as the nature of the conflicts changed as well.

1.3 Between theory and practice

1.3.1 The three basic principles of peacekeeping

Having analysed the theory of the organization, vital for understanding the scope of the peacekeeping force, it is important to note that peacekeeping operations developed through practice and reforms, also because of the lack of a direct UN peacekeeping reference in the UN Charter. Therefore, theory can be found in the operations mandates of the Security Council and the principles of operations.

The three principles that set UN peacekeeping operations for international peace and security are impartiality, consent, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate (DPKO, 2008).

Impartiality plays a crucial role in PKOs, and it is important to maintain the parties' consent and cooperation. The mandate should be carried out by the operation in an impartial way, meaning that it must be objective during the dealing between the parties, and this status of impartiality must be maintained during the whole duration of the mandate because credibility and legitimacy should not be undermined (United Nations, n.d. g). In other words, favoritisms or prejudices should not be present during the missions, as the consent may be threatened or withdrawn by one or more parties. Communication during operations must be clear and transparent for these reasons (DPKO, 2008).

PKOs are supposed to be deployed once the parties involved have consented to their implementation. Through this consent, the parties are committed to a political process. Without explicit consent, the UN operation 'risks becoming a party to the conflict, and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace' (United Nations, n.d. g).

The last principle of the Capstone Doctrine is the nonuse of force. Since the first peacekeeping operation, the only deterrence in which the forces are allowed to use force are cases of self-defence and defence of the mandates. This condition must be allowed by the Security Council, which gives the authorization to 'use all necessary means' (UN Charter, 1945) in cases where there are attempts to obstruct political processes, where civilians are at risk, and whenever national authorities need assistance to maintain law and order (DPKO, 2008). Furthermore, an operation should consider the use of force at last and must use it precisely, proportionally and appropriately to achieve the goal. Several factors must be considered, and between them, there is the need to consider the humanitarian impact, public perceptions, and the effects that will be consequent on national and local consent (United Nations, n.d. g).

The three principles are interrelated. However, the PKOs are often deployed in fragile environments, where violence, collapse and distress are ordinary. Whenever interests are present, the United Nations' work may be tested for weakness and division by some parties. Moreover, missions may assume some functions temporarily based on the capacities and many are the variables that may change the nature of the mission during its course (DPKO, 2008).

1.3.2 Peacekeeping operations into practice

In the 1990s, an increase in tolerance for the use of force was registered.

Many scholars discuss that with the most recent mandates of peacekeeping operations, there was a shift from defensive toward offensive use of force (Peter, 2015). It is argued that the distinction between *peacekeeping*, where the missions were originally limited to the observing of cease-fires and the laying of foundations for peace, and *peace enforcement*, where coercive measures were included, became blurred with time.

The first two peacekeeping operations were the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) (United Nations, n.d. a). The UNTSO and UNMOGIP share some features, but the first reason why they are important to mention is that they were pioneering missions. As so, they established the principles for future missions. Apart from this, they share the nature of the mission, as both operations were carried out in regions characterized by recent conflicts to monitor ceasefires.

Established in 1948, the UNTSO was set as Arab states contested the declaration of statehood of Israel (1947), the UN troops were asked to supervise the implementation of the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreements, prevent conflict escalations, and assist the UN PKOs in the region (*UNTSO*, 2020).

The UN military observers of the UNMOGIP arrived in 1949 with the same purpose as the UNTSO observers, but in a different area: they had to monitor the ceasefire between India and Pakistan after the First Kashmir War (United Nations, n.d. a).

The personnel of both missions were unarmed military observers. Due to the conflict events that followed in the years, the nature of the UNTSO and UNMOGIP operations, and the role of the personnel, changed. It remained active in the area to this day to observe developments.

The first time the use of force was deployed by the United Nations peacekeeping forces was during the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) (United Nations, n.d. a).

The mission was established in 1956 and it was set with the consent of the parties involved and in response to the Suez Crisis. The force terminated with the request to withdraw by the Egyptian Government. The Secretary-General was informed that the government of Egypt

would not have allowed and consented to the stationing of the Force on Egyptian territory and in Gaza anymore, so the forces were obliged to leave in 1967 (*UNEF I,* n.d.).

The three principles of PKOs have characterized UNEF 1. It was a force considered neutral, it was armed but just in self-defence. Even if the success of a mission is complex to define because it depends on several criteria, UNEF 1 was generally considered successful by the international community. For this reason, it may be discussed that missions like the one just mentioned, did not go too far from theory, at least for the period in which the mandate worked, and the consent did last. Further reasons for the importance of UNEF 1 to be mentioned is that it was established for the first time by the General Assembly, as the Security Council's inability in the case.

Another pioneering mission of the United Nations was the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which was launched in 1960 and deployed 20,000 military personnel in the newly independent Democratic Republic of the Congo (United Nations peacekeeping, n.d. a).

ONUC was an important operation because supportive of the process of decolonization and the process of independence of nations. Resolution 143 of the Security Council authorized to assist militarily, as necessary, the Government of the Republic of Congo in order to withdraw the Belgian forces from the Republic, assist the government, and provide technical assistance as the country became independent (*ONUC*, n.d.). The mandate was then modified involving the maintenance of territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo. Furthermore, the function of ONUC successively started to include the prevention of future civil wars and the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary, advisory personnel and all mercenaries that were not part of the United Nations Command (*ONUC*, n.d.).

Specifically, as described in Resolution 161 of 1961, the Council having considered the situation in the Congo, authorized the secretary-general '1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo' and '2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries (…)' (UNSC, 21/02/1961).

ONUC was successful in its purpose of maintaining the integrity of the territory and withdrawing foreign troops, however, the political, human, and financial costs were high (Curtis and Taylor, 2020). The operation ended in 1964. The first operation carried out by the UN in Congo can be seen positively.

MONUC was a following UN operation which was established in 1999 in Congo and then was renamed MONUSCO in 2010. The authorization regarded the support of the government and the protection of the civilians. Many have criticized the missions carried out in the Democratic

Republic of Congo, for instance, Hultman states that the UN made several mistakes and did not do enough to prevent violence (Hultman et al., 2014). The equipment of MONUC troops and their hesitation in pursuing action for violence reduction was exemplary. Overall, when the personnel were increased and the separation was done, MONUC was more efficient in ensuring security (Hultman et al., 2014). However, the missions in Congo, since the first mandate in 1960 till today, have demonstrated the difficulties of UN peacekeeping in state-building of nations.

It may be argued that peacekeeping actions, when intervening in certain situations of conflicts or instability, may simply freeze the scene. Five out of the fifteen first operations of the UN peacekeeping forces are still active: one of these is the one in Cyprus. For just an initial comparison between the other emblematic peacekeeping missions, it is now anticipated that it has been almost six decades since the term of the force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established. Because of the lengths of its mandate, the use of force adopted by the UN has been debated at various times, in some cases judged as overreaching and in others as not enough. Apart from the long-standing conflict, there are several reasons why the UNFICYP is an emblematic UN peacekeeping force. The core and rooted issues of the conflict are undermining the efficiency of the work carried out by the UN, as will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

The UN, together with the entire international community, faced criticism for the inability to respond and prevent some events and atrocities. In particular, after the Cold War and with the dissolution of the USSR, new conflicts in different regions arose. O'Neill stated that 'peace enforcement' may mean a tough involvement by the UN, but how, who and with what means, is often difficult to define (O'Neill, 2002). Some of the conflicts after the Cold War saw interventions with operations that were criticized to be failures, or not achieving the expected result and success. The meaning of 'peace' changed in the sense that became linked to 'justice'. The mandates received innovations and were often defined as vague (O'Neill, 2002).

The peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia, for instance, challenged the three key principles of peacekeeping. Chapter VII of the UN Charter, where peace enforcement is explained, was not referred to in the initial operations of the UN in former Yugoslavia.

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was initially established in Croatia in 1991 to create the conditions for peace and its mandate was successfully expanded to other areas, till the expansion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (*UNPROFOR*, n.d.).

The UNPROFOR mandate expanded over the years with several resolutions and within the expansion, the link to Chapter VII appeared. When the conditions in Bosnia seemed to have officially brought to a large-scale war, in 1992 the UN Security Council, through resolution

770, deployed the UNPROFOR mandate to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and elsewhere using 'all measures necessary' (UNSC, 13/08/1992).

In 1993 the Security Council established Sarajevo as a *safe area* and later extended this status to other five zones considered humanitarian corridors for the protection of civilians. With the UN Security Council resolutions and the expansion of the role of UNPROFOR, the distinction between 'humanitarian', 'peacekeeping' activities, and even military intervention became blurred.

UNPROFOR was brought into conflict with the Bosnian Serbs and then recalled action from NATO air forces.

The UNPROFOR failed to protect the safe area of Srebrenica in July 1995, during which around 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were killed: the genocide of Srebrenica was a tragic European genocide which happened after World War 2. It followed a lack of credibility in the entire operation, affecting the standing of the UN in the public opinion of the West (Wallensteen, 2002).

In 2017, the secretary-general of the UN Guterres recognized that the international community, particularly the UN, accepted the responsibility regarding the tragedy of Srebrenica and has worked to learn from the lessons of its failures (UN News, 10/07/2017).

The UN was subjected to further reconsideration less than a year before the Srebrenica massacre, the UN was not able to act in the Rwandan genocide when the HUTU government massacred over 500,000 people (1994) (Evans, 2018). The demands of the major operations in Yugoslavia and Somalia caused a reluctance in intervention from developed countries, which did not want to intervene militarily in Rwanda. It followed an action from the UN which was unauthorized and did not possess resources enough to prevent the tragedy. The operations in Yugoslavia, and similarly in Somalia, were operations that, as expressed by Evans, posed a major challenge to the original principles of UN peacekeeping (Evans, 2018).

With the new century, new challenges were increasing, as well as the requests for complex operations. Several operations were established by the Security Council in diverse African countries, like in Côte d'Ivoire with the UNOCI, in Libera (UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Sudan and the south of the country and Syria (UNSMIS). Furthermore, UN PKOs returned to act in places where the peace demonstrated to be at risk, like in Haiti and the newly independent Timor-Leste (United Nations n.d. a).

As written on the UN website, peacekeeping had to deal with several challenges and in 2010 'a phase of consolidation' was reached, where the operations started to slightly decline (United Nations n.d. a).

Moreover, according to Jerzy Ciechanski, the doctrine of collective security which is part of the UN Charter is based on assumptions that hardly meet the reality of the world since 'states are not prepared to defend the existing order in situations where their national interests are not directly affected', plus, states may be unwilling to give up the control on their military forces when it may go against their interest (Ciechanski, 1996).

It has been discussed how the traditional principles of peacekeeping operations are set in a world characterized by many variables, complexities, and challenges that the UN PKOs have to face. The genocides mentioned were particularly emblematic because they led to criticism and a discussion on whether UN peacekeeping needs further theory and reforms to respond to and prevent further mass atrocities.

1.4 The evolution of UN Peacekeeping operations

1.4.1 The effects of the Cold War

From the early years of peacekeeping operations, the UN's role evolved and changed. The factors that contributed to these changes are ever-expanding challenges that the body of the PKOs must face. These challenges are strictly related to the changing geopolitical arena and the conflicts themselves.

It has been discussed how the first operations, from the 1950s to 1980s, were limited to ceasefire maintenance and support on the ground while promoting dialogue and efforts to peacefully end the conflicts (United Nations, n.d. a).

Muzaffer Erkan Yılmaz in his journal article argued that the non-use of force, one of the three basic principles of PKOs, made operations ineffective, for instance, in the case of Cyprus in 1974. During the Cold War, the involvement of the UN was limited. Nonetheless, UN peacekeeping operations succeeded in reducing competing interventions and isolating local conflicts from the ideological fight of the Cold War between 1948 and 1988 (Yılmaz, 2005).

The first dramatic change happened at the end of the Cold War, with the new generation of Peacekeeping operations. With the end of the bipolar world and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the UN became more involved as the two Cold War rivals started to cooperate more at the Security Council level (De Coning & Peter, 2019). The change was substantially from 'traditional' missions to 'multidimensional' enterprises designed to guarantee the implementation of peace agreements and help establish the foundations for lasting peace (United Nations, n.d. a).

Non-military elements were added, between them administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, humanitarian workers and other individuals who joined the existing personnel which at the beginning was constituted primarily by military personnel. Between 1989 and

1994, the Security Council authorized 20 new operations and the number of peacekeepers grew from 11,000 to 75,000 (United Nations, n.d. a).

If in the period between 1945 and 1990, the vetoes called by the US were 69 and 114 by the USSR, in the years between 1990 and 1993 there were no vetoes apart from the Russia block on financing the peacekeeping mission in Cyprus in May 1993 (Yılmaz, 2005).

As a demonstration of the increase in the actions by the Council, the chart below, mentioned and explained in Wallenstein's book, shows the number of resolutions passed and vetoed every year between 1946 and 1990. As can be noticed, the increase in the number of resolutions passed by the Security Council is relevant mostly after the end of the Cold War.

Chart 1: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, 1946-1999
Source: Wallensteen (2002).

With the following operations after the Cold War, the missions expanded and the variety of activities increased, including the monitoring and running of local elections (e.g. in Congo), the protection of certain 'safe areas' from attacks, the guarding of the weapons, ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance and supplies (e.g. Rwanda) and the assisting with the reconstructions of state functions in societies (e.g. Bosnia Herzegovina) (Yılmaz, 2005).

Another substantial change that characterised the second generation of UN peacekeeping was in the type of conflicts the UN began to deal with. Originally, inter-state conflicts were the main concern in need of intervention, while after the Cold War peacekeeping missions addressed also intra-state conflicts and civil wars (Wallensteen, 2002). This is due again to the changes in the geopolitical arena and the fact that the world has become multipolar, human rights were called to be more preserved, and many countries were just made independent. Instances are conflicts that were born after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia.

The period from the mid-1990s can be seen as a 'period of reassessment', due to the fact that the Security Council did not authorize adequate mandates and did not provide enough resources (United Nations, n.d. a). The period of reassessment is a period during which the UN peacekeeping operations suffered from the criticism and failure of the events in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia. During that period, the UN Security Council continued the long-term operations active in the Middle East, Asia and Cyprus and realised that innovations and reforms were needed to prevent future failures and a further loss of trust (United Nations, n.d. a).

After the 1990s, a series of reforms were added. In 1992, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPO), already cited as an important department which co-works with other bodies, was created to perform more complex situations (Yılmaz, 2005).

While Kofi Annan was the UN Secretary-General in 1996, an acknowledgement of the failure of previous UN operations was made. The result was the first comprehensive review since the earlier peacekeeping missions and the presentation of the Brahimi Report at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. The need for reforms in the theory of PKOs was witnessed and proposals were made. One of the most important things that needed to be faced was the problem of resources: a call for the increase of assets for the Department of Peacekeeping was made, to be able to reply to the demands and needs of the operations (Evans, 2018).

Another call was made for more clear and realistic mandates from the Security Council. Plus, it was suggested that resolutions for peacekeeping forces should pass just when there is the commitment of member states with their troops. Better cooperation between the country's troops and the Security Council is requested. Wherever it is necessary, the Brahimi Report also recalled the peace enforcement mentioned in Chapter VII, encouraging more action when there are violations. The Brahimi Report had a significant impact on how the peacekeeping missions are deployed. Many of the calls mentioned were implemented over the years, to implement effectiveness and efficiency, to respond to the failures of past operations, and finally to recover from the loss of credibility that the UN had to face (Evans, 2018).

The Brahimi Report called for new commitments from the UN while addressing the increasing complexity of the conflicts. Moreover, its statements remained relevant through the years (De Coning & Peter, 2019). With the aim to extend the guidelines and principles of the missions, the Capstone Doctrine followed in 2008, capturing 'these experiences for the benefit and guidance of planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations' (DPKO, 2008). Part II of the document deals, in fact, with the planning of the UN PKOs, while part III with the 'art of successful mandate implementation' (DPKO, 2008).

In 2014, secretary-general Ban Ki-moon announced a review of peace operations: the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO). The report had the scope to establish the needs of future operations by giving a review, basically acknowledging the challenges the UN operations face. According to De Coning and Peter in their 2019 book, reforms were set in 2015 and 2016 before the term of Ban Ki-moon ended and then followed reinforcing the critiques made in the Brahimi report on the weaknesses of the Secretariat and the Security Council. However, the direction was different, prioritizing and putting more emphasis on preventing conflicts (De Coning & Peter, 2019). Moreover, with the new Secretary-General António Guterres in 2018 and following the Department of Peace Operations, a new establishment was made: the Action for Peacekeeping. It prioritized stronger mandates, political solutions, more involvement and cooperation with regional organizations, improvements in the training of the PK forces, alignment of resources in mandates (both financial and human resources), and the influence made by member states in sustaining the consent of the host countries (De Coning & Peter, 2019).

1.4.2   Peacekeeping operations challenges

Tuvdendarjaa indicates three levels of challenges to the effectiveness of UN operations and according to him, these can be identified at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (Tuvdendarjaa, 2022).

At the strategic level, there are issues related to the leadership system, for instance, poor management and failure of leadership: misunderstandings, and slow work processes which negatively affect the activities. The global order plays a crucial role at the strategic level as well: crucial is the example of the changing role of the members during and after the Cold War. The world's most powerful nations affect the decision-making of UN PKOs because of the existing geopolitical and strategic interests they have (Tuvdendarjaa, 2022).

At the operational level, the issues are related to the nature of the armed conflict, the methods of operation and the readiness of the operations. Conflicts nowadays are characterized by high-tech technology and a form of hostility different from the traditional ones, which makes it even more difficult to determine. Plus, there are more extremisms and transnational organized crimes. This issue increases the need for the operations to evolve their mission in the protection of civilians. As for the methods of operation, today the original peacekeeping operations, consisting of the monitoring of ceasefire and protection of civilians, may not be effective enough because internal riots, crises or conflicts emerge within a nation or region. As for

readiness, the issues refer to the fact that the army or police force is constituted by the multinational member states which are hard to mobilize at short notice.

Finally, at the tactical level, a common understanding of the operation, mostly under a single mandate, is needed to be developed for the efficiency of the operation itself. Some missions failed due for instance to the lack of initiative or lack of resources, which would not have happened with a common understanding of the operation. Moreover, multilateral cooperation is needed and still is a challenge to interventions.

Discipline, or code of conduct, is one of the challenges at the tactical level. Along with the failures that the United Nations faced there are also accusations of sexual harassment or misconduct and misunderstandings carried out by the peacekeepers, police members or personnel of the UN (Tuvdendarjaa, 2022).

Improvements and modernizations to the traditional operations of the UN are urgently needed to address these challenges and avoid further failures. These depend on the commitment of the organization and the member states.

1.4.3   An eye to the present situation

Consolidated that nowadays challenges are several, the news and updates regarding ongoing conflicts in the world are an everyday occurrence. The conflicts that have lately regained the attention of the world are the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the latest events that have happened in the context of the war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023. UN peacekeeping is challenged and contested again and the debate on the need for reform and the responsibility of the UN has been reignited.

The deep dysfunction within the UN can be observed in these case studies. Since Russia is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, it has used its position to block the efforts to end the war that began in 2014 and escalated in February 2022.

Russia did not meet the standards of the UN Charter which establishes that the membership accepts the 'obligations contained in the present Charter' and that all United Nations members 'shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state' (UN Charter, 1945). With the invasion of Ukraine, Russia violated the UN Charter, therefore, it is argued that Russia is still undermining the organization (Niland, 2023). Regarding the humanitarian aid provided by UN PKOs, in response to the escalating crisis in Ukraine, the UN doubled its emergence appeal in April 2022 to 2.24$ billion (United Nations, 09/03/2022). Furthermore, since the beginning of the war, more than 8.1 million people have been provided with humanitarian assistance and protection.

