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Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Swing Between Hostility and Admiration

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ABSTRACT

L'anti-americanismo si presenta come un fenomeno complesso e con diverse sfaccettature che lo rendono di difficile comprensione e attribuzione. Se si pensa che nella storia, diverse potenze hanno manifestato illeciti o comportamenti poco conformi al diritto internazionale, a nessuna di esse è stata attribuita un'identificazione così negativa da costituire un 'anti' sentimento nei suoi confronti. Oltre a ciò lo sviluppo tecnologico contemporaneo ha permesso una maggiore e più veloce diffusione delle informazioni, favorendo l'uso comune di questo termine.

Questa particolare posizione negativa nei confronti degli Stati Uniti, largamente attribuibile all'America Latina per motivi storici, è diventata oggetto di studio accademico alla fine degli anni ottanta, ma ha assunto nuova rilevanza durante i primi anni del duemila dopo l'attacco terroristico dell'11 settembre al World Trade Center e al Pentagono con la conseguente invasione dell'Iraq nel 2002 da parte degli USA.

Quando il Presidente George W. Bush, di fronte a un pubblico statunitense sgomento dopo aver assistito a una manifestazione di odio così brutale nel proprio territorio, si chiese: "Perché ci odiano?". Questa domanda aprì una questione alla quale è stata attribuita poca attenzione nel passato, ponendo l'attenzione verso una maggiore comprensione rispetto alle cause dell'ostilità di alcune popolazioni.

L'America Latina condivide con gli Stati Uniti una dolorosa storia di battaglie diplomatiche, economiche, e culturali lunga due secoli che hanno reso la loro relazione unica.

I sentimenti negativi scaturiti negli stati latinoamericani da un rapporto così complicato possono aiutare a comprendere il fenomeno anti-americano tornato in auge.

Il primo capitolo spiega come tale concetto sia stato descritto e analizzato da diversi accademici e studiosi delle Relazioni Internazionali che, pur ammettendo la difficoltà nell'attribuire una definizione univoca all'anti-americanismo, è possibile individuare delle linee guida che lo delimitino e riescano a dare consistenza al suo significato.

L'anti-americanismo viene descritto come una predisposizione negativa radicata nella sfera personale e sentimentale, nei confronti degli Stati Uniti, di ciò che rappresentano, dei costumi e della società, includendone ogni aspetto e sfumatura.

Per facilitarne la comprensione e l'analisi, l'anti-americanismo può essere scomposto in tre varianti: una corrispondente a una particolare attitudine o mentalità avversa agli Stati Uniti in generale, una che costituisce un potente strumento politico utilizzato dai governi per ottenere il consenso popolare e infine una, largamente utilizzata dalle amministrazioni statunitensi, che diventa un'etichetta da apporre a qualsivoglia forma di dissenso che esuli dagli interessi dell'autorità governativa con lo scopo di ridurla al silenzio.

Tuttavia gli accademici presi in considerazione condividono l'importanza della distinzione fra critica a ciò che gli Stati Uniti sono includendo cioè i valori che rappresentano, lo stile di vita e la cultura, dalla critica a ciò che gli Stati Uniti fanno, riferendosi alle politiche estere e quindi al loro comportamento in ambito internazionale, che costituirebbe quindi l'espressione di un'opinione più che un preconcetto di tipo culturale.

Esiste inoltre un'associazione fra gli Stati Uniti e alcuni concetti che essi rappresentano come ad esempio la modernità. Spesso infatti, si sovrappone il termine 'modernizzazione' con 'americanizzazione', intendendo l'insieme dei processi che portano all'acquisizione di quelle caratteristiche economiche, sociali, culturali e politiche basate sull'individualismo e il razionalismo che per primi adottarono proprio gli Stati Uniti.

Allo stesso modo il materialismo e il capitalismo, intesi come l'attribuzione di una maggiore importanza alla produttività e ai profitti economici a scapito delle classi sociali inferiori, vengono attribuiti agli Stati Uniti in quanto creatori del sistema del libero scambio.

Di conseguenza, l'opposizione a tali valori socio-culturali ed economici può facilmente tradursi in avversione nei confronti degli Stati Uniti stessi.

L'anti-americanismo nasce come fenomeno culturale europeo in seno alla critica dei nuovi modelli sociali e istituzionali proposti dagli abitanti delle tredici colonie, ancor prima che ne venisse dichiarata l'indipendenza.

Mentre nel Vecchio Continente vigevano ancora regimi monarchici assolutistici che governavano società di tipo organico iniziando lentamente a vacillare, nel Nuovo Mondo si stava sviluppando una trama sociale ed istituzionale del tutto nuova, che si basava sulla rappresentazione politica, la divisione dei poteri, e l'uguaglianza. Temendo che tali novità potessero influenzare il già precario sistema secolare che regolava gli stati europei, intellettuali soprattutto inglesi, francesi, olandesi e tedeschi, facenti parte delle élites privilegiate, reagirono

a tale minaccia manifestando avversione verso il continente americano, definendolo 'degenerante e degenerativo', passando poi a includere anche i suoi abitanti, riferendosi esplicitamente agli abitanti delle colonie inglesi.

Fu anche il periodo che coincise con la progressiva attribuzione dell'aggettivo 'americano' agli individui che abitavano le colonie, escludendo automaticamente tutte le popolazioni che occupavano i territori degli imperi iberici. Infatti, sia gli europei sia i futuri statunitensi stessi, iniziarono a usare il termine anti-americano quasi all'unisono, gli uni per indicare una disposizione negativa nei confronti della nuova società in ascesa, gli altri per definire coloro che dimostravano dissenso nei primi processi decisionali di politica interna che si orientava verso l'indipendenza.

Nel secondo capitolo viene affrontata una comparazione fra le dottrine e le ideologie intese a formare l'identità nazionale statunitense e i difficili processi di emancipazione degli stati latinoamericani dagli imperi iberici.

Mentre gli statunitensi a partire dal 1823 si proponevano come 'protettori' dell'emisfero occidentale da ulteriori ambizioni colonizzatrici europee attraverso la stesura e la diffusione della Dottrina Monroe, le neo repubbliche ibero-americane manifestavano difficoltà nell'instaurare modelli istituzionali moderni poiché il potere, nelle mani delle élites bianche *criollas*, nonostante venissero promulgate costituzioni di stampo democratico, continuava a mantenere il controllo su una società meticcia che era del tutto esclusa dalla rappresentanza, evidenziando quindi un'incoerenza che causò sollevamenti e disordini fin dagli albori dell'indipendenza.

La dottrina del Destino Manifesto invece, che iniziò a diffondersi ufficialmente a partire dal 1839, elevava la società statunitense a modello civilizzatore che, guidato dalla provvidenza divina, aveva la missione di redimere le altre civiltà dalla corruzione con l'esportazione dell'esempio democratico, divenendo motore dell'espansione territoriale verso ovest e delle spinte egemoniche nel continente.

Intellettuali e politici come il cubano José Martí e il venezuelano Simón Bolívar, dopo aver assistito all'espansione statunitense arrivata a conquistare il 44% del territorio messicano, intuirono per primi le aspirazioni imperialistiche del loro 'vicino del nord', producendo scritti

che incitavano il popolo latinoamericano a unirsi e a prestare attenzione al comportamento statunitense.

Essi espressero il loro disappunto e sospetto anche nei confronti della Dottrina Monroe, criticando aspramente le tendenze imperialiste degli Stati Uniti e affermando quasi profeticamente che la regione latinoamericana sarebbe divenuta niente più che una zona strategica per gli scopi egemonici ed economici degli statunitensi.

Per contrastare la superiorità razziale vantata dagli statunitensi, inoltre, a partire dagli ultimi decenni del diciannovesimo secolo fiorì la letteratura indigenista latinoamericana, che promuoveva un'immagine positiva del mestizo il quale copriva la grande maggioranza della popolazione latinoamericana.

I latinoamericani nel tentativo di trovare un'identità regionale, individuarono negli Stati Uniti e nel loro imperialismo materialismo e utilitarismo per i quali venivano criticati, un termine di distinzione dai più puri, spirituali, ed eruditi ibero-americani, che si attenevano ancora a modelli culturali europei recuperando di fatto la stessa critica che un secolo prima il Vecchio Continente ascriveva ai coloni nordamericani.

Nel terzo capitolo è presente una discussione sulle relazioni fra Stati Uniti e America Centrale e Caraibica, che storicamente fu la regione che nell'arco del ventesimo secolo soffrì maggiormente l'intromissione e l'imperialismo statunitensi, a differenza della regione sudamericana, affrontata nel quarto capitolo, che suscitò relativamente meno interesse strategico fra i leader statunitensi, i quali relegarono quegli stati a semplici riserve di materie prime a basso costo integrandoli definitivamente nel modello primario-esportatore.

A partire dalla guerra ispano-americana per la liberazione di Cuba del 1898, Washington diede inizio a una serie di invasioni politiche, militari, ed economiche che distrussero e impoverirono la regione per decenni. Con lo scopo di onorare la Dottrina Monroe, per gran parte del secolo gli Stati Uniti, ritenendo le popolazioni latinoamericane incapaci di autogoverno, penetrarono capillarmente ogni aspetto della struttura statale della regione centroamericana.

I capi di stato dovevano essere approvati da Washington, l'invio dei Marines era autorizzato, ogni qual volta fosse ritenuto necessario, per il mantenimento dell'ordine sociale e della stabilità economica onde evitare possibili aspirazioni europee, infiltrandosi infine nel settore

agricolo dell'economia regionale in collaborazione con le multinazionali United Fruit Company e Cuyamel Fruit.

Gli Stati Uniti diedero origine a ciò che oggi è conosciuto come neo-imperialismo, creando una rete di protettorati e le cosiddette 'repubbliche delle banane' attraverso la costruzione di infrastrutture e la conseguente acquisizione di terre coltivabili. La presenza militare e la protezione del potere di leader filo-americani servivano a mantenere bassi i costi della manodopera locale e reprimere le proteste delle classi lavoratrici sempre più numerose.