And, as stated on the website of the UN Regional Information Centre, referring to the middle of September, over 580 humanitarian partners have given 13.3 million individuals life-saving assistance and protection services in the country (United Nations, 09/03/2022). Again, the protection of civilians is the UN priority, and the intensification of the operations is being carried out in Ukraine and around the country.

Reforms of the United Nations were recalled for the role of the member states and for the need for the UN to be more emblematic. On the first of March 2022, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the demand for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukraine. It increased the criticism and call for concrete action. Unfortunately, the resolutions of the General Assembly are non-binding, contrary to the Security Council resolutions (UN News, 05/04/2022). Therefore, the power that the General Assembly possess, the one to make recommendations to restore international peace, can be observed to be still limited by the inability to act if the permanent member states block the Security Council.

Suggestions on the removal or containment of the vetoes have also been called for reform (Niland, 2023). Consequently, a few months after the military invasion of Russia, the UN General Assembly decided that whenever one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council uses the veto, a General Assembly meeting will follow, in order to analyse and comment on the decision. This resolution is the result of a draft entitled 'standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council' and written by Liechtenstein's UN Ambassador Christian Wenaweser with 83 countries (UN News, 26/04/2022).

The UN ambassador recalled the importance of Article 10 of the UN Charter, and he was motivated by the fact that the veto power comes with the responsibility to achieve and follow the scope and the principles of the document itself, so, according to him, Assembly's voice should be heard when the Security Council is blocked. 'There has never been a stronger need for innovation in order to secure the central role and voice of the United Nations in this respect' (UN News, 26/04/2022).

The efficiency of the UN peacekeeping forces in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and their role are worth mentioning as well.

As far as the conflict between Israel and Palestine is concerned, it is fundamental to know that this is a conflict that should need more than just a mention. The complexity and history of the conflict itself are worth a deep analysis and the role of the UN is complex to define as well. The following analysis of the present and current escalation is a brief mention of a war that has been going on for decades and has historic roots related to territorial and religious tensions.

The role of the UN PKOs in dealing with this conflict is broad, it may be discussed to be not only humanitarian, as the efforts go beyond. According to the website of the United Nations for the Israel-Gaza Crisis, the organization has played a 'significant role' in seeking a resolution to the conflict and has been active in the region for the de-escalation of the crisis (United Nations, n.d. h). After the terrorist attack of Hamas on Israel which happened on the 7th of October and the violent reaction of the state of Israel on Gaza, thousands of innocent civilians were killed, including children and women.

Leaving aside the debated role of the organization in supporting diplomatic efforts in facilitating resolutions of the conflicts, humanitarian help and aid is what is now like never needed. Food, water and essential services have been blocked outside Gaza, where many Palestinians are trying to escape while under fire, without food and water, and suffering from losses. Protection for civilians is called as well as the need for humanitarian corridors to give aid to Gaza.

In this current situation, the system of veto once again, is undermining the ceasefire.

During the peace summit in Cairo the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres stated: 'The people of Gaza need a commitment for much, much more – a continuous delivery of aid to Gaza at the scale that is needed.' A humanitarian ceasefire was called to save these 2 million people by the Secretary-General who described the situation as a 'godawful nightmare' (Borger, 2023). The paradox is real: the trucks full of aid are blocked at the border while people in Gaza are dying, and yet the United Nations, and many other actors/institutions, appear as ineffective in peacekeeping and helping the innocents who are struggling from this war.

In concrete and according to the website of the UN, the organization has been working in the region with humanitarian assistance by sheltering hundreds of millions of displaced people thanks to facilities of the UN Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) (United Nations Türkiye, 2023). Top UN officials are engaged with the parties to the conflict and other countries in the de-escalation of the conflict while the World Food Programme and the UNRWA are coordinating the distribution of bread to displaced families (United Nations Türkiye, 2023). However, the latest news of January 2024 regarded the funding cuts to the UNRWA. The cuts of funding come from nine country contributors and seem justified by accusations towards some UNRWA workers. The financial situation will be precarious and will negatively affect the assistance to Palestinians (UN News, 30/01/2024).

Moreover, the establishment of safe humanitarian corridors to reach people is what is needed as the supplies and humanitarian staff are blocked by the intensifying of the hostilities. The cuts in funding will have tragic impacts on lifesaving, limiting the efforts of the UN in its humanitarian assistance.

1.5 Conclusion

Concluding this first part, it has been discussed how the UN peacekeeping forces play a crucial role in preventing and managing conflicts to protect civilians and support peace and security. The legal foundation of the organization has been explained through an analysis of the UN Charter. Theory and practice were compared, as practice is equally important in the shaping of the theory of peacekeeping.

It can be observed that thousands of civilian and military peacekeepers have been generally successful in keeping people alive and preventing conflict escalation in many cases. Essential humanitarian assistance has been given by peacekeepers to populations who are facing conflicts, and this includes shelter, medical care, and food (Curtis and Taylor, 2020).

A point that proves the positive power of the organization is that no other organization has the legitimacy of universal membership: Security Council authorizations are always attempted. Without a doubt, the UN has been successful in ending numerous conflicts, while mitigating tensions and avoiding de-escalation.

New kinds of threats have been faced and the UN responded with reforms and changes to face the challenges. However, reforms are always needed, as new kinds of threats are increasing. Threats from non-state actors are increasing as well, and the organization appears to be not enough equipped to deal with them. Resources like funding, personnel and equipment are asked from multiple countries enabling contributions from different parts even if they appear arguably limited.

In some cases, the complexity of the mandates makes it difficult to achieve the expected success. The global balance of power is no longer reflected by the organization, and the current composition of the Council may need more representation and reforms.

Furthermore, a point that has been considered and an issue of debate is the system of veto, as the UN Security Council is often unable to act with efficiency due to conflicts of interest present between the permanent members. In addition, as Curtis and Taylor agree, it is unlikely that the US, Russia, China, the UK and France, as permanent countries, will renounce it, making reform difficult (Curtis and Taylor, 2020). The conflicts in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine are examples of today's conflicts that are hardly met by the organization because of the issue of veto.

Whatever the future holds for future peacekeeping operations, they will deal with ever more threats and regional/local challenges represented by intra-state conflicts. Plus, it will deal with the emergence of new problems, that parallel traditional issues that the organization is unable to successfully address. The case of Cyprus is symbolic of this. The evolution of the force through the years led nowhere, as the compromise is absent, and reaching a deal between the

parties remains an illusion. It will be deeply analyzed, with all the changes and challenges that are still being faced.

2   Case Study: Cyprus and the UNFICYP

2.1 Introduction

The issue of Cyprus is a long-standing case which still seeks a solution. The factors and concerns influencing the unresolved situation are deep-rooted in today's society and are still present in the lives of the two communities existing on the island. After the understanding of the United Organization as the organization intervening in the resolution of conflicts, the case study chosen will be addressed in this second Chapter.

The historical context and the background of the case will be explained (2.2) as the influences that the islanders had to face from outside powers are among the primary reasons for the complexity of the case. Cyprus was dominated by external powers till its independence from British rule in 1960. The final period of colonial rule on the island was turbulent as the internal tensions between the two communities increased. The outsiders' influence brought consequences to the management of domestic affairs that still can be traced in today's situation. After the independence and the establishment of the United Nations presence in Cyprus with the UNFICYP in 1964, the situation worsened in 1974, leading to the *de facto* division of the island.

The UN presence will be analysed since its beginning (2.3), and the intercommunal tension addressed. The 1964 establishment of the UNFICYP and its first mandate was just the first attempt of the organization to maintain peace, which was challenged in the following years.

The first UN resolution will be examined and compared with subsequent resolutions (2.4), as the mandate had to adapt to the events. Moreover, the report of the Secretary-General in 1964, and the observations of its Special Representative for Cyprus in 1965, are striking in understanding the beginning of the UN mediating role among the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and the situation of high tension in which Cyprus was in the 1960s. The negotiation attempts are described as well, to be able to address the UN peacebuilding efforts.

The island division was one of the turning points that changed the nature of the conflict, and it is crucial to examine, as it metamorphosed the context in which the UN had to intervene to find a solution.

An eye on the present situation and the ongoing relevance of the case will be investigated (2.5), as new issues have arisen.

This chapter aims to understand the turning points in Cyprus' history and to comprehend more broadly the issues and the context in which the United Nations established its peacekeeping presence on the island.

2.2 Historical Context

2.2.1 Background

The Cyprus history was characterized by dominance of outside powers, at least before the independence reached from the British colonial rule in 1960. The reason why the island was ruled by outsiders for much of its history lies in the strategic position of Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea. For its position, Cyprus has always been seen as a vital piece of strategic territory.

During the classical times, Cyprus was under the rule of the Persians, Egyptians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, and Venetians (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The dominance of different civilizations left marks on the island, impacting its contemporary history. The role of the Cypriot Orthodox church received privileges during Byzantine rule, which it has often been alleged that remained after the dominance too. The Arab rule also left its mark on Islamic holy places that can still be found on the island. Similarly, the Venetian rulers left their mark by rebuilding the Venetian walls, the Walls of Nicosia, which up to this time surrounded the cities of Nicosia and Famagusta (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). However, according to Hannay, an important mark that was left by the outsiders' dominance in Cyprus is that Cypriots could not decide their destiny because of the influence coming from outside (Hannay, 2005).

In 1571, after the 1570 invasion ordered by Sultan Selim II, the island was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. The marks left by the Ottomans in Cyprus are often pictured badly by the Greek Cypriots, probably for the suffering they faced in terms of punitive taxes and neglect (Hannay, 2005). Despite that, the Ottoman Empire ensured the survival of the Orthodox Christianity. According to Gazioğlu, there was an actual tolerance policy as a characteristic of Turkish rule, and the *Millet system* contributed to it. In compliance with this system, to guarantee harmony, every religious community was granted autonomy in its affairs (Gazioğlu, 1999). However, as argued by Yılmaz, the system contributed to the institutionalization of the communities, and distinct ethnic identities and aspirations (Yılmaz, 2010).

The Greek Archbishop was the head of the Orthodox community and the *Ethnarch,* or natural leader and its figure survived over the years. Archbishop Makarios III had a fundamental role in its community becoming a popular political leader too and is still fondly remembered, but this will be discussed afterwards.

Even though the two principal communities formed by the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots did not mix during the Ottoman Empire, their relations were not as tense as they were after the collapse of the Empire, and their co-existence was relatively peaceful (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

From 1878 to 1960, Cyprus was ceded from the Ottoman Empire and was administrated by Britain. It remained under the protectorate until 1914. Following its accession to the British Empire in the First World War (1915), Turkey ceded the sovereignty of Cyprus to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Therefore, Cyprus was officially a colony of the British Crown from 1925 to 1960 (Ker-Lindsay, 2014, 25).

Captain Kinneir of the East India Company, cited in Michael's book, stated that 'The possession of Cyprus would give England a preponderating influence in the Mediterranean', even 64 years before the acquisition in 1878 (Michael, 2009, 14). The importance of the island was ever clearer for the empire's defence, and maintaining it was part of an insurance policy for Britain's interests in the region.

After centuries of the Ottoman Empire, the administrations completely changed on the island when the British intervened. Greek Cypriots started to think that Cyprus would never return to Turkish rule, as a result, the inspiration for *enosis* expanded among the community. Enosis, or Megali Idea, was the idea pursued by Greek Cypriots to unite with Greece. Even though enosis and Greek nationalism were already present on the island before the British arrival, they intensified in the period of British rule. It was due to the Greek Cypriot community's thought that the British would have been eager to cede the island to Athens, a matter that was considered when London offered the island to Greece if the country had joined the First World War as an ally of Britain (Michael, 2009, 16). As the Greek king refused, and in 1923 the new Republic of Turkey was set, in 1925 Britain declared Cyprus its colony (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The calls for enosis continued fueled by British false hopes and then subsequent rejections.

A turning point happened in 1931, the first riots against British authority and the burning down of the Government House took place. The riots were the consequence of an ongoing economic crisis and the addition of a tax bill on the population. Tension between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities began to grow as well. The colonial rule reacted by taking measures to these riots, but pro-union sentiment was not undermined, on the contrary, the events brought the call for enosis back again (Michael, 2009).

However, remaining determined to keep sovereignty over the island, London started to seem willing to consider the possibility of a kind of self-rule, but this happened not before the end of the Second World War (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Contrary to Greek nationalism, the Turkish one emerged only in the 1940s with the concept of *Taksim* and the idea of Cyprus partition between Greece and Turkey. The majority of Turkish Cypriots, during the British rule and mostly at the beginning of it, were sure that the ruling was temporary and that, at some point, the island would have returned to the Turkish Government.

During the British period, the two communities did not aspire to sovereignty or independence. The question was, which powers Greece or Turkey, would take over the island after Britain (Gazioğlu, 1999).

The two nationalisms, and sentiments towards enosis and takism, were fueled by the imported nationalism of the *motherlands,* Greece and Turkey. In fact, according to Ker-Lindsay, imported historical books used in schools, as well as the newspapers and the press, played a crucial role in fostering nationalistic aspirations and contributed to the division between the Greek and Turkish communities. Moreover, the British administration through the policy of 'divide and rule' contributed to the progress of the two nationalisms (Ker-Lindsay, 2014).

Both communities began to become diffident in front of the British Crown trying to give self-rule improvement on the island. In the meantime, the tension between the two was rising. The Turkish Cypriots' fear and suspicion was that, in due course, the Greek Cypriots would have received the power and would have obtained the desired enosis with Greece. The other side, in turn, saw any engagement of the crown for Cyprus' self-rule as a trap.

Fueling this, there was the leadership that had popular power among the Greek community in those years. The principal actor was Archbishop Makarios III, he was emblematic of the pursuit of enosis, and he is still considered a fundamental figure in the history of Cyprus. He had a huge influence on Greek Cypriots who considered him an outstanding leader. The figure of the archbishop is, from the Ottoman Empire and millet system, not only a spiritual figure but also the civil head of the Greek *ethnos*, nation (Michael, 2009). Makarios III was nominated the archbishop in 1950 and then the first president of Cyprus when the island became independent in 1960. His personality was contested and criticized through the years, mostly because he was incoherent when he received the presidency, and he stopped pursuing the dream of enosis, a dream that from the very start of his path seemed his fundamental aim. The Orthodox church, guided by his figure, assumed the Greek Cypriot leadership of the movement for enosis.

In January 1950, Archbishop Makarios III and the Ethnarchy Council called an unofficial referendum for enosis, which received a 96% positive response, favouring the union with Greece. However, the referendum was considered illegal by the British colonial rule (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

With the growing of movements pro enosis, in 1955 the Greek Prime Minister Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos wanted to give attention to the matter internationally. He failed in his aim, bringing at first the matter up during a meeting with the British foreign secretary Eden. The United Kingdom denied the possibility of discussing it even when the Greek prime minister wanted to bring the issue in front of the United Nations. The reasons conceived were that the

Cyprus case was an internal issue, and it was not seen as in the purview of the United Nations (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Enosis seemed the only significant alternative to the sovereignty of Britain, at least until 1958. However, the feeling of enosis was underestimated by the crown (Michael, 2009). The increase in explosions by militants on the island was proof of the growing enosis sentiment and resentment of the Greek Cypriot community. Furthermore, the birth of the EOKA was responsible for bringing on the campaign.

The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) was the militia led by the nationalist General Georgios Grivas and, differently from other anti-colonial movements in the world, was not fighting for independence but for union with Greece (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Grivas was a general and retired colonel of the Greek Army with strong anti-communist feelings who was authorized by archbishop Makarios III to put an end to the British rule and plan to unite Cyprus with Greece. The EOKA uprising started in 1955 when explosions of administrative buildings around the island took place. As the EOKA movements were growing, the fear of Turkish Cypriots of the island being united with Greece was increasing. They therefore denied association with EOKA, and many Turkish Cypriots joined the colonial force, as British rule was preferred to the Greek administration (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

A countermovement to EOKA was born to pursue taksim. The movement was a resistance paramilitary organization, firstly called Volkan and afterwards the Turkish Resistance Movement (TMT). The first demonstration against enosis took place in 1948. Among young people in the Turkish community, the sentiment of unification with the *motherland Turkey* increased supported by newly prominent figures such as Dr Fazil Kuchuk and Rauf Denktash (Varnava, 2019).

It followed that in 1956, during a conference organized by Britain, Turkey was officially given the role of equal political partner for the future, at the level of Greece (Varnava, 2019). It was also stated that in future negotiations and cases of self-determination, the Turkish Cypriots will have the same rights as Greek Cypriots to decide the future of Cyprus. This evolvement was a turning point in which Britain admitted that the issue of Cyprus was no longer an internal matter.

The reaction of Archbishop Makarios was negative, and just the invitation of Turkey made by London brought the end of the conference in a short time (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The security was then improved by Britain, the troops on the island increased and measures were taken in response to suspected EOKA offences. The tensions were always more present on the island, as the violence against the crown, and in pursuit of enosis.

It escalated till the decision to make Cyprus independent, specifically through the Zurich-London Agreements of 1959. The political analyst Niyazi Kizilyurek, mentioned in Varnava's book, explained that the moment of independence marked the failure of both the communities' nationalist elites (Varnava, 2019). Taksim and enosis were ultimately excluded by the independence declaration, which was established in a context of extreme tension and fragility, where the majority of both communities were disappointed and undeceived, and the movements and actions of revolt were just at their beginning.

Secret actions followed till 1974. Moreover, the functioning of the newly independent state was set in a context of mistrust, not considering the important aspect that Cyprus lacked ethnic identity.

Another matter of disappointment and grief for Greek Cypriots was that the Turkish Cypriots were officially considered a whole community, despite they were 18% of the population on the island (Varnava, 2019). According to Greek Cypriots, the recognition of the Turkish Cypriots was another obstacle to Cyprus's destiny, and in the years that followed, violence against them started.

2.2.2   Towards Independence: The Macmillan Plan

The talks to find a solution to the Cyprus contested situation began with a tripartite conference. In the meantime, Archbishop Makarios was deported to the Seychelles, with the hope that a more moderate leadership would born inside its community (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

One of the attempts worth mentioning in solving the issue was the plan proposed in 1958 by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. The plan consisted of a seven-year joint responsibility taken by the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey on the administration of the island (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). As stated in Gazioglu's book, the plan, described as a 'partnership and cooperation', was an experiment seven-year long in which the sovereignty would have been shared between Greece and Turkey, with the remaining of Britain's military bases and facilities on the island (Gazioğlu, 1999).

It was rejected by Greece and the community of the Greek Cypriots because it seemed too distant from their aim of full enosis. The plan explicitly refused to consider enosis or Taksim. From that moment, every proposal coming from Macmillan seemed useless, as the Greek Cypriots seemed still on their ideas of rejecting it if the terms were the ones proposed for power-sharing.

In the meantime, the conflicts between the communities on the island were deteriorating and getting ever more violent. A civil war started to be seen as possible, and the fear was that it was

in the process of happening. The fear was also related to the possibility of a war between two NATO allies, Athens and Ankara, and the concern about the Soviet Union's intrusion into the eastern Mediterranean (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The latest developments in the plan of 1958 did not have the plan effectively implemented. But a turning point was reached when the Macmillan plan was brought in front of the UN Security Council in 1958. It is widely held that the issue gained internationalization for the first time and meetings for the independence of the country followed.

While Makarios was absent, Grivas had more autonomy for military action but the possibility to negotiate with the Greek Cypriot community was weak as it lacked his political authority. However, as soon as Makarios came back in 1958, he tried to convince and inspire his people that independence could have been an acceptable solution. The reactions to his speech were different inside the Greek Cypriot community, however, the agreements started between the parties and the creation of an independent state with powers divided between Greek and Turkish communities took shape (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). A meeting between the Greek and Turkish governments in Zürich was emblematic and foresaw a second meeting in London, where Britain's and the two communities' representatives were also present.

Inside the Greek Cypriot community, Grivas and many Greek Cypriots thought the agreements were unfair due to the lack of enosis and disproportionate representation of power. A division inside the community and political rivalries were present making the transition more complex (Varnava, 2019).