Nel primo dopoguerra il potere economico statunitense nella regione crebbe anche a causa delle devastanti conseguenze del conflitto in Europa. Il capitale europeo venne sostituito con quello statunitense anche attraverso la diffusione di diverse reti bancarie in tutta l'area. Inoltre con l'inaugurazione del Canale di Panama del 1914, di cui Washington aveva la piena amministrazione, veniva sancita l'egemonia statunitense nell'emisfero occidentale.

L'imperialismo e l'atteggiamento paternalistico che Washington assumeva nei confronti degli stati latinoamericani generò reazioni nazionaliste in tutto il continente ibero-americano fra gli anni venti e trenta, dovute anche alle promesse di ricompensa non mantenute dopo aver dimostrato solidarietà con Washington durante la Prima Guerra Mondiale.

Dopo che il presidente Woodrow Wilson si fece portavoce del diritto all'autodeterminazione dei popoli nei suoi famosi Quattordici Punti enunciati nel 1918, i latinoamericani colsero l'incoerenza fra ciò che venne dichiarato da Wilson alle conferenze di pace e l'implementazione della Dottrina Monroe nell'emisfero, generando sfiducia e disappunto.

Dalla metà degli anni venti, per evitare che le tendenze nazionaliste prendessero pieghe estremiste e che le guerriglie che si stavano combattendo un po' ovunque nella regione per allontanare i Marines si inasprissero, il cambio di amministrazione alla Casa Bianca decise di adottare politiche meno interventiste. Si decise quindi di ritirare gradualmente i Marines dalle repubbliche centroamericane preferendo incentivi economici e maggiore collaborazione intra-emisferica.

Si inaugurava così quella che nel 1933 Franklin Delano Roosevelt chiamerà la 'Politica del Buon Vicinato', che sarebbe durata fino al secondo dopoguerra.

La grave crisi economica che si imbatté nella regione a causa della Grande Depressione del 1930 causò violenti sollevamenti popolari in tutta la regione latinoamericana, provocando una

risposta, seppur in tempistiche e modalità differenti nei diversi stati, che si rivelò reazionaria a livello istituzionale e politico. I governi nelle mani di capi dell'esercito che tornarono a rappresentare il modello organicistico tipico del periodo coloniale, si orientarono verso l'adozione di politiche centralistiche e nazionalistiche. Mentre nella regione centrale, questi capi di stato militari attuarono politiche repressive per il mantenimento dell'ordine nazionale con lo scopo di attrarre capitali esteri per risollevarne le economie, in Sud America iniziarono a fiorire partiti radicali come il Partido Liberal in Cile, e la Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana in Perù come conseguentemente all'inizio del crollo dei sistemi oligarchici.

Seppur con toni paternalistici, la Politica del Buon Vicinato raggiunse alti livelli di collaborazione emisferica con gli accordi economici bilaterali fra gli Stati Uniti e quindici paesi latinoamericani e durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale, nella quale, ad eccezione dell'Argentina che entrò in guerra per ultima, gli stati latinoamericani avevano dichiarato guerra a fianco degli Alleati o avevano ristretto i rapporti con l'Asse, aspettandosi una ricompensa economica da Washington.

Tale promessa fu nuovamente delusa e alla fine della guerra le economie latinoamericane si ritrovarono a fronteggiare una nuova crisi economica, la terza in venticinque anni, che causò crescenti tendenze nazionalistiche e populistiche aggravando le relazioni fra Stati Uniti e America Latina, mentre i rapporti fra Washington e Mosca iniziarono a deteriorarsi portando allo scoppio della Guerra Fredda.

La principale preoccupazione della Casa Bianca divenne quindi il contenimento delle ideologie comuniste dall'emisfero in nome della lotta egemonica fra gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica. Ogni leader latinoamericano che manifestasse tendenze riformiste o socialiste, agli occhi di Washington, era semplicemente comunista, e doveva essere allontanato.

Dopo il successo rivoluzionario di Fidel Castro a Cuba e la crisi missilistica del 1962 si aprì quindi una nuova tendenza che spazzava via la politica più collaborativa promossa da Roosevelt lasciando spazio alle preferenze per obiettivi egemonici, che portarono alla collaborazione fra Washington e la CIA nella conduzione di operazioni segrete che, mantenendo un basso profilo, si affiliavano con le frange anti-governative per destituire i capi di stato che risultavano scomodi agli occhi statunitensi.

Ciò che forse ferì maggiormente i latinoamericani fu vedere come Washington sostenesse governi dittatoriali e repressivi nei confronti del comunismo, a scapito della democrazia. Inoltre, mentre gli stati latinoamericani chiedevano aiuti finanziari per risollevare le economie interne e promuovere le industrie nazionali, Washington rispose incoraggiando l'adozione di iniziative di libero scambio e canalizzando flussi di capitale agli eserciti e al loro addestramento, perseguendo i propri interessi dettati dalle politiche della Guerra Fredda.

Le deposizioni di leader eletti democraticamente che avrebbero potenzialmente migliorato le condizioni di alcuni stati, e la conseguente sostituzione con dittatori che implementarono durissime e violente politiche repressive ferirono irrimediabilmente l'America Latina. Basti citare i deposti Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala nel 1954, Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina nel 1955, João Goulart in Brasile nel 1964, e Salvador Allende nel 1973.

Solo dal 1977 con la presidenza di Jimmy Carter che gli Stati Uniti si impegnarono nella restaurazione del rispetto per i diritti umani nel continente e le violenze dei regimi dittatoriali iniziarono lentamente a diminuire, fino ad allentare definitivamente le tensioni con il graduale indebolimento dell'Unione Sovietica.

Il panorama delle relazioni fra Stati Uniti e America Latina serve a spiegare i motivi del risentimento latinoamericano dalla fine del diciannovesimo e nell'arco del ventesimo secolo, illustrato nel quinto capitolo.

L'anti-americanismo latinoamericano è un fenomeno che si è sviluppato in modi differenti nei diversi paesi si è modificato nel tempo e si è prestato a diversi usi.

Tuttavia, come tendenza generale si può affermare che, pur essendo un fenomeno estremamente variegato, è stato controbilanciato da periodi di anti-americanismo meno intenso o addirittura da tendenze pro-americaniste, dipendendo dalle politiche più o meno interventzioniste adottate dagli Stati Uniti, e dagli incentivi economici proposti.

E' possibile tracciare un percorso temporale considerando le manifestazioni antiamericane di maggior rilievo, a partire dalle iniziali tendenze pro-americane dei *criollos* che esprimevano ammirazione per la democrazia, la Costituzione, e la ricchezza statunitensi e dalle tendenze anti-imperialistiche già accennate, che trovarono voce soprattutto nell'opera di José Martí, Simón Bolívar e José Enrique Rodó. Quest'ultimo con la pubblicazione nel 1900 del suo capolavoro intitolato "Ariel" diede vita alla corrente ideologica chiamata Arielismo, la quale

poneva in rilievo la natura spirituale latinoamericana in contrasto con quella materialistica statunitense, esprimendo tuttavia ammirazione per i modelli istituzionali che proponeva e avvertendo la comunità latinoamericana che quell'ammirazione avrebbe potuto portare alla corruzione della sua purezza.

Non mancarono comunque tratti più marcati dell'ambivalenza tipica dell'antiamericanismo, che nella storia ha spesso oscillato fra la critica per le politiche estere adottate e l'ammirazione per la grandiosità statunitense, portando a un desiderio di cooperazione politica ed economica. Un esempio lo fornì il nicaraguense Rubén Darío, che criticò aspramente Teddy Roosevelt per poi scrivere poco dopo un'ode di apprezzamento nei confronti del colosso del nord.

Tuttavia, mentre le élites intellettuali seguivano generalmente un filo comune anti-imperialista, le proteste delle classi lavoratrici schiacciate dalla dura repressione di capi di stato filoamericani non trovarono mai l'unità sufficiente per la creazione di un movimento coeso.

A partire dagli anni venti, correnti ideologiche come l'indigenismo promosso da José de Vasconcelos nella sua "Raza Cósmica", conteneva una chiara avversione nei confronti degli Stati Uniti e di tutto ciò che vi provenisse, mentre il Sandinismo, il movimento di resistenza che prese il nome dal nicaraguense Augusto Sandino, riuscì a portare l'anti-americanismo nelle frange militari per riuscire ad allontanare i Marines dal proprio paese.

Ancora una volta però, l'assenza di coesione e collaborazione tra fazioni anti-americane non portò alla creazione di un movimento regionale. Con il tempo l'anti-americanismo incluse anche l'aspetto politico, come testimonia la creazione dell'Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, un partito creato nel 1924 dal peruviano Victor Haya de la Torre, che intendeva formare un fronte continentale di anti-imperialismo radicale per contrastare l'intromissione statunitense negli affari latinoamericani, che tuttavia, come dichiarato da Haya de la Torre stesso, non nutriva risentimento per il popolo statunitense, bensì per le sue politiche, dimostrando la scissione tipica dell'anti-americanismo dei decenni avvenire.

Negli stessi anni, anche la scrittrice cilena Gabriela Mistral mostrò avversione per l'attitudine statunitense promuovendo la creazione di un movimento regionale anti-americano, ma allo stesso tempo criticava anche l'incapacità dei governi latinoamericani di non avere saputo adottare a livello locale le misure statunitensi di sviluppo economico, invece apprezzate.

Il decennio successivo, caratterizzato dalla politica non-interventista del 'Buon Vicinato', diede nuova coscienza all'anti-americanismo latinoamericano, poiché si iniziò a capire ancora di più che non erano gli Stati Uniti di per sé a creare rancore e scontento, quanto le loro politiche economiche ed egemoniche intrise di razzismo e paternalismo ad aver generato le disparità sociali locali ed economiche fra Stati Uniti e America Latina.