2.2.3 The 1960 Constitution and the three founding treaties

As soon as the state was declared independent, the first elections of the newly-born independent Cyprus took place in December 1959. The Constitution of Cyprus specified in Article 1 the nature of the Republic:

> The State of Cyprus is an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime, the President being Greek and the Vice President being Turk elected by the Greek and the Turkish Communities of Cyprus respectively as hereinafter in this Constitution provided (Republic of Cyprus, 1960).

Essentially, the power was shared between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the structure of the new Republic had a complex constitutional structure (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

The first president, who was elected by the Greek Cypriot community, was archbishop Makarios III (Varnava, 2019). As vice-president, it was elected the Turkish Cypriot Fazil Kuchuk. The two had the additional power of presiding over the Council of Ministers, formed by seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriot ministers.

The power-sharing between the two communities was characterized by a ratio of 70:30 between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in most state institutions, for instance, in the parliament or House of Representatives. The ratio changed in the case of the armed forces which was 60:40 (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

As for the judicial body the Supreme Court was assembled by a Greek Cypriot judge, a Turkish Cypriot one and a neutral foreign judge as president of the court. Finally, the two communities were partitioned in the control of affairs regarding education, culture, and religion (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Cyprus' fresh new sovereignty arrangements depended on three important signed at the time of the independence: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment.

The Treaty of Guarantee was not first cited casually but chosen distinctly for a first mention considering its controversial and opposed nature. In the specific, this agreement was signed between Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, considering the maintenance of the republic's 'independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution' (Treaty of Guarantee, Article 1, 1960). The accord gave Britain, Greece, and Turkey powers as guarantors of the independence of the island. The first article explicitly stated that the island's promotion of union, or partition with any State was prohibited. Furthermore, Article 4 declared that in the case of a breach of the Treaty, any of the three countries had the right to intervene and take action to re-establish the status quo ante, created with the affairs concluded with the 1960 constitution (Treaty of Guarantee, Article 4, 1960).

This treaty was opposed by the Greek Cypriots. It was discussed that the powers given to the guarantor countries would have meant that Cyprus was not entirely independent, resulting in its sovereignty having external subjection again. Plus, Turkey would have enjoyed the right to intervention in the affairs of Cyprus. On their behalf, the Turkish Cypriots saw this as essential as a possible attempt for enosis would have needed the intervention of the Turkish government (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). In general, the Zurich-London Agreements gave them rights and a strong role as co-founders, a role kept until 1974.

As far as the Treaty of Alliance is concerned, at the base of the agreement lay the common desire to preserve peace and security, efforts which conform 'with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter' (Treaty of Alliance, 1960).

The second treaty worth mentioning was signed between the three countries to work together to protect the sovereignty of Cyprus and collaborate in case its integrity is put at risk.

As High Contracting Parties, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey 'undertake to co-operate for their common defence and to consult together on the problems raised by that defence' (Treaty of Alliance, Article 1, 1960). Article 3 of the same treaty announces the establishment of a Tripartite Headquarters, and Article 4 states that Greece and Turkey shall participate in them as established in Additional Protocol No.1. It was agreed that the Greek force was limited to 950 Greek officers. In comparison, Turkey was limited to 650 Turkish officers. According to the Additional Protocol, the number could vary if agreed upon by the president and vice-president of the new Republic of Cyprus (Treaty of Alliance, Additional Protocol No:1, 1960).

Finally, the Treaty of Establishment allowed Britain to have sovereignty over 99 square miles of the island as British Sovereign Base areas (SBAs) for military purposes. These bases still exist, one is Akrotiri, and it is located near the city of Larnaca in the east of the island, while the other is Dhekelia, near Limassol in the west (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The presence of the British bases rendered the already fragile situation even more unstable, as Britain wanted to maintain a military base in the Eastern Mediterranean and the resentment mostly from Greek Cypriots escalated. Through the years, the incidents and tensions for this presence increased, also through the opposition by AKEL, the Greek communist party (Gazioğlu, 1999). Many from the Greek Cypriot community perceived the British presence as a continuance of the colonial rule, which should have ended with independence. It has often been alleged by Turkish Cypriots that having a British presence on the island would have meant more security.

2.2.4 Constitutional Collapse

At the signatures of the agreements and the reaching of independence, controversial reactions followed in that precise year. As already stated, the fragility and instability of the newly formed republic were tangible, and tensions were present between the two communities. The majority of Greek Cypriots were disappointed as enosis was ruled out. The other part saw positively the role of Turkey as protection and finally saw the reach of a say in matters of governance. These feelings therefore fueled the tensions. The goodwill of both people after the agreements is put into discussion as disagreements appeared as soon as there was a chance. For instance, in the

constitution of military units, and the establishment of separate municipalities in the towns and cities of Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

The tensions arose dramatically when Turkey rejected Makarios' thirteen amendments to the constitution. Makarios' proposal was a radical step taken in 1963, which according to him, would have worked for the better functioning of the Constitution. However, the amendments were constraining the disproportionate Turkish Cypriot political power, for instance, by reducing the Turkish Cypriots in the public service and the military forces, and for these reasons, the amendments were rejected promptly by the Turkish government (United Nations, 1990). Successive violent clashes between the communities led to a collapse of the power-sharing and of the constitution in December 1963. The Turkish Cypriot employees withdrew from their work positions at the government, and many of them congregated in enclaves. These withdrawals were seen by the Greek Cypriots as acts of rebellion (Varnava, 2019), while Turkish Cypriots justified the actions as moved by the necessity of protection, as the violence against them was growing. As reported by Ker-Lindsay, the question of whether the employees were forced to leave or not, remains one of the most controversial aspects of the history of the conflict (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The truth may lie in between, as many historians argue, but it is without doubt another additional controversial aspect to consider in the understanding of the Cyprus conflict as a problem, and as a situation that for many needed external interventions.

The region reached a peak of instability with a crisis in December 1963, the increased violence caused Makarios and his government to blame the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee and to abrogate them. Vice President Kuchus, as explained by Varnava, stated that a peaceful co-existence between the communities was not possible and the only possible solution was partition (Varnava, 2019).

After that, a settlement of the problem was difficult to find. Interventions on the island were discussed to 'solve' the crisis. The British government intended to find a way but a first attempt through a conference in London failed. The matter was subsequently brought in front of the UN Security Council, provoking a debate that lasted a few weeks but finally led to Resolution 184 in 1964, and intervention (Varnava, 2019).

2.3 The UN presence in Cyprus

The independence of Cyprus reached in 1960 led, as explained, to significant agreements signed between the new Republic of Cyprus, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey. One month after the declaration of independence, the island became a member of the United Nations (United Nations, 1990). The three treaties previously discussed were signed for the

safeguarding of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the new state. However, the agreements were signed in a situation of concern and mistrust, where the talks developed with great difficulty and the communication between the two communities was arguably set with both sides looking out for their interests and acting accordingly. De facto, the difficulty of the situation was not absurd or new.

In the mid-50s a UN debate over the escalated tension in Cyprus was already set, to help the development of the successive agreements. The UN's role was to facilitate communication and promote peace, but the escalation of violence forced the organization to intervene more actively. Even though the action was limited, the final years of the 1950s were symbolic because of the foundation for future involvement and further engagement.

Before the UN intervention with a peacekeeping force, a joint force formed by the governments of the UK, Greece, and Turkey preceded. The force was accepted by the Cyprus government in late December 1963 as the incidents and tensions were several. At the end of the year, and together with the joint force, which was carried out by the British contingent, a first neutral zone was created and started to divide the two communities in the capital city of Nicosia. The zone was then called Buffer Zone, delineated by the *Green Line,* and eventually called *Dead Zone.* The area became significant in the conflict (United Nations, 1990).

Nevertheless, the British peacemaking force was meeting lots of difficulties. In the meantime, the UN secretary-general, and the Permanent Representative of Cyprus were discussing how the organization could assist with the Cyprus problem and whether an internationalization of the issue was needed. A personal representative observer of the peacemaking progress was required and appointed by the UN secretary-general in January 1964. Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani oversaw the reporting of the situation and in fact, the information he gave was related to the deterioration of the case. He reported the numerous fightings, kidnappings, and taking of hostages, as well as other violent activities that were happening and the growing fear that the Turkey or Greece military intervention would have happened at some point (United Nations, 1990).

2.3.1   The UNFICYP and Resolution 186

The UNFICYP was established on the 4th of March 1964 because urgent action was requested as international peace and security were at risk. The UN and its force were assigned responsibility for peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Through the adoption of Resolution 186, the UNFICYP is a UN Force, operating under the mandate of the Security Council and the instructions of the Secretary-General, with military

contingents from the UK, and other countries such as Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. The two national contingents, the Turkish and the Greek, remained on the island but not under the command of the United Nations (United Nations, 1990). General Gyani was the first commander of the force, who was then followed by other commanders through the years. Today, the mission is headed by Elizabeth Spehar, also Special Representative of the Segretary-General, and the force commander is Major General Cheryl Pearce (UNFICYP, 2021). The UNFICYP actors played a crucial role in promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict, some with the submission of reports and by monitoring the situation. Some tried to outline possible proposals to end the hostility, which did not work but served for the subsequent negotiations.

Resolution 186 started by stating that the situation in Cyprus was likely to threaten global peace and security and could worsen if more action isn't taken quickly to keep things peaceful and look for a long-term solution (UNSC, 04/03/1964).

The resolution continued by recalling the consideration of the treaties signed by the parties in 1960. At its beginning, the document draws initial attention by recalling Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, and then recalls the obligations the Member States have in acting in conformity with the charter to prevent actions that would worsen the situation (UNSC, 04/03/1964).

Paragraph 5 of the resolution states that the Security Council

> Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions; (UNSC, 04/03/1964).

The reactions towards the implementation and establishment of the resolution were different. The Greek Cypriot community generally favoured the UN intervention. The community saw the resolution as a victory, as the intervention of the UN prevented NATO interference in Cyprus affairs.

The involvement of NATO would have been preferred, indeed, by the West and Turkey. Resolution 186 was discussed to be the detriment of the second community by acknowledging the Cyprus Government. The Turkish Cypriots did not have the representation they used to in 1960, as they abandoned their posts previously and did not take them back (Varnava, 2019).

The common resentment of the Turkish Cypriot community up to the present is caused by their lack of representation and the total Greek Cypriot one, considered by them illegal.

Within the establishment of the force, the UN secretary-general U Thant was in charge of appointing a mediator, who for a brief time was the diplomat, Sakari Tuomioja. Tuomioja was a supporter of enosis, even if he did not pursue it as it would have not been appropriate. He was then replaced by Galo Plaza Lasso.

On the 10th of September 1964, after around six months since the beginning of the operation in Cyprus, U Thant as UN Secretary-General submitted a report on the UNFICYP, the problems faced, and the efforts made so far (UNSC, 10/09/1964).

Beginning with the Military Situation (I), the document addresses the composition of the force (A, i), the countries' contingents and the number of personnel involved, and the zones and districts they used to cover on the island. The report recalls the force function (ii, 6) and its objectives mentioned in resolution 186. In the same paragraph, the guiding principles (ii, 7) are underlined. While, in the third part of the first paragraph, the report expresses the issue of freedom of movement (iii) (UNSC, 10/09/1964).

2.3.2   U Thant Report and the guiding principles of the UNFICYP

The guiding principles of the force expressed in U Thant's report in 1964 (A, ii) are fundamental for the affinity with the basic principles of UN peacekeeping, described in chapter 1, paragraph 1.3.1, of this thesis. The report notes that the activities carried out by the force must be carried out always under the control and command of the United Nations. The force operations aim at the prevention of recurrent fighting and supervision of a cease-fire. U Thant stated that the troops involved by the UNFICYP 'are to be employed only in self-defence'; and that the use of armed force will occur when 'all peaceful means of persuasion have failed' (UNSC, 10/09/1964). Self-defence is mentioned regarding UN personnel too, posts, places, and vehicles, who must be defended if an armed attack happens.

As now known, the force was committed in sensitive areas to constitute a 'deterrent to a recurrence of fighting' between the two communities, however, in the case of incidents, the force would have been committed to ending the fight, encouraging persuasion and negotiations, and then pursuing an investigation of the incident.

Moreover, the report expresses the principle of impartiality under which the personnel of the force must act neutrally towards the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities (UNSC, 10/09/1964).

An issue which was expressed by the Secretary-General, and worth mentioning, was the one of freedom of movement for the force inside the island. The personnel encountered difficulties that undermined the work, in the period under examination. The restrictions posed by the Cypriot authorities on the freedom of movement made U Thant expressly require the Government to stop limiting the force in this matter, as the function of the mandate depended on it. The issue has been a critical aspect since the beginning of the UNFICYP mandate. Roads of the island were contested by the communities and were a matter of discussion when negotiations happened. Harassment and incidents that were happening on the ground were part of the challenges the force faced. The Force Commander and the Commander of the Cyprus National Guard negotiated and arrived at a deal on this matter in November 1964. The UNFICYP would have had access to the whole island, except for some agreed areas constituted by 1.65% of the country (United Nations, 1990).

Access to the roads advanced over the years as the mandate of the UNFICYP evolved, but they happen to be still an issue.

As U Thant argued in the 'Summing-up and Observations' (VI) part of its report, the force received a great responsibility without a clear and precise mandate. The Secretary-General blamed the resolution of the Security Council, in part for its lack of expressing at which level the use of force was allowed. Related to this issue, the tension that the force lived, according to him, was high as for some the employment of armed force should have been less, and for others, it should have been stronger and more present. (UNSC, 10/09/1964).

U Thant argued that with obvious facts, the full objectives of the UNFICYP were not met, and the prevention of the recurrence of fighting in some areas was not achieved.

Incidents had been reduced, and some advances had been made, but the situation in Cyprus was still far from what was wished to be restored. At that point, the reporter was also worried about the fact that there was a *misunderstanding.* He considered that the Turkish community on the island and the Turkish Government mistakenly contemplated the function and duty of the force. The misconception was for him related to the 'return to normal conditions': the community expected the force to act employing force to return to the situation of 1960, considering the opposition of the Cypriot Government and some of their actions as illegal (UNSC, 10/09/1964). On the other hand, as explained in the UN review book 'Blue Helmet', the Cypriot Government and Greek community saw the UNFICYP's role as an *ally* to help them end the *rebellion of the Turkish Cypriots*. U Thant rejected both interpretations, as he remarked that the force function is impartial, and consent comes from both parties and peaceful solutions with no further violence are needed (United Nations, 1990). He stated that the UNFICYP was 'in the most

delicate position' that the organization has ever experienced. The tensions were increasing as the economic pressures put in force were oppressing especially the Turkish community, and a recent crisis was appearing related to the rotation of the Turkish Contingent in Cyprus.

The Secretary-General concluded his report by stating that a withdrawal of the operation would worsen the situation. However, an extension must be carried out with major financial support, clarification on the mandate, and more freedom of movement for the UNFICYP (UNSC, 10/09/1964).

Even though Resolution 186 was a fundamental initial milestone in the history of the United Nations' intervention in the Cyprus case, resentment was present, and already in the months following the publication of the resolution, a stable solution was far from visible. Consequently, the efficiency of the force has been put into discussion since its beginning.

After a crisis which took place in June of 1964, the US also tried to mediate and arrive at a negotiation. In the specific, the American policymaker Dean Acheson initiated talks with Athens and Ankara which eventually led to two plans named after himself. The Acheson Plans documents were proposals for enosis with Greece, but they included certain territories left as sovereign military bases for Turkey. The two plans were rejected, the second one by both the communities. The efforts begun by Washington were unsuccessful and soon left the attempt at the UN alone again (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

2.3.3   Galo Plaza Lasso Report

It was during the period of high intercommunal tensions of the 60s when the UN mediator Tuomioja died, and the mission needed a new mediator. It was the case of Galo Plaza Lasso, a designation made by U Thant and a step in the peacemaking of Cyprus which received different reactions, mostly from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. Before the position of mediator, Galo Plaza was the political advisor of the UNFICYP and Special Representative, this made him familiar with the case. His position was not seen very positively but was a concern for the Turkish community as he was feared to be partisan to the Greek side for his anti-colonial principles and support for self-determination (Varnava, 2019).

As a first aspect of Galo Plaza's mediation role, he intended to exclude enosis, supported rather by the UK and the US. In his sixty-six-page report of March 1965, he analyzed the situation and criticized both parties because there was not enough commitment in the negotiating of a settlement. He believed there was no willingness from both leaders of the communities to concessions, and their political ideas were rigidly holding back the settlement of an agreement. Moreover, the two communities' positions were incompatible. Both parties had their interest

that should be abandoned, whether was it for enosis or federal solution (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). He gave observations and considerations on the need for independence for the safeguarding of all rights. His recommendations focused on the need for the two parties and their representatives, who had equal interests, to meet to discuss a solution.

In paragraph 126 of his report, Galo Plaza recognized the communities as those which subscribed to the Zurich and London Agreements, therefore, no solution is feasible if it is not accepted by both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. In the same paragraph, he underlined the need for the two communities to arrive at a settlement 'since it is they who must live under the terms of any settlement', dialogue with or without the UN is therefore what is needed (UNSC, 26/03/1965).

In paragraph 129, he acknowledged that the difficulties began right after the independence, and the events of 1963 created the conditions in which the island is, a situation in which a return to the previous situation was not possible (UNSC, 26/03/1965).

The two communities' dialogue had to focus on listening and acting respecting both the parties' concerns. It had to be open to compromise if needed.

Unfortunately, the mentioned report was just one of the first attempts with little results in the process, as it will be clear how the intercommunal gap was simply expanding. It emerged that the two communities were not trying to dialogue if this would have meant the involvement of many compromises.

The UN mediator's report efficiency was a failure, Turkey rejected it immediately and dismissed successively the role of Galo Plaza as mediator. The positions over the report remained similar through the years: the Greek Cypriots perceived and continued to perceive it as a balanced report, while the Turkish Cypriots kept seeing Galo Plaza as biased towards the other community. In any event, no other UN mediator took his place in the Cyprus case, and this formally ended the UN mediators, representing a setback for the organization. Despite its failure, the Galo Plaza report was efficient as his observations and efforts impacted the negotiations the UN tried to achieve after. Fairly unsuccessful UN attempts.

2.3.4   Before 1974 - The first attempts at mediation

Direct dialogue was one of the aspects of the Galo Plaza's report pursued in the following efforts of the United Nations. In 1966, U Thant gave Carlos Bernades, who was serving as UN secretary-general's special representative in Cyprus, the guidance of Good Offices. Bernades did not develop proposals but was promoting direct dialogue between the communities (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). This effort unfortunately was limited by the Cyprus Government's persistent

goal of independence and minority rights for the other community. Makarios was standing still on the will for sovereignty and annulment of the 1960 treaties. His work was carried on while misleading and fueling the likewise persistence of the enosis ideal in his community, at least until he abandoned the enosis path because he realized it was unrealistic. For their part, the Turkish Cypriot community was weakly piloted and was trying to convince the international community that the Greek-Cypriot Government was imposing itself illegally and coercively towards them (Varnava, 2019).

Two attempts of dialogue between the two communities in 1967 were inefficacious, enosis was once again proposed, provoking an immediate rejection from Ankara. Cyprus saw further intercommunal fighting in 1967, and an invasion seemed close.

Security Council Resolution 244 of 1967, called upon intercommunal talks, which took place between 1968 and 1974. The resolution, furthermore, recognized the enlargement of the force, including the control of disarmament and arrangements to secure internal security (UNFICYP, 2021).

In those years, as Makarios abandoned enosis and was present for diplomatic talks, General Grivas secretly returned and formed the pro-enosis organization EOKA-B. The organization was against Makarios' doctrine, and against inter-communal talks, which was making the political climate of the beginning of the 70s undermining the search for a solution (Michael, 2009).

2.3.5   The events of 1974

The period of intercommunal talks between 1967 and 1974 was pivotal for the evolution of the conflict and for the UN's involvement in it. The primary reason why this period is essential to mention is because it ultimately led to the partition of the island, setting the beginning of a condition with consequences that persist to this day. The political atmosphere of instability was moving something as far as settlements were concerned. According to Michael, agreement on local government was the final obstacle to a settlement agreed by the parties. As cited by the author, the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim reported to the Security Council that an agreement was almost reached on 'the structure of the State, the division of powers and the degree of local authority to be granted to the Turkish Cypriot community' within their renunciation of several rights comprised in the 1960 constitution (Michael, 2009). It suggests that had it not been for the escalation of the events, an agreement could have been worked on. After the death of Grivas in 1974, EOKA-B started to be guided by the brutal new leader of the Greek militia Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis. Greek and Greek Cypriot forces began to fire the

presidential palace forcing Makarios to escape. At that point, Makarios was replaced in the Cypriot administration by the supporter of enosis Sampson (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

As the military junta took control of the island through a *coup d'etat*, Turkey decided to invade the island after a refusal from the British government to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee. This decision was moved by the fact that enosis was once again feared, and the Turkish Cypriot community seemed in danger from the continued fighting (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The invasion happened in two stages. A permanent cease-fire was called by the United Nations and was reached permanently only at the end of 1975, but at that point, the Turkish invasion resulted in the gain from Turkey of a little more than 36% of the island and the geo-political configuration of Cyprus became formed by two 'virtually mono-ethnic states separated by a buffer zone guarded by UN peacekeeping troops' (Hannay, 2005).

The consequences of the events of 1974 were several. Turkish Cypriots left the south for the north, while numerous Greek Cypriots, approximately 200,000, had to leave the north for the south abandoning their properties. The movement of people and internally displaced persons caused issues related to property claims and freedom of movement and settlement, moving the following attempts at negotiations between the parties which will be discussed in chapter 3.

After the second wave of Turkish intervention in 1975 and the cease-fire reached, the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus was announced. It was subsequently declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which, since then, has been recognized by Turkey only. Cyprus is, ever since, divided as depicted by the lines in Map 1 on the next page, where the cease-fire lines are shown. The status quo is still maintained by the UN in the area between the two lines. Moreover, each community has authority and jurisdiction *on their side* and cannot intervene in the other.

Map 1. Map of Cyprus.
Source: United Nations (2019).
Office of Information and Communications Technology.

2.3.6 After 1974 – a comparison of the UN resolutions

After the coup d'etat of the Greek Cypriot community and the consecutive military intervention of Turkey, the mandate of the UNFICYP expanded out of apparent necessity.

In any case, the process of functions' expansion of the mandate started already in 1965.

Resolution 186 of 1964 was emblematic of the initial functioning of the force. Even though it was commented by U Thant for its lack of clarity on the mandate, it was conceived in a context where the intercommunal conflict in Cyprus was undermining international peace and security, and its mandate was clear on addressing the type of hostilities as the issue. The evolution of the mandate through several resolutions was needed because, as it is written in the UN review of peacekeeping actions 'UN Blue Helmets', resolution 186 was not conceived for large-scale hostilities, especially not expecting to deal with the armed forces of one guarantor power as it happened in 1974 (United Nations, 1990).

On 20 July 1974, when the Turkish Government launched its military operation in the north of Cyprus, resolution 353 was adopted by the Security Council at its 1781st meeting to end the intervention and call for a cease-fire. The document, considering the latest developments in Cyprus at that moment and the report of the Secretary-General, exposed all the organization's concerns related to the threat to international peace and deplored the outbreak of violence. In the specific, the resolution:

> l. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;
> 2. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;
> 3. *Demands* an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 1 above;
> 4. *Requests* the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements, including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974; (…) (UNSC, 20/07/1974).

Moreover, it refers to the guarantor countries Greece, Turkey, and the UK to enter negotiations urgently for the restoration of the situation and recalls the cooperation of all the parties with the UNFICYP. The UN did reinforce UNFICYP during the 1782nd meeting out of necessity.

The achievement of an agreement accepted mutually by both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities was commended by the General Assembly, which promoted preliminary intercommunal talks. Through General Assembly's Resolution 3212 of November 1974, the body recalled the respect of Cyprus' sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the withdrawal of the foreign troops and the need for all refugees to return safely home (Michael, 2009). Resolutions 364 and 365 of the Security Council followed the General Assembly's documents in December.

After the intercommunal talks, Resolution 367 is also worth acknowledgement as it was adopted in 1975 after the intervention and the de facto division of the island. The resolution adopted by the Security Council, calls for the respect of the integrity of Cyprus once more, and diplomatic efforts are called again for negotiations and cooperation with the peacekeeping force. Paragraph 2 of Resolution 367 refers to the unilateral decision of declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus. It enunciates that this unilateral decision, not only compromises the establishment of an arrangement accepted by everyone, but also the negotiations in their totality and UN resolutions. In paragraph 6, a request to the Secretary-General for a new mission of Good Offices is made. Finally, calls emerged for cooperation between the parties, representatives of the communities and the UN (UNSC, 12/03/1975).

United Nations resolutions kept being adopted by acknowledging the situations and the concerns, as happened in the case of resolution 353 and the focus on the ceasefire necessity, or as in the case of resolution 367 and the recognition of the division of Cyprus.

Moreover, from their origin to the present, the UNFICYP resolutions, have kept requiring collaboration between the parties, and respect to the work of the UNFICYP.

2.4 The following attempts at negotiation

The events of the 1970s, which eventually led to the division of the island, were turning points that completely overturned the case of Cyprus. The international diplomacy which started in the 1960s, mentioned as the beginning of UN presence on the island, was important to acknowledge its difference from the period after the events of 1974, as dramatic changes happened. Michael stated that partition, dislocation, and militarization are factors that became variants of the *metamorphosed conflicts*, completely different from 'any previous incarnation' it had (Michael, 2009). Future negotiations afterwards emerged with the UN-mediated intercommunal talks as the common denominator (Michael, 2009). Moreover, all these negotiations had at their core four enduring issues, discussed repeatedly during the talks, and these regarded governance, security, territory, and property. According to Hannay, the two

communities had real fears that also influenced the negotiations. The Greek Cypriot community feared that the Turkish Cypriots would break away from the newly formed Cyprus and win international recognition. For the Turkish Cypriots, the fear was that the other side would have domination and control in the institutions of the new state. This fear became a sensitive point for Denktash, who blamed the UN for recognizing the Republic of Cyprus even though it had no Turkish Cypriot presence since 1963 (Hannay, 2005).

2.4.1 The High-Level Agreements

Right after the declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus in 1975, the UN tried to restart the talks between the parties with little success. In 1976, the UN and its Secretary-General Waldheim, in pursuit of Resolution 367, chaired direct meetings between the two leaders of the communities, Makarios and Denktash. Talks which represented a set ahead in the conflict. These talks moved something as they arrived at a four-point agreement: the first High-Level agreement (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Both the representatives agreed on the view of Cyprus as an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic. Taking the nature of the reunification investigated by both into account, it would have followed a discussion on the administration of each community, and aspects of importance such as freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and right to property.

According to the High-Level Agreement, the bi-communal character of the State would have been regarded when decisions over powers and functions of the government would be discussed. Relying on the agreement, a twelve-point proposal for a federation of two states was drafted by the US, Britain, and Canada, and then presented by the UN to the parties, facing the rejection of the Greek Cypriot community. The rejection was justified by the community for its lack of attention to freedom of movement, settlements and rights to own property, aspects of fundamental concern (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

The second round of talks and the second High-Level Agreement followed the death of Makarios. The direct meetings took place between Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou, the new president of Cyprus, in 1979 and led to a ten-point agreement based on the 1977 guidelines and the UN resolutions. One issue brought to attention during the talks of 1979, was the reach of an agreement for the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices, a suburb of Famagusta, uninhabited and contested between the two communities since the Turkish intervention. The sixth point of the agreement regarded the avoidance of any action undermining the outcomes, both sides were committing and promoting 'goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions'. Plus, point eight underlined the opposition to partly or total union with any

country, guaranteeing instead independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (*PIO*, n.d.). As described by Hannay, the two High-Level Agreements were just 'thin skeletons of a settlement', they did something, however, in favour of a bi-communal solution (Hannay, 2005). Complicating the talks of the 1980s was the 1983 declaration of independence of the north of the island by Denktash and the Turks. Claimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), it provoked a reaction from the UN. The Security Council condemned the move and did not recognize the new state, calling all the member countries of the organization to do the same (Hannay, 2005). Resolution 541 of the UN Security Council expressed the declaration's invalidity and since then unrecognition of the state is still present in today's scene. TRNC is, as already mentioned, considered a nation only by Turkey.

2.4.2   The Set of Ideas and the Confidence-Building measures

The UN did not give up its efforts to find a solution for Cyprus, even after Denktash declared the TRNC in 1983. Furthermore, Denktash affirmed that the declaration would not undermine his efforts to find a settlement. After a while, the reunification talks resumed with little progress (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The TRNC declaration was an additional element to the inextricable ones, which rendered the talks more complex. Not only the TRNC was condemned and not recognized by the international community, but it was also seen critically by many Turkish Cypriots for the complications it brought to talks. It is commonly believed that it contributed to further distance and tension between the two communities.

The UN's new Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar proposed a new draft framework agreement to the two parties in 1986. The draft called again for the creation of an independent state with bicommunal and bizonal characteristics. According to Ker-Lindsay, the limits of the draft appeared to be the fact that it would have been based on a confederation, the Turkish forces on the island and the Turkish settlers were not addressed, and there was a *de novo* lack of reference to the three freedoms (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). For these reasons, the proposals did not seem to have the Greek Cypriot community's support. While an international conference to discuss guarantees was encouraged, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots still felt like the Cypriot administration was illegal, so they were not open to discussion.

The Set of Ideas was a comprehensive solution proposed by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1992, which went beyond the High-Level Agreements. The proposal addressed the core concerns like the bicommunal federation's administration, its governance, the addressing of the territorial adjustments issue, and the return of displaced persons. According to Bolukbasi, the talks organized by Ghali led nowhere and continued accusing each community of lacking

goodwill. This time again, direct dialogue with the parties was tense. Denktash was accused of his refusal to collaborate and compromise. For his part, the Turkish Cypriot leader criticized the role of Ghali as he exceeded his authority (Bolukbasi, 1995).

Other factors started to negatively influence the negotiations, for instance, the Cypriot government's application to the European Union in 1990. Moreover, Denktash reactions to the application made him refuse further talks and further attempts progressed by the UN. Furthermore, the new Greek Cypriot president elected in 1993, Glafcos Clerides, distanced the government from the Set of Ideas (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The Set of Ideas and Ghali's mission were another failure of the efforts carried out by the UN. Another UN attempt was with the Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), comprehending the reopening of the Airport of Nicosia, closed since 1974 and controlled by the UN, and the return of Varosha to Greek Cypriots (Hannay, 2005). After these attempts, the organization was tired and hesitant to go on with its efforts and the lack of political will was blamed on Denktash again. Ultimately, neither side seemed to collaborate with the UN draft and the request to endorse it. EU's decision to begin the accession talks with Cyprus delayed the situation. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots contested the island's annexation to the EU as it would have violated the constitution of 1960. The situation on the island in the 1990s was more than tense, and it got worse as Denktash declined the invitation to join the talks with the European Union (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

2.4.3 The Annan Plan

The Cyprus entrance process to the EU influenced the conflict in a context of already high tension, which lasted the final years of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Even though the process of Europeanization was affecting the conflict deeply for several reasons, it should take space in another separate analysis. It is important to note, however, that the developments were set in singular conditions in which the CBMs failed, the UN initiatives were temporarily paused, and a process of militarization by both sides added complexity to the period concerned. The presence and superiority of Turkish troops on the island contributed to the tension, affecting security concerns and political behaviours (Michael, 2009).

A crisis erupted in 1997 with the S-300 missile crisis, in which Clerides acquired the air defence missile from Russia. The crisis is particularly exemplary of the fragility of the situation. A deterioration of the conflict could have brought an armed confrontation not only between Greece and Turkey but also involving Russia and NATO. The military build-up was growing on both sides of the island, increasing ethno-nationalism. In this context, the temporary absence of the UN entailed the renovation of Anglo-American diplomatic efforts till the reactivation of

the intercommunal talks by British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind and the Annan initiative, named after Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Michael, 2009).

According to Michael, even though the UN depended already on the US and British support before the Annan Plan, with it the relationship became almost equivalent. It was hoped that a deal could have anticipated the meeting of EU leaders in 2004 (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Unsurprisingly, no remarkable progress was made.

The Annan plan's first submission was in 2002 (Annan 1), and the final draft, the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, was submitted in March 2004 (Annan IV). The agreement was defined as an opportunity for both parties, as the communities 'had never been closer' to reaching one according to the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Cyprus. He was not alone, as Annan himself trusted his plan to the point that he believed that never had external and internal elements so aligned as it (Michael, 2009).

The negotiations focused on proximity and direct talks related to the core issues: constitution, security, and territory. The final draft, or Annan V, committed both sides as equal co-founders of the *United Cyprus Republic (UCR).* Cyprus would have been a federalist state on the example of the Swiss. It would have had a single international personality but composed of two equal states: the Greek Cypriot state and the Turkish Cypriot. Supported by Greece and Turkey, the state would have considered, with the necessary changes, the 1960 three treaties. Unions with other countries would have been prohibited. Many were power-sharing arrangements, and between them, the plan proposed a parliament made up of two chambers, a Senate with equal representation of the two communities and a Chamber of Deputies with proportional representation (Michael, 2009). There would have been a presidential council composed of six members elected by both houses (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Security and property were addressed. As far as security was concerned, territorial integrity would have been 'safeguarded' by the Treaty of Guarantee. The UN would have chaired a Monitoring Committee and would have been present as the only military force on the island with the extension of the UNFICYP's mission. An aspect that the plan addressed and proposed to solve is the concern over property claims and the return of displaced persons, which will be discussed with more attention in Chapter 3.

Another aspect that made the Annan Plan different from previous proposals was its consideration and involvement in the EU process, as the island accession to the organization, it would have also supported the Turkish EU accession (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

The US, most of the EU members, the UN and the Turkish government announced that would have been in favour of the proposals, however, opposition from both sides of the Cyprus

communities existed, to the point that mobilization against the UN plan took place. Rejection was stronger among Greek Cypriots, as anti-Annan Plan campaigns opposed the plan since its first version in 2002 and finally followed the request of rejection by Papadopoulos (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). When the time came for the Cypriot people to decide, the result of the referendum of April 2004 revealed that the majority of Greek Cypriots composed of 76% were against the plan, while the majority of Turkish Cypriots of 65% were in favour of it (Loizides and McGarry, 2019). It was yet another missed opportunity for the reunification of Cyprus through the efforts of the UN. Since then, Cyprus has had a *de jure* membership with the EU. Whereas the northern part has several restrictions, such as concerning direct flights or trade within the organization. Loizides and McGarry underlined the fact that the Annan Plan was innovating for conflict resolution as the UN has been given authorization by both sides to 'arbitrate on non-agreed matters'. This caused concerns about their future enforcement, as the plan endorsed settlements not supported directly by the leaders (Loizides and McGarry, 2019).

2.4.4   The Crans-Montana talks

The failure of the Annan Plan established a new period in the history of negotiations and in the involvement of the UN in the peace process. Two years after the Annan Plan V and its referendum, the UN succeeded in its intention to reopen dialogue between negotiators Papadopoulos and Talat, but with little result, as it accomplished only the possibility of restarting talks (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The successor of Denktash, Talat, seemed to be more open to dialogue and in favour of a peace process (Yılmaz, 2010). In 2008, the parties and their leaders decided to be more *directly* and *bilaterally* involved in the negotiations, as the failure of the Annan Plan and the UN-led processes brought disappointment and provoked a loss of confidence in the organization.

This decision slowed down the negotiations at several points. The process was led by Cyprus alone, with the two parties controlling it. Even though the UN facilitated it, no UN mediator was present (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Despite that, the peacekeeping mission on the island was maintained, and its direct involvement in supporting the peace process remained active. Hope for UN Cyprus Talks recovered in June 2017 during the Crans-Montana conference in Switzerland. The United Nations guided the talks between the Greek Cypriot community leader Anastasiades, the Turkish Cypriot leader Akıncı, the guarantors' foreign ministers and the UK's Special Envoy (*UN Cyprus Talks*, 2017). The aim of the conference was the achievement of improvements regarding security and guarantees, fundamental for reaching a broader agreement and coming to a general trustful understanding between the parties.

The other issues over territory, property and governance were still points of discussion in the talks.

The current UN Secretary-General Guterres supported and called for determination in reaching a comprehensive solution. Guterres concluded the conference by declaring that the talks failed to find a solution, despite the intense dedication. Turkey's military presence on the island and its future was one of the main points debated and disagreed on (*Aljazeera*, 08/07/2017).

After the collapse of the Crans-Montana talks, the attempts to negotiate were resumed in 2021, with the Informal Five Plus UN Meeting. According to resolution 2561 of 2021, the aim was to find common ground for dialogue between the leaders of the two communities and the guarantor powers, to proceed with formal negotiations (UNSC, 29/01/2021).

The formal negotiations would have had prerequisites. The Greek Cypriot delegation was still on the commitment, derived from the Crans-Montana talks, for a settlement which would have meant the settlement of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality. The delegation representing Turkish Cypriots restated its proposal for a Security Council resolution which would have established the two sides' equal international status and sovereign equality (UNSC, 29/01/2021).

As they failed to find common ground for formal talks, the UN Secretary-General has since then attempted to restart the Cyprus negotiations on many occasions, encouraged by the Council members. Therefore, officially the Crans-Montana unification talks in 2017 were the last attempt, where another loss of an occasion caused unmeaningful political progress.

2.5 UN's ongoing relevance in the Cyprus case

Several factors still impact the conflict over re-unification, influencing both the island and the surrounding region. Sporadic international attempts to resume negotiations and peace processes are still carried out and have today been affecting the lives of the two communities for six decades.

The failure of the Crans-Montana talks worsened the situation, even though the talks at their beginning seemed a promising success, evoking a sense of optimism for a solution similar to the optimism experienced during the 2004 Annan Plan. Additional factors exacerbated the shared frustration of the parties and the international community, compounding the disappointments following the collapse of the UN-led negotiations.

In addition to the core issues obstructing the finding of a solution since 1974, new issues like the discovery of new natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, began to fuel more discussions. Possible wars for new resources have started to alarm the region.

Cyprus struck gas in 2011 and 2019, provoking more direct involvement of Turkey in the energy game (Andrei, 2019). Plus, the discoveries of gas reserves, in Cyprus and other areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, incited the interest of European countries and their energy companies to intervene as well. Neighbouring countries intended to cooperate with the island for their interest, benefitting from it strategically and economically. It brought competition over new-found resources. What is more, President Erdoğan warned, that Turkey's intervention would have been ready 'if necessary' to respond to the violation of its sovereignty by Greece, Cyprus and foreign actors (Andrei, 2019).

An additional problem highlighted by Andrei is that Turkey has not recognized the Republic of Cyprus and has not accepted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This leads to an issue over rights to a continental shelf, which Cyprus has not according to Ankara (Andrei, 2019).

In this context, militarization is increasing in both parts of the island, and naval and air forces have also been mobilized and deployed by Turkey. The Republic of Cyprus and Greece tightened their military links with Western partners, especially with the US which was trying to dissuade the Greek Cypriots from buying from Russia. While, as the report by the International Crisis Group noted, attention will be given to the US selling to the Greek Cypriots, and accordingly, the north of the island will be *fortified* (*International Crisis Group*, 2023). Military reinforcement complicated the situation, but according to the report, it does not necessarily mean a critical point is likely to follow.