I populismi che ne risultarono, pretendendo di dare voce ai popoli e alle loro problematiche, trovarono negli Stati Uniti il nemico opprimente che aveva causato la precarietà nella quale tali popoli si trovavano, e di conseguenza divenne, come ad esempio per l'argentino Juan Domingo Perón, un potente strumento per raccogliere il consenso popolare e vincere le elezioni.

Nonostante la demonizzazione degli Stati Uniti, comunque, quello nordamericano rimaneva un modello ritenuto di successo. Ciò che creava maggior risentimento era allora il senso di esclusione e la sensazione di non essere trattati equamente nel panorama emisferico.

L'anti-americanismo assunse anche connotati economici con la diffusione della Teoria della Dipendenza negli anni cinquanta con l'argentino Raul Prebisch, secondo cui l'impoverimento dell'America Latina era stato causato dal modello primario esportatore in cui gli Stati Uniti avevano inserito le economie della regione, perpetuandone la perifericità e il sottosviluppo.

Nel 1958 invece assunse connotati violenti da parte del popolo venezuelano, che espresse il proprio malcontento nei confronti degli Stati Uniti aggredendo il vicepresidente Nixon e costringendolo alla fuga.

Il leader che meglio incarnò l'uso dell'anti-americanismo per ottenere consensi fu Fidel Castro che sapientemente riunì attorno a sé le frange rivoluzionarie anti-americane e il risentimento liberal-democratico cubano per riuscire nel colpo di stato del 1959.

Anche Castro stesso, tuttavia, manifestò avversione per gli Stati Uniti separando l'agito di Washington dalla società nordamericana, che dichiarò di non disdegnare affatto.

Il leader guatemalteco Juan José Arévalo fu un'altra figura che si dimostrò capace di separare l'avversione alle politiche della Casa Bianca da un giudizio positivo circa gli statunitensi. Criticò infatti la deposizione forzata di governi eletti democraticamente e quindi la mancanza di coerenza fra ciò che gli Stati Uniti rappresentavano e ciò che facevano.

L'anti-americanismo manifestato a Panama, invece, culminato nella rivolta del 1964, dimostrò di essere di tipo conservatore poiché si attenne a vecchi risentimenti nazionali nei confronti degli Stati Uniti per ottenere negoziati con Washington.

L'ambivalenza dei sentimenti anti-americani dell'opinione pubblica latinoamericana è dimostrata anche dai sondaggi popolari esistenti a partire dagli anni novanta e analizzati nell'ultima parte del capitolo, che spiegano come, negli ultimi decenni, ci sia un apprezzamento generale degli Stati Uniti, che cambia secondo variabili economiche e geografiche, ma che allo stesso tempo manifesta ambivalenza dimostrando scetticismo verso le politiche statunitensi e un'avversione verso l'intromissione degli stessi nella regione, accompagnata da un apprezzamento della società e della cultura popolare del loro 'vicino del nord'.

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Preface

The twentieth century was marked by the rise and affirmation of the United States as a world superpower, to an extent such as to be defined by some scholars as the American century. Since the colonial times, the inhabitants of the English thirteen colonies of North America have displayed a set of innovations in the cultural and political field that has produced a wide range of foreign criticism because the initiatives proposed by this new model of society menaced the secular *Ancien Régime* that dominated the European culture. Such criticism developed in the Old World flawed, by extension, into Latin America and acquired so much importance as to render the past century also the anti-American century.

Starting from the assumption that Latin America is the world region which the United States historically tied more relations with, the understanding and analysis of the anti-American phenomenon becomes interesting and fascinating.

Despite the scarce interest that political scientists and scholars have attributed to anti-Americanism, it has regained momentum after the shocking 9/11 terrorist attack, which was perhaps the most brutal manifestation of hatred toward the United States. Since the attack and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2002, the United States and the world have started wondering about what was the image of the United States abroad, what opinion foreign publics had of the United States, its citizens and its institutions, its ideals and its culture, its policies and symbols. But, most importantly, what does Anti-americanism mean?

In this essay I will start with a discussion of the interpretations of anti-Americanism in the first chapter by examining and comparing the definitions and works provided by scholars and academics of the caliber of Max Paul Friedman, Brendon O' Connor, Alvin Rubinstein and Donald Smith, Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, Ivan Krastev, Paul Hollander, Giacomo Chiozza, and Alan McPherson in order to give reasoning to the meaning of anti-US sentiments and to delineate a general and acceptable characterization. Moreover, in the second part of the chapter I will present the features of the first expressions of anti-Americanism, that originated in Europe, by analyzing the works of English, German, and French intellectuals that wrote about the widespread skepticism of the British colonies.

In the second chapter, I will discuss the historical and doctrinal background that characterize the United States' identity, starting from the process of independence from Great Britain in the eighteenth century, with the aid of books and articles dealing with the United States' ideologies and doctrines developed, discussing over the American exceptionalism that was born within the Manifest Destiny, which generated the US cultural belief of being the one civilization that was destined to expand and to redeem the world by proposing the highest example of modern society, which allegedly justified US territorial expansionism during the nineteenth century and the economic and hegemonic imperialism that victimized Latin America during two centuries of time. In the national identity building, the United States displayed a set of beliefs and outlooks that inevitably influenced and drove its foreign policies and, most notably, led the United States to come to identify as America. I will also propose a comparison with that of Latin America, starting from the colonial times and the process of independence highlighting the differences between the two realities, while discussing the problem of self-identification in the region caused mainly by the lack of unity and the extreme diversification of its inhabitants, focusing mainly on the philosophical writings of Latin American intellectuals and politicians such as José Martí and Simon Bolívar, and I will also show how the Latin American countries basically shifted from being European colonial dominions to becoming economic possessions Great Britain and then of their Northern neighbor.

By studying political science and history books, and official diplomatic documents, in the third and fourth chapters I will analyze the diplomatic relations between the Colossus and Latin America from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the Cold War, focusing on the US policies implemented and separating the Central region from the Southern, because the military and economic interventionism perpetrated by Washington in Central American and the Caribbean differed from the postures assumed with respect to the Southern states, both for strategic and for economic reasons, and at the same time also Latin American responses were, at times, distinct. In the fifth and last chapter I will finally speak about anti-Americanism and its implications after consulting academic articles and essays, journals, and philosophical pamphlets written by both US political scientists and historians and Latin American intellectuals and diplomats, and I will attempt to demonstrate that the main feature that identifies and unifies Latin American anti-US tendencies is ambivalence. Starting from the first displays of

anti-American reactions to the United States' imperialism, I will explain the development of such phenomenon following the timeline of the chapters regarding US-Latin American relations.

In the last part of the chapter I also analyzed the public opinion polls that have been made starting from the 1990s and collected by *Latinobarómetro* and the *Pew Research Center* survey databases that, by conducting public opinion polling, they gather information about attitudes and trends that shape the world, including what Latin American countries think about the United States. In the analysis of the questions posed and the answered received, I will attempt to give reason of the ambivalence of anti-Americanism.

1. ANTI-AMERICANISM ON THE WATCH

The twenty-first century, often defined as the “post-September 11 world”, has brought a new necessity to the need to explain anti-Americanism, and studying its history has become of vital importance to understand its meaning and implications.

Anti-americanism presents itself as an arduous concept, starting from its basic meaning which, including the prefix “anti-“, seems to hint at a strong contrast, hatred, and opposition to what is known to be “Americanism”, namely what is represented by the United States, and the nation itself as a whole. Historically, every nation-state which emerged as world power or displayed deep wrongdoings has been heavily criticized by the international community, and found itself compelled to manage oppositions, protests and hatred.

But the American case is unique because, although admitting that there has never been a more interconnected global environment before the United States took the international leading role, there has not been such hatred toward a nation so as to generate an “anti” feeling toward it, nor an “ism” so as to characterize it as a deep-seated trend, attitude, or behavior.

“When other countries are resented or hated, we do not elevate that hatred to the level of an ideology, or seek its cause in deep-seated psychology, or in opposition to first principles like freedom and democracy. [...] national prejudices are an international sport, but why has this been turned into an “ism” in the case of one country?”¹

Explained and asked himself Max Paul Freedman in his book: “Rethinking Anti-Americanism: History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations”. This is the basic reason for which anti-Americanism deserves a particularized and deep analysis.

¹ Max Paul Freedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism: History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations” p. 2

1.1: The meaning of a multifaceted concept

The term anti-Americanism includes an extensive range of settings and therefore it is easy to be misled into generalizations and wrong interpretations. Anti-Americanism emerged as an object of attention of social scientists in late 1980s and early 1990s, but in the first decade of the twenty-first century it has reached its peak of scholarly interest because of its regained popularity since the 2002 President Bush's "Iraqi Freedom" operation.

Definitions of the expression are based on what other commentators and scholars have marked as "anti-Americanism", therefore the result is ambiguous since there is no widely accepted definition of the term.²

There are a few distinctions that should be made to dismantle the concept in order to understand its basic single parts. To simplify the comprehension of the phenomenon, for convenience we can identify an anti-Americanism perceived as a particular mindset and attitude, an anti-Americanism as a simple label attributed to dissenters who criticize Washington's policy, which contributes to the misunderstanding of the concept because it is complicated to distinguish it from anti-Americanism as an attitude, and an anti-Americanism used as a political instrument, both by Washington and by foreign governments, and all of them could be segmented into even more different varieties.

Scholars and academics share the general definition of anti-Americanism according to which it constitutes a negative predisposition towards the United States as a whole and what it represents, which incorporates the personal sphere and feelings, and goes beyond pure criticism over policies or government decision-making.

Alvin Rubinstein and Donald Smith, US Political Science Professors, defined anti-Americanism "as any hostile action or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States"³, thus highlighting the peculiar aspect of anti-Americanism as a mentality and an attitude, namely the hatred towards what the United States is and is made up of, embracing its totality.

² Brendon O' Connor, "Anti-Americanism" in Martin Griffiths (ed.).