In this context, the UN keeps playing its role with the UNFICYP in maintaining stability, seeking to mediate and facilitate dialogue. UN affirms the importance of its conventions as UNCLOS and always engages the parties in cooperation.

The two communities submitted proposals towards the UN Secretary-General on the matter. Turkish Cypriots called for a joint committee, but the Greek Cypriot community did not seem willing to cooperate. They excluded the possibility of hydrocarbon joint exploitation or any agreement for sharing the resources with the Turkish Cypriots. To them, a deal over Cyprus must take priority (Andrei, 2019). The alternative was proposed by the Republic of Cyprus in 2019 and rejected by the Turkish Cypriots in 2022. It would have legitimated the Greek Cypriot control over resources (*International Crisis Group,* 2023).

Economic cooperation between the two could solve the issue of what the communities consider theirs for being in their territory. At the same time, the two communities are exhausted by the continued failure of peace attempts to conflict. The two sides do not want a worsening of the

situation provoked by this new issue of exploitation of resources, since the old and unsolved issues undermine the conflict already.

Over the years and since 2003, the contact between the two parties increased with the opening of checkpoints controlled by the UN in the buffer zone. Despite this, the relations between the North and the south did not improve and security is a concern. Although security will be discussed more deeply in the third chapter concerning the efficiency of the UN in keeping it, incidents in the area are still numerous and problems over territory are ordinary.

A set of confidence-building measures was pushed by Ioannis Kasoulides in 2022 and presented to the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Tatar. The proposal concerned Varosha, the transferring of part of the town to the UN and then to the Greek Cypriot administration.

The project comprehended also the adoption of measures to facilitate trade with the northern part of the island and with Turkey, together with opening ports and the airspace of the TRNC. Moreover, the Ercan airport operations were proposed to be placed under the UN. While the port of Famagusta was proposed to go under the EU authority (*International Crisis Group,* 2023).

Tatar rejected the proposal in 2022 as he wanted his sovereignty over the territory to be recognized before. Likewise, renouncing the jurisdiction over Varosha, the airport and the port was unacceptable.

International flights are banned from the Ercan airport in Nicosia, which is also the only airport situated on the Turkish Cypriot side. Today, the only flights that the airport does are flights in connection with Turkey.

Reaching the airport from the Greek side is not easy. Opening the airport to international flights not only could benefit the northern side and its tourism, but it could also affect the other airports of the island and somehow, arguably influence the relations among the communities. The Turkish Cypriot airports and ports on the northern side of the island are considered illegal by the UN as well, provoking and contributing to a sense of isolation shared by Turkish Cypriots. Instead, Turkish President Erdoğan, on the occasion of the new terminal building's inauguration in the TRNC, mentioned this sense of isolation shared by Turkish Cypriots and, on the same occasion, he urged people to embrace the idea of two equal states coexisting, as opposed to the culture of dominance, tension, and conflict present on the island (*Presidency of the Republic of Turkey*, 2023).

Regarding the present UN efforts in possible agreements, they were put into discussion for the future. A reduction of the peacekeepers was already done, and many observers argue that the money for the operation should be used somewhere else (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). It seems,

however, that the UN will remain the only peacekeeping force on the island, being favoured compared to NATO, opposed by the Greek Cypriots, and the EU, opposed by Turkish Cypriots. As for the UN Security Council, the five permanent member states have the potential and power to be involved in the efforts for a possible settlement, as explained before in the part related to the organization (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Britain may appear as the most present influence due to its guarantor power. The US seemed to care about the Cyprus problem as well. However, they had little effective influence in the negotiations so far. The other member of the UNSC who seems to have been involved in parts of the situation's developments, after Britain and the UK, is Russia. Given that the two communities perceived the involvement of the permanent UN members differently, one community sees the participation of each member as favouring or opposing its cause. For instance, Greek Cypriots perceived the role of Russia as a protector of their interest. On the other hand, through their negotiation attempts, the US and the UK were occasionally accused of favouring the Turkish Cypriot side (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

As has been demonstrated, the UN's ongoing relevance in Cyprus, and the efficiency of its peacekeeping, is influenced by the existing structure of the United Nations, as member states influence several aspects of the UNFICYP.

Moreover, political pressures and conspiracy theories may influence peacekeeping impartiality, undermining the trust of the two communities in the work of the organization.

Finally, the support given to the mission is also influenced by the UNSC, as the quantity and quality of the UNFICYP personnel depend on the contributions of the member states.

The report of the Secretary-General on the UNFICYP related to the period from December 2022 to June 2023 detects the most recent activities of the peacekeeping force while considering the events that defined the relevant period. A significant development identified in the report is the election, in February 2023, of Nikos Christodoulides as president of the Republic of Cyprus. Christodoulides emphasized as his main concern the Cyprus issue (UNSC, 05/07/2023). According to the report, the Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar congratulated him on his election and proposed a face-to-face meeting under the auspices of the Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus.

However, the latest report of January 2024, underlined that there have not been concrete changes in the political dynamics since then, as the two sides 'maintained their divergent positions regarding the way forward on the Cyprus issue' (UNSC, 03/01/2024).

Throughout the reporting period, the leaders did not engage in significant developments, and the public prospects for a potential peace remain unchanged. The two communities are focused

on the socioeconomic and political developments within the respective sides. Problems regarding military violations are also mentioned, fueling a sentiment of mistrust, but this will be discussed in the next chapter.

Finally, the Secretary-General recalled the work and actions of the leaders in addressing the Cyprus issue, promoting dialogue and building trust (UNSC, 03/01/2023).

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter made the complex nature and multifaceted context of the Cyprus case more evident concerning its historical background, the beginning and continuance of the UN presence, and its ongoing relevance. The complexity of the issue is contributed by the external impact and interventions the island faced, from the civilizations that came to dominate the island historically, the British rule during the colonization, the longstanding Turkish and Greek influence on the island and the international impact of the UN and finally EU. The reasons for the influences and interventions may lie in the strategic position of the island, as it has always attracted foreigners, and more recently saw international interest caused by energetic discoveries.

Over the years, the two main identities living on the island, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, faced problems co-existing. To foster the differences and tensions between the two was the independence from British rule with the constitution in 1960, and the three founding treaties. The 1960 Constitution demonstrated its fragility in just four years. Tension and fighting characterised the coexistence of the two populations, which prompted the UN to intervene in 1964 to maintain stability.

The Greek *coup d'état* of 1974 for the *enosis* and the consequent invasion of Turkey with the division of the island, provoked a general thought that the UN did not prevent the escalation of the conflict. Nonetheless, a ceasefire was reached in 1975, and the status quo has been maintained in the UN buffer zone ever since.

The UNFICYP was established with a first mandate, where the function of the force was explained in the first resolution 186 of the Security Council. From the first resolution, the attempts of the UN to mediate in the conflict were several, through numerous negotiations drafts and proposals. Resolutions and mandates were compared to underline how they changed over time as they needed to adjust to the rise of new issues.

Many were the actors involved in the peace process effort. The High-Level Agreements, the Set of Ideas, the Annan Plan and the Crans-Montana talks all possessed for a period, more or less short, optimism that a solution would have been close. It was acknowledged that the failure

to reach certain agreements was due to the lack of compromise and willingness from the parties, which were demonstrated to be present since the beginning of the attempts. The failure of the Annan Plan also brought a sense of disappointment and lack of confidence towards the United Nations.

However, optimism does not seem to be present in Cyprus' current situation either.

Even though the mandate of the UNFICYP is renewed every year new negotiation attempts seem far, and compromises between the two communities over some core issues seem distant. Analysis of the negotiation efforts' causes and concerns that pose challenges to the organization's work has been used to evaluate the effectiveness of the UN in maintaining peace in Cyprus. The UN Security Council structure and the role of the permanent member states have been discussed, as they have the constant potential to influence the efficiency of the UN peacekeeping mission both positively and negatively.

The issue over security will be deepened in chapter three to critically see the efficiency of the UN force in its function to deal with core issues and maintain stability.

Similarly, the problem regarding territory and property is deeply rooted in the case of the Cyprus conflict and needs analysis as it continues to influence a possible agreement.

3   Discussion

3.1 Introduction

In the pursuit of a long-standing peace and a lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force on the island stands as a crucial unit of the entire organization with the mission to maintain international peace and security.

This chapter, the final chapter of the thesis, delves into the efficiency of the UNFICYP through the analysis of three crucial factors rooted in the conflict, which shape to this day the involvement of the force in Cyprus and its competence.

In the specific, the three factors used to assess the effectiveness of the UN in bringing about peace in Cyprus will be the main topics of discussion in this section. The border security, property issues, and current societal peace between the two communities serve as evaluation indicators.

The field research done on the border will anticipate the examination of the three factors, particularly discussing today's security in visiting the northern part of the island from an outsider's perspective and acknowledging the diversification of the two identities.

The first factor worth analysing in the discussion of whether the UNFICYP is efficient in peacekeeping is the *security* of the buffer zone (3.2). Not only security is at the core of the United Nations mission, and its maintenance is the reason for the UN's intervention in the Cyprus case, but it is also the heart of the mandate of the UNFICYP. The work of the UNFICYP in keeping the ceasefire and its effort to maintain security will be highlighted, with an eye on its legal status, and the modalities and characteristics of the work. The buffer zone role will also be discussed concerning the lives of the civilians, as it keeps splitting the island and influencing the movement of people. The character of the buffer zone changed through the years and the incidents happening in the area decreased since the first years of administration by the UN. The risk of armed conflict has been mitigated. However, sporadic incidents and violations still happen despite the presence of the force. Moreover, the area is also called the *Dead Zone* and part of it is abandoned, the UN lacks a mandate and budget to maintain the entire zone and many infrastructures are ruined.

The problem of *property* is also an issue the UN must deal with (3.3). The Cyprus conflict had a huge impact on the properties of Cypriots. The displacement of people is a sensitive issue caused by the tension on the island which started to be present in the 1950s and 1960s. The disputes over properties arose in those years, and increased with the de facto division of the island, as numerous refugees were forced to leave their homes and their belongings for the north or the south. Special cases will be explained as emblematic of the evolution of the property

issue, particular attention will be given to the case of *Loizidou v. Turkey*. An evaluation of the UNFICYP's efforts in mediating the disputes will be addressed. Its assistance to refugees will be discussed as well.

Finally, but not for less importance, the aspect of *societal peace between the two communities,* and the peace education, will be explained (3.4) as presently influencing the communities on both sides of the island. A feeling of mistrust causes indirect tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and it is fueled by old educational systems, misinformation, and distorted historical perspectives. The UN's involvement in it will be analysed, as it is engaged in shaping a narrative that could bring lasting peace, through different programs and projects that promote peaceful education. Collaboration with bodies, agencies and NGOs is crucial. The work of a specified NGO, the Home for Cooperation, which has worked since 2011 on the building of bridges between the two communities will be approached.

The three case studies, help us understand the complexity of the case and the limits of the UNFICYP in dealing with its mandate. The force is challenged when incidents occur in the buffer zone when property issues and agreements to solve them are difficult to find, and when mistrust limits the UN's effort for dialogue. Psychological factors can shape two different and divided identities that hardly meet in a unique Cypriot identity. Those listed and explained in the following chapter are just some of the reasons why the UN force is arguably ineffective, and the length of its operation proves the limits of the operation.

3.2 The UNFICYP and the security maintenance in the buffer zone
3.2.1   May 2023

On the 5th of May 2023, crossing the UN checkpoint of the buffer zone through Ledra Street in the capital city of Nicosia made me realize the reality of the island's division. The entrance into the Turkish-recognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was quick and smooth through the exhibition of the passport. Present that day there were tourists who were crossing the border to see the *other side* of the island. Among us visitors, there were also Greek Cypriots, who were crossing the border for work or personal reasons.

I found out later that a few decades ago, crossing the area was more laborious. Given that, close to that checkpoint at the end of Ledra Street, the Ledra Palace Hotel was the only point of contact in the 1990s (Papadakis, 2005). The initial openness of checkpoints was in 2003, and subsequently, the adhesion to the EU brought major freedom of movement. The opening of the borders, unexpectedly announced by Denktash, provoked an immediate beginning of the crossing on the 23rd April of 2003 (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). A restriction on travelling was therefore

ended that day. Today, twenty years later, the number of people crossing is thousands, and the checkpoints allow the transfer of people, vehicles, and goods between the two sides.

What was surprising that day of May 2023, which today after all the research and reading no longer would have surprised me, was the role of certain cultural symbols. The elements characterizing the two sides change completely within the crossing of a few hundred meters. The observations developed were that the communities' cultural elements strongly represented a community that did not seem present on the other side.

The first thing I saw once entered the TRNC, was a pastry shop selling *baklava*, the famous Turkish dessert. After the baklava shop, the Turkish flag, beside the TRNC's one, became visible to me around this side of Nicosia, just as the Greek flag flying around Paphos, or above other Cypriot cities in the south. As the majority of the population on this side is Muslim, during the day the call to prayer, known as the adhan, can be heard, and around this side of the city, mosques are the most frequented religious sites.

After having walked around for more or less a couple of hours, I had the chance to speak with some Turkish Cypriots, and I took the opportunity to ask them a few questions about the conflict, the political situation, and the role of the UN and EU commonly perceived by civilians in finding a solution.

The first person I had the privilege to talk to, was a gentleman in his seventies. To maintain privacy, it will be referred to as *TC Resident 1* from now on. He was born in Paphos and he had to escape north when the events of 1974 occurred. He explained, without many details, that he was actively involved during the period of the conflict and for him, a common ground between the two communities was, is and will be hard to find soon. He continued, 'maybe the next generation will find a solution, but both mine and your generation will not see a settlement'. He stated that the situation is also influenced and worsened by conflict over natural resources, as a sharing of them is inconceivable for Greek Cypriots. Finally, he explained how, when crossing the border to reach the Greek Cypriot's side, officials make the process slow and they want to 'lock the Turks in one side' (TC Resident 1, 05/05/2023). As for the role of the UN, TC Resident 1 argued that the organization wants to find a solution but lacks understanding that the two points of view are too different.

The second person I met was the owner of a restaurant in the TRNC. He had a stronger perception of the Cyprus conflict. He was seven years old when the war began, and he clearly remembered the bombing. *TC Resident 2* argued that a settlement was unlikely to be found and that only another armed confrontation could lead to a solution. According to him, as the UN has as member states China, the United States, and Russia, the case of Cyprus is distant from

their interest, resulting in the almost useless work of the United Nations (TC Resident 2, 05/05/2023).

The last Turkish Cypriot I spoke to was *TC Resident 3*, in front of a bar close to the checkpoint. TC Resident 3 argued that no one there wished the war, and many people were not interested in politics but just wanted more freedom of movement. He stated that the problem lay in the two different points of interest of the communities: they want to be recognised, while the Greek Cypriot side does not cooperate for this recognition, but just wants a unified Cyprus. He agreed with the other interviewees on the role of the UN. However, for him, if the UN wish to solve the situation, with its power it could find a settlement once and for all (TC Resident 3, personal communication, 05/05/2023, Nicosia).

One thing was clear to me at the end of that 5th of May, and that was that the situation resigned the people I spoke to, no one among the Residents of the TRNC seemed to believe that a settlement could be reached shortly, and no one was positively seeing the work of the UN in finding a solution and peacebuilding.

Returning to the southern side and confronting locals there, I perceived more resentment carried by the fact that lots of Turks from Turkey now live in what the call *occupied part.* The feeling that a solution would not be found soon was shared among the residents of the south of Cyprus as well.

Talking to a Greek Cypriot from Nicosia, *GC Resident 1,* the issue of property is one of the primary problems that still complicates the seek for a solution in Cyprus. She argued that lots of Greek Cypriots lost their houses, therefore compensation and property rights need to be safeguarded optimally in a possible solution. Moreover, for her, the propaganda was still very present, and she explained to me that once someone crosses the border for the *other side*, the fact that he/she notices Turkish elements 'is part of their rhetoric and propaganda' (GC Resident 1, 05/05/2023).

GC Resident 2 denied the future recognition of the TRNC. And according to the man, in his thirties, a solution right now is quite unlikely to be found. He explained that the only solution that could be accepted by the Republic of Cyprus was a solution that involved reunification, but the *Turkish side* would not agree. Furthermore, a settlement would have to imply the terms and principles of the European Union. Therefore, he considered it quite unlikely that this could be achieved shortly because a possible unification would find the Turkish denial (GC Resident 2, 05/05/2023).

The last person I spoke to was a man from Paphos probably in his 60s, *GC Resident 3*, he argued that the policies of the parts were too far to find a compromise. According to him, as Turkey

occupied the properties and the territories of Cyprus, only a settlement where Turkey does not influence and compensate for the violations could be agreed upon by their government. However, right now, the two communities focus on different aspects of their respective politics. Moreover, he argued that for a settlement 'Turkish forces should leave the island' (GC Resident 3, 05/05/2023).

Drawing parallels with the past is insightful for this current research. For this reason, a parallelism is possible to be made with Yiannis Papadakis' book 'Echoes from The Dead Zone', where he describes his experiences, at the end of the 20th century, as a Cypriot scholar who studied in the UK and returned to the island to research on both (Papadakis, 2005).

He first crossed the border of divided Cyprus in March 1991, before the opening of the checkpoints to Cypriots, and his experience was very different from mine. As a Greek Cypriot, the studies and research he carried through the years on both sides, speaking to ordinary Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turks, made him realize things he did not expect. He recognized that his truth, deriving from his childhood living on the southern part of the island, and his education, were different from the reality he faced through the narratives of people on the other side. He soon twisted his truth and started to see things differently, mostly for what concerned the people and the historical events characterizing the Cyprus problem. He did not know that most of the war took place from 1964 onwards, it did not begin in 1974. He did not know about how many Turkish Cypriots before 1974 became refugees and how many suffered or were killed (Papadakis, 2005). His discoveries related to the role of propaganda twisted his vision as well, and the perspectives of both communities made him realize the complexity of the issue. The dead zone is the primary location of his book, and it is curious to read how he was not left free to conduct his research, as during its first interviews an official was always present. Carrying the kind of research he did in the dead zone, at the beginning of the 1990s, made him risk accusations of espionage. At the time of his writings, the buffer zone was very different from how I perceived it. Despite this, security, property and propaganda were issues back then but still are influencing the context of Cyprus and the UNFICYP.

3.2.2 The buffer zone and its legal status

Security is the primary aim of the United Nations peacekeeping forces, and to maintain it, the organization uses a series of instruments and tools such as the establishment of buffer zones. The establishment and safeguarding of the buffer zone in Cyprus, also called the Green Line or

Dead Zone, are among the most important activities that the UNFICYP has dealt with since its first intervention on the island in the 1960s.

The United Nations Police (UNPOL) is part of the UNFICYP and since 1964 has had the responsibility to maintain and restore law and order (UNFICYP, 2021). In compliance with the mandate, UNPOL has no executive powers, but to accomplish its police task, it cooperates with the Cypriot Police and the Turkish Cypriot Police. Among the activities that the UNPOL has in the buffer zone, it supports public order, monitors demonstrations, supports the resolution of disputes between the two communities, and regulates civilian activities (UNFICYP, 2021).

Since 1964, the buffer zone was created through demilitarization in response to violence between the communities. Military lines are today drawn on each side, and each community cannot exercise authority, jurisdiction, or make military moves beyond its military lines. The buffer zone is precisely the area among the delineations, between the National Guard and the Turkish ceasefire lines. It holds 3% of Cyprus and extends for about 180 km (United Nations, 1990). The possibility that the other side develops military forces preoccupy both the communities, and for this reason, the UNFICYP mandate includes inspection and control of the parties' activities. Some areas within the zone are open to civilian usage, they are called Civil Use Areas, freely allowing the movement of people. More than 10,000 people live or work there. Outside those areas, civilian movement and activity are prohibited in most of the zones unless authorised by the Force (UNFICYP, n.d. c).

The role of the UNFICYP in the buffer zone has evolved with the succession of resolutions, as the entire mission has through the years. Some areas within the buffer zone are excluded by the control of the UN though. For instance, the area of Dhekelia is outside the control of the UN because it is a British Sovereign Base, and Varosha has no UN jurisdiction as it is under Turkish military control (UNFICYP, n.d. c).

As a consequence of the events of 1974, the UNFICYP and mentioned resolution 353, called for the immediate ceasing of firing (United Nations, 1990). The role of the UNFICYP changed at that moment and had to react with a high state of readiness and full alert. Humanitarian operations were organized by the UNFICYP, and the best efforts to prevent any escalation of incidents were called by the Security Council. While, reinforcements from the contributing countries were requested and redeployed (United Nations, 1990).

It is, therefore, from resolution 353 (1974) that the buffer zone was determined as the security zone, where the only force allowed in the area is the UNFICYP.

As far as security is concerned, after the events of July and August 1974, the force took on significant humanitarian functions. The support of the UNFICYP in favour of as many normal

civilian activities as can be resumed is constantly under armed guard by the military on both sides. It makes it easier the resume farming in the buffer zone where it is safe and assists both communities with the delivery of water and electricity across the borders (UNFICYP, 2021).

Today, the scope of the buffer zone varies from safeguarding civilians to preventing a return to armed confrontations. Not only the buffer zone is decisive for the maintenance of the ceasefire by the UN, but it is also an important tool for controlling the movements, as many individuals need to cross the borders for different reasons.

Through the buffer zone, the UNFICYP has an important humanitarian role as it addresses the needs of the population who suffered the conflict, especially those who have been displaced since 1964 or need assistance. Moreover, UNFICYP collaborates with other International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the zone. Fortunately, the humanitarian work of the UNFICYP in granting security and keeping peace is supported by also other entities.

The legal status of the zone appears confusing because of the longstanding situation, the historical context and the complexity of the events that happened.

Given that the buffer zone is under UNFICYP command, the UN mandate and the terms of the many international accords for an island ceasefire made the work on it much more difficult. The political division, the separation of the societies and the lack of recognition of the TRNC finally contributed to challenging the work of the UN in the area. Among the principal aspects challenging the work and efficiency of the organization's peacekeeping are predominantly the incidents which still happen in the zone and the limits found in the resources and the budget of the UNFICYP.

3.2.3 The limits of the buffer zone

The limits of the borders have been the cause of several disputes since the existence of the buffer zone. Security concerns are put at risk when individuals from both sides of the island access the Green Line without authorization, violating in this way the principle according to which civilians are forbidden to access the zone. Among the ceasefire violations, there are any moves, builds or deployments of military elements, but also individuals' violations and demonstrations.

According to the data collected by the UN, every year approximately hundreds of incidents happen with more than 850 troops and 60 police officers dealing with them (UNFICYP, 2021). Even though it can be observed that access violations and consequent related incidents were greater at the beginning of the presence of the UNFICYP compared to the present, incidents

still happen, triggering violence both towards community members and UN peacekeepers. The tension around the area increased in 1996, as indicated by the Secretary-General in his Report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus dated 10 December 1996 and referring to the period between the 11th of June and the 10th of December 1996 (UNSC, 10/12/1996).

He observed that hostility and distrust were increasing between the two communities due to specific events.

On the 11th of August 1996, a group of Greek Cypriot demonstrators entered the United Nations buffer zone without authorization and encountered counterdemonstrators from the other community. Counterdemonstrators, Turkish troops, and Turkish Cypriot police were allowed by Turkish forces to enter the buffer zone as well. Among them, there were illegal members of the *Grey Wolves* group: an ultra-nationalist Turkish organization. The area became successively the location for clashes between the parties, and violent fighting. A Greek Cypriot was killed by a member of the grey wolves with an axe.

A few days later, during the funeral, 200 Greek Cypriots entered the buffer zone again meeting the opposition of the UNFICYP. One Greek Cypriot was shot to death by the Turkish / Turkish Cypriot side while he was climbing a flagpole to pull down a flying Turkish flag. The Secretary-General reported that during the fighting of the 11 and 14 August, 19 UNFICYP soldiers were injured, and other civilians wounded, causing an increase of tension between the sides. The UNFICYP personnel did their best to deny access to the buffer zone, however, the Secretary-General argued that it must be the responsibility of the local authorities to control the civilians (UNSC, 10/12/1996).

The following month, in the British Sovereign Base Area, two Turkish Cypriot soldiers were shot. In that period the number of incidents increased and UNFICYP personnel kept intervening to prevent escalation while being threatened. Furthermore, the visits to Turkish Cypriots in the south carried out by the UNFICYP increased as the community felt unsafe.

The Secretary-General concluded his report on the events of 1996 by stating that the leaders of both sides must act to reverse the negative trend of the past and lead their communities in a more positive direction (UNSC, 10/12/1996).

Incidents decreased since 1996. The distribution of fatalities over the years, since the establishment of the mission, is indicated in the histogram provided by the UNFICYP Mission Fact Sheet. It visually shows a decrease in the incidents. The visual graph reveals the data updated till January 2020: more recent events are not present and should be considered (UNFICYP, 2020).

Fatalities Since the Mission Establishment

● Hostile ● Non-hostile

Source: UNFICYP (2020). UNFICYP Mission Fact Sheet.
NOTICAS

The opening of the Green Line in 2003 changed completely the situation once again. Unexpectedly, despite the prediction of intercommunal violence due to the possibility of people crossing, there were almost no incidents on the actual day of openness (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The number of people crossing was enormous, and it challenged the work of the authorities. However, the atmosphere seemed to be kept positive by the people. The incidents unfortunately did not disappear across the buffer zone.

In the Security Council report regarding the period from December to June 2023, the Secretary-General addressed specifically the prevention of tension around the buffer zone. As indicated in the UN report of 2023, irregular migration of people is a problem that challenges the UN's work since criminal groups take advantage of the lack of access to asylum processes at the crossing points (UNSC, 05/07/2023). It is underlined in the report how illegal trafficking may be a reflection of the increasing economic gap between the two sides. Therefore, the UNFICYP continue to confront tensions, unauthorized accesses and activities, and disputes.

One of the latest incidents involved the attack on three UNFICYP personnel that occurred last August 2023. The Turkish Cypriot security forces were building a new unauthorized road inside the UN buffer zone. UN intervention in preventing the unauthorized work, according to the news, led to violent reactions that resulted in the wounding of UN peacekeepers and damaging of vehicles (UN News, 19/08/2023). The event led to the reaction of the UN Secretary-General, as he recalled the Turkish Cypriots for respecting the UNFICYP mandate and their buffer zone. All personnel and machinery were requested to be withdrawn as an escalation of tension must be prevented, while the UNFICYP condemned the assaults against UN peacekeepers (UN News, 19/08/2023). The events that occurred in August 2023 were a matter of discussion on the island among the two communities, particularly among the Turkish one, as the UN was accused of having left its neutrality by the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan (*Ekathimerini.com*, 2023). Fidan also complained about the fact that according to him, the UN allowed similar road constructions carried by Greek Cypriots in Pyla. It served to increase the

tension between the communities once again. The different perspectives of the two sides on the events of 2023 appear unsurprisingly contrasted. If from one side the Greek Cypriots saw the construction of the road as a threat of military nature; the Turkish side described the work as a *humanitarian* project for both the communities coexisting in the area of Pyla (*Ekathimerini.com*, 2023).

The most recent report available and submitted by the Secretary-General for the period June 2023, to December 2023, examines the military violations that happened in the six months-period. It expresses the grave concern of the UNFICYP in noticing that security forces in Cyprus are using civilian infrastructure for military reasons while dressing in civilian clothes. Such actions put people in danger as they obfuscate the distinction between military, security, and civilian personnel and facilities. Inadequate discipline was therefore recorded in the period analysed, with several 'move forward' violations by Turkish Forces in the buffer zone provoking a reaction and continuous engagement of the UNFICYP (UNSC, 03/01/2024).

In addition to this, cause for concern and work for the UNFICYP through the mission's Mine Action Service, there is the call made by the Security Council to clear 29 remaining hazardous spots still on the island. Despite the UN efforts to clear activities, it has not been programmed yet as the National Guard refused to discuss it (UNSC, 03/01/2024).

Without the work of the UNFICYP in maintaining the status quo and security in the buffer zone, with the effects that this has on the rest of the island as well, escalation and deterioration of the situation would be more likely. Civilians are protected through the humanitarian assistance given by the peacekeepers, inside and outside the Green Line. People living closer to the Green Line may feel safer as international involvement in the area prevents further conflict. Although the situation from a diplomatic point of view is stagnant and incidents still happen, at least a confrontation between the communities would meet with the UN's attempt to stop and avoid violence.

It becomes apparent after the most recent events, however, that similar incidents may increase the tension to an unpredictable level, even though their frequency is lower compared to the past. The UN force may not be able to respond to this unforeseeable level of tension caused by future incidents.

The limits of the UNFICYP impact the control of the area, undermining the security of civilians and contributing to the resentment of the communities.

A factor that inhibits the work of the UN is the budget of the force. In its origin, the UNFICYP's budget was the result of voluntary contributions made by UN member states. Today, the budget is made from contributions for its two-thirds and the Government of Cyprus for one-third,

resulting in 56,225,300$ for the 2023-2024 period (UNFICYP, 2023). However, the budget seems not to cover activities such as the maintenance of infrastructures in the buffer zone, therefore the common feeling is that entire areas were abandoned and frozen at the time of the invasion in 1974.

The pictures on the next page, found in the article written by Taylor for *The Atlantic* in 2014 and taken by Neil Hall in the buffer zone, show the status of the area. Picture 1 shows an abandoned house with holes from gunshots. Picture 2 shows the departure area of the Nicosia International Airport, which remained as it was when the two communities militarily confronted each other (Taylor, 2014).

Picture 1 (Reuters/Neil Hall, 2014);
Picture 2 (Reuters/Neil Hall, 2014).
SOURCE: Taylor (2014). *The Atlantic.*

3.2.4 Assessing UNFICYP's efficiency in the buffer zone

The efficiency of the UNFICYP in maintaining security through the buffer zone is limited due to the violations and incidents, the lack of cooperation among the parties, the unclarity of the mandate, the limitation found on the resources available and the restriction of the budget. Security is one of the most successful elements of the UNFICYP in keeping peace in Cyprus, and as demonstrated through a comparison with the past, it is now more efficient as serious incidents like the ones in the 1990s have not repeated themselves. The crossing of the buffer zone to reach the TRNC was made regular after 2003 and smoother through the years for everyone. When I visited the TRNC, crossing the most famous checkpoint in the capital city, my perception was that the situation was safe and controlled. Generally speaking, the island is secure. However, I shared a feeling with my colleagues, which was that the control was at times fragile and that the situation could have gotten unpredictably tenser due to the resentment that some Cypriots may have shown. The bitterness among the communities and the increase in military violations in the latest period can be proof supporting the fact that improvements are still needed. The UNFICYP works to promote dialogue for peacekeeping, and it is doing it through different programs that will be discussed. However, the zone could be better surveilled and monitored, through also more advanced technologies; and the engagement of the communities in dialogue should be fostered. Efforts to restore some cultural sites within the dead zone may contribute to a better atmosphere and a sense of common shared history, but the limits of resources could not permit it.

Furthermore, part of the peacekeeping to safeguard the security of the civilians should be sustained also by the authorities of the communities. After the incidents, for instance, in both the cases of 1996 and 2023, the authorities of the parties were recalled. The mandate of the UN forces is frequently evoked to attention, and the work of peacekeepers is required to be respected.

My final observations on the matter of the UNFICYP in its role to secure safety through the buffer zone are that a complete situation where incidents do not occur, and people coexist, must be promoted primarily by the authorities of the communities. Not only the peacekeepers may not understand fully the rooted factors that characterize the tension, but they may face challenges in dealing with the incidents. Taking the case of the incidents that happened in August 2023 as an example, the UN Secretary-General recalled the constructive cooperation of the two sides in its latest report on the UNFICYP activities (UNSC, 03/01/2024).

Accordingly, the UNFICYP needs to find sustainability from the two forces for keeping peace and building a context of trust, otherwise, the island will stay divided, and the situation *frozen* in time.

3.3 UNFICYP and property issues

3.3.1 The impact of the conflict on property and refugees

As intercommunal tension increased in the years among the 1950s and 1960s, movements of people inside Cyprus started, at first from the Turkish Cypriot community.

Events and violent conflict with Greek Cypriots were becoming widespread from December 1963. Turkish Cypriots were consequently forced to leave their houses because of the violence towards them. They were then forced to congregate in enclaves as they needed protection from Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

The Greek coup, and the invasion of Turkey in 1974, provoked unprecedented numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the Greek Cypriot community, becoming a turning point event in the conflict. If a comparison could be made, most of the internally displaced people during the 1960s were Turkish Cypriots, while after the Turkish invasion, several Greek Cypriots became IDPs in the south.

The exact number of IDPs since the intervention in 1974 in Cyprus is contested and debated, the *internal displacement monitoring centre* revealed that according to official records, the number is approximately 242,000 persons. Moreover, it is stated in the document that the Republic of Cyprus does not remove IDPs from their registers 'as long as they do not return to their areas of origin' (*iDMC,* 2021).

After their displacements, individuals have built new lives respectively in the north or the south of the island. Many IDPs from both sides now live in the houses that once were properties of other families.

Since 1964 UNFICYP's efforts have addressed the issue of displacements, by giving assistance to refugees and getting ever more involved in mediating the issues regarding properties. In 1974, the involvement of the UN increased as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was involved in assisting humanitarian needs. The UNHCR went from providing humanitarian assistance through emergency assistance to the reinforcement of institutions and infrastructure, and ultimately to bi-communal projects designed to act as a bridge of dialogue and communication between the two communities to foster mutual trust and confidence (UNHCR, n.d.). The efforts of the organization lasted till 1998 when the work was

given from the UNHCR to other UN bodies, as humanitarian relief assistance was developed in other projects.

The freedom of movement changed in April 2003, as Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were free to move across the border. Freedom of movement, however, differs from the freedom of settlement and the right to own property.

Due to the historical background, the issue of property is still a sensitive issue that limits the search for a solution for the island's future. The desire to return to their properties in the north is still shared among the Greek Cypriot community. What is most matter of concern regards the territories that were once property of the Greek Cypriots and are now under Turkish Cypriot control (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

In light of this, one of the most important issues to be resolved in a potential settlement is the issue of property. The principal problem at the core of the issue is that the two communities have two different perspectives on the matter, therefore UNFICYP's attempts at mediation become challenging.

3.3.2   Property disputes

The different views on the issue of the property make negotiations hard and disputes ever-present. From 1974 to the 1990s, the problem was not directly addressed in the negotiation efforts. Even though, for the Greek Cypriot community, the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes was a pre-condition for any settlement since the beginning (Michael, 2009). However, a case that emerged at the end of the century legally influenced the context of the property issue: it was the *Loizidou case v. Turkey*

The case of Loizidou is emblematic when addressing the issue of property and the will of refugees to return to their homes. It changed the Cyprus issue approaching the act of *compensation,* while the European Court of Human Rights was also involved (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). As explained by Ker-Lindsay, Titina Loizidou was a Greek Cypriot refugee and demonstrator who was arrested by the Turkish forces because she attempted to cross the Green Line. In 1989, she brought a case in front of the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey. She claimed that due to the Turkish military's occupation, she was no longer in control of her property in the northern town of Kyrenia, and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the rights of individuals having their homes respected, was therefore violated. In 1996, the Court declared that Turkey was responsible for the actions of the Turkish Cypriots, due to the massive presence of Turkish troops in the area. The country was therefore

responsible for the violations of Loizidou's property rights and was obliged to pay compensation to Mrs Loizidou (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

The case was crucial because it was the first case where the property right was addressed in the context of Cyprus and paved the way for a great number of similar cases. It legitimated the request that many other Greek Cypriot refugees had to return to their homes in the north. The fact that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not recognized internationally was also crucial to the merits of the case. However, the litigation would have had severe political and financial repercussions on the country, therefore Turkey rejected the ruling.

Not only this decision was against the need to respect the ruling of the ECHR, as the basis of possible European membership, but it also complicated the already challenging context of properties in Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Consequently, and since then, displaced people have been continuing to seek remedies for their properties, through legal actions both nationally and internationally.

Papadakis, while conducting his research studies and talking to Greek Cypriots, realized that they had the greatest desire to return to their villages (Papadakis, 2005). In his book, the author often refers to the symbolic meaning of the words 'I Don't Forget', as he found them written everywhere in Cyprus, from schoolbooks to pictures of Cyprus under occupation. The words were used by Greek Cypriots concerning 'the memories of our occupied villages, our ancestral hearths, our graveyards, our occupied churches, our occupied homes, our gardens…'. Papadakis stated that these words were words of hope for an eventual return of Greek Cypriots to their properties and a reunited Cyprus. Asim Bey, one of the Turkish Cypriots Papadakis spoke to, explained to him that the photos Greek Cypriots have of the villages where they wish to come back, are pictures before 1974, implying that everything changed since then. Their recall to return to the north would have meant for him to become a refugee again.

The slogan that Papadakis noticed because used by Turkish Cypriots was 'We Won't Forget'. With analogous words, what they meant was different. They 'won't forget the martyrs who died, what Greek Cypriots did to us, the sacrifices of those who shed their blood for us, our past sufferings, the pain' (Papadakis, 2005). The two similar slogans for the nature of the word choice, underlined two very different screams, that summarize the problem among the two communities. If the Greek Cypriot 'I Don't Forget' assumed a return to a unified Cyprus, the 'We Won't Forget' assumed that a union/coexistence would not happen again. According to Papadakis, 'no one was punished for the violence inflicted on the people of the other community, no one was held responsible', moreover, 'injustice and pain could not be forgotten

by those who had suffered (…). Still, it could never be too late for acknowledgement, bearing up to the responsibility and asking for forgiveness' (Papadakis 2005, 179-180).

The whole concept of Cypriot refugees has been debated. The dilemma was whether to recognize Turkish Cypriots who left their homes in the 1960s as refugees or only those who were forced to move by the events of 1974.

Since many individuals had to leave their homes, the issue of ownership became sensitive and remained so for all islanders, and the discussion of who should be held responsible for the injustice was carried on while keeping the dialogue alive.

3.3.3 UNFICYP's role in mediating over territory and property

From the beginning of the presence of the UN on the island with the UNFICYP, efforts to restore normal conditions were made. The UN attempted to give proposals where the interests and rights of the communities were addressed.

After 1974, the Greek Cypriot part in the negotiations was adamant on a few aspects, and for these, it was not inclined to compromise. These issues to be addressed were, as explained in Chapter 2, the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement, and the right to own property. Before the Set of Ideas, the Greek Cypriots refused all the proposals, as they were not concerned enough about these three freedoms. However, the proposal of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali seemed keen to address the property adjustments and the return of the displaced people. In fact, in intercommunal talks, territorial issues have been discussed since 1975. Property was an issue dealt with only indirectly, through the addressing of three topics: territorial issues, fundamental human rights, and security (Gürel and Özersay, 2005).

As for territory, in 1992, the UN proposed a new map with proportions of around 28% to the Turkish Cypriots and around 72% to the Greek Cypriots (Hannay, 2005). The map was rejected. However, the proportions were endorsed by the UNSC for future negotiations. The map proposed the return of the Morphou town to the GCs, and the return of Varosha. Moreover, according to Hannay, Greek Cypriots' efforts were to negotiate for more territorial adjustments; they attempted to lower the percentage of the TC zone to 25%, knowing that it was unlikely to be arranged (Hannay, 2005).

The proposal of Ghali failed to meet the support of the Turkish Cypriot part, as the position of Denktash was still. Denktash had the objective since 1974 to gain recognition as an autonomous unit. Therefore, the two issues which influenced all the negotiations since the division of the island were over territory and constitution (Michael, 2009).