³ Alvin Rubinstein and Donald Smith, "Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy" p. 35

Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane in their “Anti-Americanism in World Politics” provided great contribution to the definition of anti-Americanism distinguishing between negative predisposition with respect to “what the United States is”, meaning the fundamental values and behaviors of US society, and to “what the United States does”, that is, the foreign policies that Washington implements. They found that the first is a constant variable, because dislike of a nation’s identity, culture and lifestyle is less likely to alter with the passing of time, while the latter can change with the changing of policies and decision-making, because one can reshape opinion with the readjustment of policies and behavior of the state.

According to the authors those who feel negative about what the United States *is* express a negative mindset, differentiating them from the opinion one can have about what the United States *does*, highlighting the distinction between bias and opinion.⁴

Like Ivan Krastev notes in the article he wrote about the matter in 2004, anti-Americanism should be separated from criticism of U.S. behavior or policies, and specifies that disagreeing with Washington’s policies *because* they are supported and proposed by the United States is a clear manifestation of anti-Americanism, thus highlighting the link between anti-Americanism and the personalistic negative attitude towards the United States. What can be deduced is that it has not much importance the nation’s behavior per se for anti-Americanism, but it is the nation itself the target of the hatred, and as a consequence whatever the United States *does*, even if just and benevolent, will be distorted because of what the United States *is*. Indeed, Krastev defined anti-Americanism as “a systemic opposition to America as a whole. It is a critique of the United States that transcends mere disagreement over specific policy questions or government decisions”.⁵

It is generally agreed among scholars and academics that anti-Americanism should be distinguished from righteous and well-founded criticism to specific US policies and behavior, which constitutes an opinion or a point of view rather than bias, and it has to do with what the United States *does*, not with what the United States *is*.

A few academics also define anti-Americanism like a sort of disease, a structured negative predisposition which goes beyond mere dislike of the United States.

⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Anti-Americanism in World Politics” p. 10

⁵ Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century?”, Journal of Democracy Volume XV, Number II, April 2004, p. 7

Apart from his call for the need to avoid designating all critiques of American society as anti-American, Paul Hollander in his “Anti-Americanism: Irrational and Rational” joined other scholars who think that opposition to the United States is a symptom of psychological or moral weakness. He interpreted the concept as denoting “a particular mindset, an attitude of distaste, aversion, or intense hostility, rooted in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society or its foreign policies”. He linked the concept to a negative and hostile personal and subjective predisposition, defining it as a groundless type of bias and comparing it to sentiments such as racism, sexism, or anti-Semitism. Furthermore for Hollander there is a common feature of anti-Americanism for every conceptualization of the term, that is the aversion to modernity, which the United States most strikingly represents and embodies since the time of its independence.⁶

Modernity is a process often called “Americanization”, and the concepts have such a strong bond that being against modernity can actually mean being against the United States itself. For those abroad, indeed, Hollander explains, modernization, Westernization, and Americanization are quite inseparable.

Professor Giacomo Chiozza, too found that anti-Americanism is ascribable to modernization as in his work “Anti-Americanism and the American World Order”, he found and discussed the causal hypothesis about the connections between popular creed systems and the presence of anti-American attitudes in different subcultures. According to one of them, the “traditional worldview hypothesis”, anti-Americanism finds its origins in the responses to the challenges posed by the individualistic model proposed and boosted by the United States to the forms of long-established authority.⁷ It is, basically, a problem of differentiation of values in different cultures, that allegedly distinguishes Western from Islamic society nowadays, or the European and Latin American from the Northern American a couple of centuries ago, as we will see below. The anti-American feeling in this case stems from the gap that the United States historically created challenging the traditional and secularized models and values, with the introduction of the concepts of democracy, progress and gender equality, which were perceived by dissenters as a threat to their own states’ peace and therefore felt the need to protect themselves.

⁶ Paul Hollander, “My Work on Anti-Americanism”, Philadelphia Society Meeting April 12, 2012

⁷ Giacomo Chiozza, “Anti-Americanism and the American World Order”, p. 129

Based on Katzenstein and Kehoane's "social anti-Americanism", the "anti-market worldview hypothesis" also provided by Chiozza, too offers an example of this kind of social values differentiation, as the critic is directed to the United States's materialism, which gives main importance to productivity and profits at the expense of the social well-being of lower classes, and to its imbalance between efficiency and equity,⁸ a dynamic well known and shared among the Latin American people and Third World in general. The capitalistic system, purported by the United States and believed to be detrimental for the poorer countries, has become, as we will see, a key feature for the reinforcement of anti-Americanism as it found its consequences in the impoverishment of Latin American countries and developing countries in general in exchange of the enrichment of the modern world, represented by the Colossus.

Expert in twentieth-century US foreign relations, Max Paul Friedman notes that part of the misunderstanding on the meaning of anti-Americanism is also given by the fact that national identity in the United States is linked to a set of values, namely capitalism, modernization, and materialism rather than a myth of ethnic origin as in other countries. As a consequence, opposition to those values could be more readily labeled as hostility toward the nation itself.⁹ Friedman shares the generally shared definition of anti-Americanism as a "particularized hostility and generalized hatred of the United States", or "hating the country more than any other and hating everything about it", and as a result, he found there are few people fitting to the anti-American label, although throughout history many have been called so.¹⁰ Friedman claims that anti-Americanism intended as a negative and personal attitude towards the United States in the totality of its aspects, like other scholars have defined it, finds only few respondents, thus highlighting the misuse of the term and explaining that it is often used to promptly mark as "anti-Americans" those who simply dislike a few aspects of the United States without hating it.

He heavily criticizes US faults in treating the concept of anti-Americanism as a myth, stating it was identified as such by American people themselves, and he also focused on the

⁸ Giacomo Chiozza, "Anti-Americanism and the American World Order", p. 118

⁹ Max Paul Friedman, "Rethinking of Anti-Americanism: History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations", p. 23

¹⁰ Max Paul Friedman, "Rethinking of Anti-Americanism: History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations", p. 5

consequences this has had on US interests, asserting they have been quite negative. Anti-americanism and the way it was perceived and managed, Friedman affirms, smudge critical discourse and deviate the attention from real problems because Washington is characterized, according to the author, by the lack of ability to separate criticism from anti-Americanism, and to accept foreign critics by labelling them as anti-American. If the United States could cope with foreign criticism, he suggests, policy discourse would be less constricted and helpful information could be drowned; paradoxically, anti-Americans, or who has been designated as such, have often provided fruitful advice where pro-Americans have been damaging US interests for not being able to accept opinions different than theirs.¹¹

Scholars also have analyzed anti-Americanism and its perception in politics, distinguishing between what the concept represents for the Left-wing thinking and what for the Right-wing thinking. They focused on the way it is strategically used to silence dissent in the case of the Right, and how it is seen as resourceful for the Left, which underlines the importance of the consideration and understanding of criticism, rather than classifying it as simply anti-American and turning their back on it.

Hollander, supporter of the Right Wing, sharply argues that anti-Americanism is “an aberrant position broadly adopted by the Left” and as a result, according to him, it is a combination of anti-capitalist critique and a sense of victimization, that forges the personal sphere to the political becoming almost indistinguishable.¹² Krastev instead defends the Left’s position on the matter and agrees with Friedman, claiming that anti-Americanism often became a label easily put by Washington to smear criticism. Krastev believes that for the Left the concept does not represent mere dislike for the United States itself, but rather it is a demonstration of dissent for its own failing at honoring the ideals it has persistently tried to impose globally, while in the Right-wing thinking anti-Americanism is a manifestation of hate towards US values, civilization, and lifestyle, not for its foreign policies.¹³

¹¹ Max Paul Friedman, “Rethinking of Anti-Americanism: History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations”, p. 4

¹² Paul Hollander, “My Work on Anti-Americanism”, Philadelphia Society Meeting April 12, 2012

¹³ ¹³ Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century?”, *Journal of Democracy* Volume XV, Number II, April 2004, p. 8

Katzenstein and Keohane's distinction between Left and Right wings' attitudes toward anti-Americanism agrees with Krastev's point of view, that is, American Left supports the idea that anti-Americanism constitutes opinion rather than bias, because it is measured by polls, meaning it is a reaction to what the United States does (policies), and therefore reasonable, and as a consequence, the Right-wing policies that instigate those reactions should be modified. But, they point out, if anti-Americanism represents a fleeting opinion, if policy changes, then that opinion might change into positive, and therefore the long-term effects of anti-Americanism would be derisory. The Right wing instead, claims that anti-Americanism is the mere reflection of "a deep bias against the United States: people who hate freedom hate us for what we are"¹⁴, thus confirming what others have said about the Right-wing thinking on anti-Americanism.

The American Right thinks anti-Americanism can be ignored, simply because if the United States follows efficient policies, then opinions will follow. The authors underline that the essence of bias is unfair prejudice, and therefore the response of foreign publics to successful policy is not likely to change quickly, because it remains a country they fear and detest. Katzenstein and Keohane concluded that both Right and Left should reformulate their positions. They also harshly criticized, like Friedman and Kristen did, the Right overestimation of discontent of American power and distaste of American values because it fails to notice the political importance of the distrust American actions can induce, being this one of the main reasons anti-Americanism still exists, thus completing Friedman's line of reasoning. The authors by the way do not exclude that some expressions of anti-Americanism are so mistrustful that they tend to correspond to bias, and express their concern about whether opinion hardens into distrust or intolerance, as appears to be happened in recent times in Europe, China, and in the Arab Middle East, the political consequences could be severe.

As we can deduce, anti-Americanism can serve as a political resource that, if strategically used, as scholars have pointed out, it can be underestimated and used to powerfully silence criticism in order to follow the political agenda, like we have seen it happens for the Right Wing, or it can serve as a bias to justify personal discontent, or, furthermore, it can be used by foreign governments with the aim to gain consent among public opinion.