The question of property is equally influencing and important. The UN's effort to mediate over property is moved by the sensitive nature of the issue and by the fact that almost half of the Cypriots lost their properties in the years between 1963 and 1974 (Hannay, 2005). Once again, the lack of willingness to compromise and the extreme positions of the politicians from both sides of the island made the work of the UN even more complex. The property issue is strictly linked to the problem over territory, and an agreement over territory adjustment would have simplified property needs as well.

If a territorial part, now under the control of the TCs, had returned to the GCs, part of the refugees would have been able to return as they wished. The TCs would have had to move again to stay in a territory under the administration of the Turkish Cypriots. On this, the politicians agreed. However, as no territorial adjustments were carried out, no property rights were properly safeguarded.

While analyzing the events and the data, it becomes evident that already in the 1990s, after almost thirty years in which refugees had to rebuild their lives from zero in another part of the island, a brand-new claim of property and return would have been improbable. Today, the practicability of the event would be even less. Asking someone to move again to a side that is under the control of another community is unrealistic. One point of view is justified by the fact that the resentment still moves the IDPs towards the occupation they had to face, and the memory of their properties which they remember in the status previous to 1974. However, it must be considered that not all of them may be willing to move again.

In compliance with what Hannay argues, the two communities agreed on financial compensation as a method for resolving property claims. However, Greek Cypriots would not accept the position of the Turkish Cypriots to exclude any right of return. While Turkish Cypriots were open to the discussion of property issues, just in case this process was carried out excluding in advance other methods apart from the compensation one (Hannay, 2005).

After the opening of the Green Line, the possibility of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem, as it has been already discussed, saw a glimmer of light with the Annan Plan proposed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and put forward in 2004. The UNFICYP was instrumental in the attempt to implement the Annan Plan. The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, or Annan Plan, focused on the core issues as constitution, security, and territorial adjustments were addressed. The UNFICYP would have been active in the implementation of the provisions, for instance in cases of buffer zone adjustments, and helping the return of displaced persons. In the specific, the plan addressed the issues of territorial assessment,

property claims and the return of displaced people in Appendix A, articles 9, 10, and 11 of the Main Articles.

Article 10 of the Annan Plan (2004) over property stated:

1. The claims of persons who were dispossessed of their properties by events prior to entry into force of this Agreement shall be resolved in a comprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respect for the individual rights of dispossessed owners and current users, and the principle of bi-zonality (Annan Plan, Article 10, par. 1).

Article 10, paragraphs 2 and 3, referred to properties that would have or would have not been subjected to territorial adjustments, provided for in the same document. In the case of properties undergoing territorial assessments, properties shall be returned to their evicted owners.

For concerns about the properties which were not subjected to territorial adjustment, dispossessed owners shall be effectively compensated for their property, with the value determined at the moment of possession and modified to account for increases in property values (Annan Plan, 2004).

The plan outlined, considering all the specific cases, mechanisms for the return of properties. It considered all the choices that dispossessed owners shall have taken. Owners could choose compensation as well, for the enjoyment lost from their properties. An entire section of the document was dedicated to Compensation (Section A), where property of different nature and owner are addressed in the specific.

Moreover, Article 10, paragraph 4, proposed an impartial and independent Property Board or Commission which should have administered the property claims (Annan Plan, 2004).

Therefore, the proposal settled part of the displaced people following territorial adjustment, and the other people would have received financial compensation or would have been allowed to return to their properties.

The comprehension and detailed provisions of the Annan Plan are evident in the look for a solution to property issues. The plan considered all the choices that the dispossessed individuals had and the aspects to be considered when compensation was concerned. Finally, the Annan Plan would have called for a federation constituted by two states: the Turkish Cypriot State and the Greek Cypriot State (Özersay and Sözen, 2007). Not only it would have been the logical outcome of the four decades of negotiations, but it was also a feasible plan that would have needed mutual compromises from the two parties involved. In matters of property, the fundamental needs of the two communities seemed to be a focus.

However, many Greek Cypriots saw the plan's provisions as inadequate. According to Ker-Lindsay, it was either because they did not understand the restitution, compensation, and bonds systems which the plan proposed, or they were against the fact that in specific cases, they could not reclaim entirely their former houses and land (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Many of them saw the property regime as a violation of the right to property as a basic human right, and therefore violation of European conventions and international law (Özersay and Sözen, 2007).

Other aspects were also concerning for the community, while misinformation and strategic factors influenced the rejection of the plan (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). In fact, 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against it.

The large majority of Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan, however, in agreement with Gürel and Özersay, they also had concerns about the property regime proposed, due to the potential economic and social impact it would have had (Özersay and Sözen, 2007).

With the Annan Plan, despite the final great rejection of one of the two sides, the UN was close to having reached an agreement that was the result of many attempts and that focused on the core issues underlying the conflict.

However, the UNFICYP continues to work for a comprehensive solution. The force is today primarily involved in the framework of its peacekeeping mandate. Since 1964, it has co-operated with the Red Cross and the Cyprus Joint Relief Commission for assistance to refugees, who were mainly Turkish Cypriots (United Nations, 1990).

3.3.4 UNFICYP's Refugee Assistance

Cyprus has the largest percentage of internally displaced people (IDPs) relative to its population. The percentage is 22.3% and it is revealed in the UN General Assembly report prepared by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2011 concerning the work of the UNFICYP in providing humanitarian assistance (UNGA, 07/01/2011). The UNFICYP helps facilitate the return of these IDPs, facilitating the crossing of the border as well. The report addressed the respect and restoration of all human rights in Cyprus, especially addressing the problem of refugees. The report included also the call for an accounting of all the missing persons, and the restoration of the fundamental human rights of freedom to move, settle and own property. In the specific, part II of the report addresses human rights concerns. It mentioned the importance of the work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) as well. And the work of the UNFICYP in assisting and monitoring the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots who live in the South of Cyprus (UNGA, 07/01/2011).

3.3.5 Assessing UNFICYP's efficiency in property

It has been discussed how gradually the property issue went from being an aspect treated indirectly in the first negotiation attempts of the UN till becoming an aspect that was addressed in the Annan Plan and will be central in the case of a future successful reunification. It will cause social, economic, and political consequences on the two populations, however, just if an equilibrium and compromise will be found.

The examination of the work of the UNFICYP till today, and in light of the multifaced challenges, it is my considered belief that the presence of the UNFICYP will continue to serve as a mechanism for the safeguarding of the fundamental human rights, especially the rights to freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and right to own a property. The force demonstrated to prevent escalations of conflict and improved the situation of many IDPs through all the assisting and monitoring tools it possessed. Due to the support of different UN bodies specified in the sustain to refugees and in the solution of property claims and disputes, the UNFICYP saw its work assisted and its peacekeeping actions enlarged. The possibility of inefficiency in terms of property rights and the rights of refugees could be awarded in cases where the UNFICYP is limited by a lack of will to compromise by the two parties. Both the communities need therefore to be open to dialogue also for these concerns, and they must leave the political ideals that they brought in past attempts, as they were failures.

As far as the Annan Plan is concerned, the proposal of Kofi Annan, supported by the UNFICYP, was the outcome of years of negotiations, where the UN tried to find a solution which would have centred the core issues. The plan expanded the basic principles and aspects treated also in the Ghali Set of Ideas, however, it directly addressed the property issue. As demonstrated by the mentioned articles of the plan, the proposed property regime was an attempt to address deeply the issue while compromising the needs of both parties. Therefore, as Özersay and Sözen argue, the goal of Cyprus' situation is to address a lasting equilibrium between human rights and the concepts of international law where international peace and security are safeguarded. If carried out to protect the public interest, certain practices that involve the limitation or loss of property are permissible under international law, provided certain requirements are met and compensation is paid (Özersay and Sözen, 2007).

The UN made an effort to strike a compromise between the possibility of bi-zonality in the case of Cyprus, and the property right. However, the result of the plan, also on this matter, demonstrated Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots were not open to compromise. The two communities appear adamant in two respects that unfortunately make the UN's proposed compromise almost impossible. For the Greek Cypriot community, human rights norms are

central, while any solution from the Turkish Cypriot community needs to be grounded in a bi-zonal one. In compliance with what the authors agree on, both sides look for the ideal solution, considering it the only acceptable solution, continuing their political dispute using the UN negotiation process as an arena (Özersay and Sözen, 2007).

3.4 The UNFICYP and the societal peace between the communities

3.4.1   UNFICYP in civil affairs

At the root of an unresolved issue, as is the Cyprus one, there are two communities which happen to have different political aspirations and ideals. Two core issues that make this common ground difficult to find have been discussed as case studies. The peacekeeping force in Cyprus is now addressed for its efforts in facilitating dialogue, promoting societal peace, and building bridges between the two communities.

The UNFICYP carries out its mandate of peacekeeping of the UN with several programs and bodies, however, it faces challenges and obstacles as well. Limits like the problem of mistrust and misinformation have had an impact on the UNFICYP work which had to adapt to face the obstacles.

The UNFICYP carried out a humanitarian review of the main communities' living circumstances in Cyprus in 1995, covering the years from the organization's founding to 1995. However, the focus was on the operations since 1974. It examined the lives of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites who were living in the north, and the Turkish Cypriots living in the south. The outcomes of the review were then shared with the authorities of the two sides. The rights of the Turkish Cypriots living in the south were found to be respected and they were not subject to restrictive regimes. Nonetheless, they experienced forms of discrimination and harassment, which made it difficult for them to lead completely ordinary lives. On the other hand, it was revealed that the Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the north suffered from severe restrictions which were imposed by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Their basic freedoms happened to be violated. What was most matter of concern was that due to these violations, the existence of the Greek Cypriot community and Maronites would end in the northern part of Cyprus (UNFICYP, n.d. b).

After conducting a discussion with the authorities on both sides, the UNFICYP made several recommendations for corrective measures and remedial action, to be taken by both the government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities (UNFICYP, n.d. b).

A few years later, the civilian aspect of the mission was addressed through the establishment of the Civil Affairs section, which since 1998 has been working in three main areas of activities: civil activities, humanitarian assistance and community relations (UNFICYP, 2021).

Civil Affairs was established to directly address the increasing civilian nature in the Cyprus context, as once the UN buffer zone was settled and the military status quo obtained, the activities of civilians could have been resumed.

The section's functions evolved and, as the promotion of trust between the two communities is crucial, since 2014 the UNFICYP has increased its ability to facilitate it. Today, it is an integrated component, with 13 civilians working under the direction of the Chief of Civil Affairs, with support from two military personnel and five UNPOL members in Headquarters (UNFICYP, n.d. a). The work of the Civil Affairs Unit includes understanding the concerns and needs of the people affected by the conflict. They address the problems involving local communities and other actors, to engage them and contribute to the building of peaceful conditions.

As far as the civilian nature of the activities is concerned, communication is considered key and is promoted in different ways. Issues regarding the civilian populations are addressed and communication between the authorities is pushed daily to solve them. The buffer zone is sponsored as a place where the communities can interact safely. There, the crossing of points is monitored, and families can visit, activities such as agriculture are endorsed, and social or commercial interactions happen (UNFICYP, 2021). Promoting the buffer zone as an area where peace, as well as the return to normal conditions, are encouraged, can only work as an advantage in the Cyprus situation. The Sector Civilian Activity Integrated Office (SCAIO) works for the specific management and permit system of the Green Line for civilian purposes (UNFICYP, n.d. a). For what concerns humanitarian assistance, the UNFICYP supports the Greek Cypriots in the north, a small community of Maronites who live in the north as well, and the Turkish Cypriots in the south. The assistance includes humanitarian supplies and the insurance of social welfare, education and medications when needed (UNFICYP, 2021). In addition, trust is built by encouraging community relations. Confidence-building is promoted through measures that include cultural exchanges and initiatives for both communities. The UNFICYP encourages cooperation at the technical level. It supports the preservation of the shared cultural heritage and promotes dialogue through cultural and sporting events (UNFICYP, n.d. a). Furthermore, the Civil Affairs unit monitors and then reports the developments to the UNIFCYP.

Moreover, the Good Offices mission in Cyprus has been involved since the beginning of the presence of the UN on the island and works together with the UNFICYP concerning civil

society (Novosseloff, 2021). The two collaborate with civil society actors and local community representatives. Their working environment provides, however, limited political space and institutional support for those who politically stand in the promotion of a culture of peace. As Novosseloff argued, outside Nicosia is even more difficult to reach the civil society actors and the efforts of the UN are limited by this (Novosseloff, 2021).

3.4.2 Challenges to societal peace

The UNFICYP's Civil Affairs section promotes an environment for dialogue and peace in Cyprus. However, building trust faces some limitations and challenges when the local communities are engaged.

Not only the principal limit is found on the physical division of the island, as the efforts to reunify it were inefficient, but a division is present between the communities in terms of narratives as well. The obstruction of dialogue, not only in the case of Cyprus but also in many other conflicts involving two or more communities, is caused by feelings of mistrust due to

In one of the latest reports written by the Secretary-General on the UNFICYP activities, the communities still rely on 'divisive narratives' which complicate the achievement of a reconciliation (UNSC, 05/07/2023). The recall of the Secretary-General is direct to the leaders of the communities, as they should commit to supporting, building and fostering, the relations between the two sides. Concrete support must be given for people-to-people initiatives in order to prove their sincere dedication. To arrive at a mutually agreed settlement, it is necessary to impact the lives of the Cypriots through social, cultural, and sportive activities, where trust can be built. Owing to the fact that mistrust is a shared feeling among Cypriots on both sides of the island. historical narratives, identity politics, and the rhetoric of nationalism.

In 2011, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe argued that despite the efforts from the Government of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots living in the south were facing hostilities in matters such as access to education and social services, and this is also due to the limited use of the Turkish language (UNGA, 07/01/2011) Therefore, the efforts were recalled for the respect of the rights of all communities, and UNFICYP has been continuing in its effort of assistance to TCs in the south, while attempting reconciliation between the parties.

However, the rhetoric that has been used by the communities and their authorities, which finds its roots in the past conflict, is still present contributing to the feeling of division. The refraining from actions of rhetoric that draw away from a settlement was already called upon by the Security Council on numerous occasions, for instance in resolution 2646 of 2022. According

to both the Security Council and the Secretary-General, the atmosphere in Cyprus must be improved to prepare the communities and deliver more constructive messages (UNSC, 28/07/2022).

However, as the Secretary-General argued, dialogue is not promoted, and the pillars of reconciliation are absent. Moreover, the sentiment of division and intolerance can be found in the rhetoric of schoolbooks, particularly in Greek Cypriot schoolbooks (UNSC, 05/07/2023).

History knowledge can influence the perspectives of individuals, and education can also transfer hostility in some cases. As expressed by Papadakis, in societies where ethnonational conflicts take place, history can be used as a tool to prorogate a specific narrative (Papadakis, 2008).

Papadakis analysed and compared the primary-level and secondary-level textbooks used before 2005 by both communities. He subsequently wrote his publication on how ethnic nationalism was used in the history education of the divided Cyprus. According to the author, ethnic nationalism is present on both sides, concerning the two 'motherlands', Turkey and Greece.

As the history of Cyprus is more recent, Greek Cypriots were taught the history of Greece, while Turkish Cypriots were taught the history of Turkey. In primary education schoolbooks, Turks are represented as 'Hellenism's barbaric archenemy'. Medieval Greece was described as the 'Glorious Byzantine Empire', while the Ottoman Empire was a 'barbaric regime' that 'imposed Islamization' (Papadakis, 2008). According to Papadakis, the term Cypriots used in all the Greek Cypriot books he considered, is equivalent to Greeks only, influencing a historical consciousness for that period where other population groups were not present, or were parasitic (Papadakis, 2008).

Moreover, in the Greek Cypriot schoolbooks, the term *Turks,* for the Turkish Cypriots, is used in a negative light. Turks were considered uneducated 'nomads, people with no civilizations, people of the horse, People of the Koran, Muslim fanatics who had vowed to spread Islam by the force of fine and the sword' (Papadakis, 2005). The violence which characterized the period of the 1960s was briefly described in the books, and only from the point of view of the Greek Cypriots. Papadakis explained in his book *Echoes from the Dead Zone* that as he talked to Turkish Cypriots in the *occupied area,* he soon realized that his education in Cyprus was limited, mostly for what concerns the suffering of the Turkish Cypriots before 1974 (Papadakis, 2005). According to Greek Cypriot schoolbooks, the conflict was an aggression by *Turks* against the *Greeks*. Moreover, the primary-level textbooks analysed, dealt with the religion fueling racist stereotypes related to Muslims (Papadakis, 2008).

Ethnic nationalism was found by Papadakis in the Turkish Cypriot schoolbooks as well and in a much more amplified way. The publications under investigation were written during the period when the Right, which sought to keep the island divided, controlled the Turkish Cypriot side. The history of Cyprus was presented as merely a component of the history of Turkey.

The writings glorified the Ottoman Empire and portrayed it as a time of freedom and progress. Monuments from the two periods that have remained in the divided capital of Nicosia today convey different feelings. For Greek Cypriots, the monuments that remained from the Ottoman period reminded them of the brutality of the barbarians. For Turkish Cypriots, the Greek or Byzantine monuments remind them of the evil Greek Cypriots (Papadakis, 2005).

The Greek Cypriots are called *Rum,* implying that they are different from Greeks and were subjects of the Ottoman Empire, depriving them of their Greek identity and delegitimating their political ambition of enosis. According to the books, between 1963 and 1974 *Rums* were barbarically against the *Turks* in Cyprus in order to eradicate them and union with Greece. The period of the 1960s, almost absent in the Greek Cypriot textbooks, was described in great detail. On the other hand, the events of 1974 were described in the books examined by Papadakis as the '*Happy Peace Operation* when the *Heroic Turkish Army* came to safeguard the *Turks of Cyprus'* (Papadakis, 14, 2008).

It can be observed by the comparison carried out by the author, that both sides do not consider the suffering of the other community. The language plays an important role, the Levinasian view is mentioned by Karahasan as official narratives exclude the Other and create a narrative that involves the nation.

Enosis and Taksim are concepts that do not consider the Other (Karahasan, 2005).

The already mentioned use of the slogans I Don't Forget and We Won't Forget is exemplary of the different narratives and interpretations of events. And their use is a remark of the fact that both communities do not forget the past, *as* they know it. Finally, war is represented as the motor of history. What the two historic educations share is the monoethnic and ethnocentric nature. Neither of the two considers Cyprus as the multicultural and multiethnic space it is (Papadakis, 2008).

The Turkish Cypriot schoolbooks which were inspected after, broke away from a traditional narrative schema and viewed the nationalism of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as a negative divider of the people of Cyprus. This was due to the recall of the left-wing Republican Turkish Party for a rewrite of the books following their election in 2003. The left party was, in real terms, reunificationist and Cypro-centric. Therefore, the transformative shift in the Turkish Cypriot schoolbooks was politically open. However, in 2008, at the end of his publication on

history education in Cyprus, Papadakis suggested that the objectives, methods, and contents of history education on both sides needed to be reevaluated and recommendations at the European / international level should be consulted (Papadakis, 2008).

Since April 2003, with the opening of the borders, Cypriots have been able to question more their narratives. Hakan Karahasan argued in 2005 that changes were brought in North Cyprus with the Annan Plan and the new administration. On the other hand, the UN proposal's rejection in the south was evidence of the continuing narrative that is upheld as the only authentic story (Karahasan, 2005).

Fueling this narrative of mistrust between communities there is the fear and suspicion that the other side is plotting something. The militarization increase observed is fueled by this paranoia, which obviously has consequences in the work of UNFICYP. The force which needs to build trust as it struggles to find political support. As Yılmaz claims, any effort to promote peace should recognize and acknowledge the psychological factors which are actually at the core of the problem in Cyprus (Yılmaz, 2010). When at the governmental level, the promotion of intercommunal understanding is lacking. The politics of leaders do not support initiatives aimed at fostering trust. Therefore, they are averse to making concessions for fear of criticism or because they want to maintain their 'face'. Yılmaz addressed the rejection of the Annan Plan from the Greek Cypriots because they were not 'psychologically ready for partnership'. According to him, Turkish Cypriots may have voted in favour of the referendum because they thought they would have enjoyed economic benefits and the European Union's possibility of adhesion was also to be considered (Yılmaz, 2010).