¹⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Anti-Americanism in World Politics" p. 10

Hollander for example thinks that foreign anti-Americanism is characterized by the tendency to concentrate on specific and widely shared resentments such as American management of economic policies, unfair trade practices, coercive political dominance, strong military presence, insults to national pride, the undermining of cultural traditions by American mass entertainments, and so forth, therefore constituting a reaction to US actions and behavior; anti-Americanism at home manifests itself instead, according to the author, as severe rejection of American society by Americans in distinct institutional settings, and differs from the one abroad because it gets to be ambiguous, subjective, and imbued with personal quality, reflecting the inclination to blame the social order for a wide range of personal discontents and problems.¹⁵ Hollander also adds that homegrown anti-Americanism served as a mold for anti-Americanisms abroad and he dares to affirm that thus it became one of the principal US exports.

Krastev instead notes that the United States has become, with the phased reemergence of anti-Americanism, a sort of “scapegoat” within the international community, that often blames the Colossus for international matters. In Cold-War politics, Krastev argues, once anti-Americanism has been conceptualized as distinguished from communism, the phenomenon has «turned into a conjurer’s hat, where pieces of different ideologies, anxieties, and political strategies come together to be recombined and recycled for a new life.»¹⁶

Giacomo Chiozza, too, offers a perspective on the theme sustaining the argument according to which anti-Americanism serves to designate the United States as the subject that takes the blame for international problems in his “scapegoat hypothesis”, which claims that popular anti-Americanism is produced when people blame the United States for the present dissatisfaction for the situation in their own country, a behavior assumed by many state-actors in the international arena. This assumption, Chiozza notes, constitutes a main feature in the rhetoric of the “anti-anti-Americans”, which they condemn criticism, and therefore anti-Americanism becomes a political instrument for different realities.¹⁷

¹⁵ Paul Hollander, “My Work on Anti-Americanism”, Philadelphia Society Meeting April 12, 2012

¹⁶ Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century?”, *Journal of Democracy* Volume 15, Number 2, April 2004, p. 6

¹⁷ Giacomo Chiozza, “Anti-Americanism in World Politics”, p. 115

Alternatively, Rubinstein and Smith in their work segmented anti-Americanism in a way that still today impacts academic studies on the matter, and between the four categories of anti-Americanism they identified, they found that what they called “instrumental” anti-Americanism constitutes the manipulation of hostility perpetrated by a government for ulterior purposes, such as mobilizing domestic support or identify a reality that takes the blame for governmental failure, and that “revolutionary” anti-Americanism arising in opposition groups seeking to overthrow a pro-U.S. government and developing as an important ideological doctrine of the new regime building mass support, phenomenon that, as we will see below, manifested in different Latin American states especially during the Cold War .¹⁸

Summing up the definitions and notions provided, one can conclude that anti-Americanism is, as defined by Chiozza, “a multifaceted phenomenon, too loose to be a well-knit ideology, too differentiated to be a cultural syndrome”.¹⁹

If we remain faithful to the staple meaning of the word, we can say that anti-Americanism stems from a personalistic and subjective sentiment of hatred and distaste molded by a certain amount of bias towards the United States, its politics, its government, its society, lifestyle, culture, and, as Friedman underlined, its set of values, because it is what the Colossus is made of, elevating to an ideological state. But as scholars have pointed out, if we consider this definition, then only a restricted and irrelevant group of people responds to the features just listed. Furthermore, since anti-Americanism differs from state to state and it changed and evolved with the passing of time, one can say that there is not a valid and unique definition of the phenomenon, as it manifests with all of its ambiguities and contradictions.

As a consequence, as Chiozza powerfully defines it, anti-Americanism stems from “popular opinion of the United States [that] is a plastic balance in which negative and positive elements, like and dislike, synchronize with no ostensible antagonisms”²⁰, and we will see how this description perfectly fits the Central and Latin American case, which shows an ambiguity that gives rise to an equilibrium between admiration and hostility, rather than a full-scale hatred.

¹⁸ Alvin Rubinstein, “Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phenomenon”, in “Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy”, p. 21-28

¹⁹ Giacomo Chiozza, “Anti-Americanism in World Politics”, p. 118

²⁰ Giacomo Chiozza, “Anti-Americanism and the american World Order”, p. 4

Moreover, the abuse of the concept has brought to mark as anti-American any opinion, criticism, or idea that results opposed to that of Washington, a behavior that, as noted by various scholars, is peculiar of the Right-wing line of thinking, and it is the reason why it is widely accepted that there is an urge to distinguish between bias and opinion, because many times criticism gets to be constructive rather than destructive, and ignoring it means to strengthen anti-Americanism itself. In this sense anti-Americanism can be seen as limiting, but when it comes to use it as an instrument to gather mass consensus it gets to be very powerful and effective.

1.2: The Origins of anti-Americanism

The History of anti-Americanism is much older than it is generally believed and it is dated back in the eighteenth century, even before the Declaration of Independence was made. Decoding its historical development and its powerful continuity throughout the centuries will help to understand it as a contemporary issue.

The term initially was simply ascribed to being opposed to the interests of the colonials settled in the Northern continent, or to their fermenting will to be independent from the United Kingdom, but large part of criticism, specifically from Europe, even if it was not yet called “anti-Americanism”, showed some features that characterize a deep-seated sentiment of hatred toward a society.

In the early 1770s, before the Declaration of Independence made in 1776, the group of immigrants that sailed to the New World with the intention to create a new society that would have distorted the *Ancient Régime*, was immediately perceived in a negative fashion, causing fear and doubt.

The objective that those immigrants were pursuing strongly chocked with the political and economical interests of the European Empires, and therefore first oppositions to the American system can be located in the pre-modern Europe. During a period of tensions and uncertainty because the *Ancient Régimes* system was starting to falter in the Old Continent, an important debate among powers begun to take place.

The European Empires discussed about which would have been the most appropriate connotations that a government had to feature in order to be efficient and work well, because the existing model was showing the first cracks and the New World was proposing itself as a wave of change that risked to cross the Atlantic Ocean, and consequently damage the existing privileges of the ruling aristocracies. Controversies were produced, indeed, upon themes such as the reduction of social inequality, social privileges, institutional democratization, and the widening of democratic participation. The avant-garde fashion that characterized the projects coming from the New World were suspected to threaten the Old World stability.

The earliest forms of anti-American comment tended to be cultural criticism of the lack of taste, grace and civility of American habits and manners, all thought to be ascribable to the unfitting environment and climate of the continent.

The initial thought of the eighteenth-century European science instead was that all living things in the Americas were not only inferior to those found in Europe, but they were also living in a condition of decline. In the common elitist thinking across Europe, there was something “degenerate” about North America’s environment that made it inherently and irredeemably inferior.

About the continental environment, the French anthropologist Georges Louis LeClerc, the Count de Buffon, produced in the late eighteenth century the “Theory of American Degeneracy”, according to which anything or anybody that moved to the Americas would degenerate. He was considered to be the greatest biologist and naturalist of his time, and apart from classifying animals and plants, he also divided humanity into distinct races. He believed human race to be differentiated into several groups according to climate, diet, and physical conditions in which they lived. Taking the hostile American environment as a starting point, he concluded that adaptation and civilization there would be virtually impossible and, in change, turn into degeneration. In his “Histoire Naturelle” he described not only the Native Americans as a degenerated variety of humans due to the unfitting climate conditions, but he also affirmed that, like animals transported to America “had become smaller and weaker”, so would have happened to humans.²¹

²¹ Barry Rubin, Judith Colp Rubin, “Hating America: A History”, pp. 9-10

However, other European intellectuals extended Buffon's theory of American Degeneracy to include white Americans. According to them, transplanted Europeans would continue to be plagued by the inimical continent, because in Europe nature was benign and provided men aid and assistance, while in America disasters such as hurricanes, blizzards, floods, epidemic diseases, wild poisonous animals and insects was unfavorable for the human being. Most Europeans thought that domesticating nature was the basis of civilization, and therefore, if nature was wild, no civilized man could possibly be living there, and if he tried he would be doomed to degenerate with it.

The French intellectual, economist and philosopher Abbe de Raynal in his 1770 publication, "Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Deux Indes", wrote: "One must be astonished that America has not yet produced one good poet, one able mathematician, one man of genius in a single art or a single science."²²

Apart from criticism on the degeneration of America, Raynal deserves particular attention because he displayed for the first time an anti-Americanism with what we would call today a leftist connotation. He called attention on the fact that the European conquest of America had produced, along with the adoption of the slavery system, only starvation, mass deaths, disease, and, above all, the slaughter of the innocent natives there. Since America was born from such evil imperialism, Raynal underlined, nothing good could come from it.²³

Another proponent of the degeneracy thesis at the time was the Dutch naturalist Cornelius de Pauw, who decried the existence of America as "the worst misfortune" that could ever have happened to all humanity, and its discovery the most disastrous event in history of civilization because, he thought, it brought death, epidemic diseases, and slavery.²⁴

De Pauw represents one of the first example who fits the figure of those politic figures who use anti-Americanism as an instrument for political scopes, as he abused the European cultural denigratory wave of the New World with a specific goal. He translated it in a premeditated and negative propaganda in order to score a personal objective, and thus he discovered and showed the power anti-Americanism could have in international politics. At the time, he worked for the Prussian ruler Frederick II, who, in order to maintain the Prussian population within its borders,

²² Thomas Jefferson, "The Portable Thomas Jefferson", p. 56

²³ Henry Steele Commager, Elmo Giordanetti, "Was America a Mistake?" pp. 12-14

²⁴ Barry Rubin, Judith Colp Rubin, "Hating America: A History", p. 11

started an ad-hoc anti-American campaign thus making Prussia become the first anti-American advocate. Given that Prussia had no possessions in the New World, if Germans emigrated to America, they would have become British subjects and therefore enrich their enemy. Continental degeneracy, being an anti-Americanism at the embryonic state, as a consequence shifted from targeting the whole continent to addressing the thirteen colonies, for pure political convenience.²⁵

By the time the war of Independence began, since being anti-American meant siding with the British empire and thus against the colonials' independence, the concept rapidly became polarized and it rapidly acquired an excluding significance because it basically meant that "either you are with us or against us". Anti-americanism here starts becoming a political tool in American hands this time, because by marking as anti-American any opponent, even if not siding with the British Empire, they were simply silenced and thus allowing the prosecution of government's decision-making. This dualistic dynamics will be strategically long used by US administration throughout the centuries in the narratives deployed in its foreign relations, reaching its highest point during the decades of the Cold War.

Citizens who protested were promptly called anti-Americans, and so were American merchants from other colonies who dealt with British imports because they did not support American manufacturing and thus jeopardize the independence of the young republic, or whoever sided Great Britain in its taxation policies.²⁶

Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson in those years were the most bothered by European criticism, and thus both mobilized to prove it wrong by publishing works showing that America's population was flourishing, not decaying. They described American nature, animals and humans beings living there as perfectly sane and strong, as those in Europe or even more, proving it to European elites providing weather reports, detailed descriptions, and demonstrating that births and marriages were numerically superior to those in Europe.

In the aftermath of the conflict with Britain in 1783, America was no longer easily criticized as a decaying continent, but the degeneracy theory kept being successful. Alongside it, new criticism arose about the lower status of the American style and society in comparison with the

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Max Paul Friedman, "Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations", pp. 21-22

European, finding its cause in the melting pot of foreigners that formed the new republic. European liberals instead felt encouraged by the republican setting of the new nation, because they hoped its example could be followed in Europe allowing the formation of representative governments.

After the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and moreover after the proclaiming of the Federal Constitution of the United States in 1787, placed the newborn nation under the spotlights. A new debate on modernity had been opened: European intellectuals were divided on the American experiment; some of them were against the overthrow of the existing elitist and Eurocentric order, that is, a stable class system based on a monarch's and an aristocracy's setting of standards, while others were in part curious, in part in favor of a change that would be perpetrated by the overseas nation, so fresh and flexible and accommodating immigrants from all over Europe, that could create a new race of men.

The United States constituted by then, especially after the failure of the French Revolution, the sole example of a country inspired by Enlightenment principles. Hence it immediately became the only target for those individuals who were both attracted and repelled by the ideals of the modern democratic society that was growing in the New World.

As a consequence, on one side there were European intellectuals who were fascinated by the New World, and after being disappointed by European incidents after Napoleon's restoration, thought to be without future perspectives, and who considered North America as the future of mankind especially because the feudal past was missing and the free bourgeois society was developing. To them, the success of the new system would have threatened traditional institutions and privileges, overthrowing the ancient regime and the long-living feudal system. On the other, some perceived that the Old World was about to change and feared, like all the privileged, they would lose their power, wealth, and influence. Skeptical observers of that time extended the accusation of the degenerative intrinsic nature of the New World to complaints about its abstract liberty and principles.²⁷ The negative perspective on the United States's future was based on the assumption that everything good had already been created in the

²⁷ Sudeshna Roy, Dana Cooper, Brian Murphy, "Transatlantic Relations and Modern Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Examination" p. 194

traditional system, and if European society had reached its highest point, creating a new and different one would be risky and condemned to fail.²⁸

These first contrasts between progress and threat suggest that the anti-American feeling at its embryonic state plunged its roots in the conservative field. On the base of this attitude relied a more general trend of denigrating the New World as a whole, starting from a strong Eurocentric political and cultural vision.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, European observers and commentators were spectators of the astonishing rise of those colonies that were rapidly demonstrating an efficient applicability of their republican beliefs, and while the rest of the colonies in the American continents were just beginning to cultivate emancipation desires, the attention that was focused in the Northern American “experiment” led to the common use of the term “America” to refer to the United States alone, both at home and abroad. In Chapter III we will see how some national US doctrines also contributed to the equation America-United States and the consequences it brought.

About criticism at home, in 1811, the Irish writer Robert Walsh was settled in the United States and launched a magazine journal, *The American Review of History and Politicks*, to express his doubts about President James Madison’s decision to engage into a second war with the British Empire, explaining that the restrictions on trade with Britain would have gone against the US interests. He was readily called anti-American, but another magazine writer aligned with him to dissent about the accusation, stating that personal judgement had nothing to do with patriotism. This was the first critic to the misuse of the anti-American label, as the connotations of treason and lack of patriotism did not fit the situation. At this time, anti-Americanism served as an instrument designed to discredit a challenge to presidential decision making on foreign policy.²⁹

What must be underlined about these first uses of the concept, is that for the most part, those accused of anti-Americanism were Americans who simply disagreed with government’s decisions, the first of numerous examples of Paul Hollander’s theory about US home-made anti-Americanism and, as previously seen, also of how it can be strategically used in politics used to

²⁸ Barry Rubin, Judith Colp Rubin, “Hating America: A History”, p. 7

²⁹ Max Paul Friedman, “Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional concept in American Foreign Relations”, p. 24

silence dissent. Furthermore, the abuse of the concept and its significance perpetrated by the Washington Administration brought in this, like in many other cases decades later, to fail to consider opinions that could result benign and favorable rather than rapidly depicting them as anti-American in order to follow a policy agenda.

This means that being anti-American, at the first usages Washington did of the term, indicated to be against the colonies and their interests as well as being disloyal to them, ascribing to opponents in domestic policy a feeling that encompassed the personal sphere, namely an inherent unpatriotic sentiment against America. Consequently, charging dissidents of betrayal of their nation because they exposed its faults and thus exclude them from the nation itself is a tradition in America that can be traced back to the colonists.³⁰

European criticism of the United States as a dying empire because of its innately inferior nature of the land survived well into the twentieth century. After the independence however, criticism about the degenerative environment shifted to criticism of a degraded people living in a badly structured society. In Europe elites feared that ideas such as republicanism, equalization of classes, repulse of aristocratic culture, and materialism would spread.

The Savoyard philosopher Joseph de Maistre believed that not only was the Declaration of Independence based on flawed premises, but so was the US Constitution, he warned, that it “is the most fragile thing in the world”, holding that nothing constructed on the thin soil of Enlightenment principles could possibly sustain a genuine culture. To him, there was only a dull materialism: “The American knows nothing; he seeks nothing but money; he has no ideas”.³¹

On the other hand, the War of 1812 in which the United States defeated the British Empire fostered a spirit of national unity and an “Era of Good Feelings” in the newborn country. Americans felt confident for affirming themselves as a new great Nation. It was during that time that the expansion towards the West begun, and in Europe people started looking at the United States with interest, divided between admiration and concern.

In those years anti-Americanism started playing a specific political function: abroad, as it increasingly concentrated on the grievance that the democratic experiment was a failure that

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Qin Pang, “The Role of Anti-Americanism in the Contemporary European Identity Building (Note 1), *Review of European Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1; p. 95

would have lead to degraded society and culture; at home, it was used more and more to silence opposition with accusations of treason to the nation.

When the United States decided to proceed with the annexation of Texas in 1844, critics at home found themselves stigmatized as “disloyal, anti-national, anti-American” for distrusting the administration’s case against Mexico and predicting that it would lead to needless bloodshed.³²

Among the “anti-Americans” guilty of “moral treason” were almost half the members of the Senate who voted against annexation, and leading opponents of the ensuing with Mexico were John Quincy Adams and a young Congressman from Illinois named Abraham Lincoln. Mexicans who protested against a disadvantageous settlement with the United States, were labeled by the American Right Wing as anti-Americans instead of pro-Mexicans, demonstrating that they were dubbed not for their patriotism, but for their apparent emotional hostility towards their Northern neighbor.

From 1808 until during the 1820s, after the power vacuum left by the Bourbon King of Spain Charles IV consequently to the Napoleonic wars and the scarce respect that the colonies had for King Ferdinand VII, Latin American countries subjected to the Spanish Crown had started to struggle for their independence from European powers. In the same decade Secretary of State John Quincy Adams drafts the well-known Monroe Doctrine, communicating US preoccupation at the time when the future of the independence-thirsty Latin american states was unpredictable, while marking the lines of future U.S.-Latin American relationship.

Advocacy of equality was, for the United Sates, the best way to give individuals the possibility of contributing to society. In the nineteenth century success was measured, in the United States, with the worldwide achievement reached largely thanks to US citizens’ ability and hard work. This was the American response to Europe, in which the aristocratic system rewarded people thanks to their birth merits. Europeans thought that to set a high standard of culture it was necessary to give primary importance to noble classes and intellectuals, and basically they saw America as prioritizing those who wanted to achieve material wealth.

³² Max Paul Friedman, “Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations”. p. 25

Critiques concerned not only American cultural backwardness and soullessness, but also expressed the European fear of a growing self-adulating people, because of the rhetoric and discourse adopted and because of the slavery abuse.

During the last decades of the 1800, the United States experienced a rapid industrial revolution, exceeding Great Britain economically, and surprising the skeptical that didn't trust the success of the North American experiment. The United States was emerging as a great industrial country, pioneering the development of big industries and assembly-line methods, but this very success only fueled more anti-Americanism. It was believed the United States was heading for world economic domination and other states had to follow its methods or be left behind. Anti-Americanism was still based on the belief that the United States' productive impetus was possible at the expense of the spiritual and moral values.