Economic disparities and crises are also among the factors that influence negatively societal peace on the island. After 1974 Cyprus was characterized by an economic asymmetry. The Greek side was able to recover after the de facto division, while the Turkish side had to face an economic embargo, and its unrecognition influenced its economy. Turkish Cypriots in the north suffered a high level of unemployment and high inflation due to the isolation (Yılmaz, 2010). Accordingly, the leaders of the TRNC had to strengthen the political and economic relations with Turkey, as it is the only country recognizing its authority and supporting it financially in different ways. However, international community support is requested because of the sufferings of many, and Turkish aid may not be enough in the long term.

3.4.3 Building bridges

As already discussed, the multifaced factors influencing the Cyprus case are dealt with in several ways by the UNFICYP, UNFICYP components, UN bodies, projects and programmes with different functions but the same goal: the building of conditions for societal peace.

The activities of the components sometimes overlap as they share the aim of finding a common ground that can give space to a settlement and reunification. The building of bridges between the two communities is therefore crucial because, as it has been argued, political and psychological factors may keep the two peoples in a situation of mistrust and suspicion.

Considering the present situation with the UN report of the Secretary-General of 2024, where the activities of the UNFICYP are examined for the period between June 2023 and December 2023, the latest events on the ceasefire lines and the significant developments are examined. In particular, according to the Secretary-General, the violations challenged the efforts of the UN and contributed to increasing the common sense of mistrust, contrasting the measures of confidence-building. Fortunately, a 'mutually accepted way forward' to the recent violations was reached (UNSC, 03/01/2024).

In any case, the mission kept facilitating contact between the communities through the organization of events. According to the Report's section D, 170 pro-intercommunal relations and peacebuilding events were organised or funded by the UNFICYP in the final six months of 2023, in response to the politicians' apparent lack of effort to foster reconciliation (UNSC, 03/01/2024). Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have been brought together on several occasions, for instance in the event of an entrepreneurship fair inside the buffer zone.

The relations between the local communities are facilitated by the UNFICYP Civil Affairs Component, which engages the communities through several programs and projects. Are exemplary the organization of workshops such as the *Peacebuilding in Divided Societies* Programme, which takes place in January and February 2024, engaging people from 18 to 30 years old to know more about conflict management, and negotiation, giving importance to women's inclusivity (UNFICYP, 2024).

Peace is therefore transmitted by the efforts of the UN to bring together people from different backgrounds and cultures. Moreover, individuals can find more about the peacekeepers and their actions in the online journal Blue Beret. Thus, in the document from Autumn 2023, a discussion held in Nicosia on the 23rd and 24th of September 2023 allowed people from different parts of the island to confront each other over themes regarding the memory of conflict and peacebuilding. Opinions and viewpoints were exchanged with many actors, including academics, activists, and organizations building (*Blue Beret Magazine*, 2023).

Young people and women are often engaged in activities for trust-building. Important programs involving them, and events are organized periodically. Young representatives of the two sides were present at the second annual Local Conference of Youth, held in 2023 and conceived out of the United Nations Youth Champions for Environment and Peace initiative (UNSC, 03/01/2024).

As far as women are concerned, the mission of the UN in Cyprus addresses the need to involve women in possible negotiations for solutions, through the work of the Technical Committee on Gender Equality and in coordination with the mission of good offices (UNSC, 03/01/2024).

Other key units of the UN cooperate and work together to maintain peace. While entities like the Civil Affairs Unit and the Liaison Officers work directly with local communities through the organization of events and addressing specific concerns, bodies like the Special Representative of the Secretary-General play diplomatic roles, involving direct leaders in the diplomatic efforts, and other units like the Military Component are involved on maintaining the status quo in the ceasefire line. Moreover, other actors cooperate with the UNFICYP.

The force collaborates also with international agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This is evidenced by the collaboration made during the *Youth, Peace and Security* event organized in September 2023 in Nicosia. The event was organized by the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Cyprus, and took place inside the buffer zone, more precisely at the *Home for Cooperation*, a famous NGO working for the island. The goal of the occasion was to promote the realization of young people's meaningful involvement in peacemaking, decision-making, initiatives, and pledges to the Sustainable Development Goals (*Blue Beret Magazine*, 2023).

The Home for Cooperation is a community centre which has been working since 2011 in the middle of the UN buffer zone in Nicosia, around the Ledra Palace Area. The goal of the organization is the promotion of dialogue between people from different ethnicities, religions, and backgrounds (Home for Cooperation, n.d. a). It carries out its mission through creative, cultural and educational activities and events, always moved by the desire for inter-communal peacebuilding between the divided communities. Art and culture are crucial powers used by the NGO in its peacebuilding programs.

The inter-communal relations are strengthened by the Home for Cooperation also through the organization of games, through the inclusion of everyone and with specific goals of dialogue. As it is written on their website, words are a powerful tool of communication, and the discovery of a new language can allow you to understand and connect with other people (Home for Cooperation, n.d. b). Language classes in Greek and Turkish are organized by the NGO, to

eliminate the possibility of a lack of relations and barriers between individuals living in Cyprus. Games are also organized to facilitate the learning of languages. A bilingual educational memory game called *Minilingo* is organized by the Home for Cooperation. It consists of cards with illustrations of words and their pronunciations in Greek and Turkish pairs. The idea that moved the organization to create this game was the building of awareness towards the co-existence of different languages and communities on the island. Words and languages can play divisionary roles between the communities of a country, a simple game like this Minilingo can educate young and adults.

Music is another tool used by the Home for Cooperation. Through the *United by Sound* program, music is used to connect people from the Cyprus communities, helping them to build relations starting from the music passion that they share and to drop prejudices. The motto of the program is 'Cyprus is too small to have two separate music scenes', and therefore it promotes the emergence of Cypriot artists with no barriers. Through the program, local and international musicians share knowledge and skills. Performances are hosted connecting musicians from across the divide with viable opportunities (Home for Cooperation, n.d. c).

The mentioned above are just a few of the activities that the organization arrange to build bridges between the communities. To create awareness and start discussions, the NGO plans peace camps, city tours and various kinds of campaigns that support fundamental human rights and promote positive peace in Cyprus (Home for Cooperation, n.d. d).

Additionally, with funding from the European Commission, the Home for Cooperation is implementing the Europe Direct Ledra Palace Area project that began in 2022 and will finish in 2025, joining the pan-European. The Centre has the goal to inform European citizens across the island about their rights within the Union and the opportunities available for them for work and education (Home for Cooperation, n.d. e). The location is not a case as the Home for Cooperation works inter-communally from the buffer zone.

3.4.4 Assessing UNFICYP's efficiency in peace-building

After 60 years of the presence of the UN in Cyprus, diplomatic attempts to solve the case of Cyprus were failures. The talks between the leaders, both directly and indirectly and including the present support of the UN, were the priority but have proved inefficient.

As people are always the actors who suffer the most from a conflict, civil society has to be moved. The problems and issues that the communities of Cyprus still have to face due to the negative peace present on the island are several. For these reasons, the work of the UNFICYP

is essential. As the political leaders are adamant on certain aspects of their policies, the UN has to move something for the good of civilians and peace.

According to Harris's assertion in Ker-Lindsay's book, formal negotiating techniques still rely on old approaches and only involve communities at the end, not throughout the process of the talks (Ker-Lindsay, 2014).

As political leaders have proved to be unable to see the multifaceted context and miss the need to compromise through dialogue for a settlement, civil society is required to be ready for peace. The UNFICYP works to build the trust needed between the communities with the help of bodies, agencies, and NGOs. Dialogue and communication are key for a possible reunification, no matter how this will be carried out. Education has been challenged and the UN Security Council recalled the necessity to reform and follow the recommendations given.

Events to foster communication between the communities seem to have increased recently, and the resources to promote dialogue seem to have been expanded as well. According to Harris, the United Nations Development Program, the European Union, and other funders support the need for Civil Society Organizations for further capacity building (Ker-Lindsay, 2014). Therefore, the UN not only works for the finding of a comprehensive solution, dealing with the political leaders and negotiations, but it also works with initiatives and projects to foster cooperation at the regional or local level.

3.5 Conclusion

The final chapter of this thesis addressed and discussed the overall efficiency of the UNFICYP when dealing with core factors rooted in the conflict.

Based on the evidence presented, the common aspect that the three factors described share is the need for efforts in compromise and dialogue. In the past and the present, the community leaders have proven diffident, and the collaboration with the UN force has been limited by this lack of openness to compromise.

Regarding security, it is shown how the negative approach causing violations in the buffer zone has been reversed in more recent times. With the present and constant work of UNFICYP in the zone, incidents have decreased. However, it was demonstrated that violations still happen and could cause unpredictable consequences, which is why authorities and communities are reminded to respect the work of the UN in recent reports submitted by the UN Secretary-General.

It has been acknowledged how issues over territory and constitutions were the principal issues of dialogue at the table of past negotiations. In particular, the search for a resolution to property-related problems has been dealt with and proposed in the provisions of the Annan Plan. The Plan would have included that the Turkish Cypriot State and the Greek Cypriot State would have formed the two states of a final federation. It has been highlighted how the property problem progressively evolved from being addressed indirectly in the UN's initial negotiation attempts to be a key component of the Annan Plan and a crucial factor in the event of a successful reunification. However, the unresolved property disputes contribute to present resentment between the communities of Cyprus, making it a complex task that the UN has to deal with.

The United Nations has been actively involved in resolving property issues and building intercommunal confidence through various means. The recent community-building events and increased resources are helping support discussions towards conflict resolution and peace. To achieve a positive and peaceful outcome, local communities must be led in the right direction, including psychological factors, and leaving scepticism behind. UNFICYP is working towards this goal by using all the tools at the UN's disposal and collaborating with NGOs.

The international community continues to urge the communities' leaders to engage in diplomatic efforts for negotiations and settlements, although at the moment positive developments seem distant.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the case study of Cyprus presented in this thesis was explained from its origin to its present core issues, to address the pivotal role and efficiency of the United Nations in keeping peace on the island. The 60th anniversary of the UN presence in Cyprus is the reason and opportunity to question the efficiency of one of the longest-running peacekeeping operations carried out by the United Nations.

Despite the Research Question raising analysis of peacekeeping, to answer, the work addressed also the role of the United Nations in peacebuilding. In fact, a focus was given to the role of the organization in leading the parties to negotiations. It has been observed how United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding are strictly interrelated, which is why the thesis aimed to discuss both phenomena, analysing how they both influence the common goal of promoting peace and how one can influence the other.

The purpose of this thesis was to comprehend how the UNFICYP functions in a complicated environment and how the force helps to uphold security, defend human rights, and foster confidence.

As for peacebuilding, the organization has been involved since 1964 in the negotiation attempts. Its efforts focused on the set of a common ground where the two communities could find a solution and make reunification of the island possible. By exploring the United Nations' attempts, it can be demonstrated that the inconclusion in reaching a solution affected also the UNFICYP's efficiency in keeping the peace in Cyprus.

As various actors have been involved over the years, it is observed that the political elites were never really open to compromise. In light of the observations made, explanations of the context, and the main factors with which the UN must interface, it can be concluded that the insufficient results of peacebuilding processes have contributed also to peacekeeping limits.

In the first decades of the presence of the UN in Cyprus with the UNFICYP, it has been argued that the efforts were primarily diplomatic, involving the parties just in the context of the negotiations. It has been observed how civil societies have been more involved recently, owing to the Civil Affairs unit of the UN, the role of programmes and projects, and NGOs, like the Home for Cooperation working for trust building since 2011. The past lack of civil involvement, misinformation and public resentment, compromised the efficiency of the UN. Mostly, the absence of will from the two communities to refuse proposals has been criticized, supported by expert opinions, for instance in the case of the Annan Plan's rejection.

Chapter 1 examined the United Nations, as it is the primary international organization dealing with conflict resolution and ceasefire maintenance. The UN scope explained at the beginning

of the thesis is fundamental for subsequently addressing the case study of the operation in Cyprus. The legal foundation and the theory of the UN were examined to comprehend how the organization intervenes and which organs authorize actions in case of security threats.

It was discussed how a UN peacekeeping reference is absent in the UN Charter, and how the practice shapes the peacekeeping operations, as it was afterwards proven by the case of Cyprus and the evolution of the force since its first mandate.

The explanation of the guiding principles of the UN operations was useful for the awareness of the values and nature of the UN interventions in conflicts. Impartiality, consent, and non-use of force except for self-defence are essential in the mandates of the Peacekeeping operations and for their efficiency. A brief explanation of different operations established by the UN made possible a comparison and a deeper comprehension of the case study.

Moreover, the operations' challenges can be found in past operations but in present situations as well, for instance in valuing the mandates and their difficulty in achieving the expected successes. Reforms to deal with the limits of the organization have been implemented but it can be observed that are still needed. Mostly for what concerns the limits provoked by the global balance of power, political pressures, and the conflict of interest.

Not only the work of the organization is challenged by the veto system and other facts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, but humanitarian assistance is deeply recalled due to intra-state conflicts and new challenges. The last paragraph of this first chapter mentioned the present, underlining the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Although the UN is doing everything within its resources to condemn Israel's attack on civilians, this is not enough to establish a ceasefire, and the funding and equipment encounter limitations.

Chapter 2 addressed the case study of Cyprus and the conflict. The background and historical context of the case were examined at the beginning of the chapter. Cyprus' strategic position saw the intervention of global powers in the attempts to control the Middle East. In fact, it was ruled by other powers until 1960, when it gained independence from the British crown. As demonstrated, the impact of foreigners on the island's domestic affairs had repercussions still evident in the current state of affairs. The imported nationalism from Greece and Turkey's motherlands fostered the two nationalisms as well as attitudes toward enosis and takism. The press, newspapers, and imported history books used in schools all had a significant part in dividing the Greek and Turkish communities and encouraging nationalistic aspirations. The advancement of the two nationalisms was aided by the British policy (Ker-Lindsay, 2014). Internal tensions between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities started to grow throughout Cyprus' final years of colonial administration. For this reason, the 1960

Constitution and the Three Founding Treaties were signed in a situation of fragility and instability. As a consequence, four years later the Constitution collapsed. The increase of intercommunal violence in 1963 and 1964 brought to the beginning of the presence of the UN with its peacekeeping force UNFICYP on the 4th of March 1964.

The report of U Thant in 1964 and the one of Galo Plaza Lasso in 1965 are also dealt with in Chapter 2, demonstrating that the lack of compromise was present since the beginning. In particular, U Thant argued that there was a misunderstanding in the role of the UN perceived by the two communities, complicating the UNFICYP attempts. While Galo Plaza argued that the two community leaders, Makarios III and Denktash, were unwilling to make any compromises and that their political views were firmly impeding the development of a settlement. Furthermore, the stances of the two communities could not coexist. Whether it was for a federal solution or enosis, both parties proved to have too distinct interests.

The crisis in 1967 and the intervention of Turkey in 1974 after the Greek Cypriot nationalists' *coup d'etat*, had a huge impact on the ability of UNFICYP to accomplish its mandate. The first UNFICYP mandate was set up before, but the intervention of Turkey, as it has been discussed, changed completely the dynamics. As a consequence, Resolutions 353, and 367 followed the first one and preceded several more.

The resolutions were analysed in their attempt to adapt to the new context, which involved the division of the island, a new political situation, and the unrecognition of one of the two parts: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The UN's attempt at negotiation and peacebuilding was examined through the analysis of several proposals, the High-Level Agreements, the Set of Ideas, the Confidence-Building Measures, the Annan Plan, and the Crans-Montana Talks.

The attention given to the UN's ongoing relevance in Cyprus demonstrated that the international attempts to resume negotiations are still present, and as explained, recalled by Secretary-General António Guterres. However, the resumption of talks is limited by the lack of meaningful willingness for progress by the political parties involved. The latest developments related to new natural resources, an increase in militarization, and violations on the security front in the buffer zone could constrain the possibility of dialogue. Furthermore, economic crises and asymmetry influence today's situation.

Chapter 3 delves into the effectiveness of the UNFICYP and tackles three critical issues that originated from the conflict and continue to impact the lives of Cypriots. The first case study is security, and it explores how the UNFICYP in the buffer zone contributes to maintaining it. The legal status of the buffer zone and the limitations that the UNFICYP faces in that area are

also analyzed. The security issue has been present since the start of tensions between communities, and while the UN force generally succeeds in upholding the status quo, recurring violations still occur. Cooperation over security between the two sides is lacking, further limiting the UNFICYP's efficiency.

The second issue examined is the issue of property and the problem of internally displaced people. It was discussed how the internal movements in Cyprus started in the 1960s, and increased after the intervention of Turkey, as people were forced to leave their homes. The addressing of the property problem in the negotiation attempts, focusing directly on it to reach an agreement, was gradual. The UNFICYP supported the proposal of Kofi Annan, where the core issues were addressed. However, as it has been observed, it encountered the rejection of the Greek Cypriot community. The force is involved in refugee assistance, but as far as the property issue is concerned, the two communities seem set on two points that make the UN's suggested compromise inconceivable. Human rights standards are essential to the Greek Cypriot community, and any Turkish Cypriot solution must be based on a bi-zonal one.

The last aspect discussed in Chapter 3 is the UNFICYP effort to promote societal peace between the two communities, encouraging communication, fostering dialogue, and creating peaceful relations. With several programs and bodies involved, the UNFICYP carries out the UN mandate for peacekeeping. It also faces challenges and barriers which have been observed. The 'divisive narratives' complicate the reconciliations, and the lack of support from the political leaders in building trust contributes to it.

Education played a key role in dividing the communities, incrementing the tension by representing the facts in a distorted way. The analysis of schoolbooks carried out by Iannis Papadakis supported the argument over the fact that the different interpretations of historical events contributed to the complexity of two different narratives. The efficiency of the UNFICYP was therefore challenged by years of misinformation and mistrust perceived by the two sides and rooted in their education.

To build the bridges needed for a future where the two communities of Cyprus coexist without discrimination, human rights abuses, or distrust between the people, the UNFICYP uses all the resources available to it, including funding and the involvement of several UN units.

The observations that arose from the analysis, developed the argument that the prolonged nature of the case and current status demonstrate that meaningful efforts from the two parties involved were, and still are, absent. The two sides' positions on the issue of property are matters of concern, as well as the tension that may increase due to incidents or violations of security. It

has been observed how authorities in the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus are not open to dialogue or compromise.

From the civilian side, the Cypriots interviewed were generally sceptical over a future solution in the short period, and it was observed how the civilian part was absent from direct involvement in conflict resolution processes. Cypriots on both sides of the island remain still in their position and see no advantage in finding a solution that will compromise their actual political or social situation.

The Cyprus issue is still unsolved, but the failure to find a solution is attributed in great part to the lack of willingness of the parties. As for the work of the UNFICYP, the inefficiencies in peacebuilding could be attributed to the limits of the United Nations itself, as argued. Diplomatic engagement, political pressures and conspiracy theories over the UN member states limit a common peaceful narrative for peacemaking. Furthermore, UNFICYP is influenced by the quantity and quality of funding coming from the member states.

Summarizing, at the UN level, parts like the military component are involved in maintaining the status quo in the buffer zone, bodies like the Special Representative of the Secretary-General play diplomatic roles by involving the leaders in the diplomatic efforts, while the UNFICYP Civil Affairs unit and Liaison Officers organize events and deal directly with the local communities. All these UN entities play a key role in the case of Cyprus.

For this reason, the international community within the UNFICYP is continually called upon, and hope lies in the possibility that these peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts will one day find support from parties open to compromise for a lasting and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus case.

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