The United States, as history can tell, gradually coming to represent innovation and the point break with the old-fashioned Europe, was often not welcomed among the Old World intellectual minds and rulers. Its rise as a world power and the self-confidence it manifested found hard criticism and widespread skepticism over the new social and political connotations that it was proposing. What created annoyance during this period, was the spread of US ideals and doctrines through articles and pamphlets that advocated the United States' predestination to civilize the world, something that extremely diverged from the Latin Americans' incapability to cope with modernization processes that caused envy, admiration, but also fear for the cultural and imperialistic menace coming from North America. But, most importantly, the Europeans that coined the term and US leaders that used it as regarding simple political disagreement or a manifestation of interests as divergent as to those of Washington, left something in heritage to Latin American intellectual elites and to anti-Americanism in general. In fact, subsequently the cultural-based criticism that characterized US people as materialistic, utilitarian, soulless, and morally inferior will return in the first manifestations of Latin American anti-Americanism that countered the growing US imperialism. Latin American elites, bearing centuries of European domination and influence, will attain, in the beginning of the twentieth century, to such model in the search for identity and self-affirmation. In addition, the first Latin American reactions to such intimidating power displayed by their Northern neighbor, already

showed the typical feature of anti-Americanism analyzed in this work, namely the ambivalence that balanced admiration and hostility. Finally, the US tendency to ascribe as anti-American simple disagreements with Washington's decisions will remain one of the many facets of anti-Americanism.

In order to understand the complex implications of Latin American anti-US sentiments however, I proposed an analysis of the differentiation between US emancipation outcomes, its outlooks and doctrines, the expansionism and imperialism that much bothered Latin American countries, that differed from it in nearly every aspect.

2. NEIGHBORHOOD PROBLEMS

At the turn of the nineteenth century the Western hemisphere was characterized by the collision of two different realities, the North and the South American, which shared a similar history that developed in extremely different ways. It is a history of European domination, of emancipation, and of conflict. Since the beginning of its development the United States displayed a widespread sense of unity and a strong commitment to build a nation-state with a solid cultural base that would have demolished the linchpins of the traditional thinking, while in Latin America the variegated and disunited architecture that featured its social fabric and political spectrum rendered the process of self-identification way more difficult.

The clash between the united and powerful North and the fragmented and weak South ultimately resulted in a series of misunderstandings, shattered hopes and frustrations which can be found at the base of the developing of the Latin American anti-American sentiment. Moreover, striving to cut-off the boundaries with the Old World in order to pursue a clear enfranchisement, the United States started divulging and implementing a series of doctrines and policies that progressively showed the imperial attitude that characterized it to such an extent as to basically proclaim itself as the spokesman of the entire hemisphere, thus making Latin American countries automatically inferior. US racism, stereotyping, and economic drives, along with the yearning for supremacy allegedly hit Latin America more than any other place in the world, and in order to understand the long-term consequences that eventually led to the formation and diffusion of Latin American anti-Americanism, it becomes necessary to analyze the first steps of these two realities since the times in which they started getting close to each other.

2.1: The Empire of Liberty

The two-century history of Latin American relations with the United States is long and complicated. The countries south of the Rio Grande learned to live together with a world

superpower and its contradictions, that presented itself historically as a neighbor that protects while occupying, invests but exploits, seeks for friendship but makes enemies.

The highs and lows of this difficult yet intriguing relationship has played a significant role in forging of the anti-American sentiment that, in the Latin American case, proved to be particularly ambiguous because it exposed and manifested a set of discording feelings such as disappointment, hatred, dislike, envy, admiration, and love.

Antiyanquismo has evolved as a complex response to the growth and interconnectedness of the US presence in Central and South America.³³

If we consider that anti-Americanism was not born alone, but it is instead a response to a United States' behavior or attitude, then a few aspects of the American intellectual history must be considered to understand the causal connections that allegedly bolstered Latin anti-Americanism.

The stereotyped yet not unrealistic vision of the United States abroad, that is of a proud, selfish, racist, sexist, and warmonger nation is due to a set of idealisms developed throughout history and countries. The stereotype has often been sublimated to doctrines or even myths that have gradually permeated US mass culture, and in part it has been buttressed both by the Washington administration's behavior home and abroad, and from the historical successes of the inexorable expansion of the "Empire of Liberty", outcome that gave inspiration for the symbolization of the US with the national emblem that took the forms of the bald eagle. Since the American British colonies were at their embryonic state, the societies that were created showed spectacular skills in the organization, administration, and building of a political, social, and later cultural reality that had never been seen before. The peculiarity of the North American people that justifies and explains the overwhelming success gained in the escalate to become a world superpower resides in the details of the very processes of society-building and nation-building and the first policies it developed, which marked the essence and discourse of foreign policies implemented across the centuries that gave birth to different reactions from foreign states.

³³ Alan McPherson, "Myths of Anti-Americanism: The Case of Latin America", *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Volume X, Issue 2, p. 141

In the minds of the newborn American society in the course of the eighteenth century emerged, along with the idea of self-rule, sentiments of faith in the collectivity and importance of the people rather than the individual. Then, in 1776 such sentiments took shape in Philadelphia, where the English-American philosopher and revolutionary Thomas Paine began drafting a short pamphlet not randomly called “Common Sense”, with which he intended to broadcast to the large reading public in the colonies ideas about self-government and independence, but overall about republicanism, presented as the best fitting organization for America. Common Sense inspired, apart from the Revolution itself, the implementation of widespread popular participation in governance, which represents the necessary element of the democratic belief.³⁴ Moreover, Thomas Paine’s contribution did not include only the decisive push for independency, but it also presented the traits of predestination that would have permeated doctrines such as the Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine: “We have it in our power to begin the world over again.”³⁵

The proclaimed United States proved to be inspirational to the democracy-seeking French in 1789, and Latin American countries during in the first decades of the 1800. Americans hence started, one step at the time, demonstrating to the worldwide public that it was the Eagle’s “destiny” to spread and implant republicanism and its values in the American continent first, and on a global basis later. During the first years of the nineteenth century, the United States underwent a period of self-confidence because of the success it was gradually gaining thus disappointing European hopes for its experiment’s failure, and for reaching favorable outcomes as trades and economics flourished. Therefore, this so-called “Era of Good Feelings” that was about to manifest in the country, along with the strong idealisms that would have developed as doctrines a few years later, provided the United States a decisive push to begin the expansion of its territorial holdings towards the West.

The purchase of Louisiana from Napoleon in 1803 represented the first move, and Washington’s interest in Oregon, California, and other territories across the West translated in the migration of US citizens in that direction.

³⁴ Sophia A. Rosenfeld, “Common Sense”, pp. 6,7,136,137

³⁵ Thomas Paine, “The Writings of Thomas Paine”, vol. I

Meanwhile, the idea of liberty coming from the North had shaken Latin American people after the English colonies had gained independence. The story of the transition from European (British) colony to the establishment of the American State presented itself as a “a conflict between republican ideals and a hierarchical monarchy where farmers, artisans, laborers, and women found enough common ground with elites to form a coherent geopolitical unit [...] or [it is] seen as a democratic upheaval rooted in social inequity”³⁶, and as a consequence it was evident that on the Northern side of the American continent a new society was about to be born, while in Central and South America one could still find heavy traces of the Old World at the dawn of the new century.

For three centuries, since when, during the first half of the fifteenth century the *Conquista* had become colonization, to the achievement of the independence in the first years of the nineteenth century, Latin America had been Europe. During that time the world had changed, and so had Iberian America. Technologies and ideas, goods and trades, societies and their organizations changed, and also evolved the balance of powers in Europe, as the Iberian Empires were losing influence while others, such as France and Great Britain, were standing out in the European landscape. A proper distinction then should be made between the greatly more extended, richer, and more populous Spanish American colonies, and the Portuguese, that were still scarcely inhabited and for the most part concentrated on the coasts until at least 1700s, but a few peculiarities of the European legacy had remained, a heritage without which Latin America would have lost its coordinates.³⁷

During the centuries in which Central and South America molded with Europe, a new civilization had been created, which featured a unitary element and an inspirational principle that resided in Catholicism, defense and expansion of which became a political mission. In political terms, too, we can speak about unity if we consider that Iberians had planted in American soil the seed of a universalistic empire, while making it grow fragmented in the *Virreinos* that were linked to the sovereign who resided overseas and thus balancing unity and division and creating a widespread dominion. The King, warrantor of the political and spiritual unity of the Empire, represented the rights holder and Church protector. In change of the recognition of his power

³⁶ Chris J. Magoc, “Imperialism and Expansionism in American History: A Social, Political, and Cultural Encyclopedia and Document Collection” Volume 2, p. 1

³⁷ Loris Zanatta, “Storia dell’America Latina Contemporanea”, p. 15

and the subjects' obedience, the King allowed such *Virreinos* to have an autonomy of some sort, thus permitting the different governments to shape around the aspirations, the influence and the power of local elites.

On the social level the Iberian leverage in America translated into the creation of corporate orders. They basically were societies in which one's rights and obligations were not alike to those of another individual, but in change they depended on the rights and obligations of the social order one belonged to.³⁸

The contrasts and ambivalences that characterized Iberian social realities in America heavily diverged from the society that was flourishing in the North under several aspects, and they allegedly constitute the root-cause of the incomprehensions between the North and South America. On one side, there was a European-born population, the Pilgrims Fathers, that fled from the mother country distrustful of the social and political institutions they were leaving behind, and they were moved by a strong ideals-imbued will to create a new nation with more efficient institutions, and to freely profess Protestantism under the protection of a new value such as equality. Therefore, not only this population was going to create a reality that strayed to this extent from the one they were leaving, but also was the North American "imagined community" in opposition to those in the Southern hemisphere, socially, politically, and spiritually speaking.

As a consequence, when Napoleon's invasion of Portugal in 1807 and of Spain in 1808 burst revolts in the Southern hemisphere given the power vacuum left in Spain and the entire system overturned, Latin American *criollos* watched their Northern neighbor as an example and an inspiration to which refer to, while the newborn United States became interested in leaking in Central and Latin American affairs. By the end of the 1820s, from Argentina and Chile in the South to Mexico and California in the North, South American countries had conquered their independence from the mother country. In 1819 Madrid ceded Florida to the United States with the Transcontinental Treaty, which marked the border between the US and New Spain, though not including Texas.

³⁸ Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", p. 17

A separate discourse is needed for Brazil, independence of which, gained in 1822, was coupled with the establishment of an independent constitutional monarchy under the Braganza regency that lasted until 1889 when Brazil became a republic.³⁹

Meanwhile, the Holy Alliance's intentions of restoring its former colonies to Spain⁴⁰, brought the United States to outline and implement for the first of several times the Monroe Doctrine, one of the most important policy realized in US history which had been designed to delineate the hemispheric separation from Europe declaring that further efforts by European nations to take control of any independent state in North or South America would be viewed as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States"⁴¹.

The doctrine was then held together by two cornerstones: the first is ascribable to the warning that the United States posed against the European powers so that they would not interfere in the newborn Latin American states affairs, which served as a protection of their just gained independence, albeit it had been expressed in a way that would have inaugurated a long season of unilateralism. With this warning indeed, the United States would have depicted any European hostility towards the Americas as a threat for the United States itself including its own security, thus self-declaring the mouthpiece of the entire continent:

"It is impossible that the allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference".⁴²

The second cornerstone consisted in the equivalent commitment of the US of not intruding in the Old World affairs, hence delineating the separation between the old, traditional and

³⁹ Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", p. 41

⁴⁰ The Holy Alliance was formed in 1815 by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and at times by France, to prevent the revolutionist wave that was spreading from the Americas across Europe with the risk of threatening monarchies.

⁴¹ "The Monroe Doctrine" (1823), Basic Readings in U.S. Democracy, United States Department of State.

⁴² The Monroe Doctrine was expressed during President Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress, December 2, 1823

absolutism-embedded continent and the Americas, that, in change, embodied the future and represented the space in which the United States would have projected its republican and democratic civilization. This very aspect foreshadowed the right and the mission which the United States self-invested with in Latin America, namely the will to export values and ideals of the society it was founder of, to dominate the hemisphere aiming to improve the conditions of peoples considered inadequate for self-government because of the centuries past under the dominion of monarchs and clergymen. The Doctrine thus operated as a compass of US foreign policy and started manifesting concretely in the strategic areas of interest in the South, that is, the Caribbean.⁴³

It is interesting to notice that this peculiar policy had been articulated without the specific authorization or agreement of the Hispano-American regimes, and therefore it could be interpreted as an “expression of superiority or benign paternalism”.⁴⁴

The doctrine also was a forceful declaration of hemispheric hegemony which already resulted apparent in the appropriation of the term *America* as a signifier of the United States alone.⁴⁵

The Monroe Doctrine indeed, speaks about America in the singular, ascribing it to the United States including both the American continents. It is unclear in the doctrine, what differentiated America or the United States from the Southern hemisphere, but it is evident that similarities among American states were highlighted in contrast with Europe, depicted as the “other”.

The United States mostly ignored protests about the doctrine emanating from Latin Americans, such as military and political leader and hero Simon Bolívar's, who in 1826 called upon his Congress of Panama to host the first Pan-American meeting and expressed his suspicions about the Monroe Doctrine. He thought, thus predicting what would have actually repeatedly happened until the end of the following century, that it would have been destined to become nothing more than a tool for US national policy agenda.

James Monroe and Simon Bolívar represent the leading figures for the comprehension of the intrigued consequences that would have abated in Latin America, mostly in the Caribbean in

⁴³ Loris Zanatta, “Storia dell’America Latina Contemporanea”, pp. 42-43

⁴⁴ Catherine Eschle, Bice Maiguashca, “Critical Theories, International Relations and the Anti-Globalisation Movement: The Politics of Global Resistance”, p. 107

⁴⁵ Walter L. Hixson, “The Myth of American Diplomacy, National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy”, p. 53

the following decades. President Monroe historically marked US foreign policy of that time during the decolonization of the Southern neighbor, while Bolívar was the exponent of a major independence movement throughout Latin America, which included Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and Bolivia. He was also a successful writer, and therefore with his letters and papers he could spread his ideas and visions that influenced the building of intra-hemispheric relations offering valid contribution. In his most famous letters "*Carta de Jamaica*" and the Convocation for the Pan-American Congress, respectively written in 1815 and 1824, Bolívar labeled the United States and Spain as the "other". As a consequence, he thought that tightening the relationships with the most powerful state in Europe, namely Great Britain, would have played in Latin American favor because of the inimical relations between the English and both Spain and the US. That is to say, Bolívar would have campaigned for Latin America to side with the enemy of its own enemy.⁴⁶

United States' discourse in this period of time was embedded with gender, whiteness, paternalism, and exceptionalism. While feminizing Latin America making it discursively incapable of aggression, the United States started discussing the ethnic cleansing of the Indians to make room for "the white man", the only able to make proper use of the land expanding the market and develop the republic, while still adopting the slavery system on the inferior "Negro". Moreover, ideals of the emerging Manifest Destiny suggested that Westward room was needed for US predestined expansion across the continent, and therefore the cleansing became, in American eyes, necessary. The ethnocentrism that pervaded American discourse and mindset can be rapidly linked to a sort of paternalistic racism towards Latin Americans, considered as a weak, less clever, and incapable of self-government race. Hence, in the early developments of the recently born relationship between the North Americans and the *Latinos*, Latin America increasingly becomes "othered" in US policy discourse. A study of the use of caricatures in US newspapers of the nineteenth century discloses a discrimination of Latin American countries, which were often portrayed as a young lady who was the object of courtship by Great Britain and the United States.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Catherine Eschle, Bice Maiguashca, "Critical Theories, International Relations and 'the Anti-globalisation Movement', *The Politics of Global Resistance*", p. 105

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 107

Furthermore, having the American people derived their origin from several other nations, made the colonels feel as being almost disconnected from every other nation, hence the formation of an untried political system projected them to the future only, unfastening their bonds with the European past. They felt that their country was “destined to be the great nation of futurity”.⁴⁸

In this context Simon Bolívar developed a counter-hegemonic project called Pan-Americanism that shaped its features throughout a series of congresses convened by Simon Bolívar himself which lasted from 1826 until 1865. Dreaming of a united Latin America, he drafted a kind of internationalism in Latin America that praised hybridity, in particular the *mestizo*, or mixed Spanish/American identity. The *Libertador's* dream never came true, but Peru, Guatemala, and Mexico in the aftermath of their independence were experiencing different movements of reform due to the persistent Indian Problem, which brought Latin American intellectuals to initiate the publication of radical didactic novels that advocated the Indian cause. The works belonging to the *indianista* literature, however, were seen as ephemeral rather than a strong social reaffirmation much needed in the Southern hemisphere.⁴⁹

The flowering of *indigenista* literature in Latin America in a time in which the United States was affirming its own image by assuming paternalistic and hegemonic traits with respect to its brethren in the South, brought to the beginning of a time in which the United States and Latin America fired discriminatory, racial and culturally-soaked arguments at each other.

Besides, Bolívar reflected on the political and social history of his land, and found opposition to the US conviction of the common destiny of both Americas to be found in republicanism, while at the same time highlighting the unilateralism with which Washington perceived the Western hemisphere:

“It is harder, Montesquieu has written, to release a nation from servitude than to enslave a free nation. This truth is proven by the annals of all times, which reveal that most free nations have been put under the yoke, but very few enslaved nations have recovered their liberty. Despite

⁴⁸ “The Great Nation of Futurity”, John L. O’Sullivan on Manifest Destiny, *The United States Democratic Review*, Volume 6, Issue 23, p. 426

⁴⁹ Elazar Barkan, Ronald Bush “Claiming the Stones, Naming the Bones: Cultural Property and the Negotiation of National and Ethnic Identity”, p. 109

the convictions of history, South Americans have made efforts to obtain liberal, even perfect, institutions, doubtless out of that instinct to aspire to the greatest possible happiness, which, common to all men, is bound to follow in civil societies founded on the principles of justice, liberty, and equality. But are we capable of maintaining in proper balance the difficult charge of a republic? Is it conceivable that a newly emancipated people can soar to the heights of liberty, and, unlike Icarus, neither have its wings melt nor fall into an abyss? Such a marvel is inconceivable and without precedent. There is no reasonable probability to bolster our hopes. [...] Although I seek perfection for the government of my country, I cannot persuade myself that the New World can, at the moment, be organized as a great republic. Since it is impossible, I dare not desire it; yet much less do I desire to have all America a monarchy because this plan is not only impracticable but also impossible. Wrongs now existing could not be righted, and our emancipation would be fruitless.”⁵⁰

Disagreeing with Monroe about the political institutions that best fitted for Latin America, Bolívar at the same time highlights the strong tie that still bounded Latin America with Europe, a detail that determined the Latin America’s incapability to get free from the grip of colonialism because “the tie that bound her to Spain has been severed”. So basically, Bolívar was reaffirming what Washington was striving to eliminate, that is, the spectrum of Europe in the Americas.

As Latin American leaders cultivated the European connection as balances against their Northern neighbor, the cultural gap between the North and the South widened even more when the Manifest Destiny, developed in 1839 but bestowed to the public for the first time a few years later by the columnist John L. O’Sullivan in the *Democratic Review*, intended to promote the annexation of Texas. It shortly became a commonly held belief, a movement that allowed Americans to present themselves as not only capable of, but destined to expand from coast to coast: “We are the nation of human progress, and who will, what can, set limits to our onward march? Providence is with us, and no earthly power can.”⁵¹

⁵⁰ Simon Bolívar, “Reply of a South American to a Gentleman of this Island (Jamaica)”, Translated by Lewis Bertrand in *Selected Writings of Bolivar* available online: <http://faculty.smu.edu/bakewell/bakewell/texts/jamaica-letter.html>

⁵¹ Ibid.

In the decades after the Revolution, grew among American people the self-perception of being the most distinguished descendants of the Anglo-Saxons and as a consequence, the inherited myth of a free Anglo-Saxon past gained new vigor in the opening decades of the nineteenth century. Being a people that left the land of corruption and of antiquity, the Puritans since the beginning of the American adventure had felt invested of a providential role in world history. As American prosperity and success broadened, so did the confidence that Providence was working through the American people, and therefore the sense of mission for reshaping the world was thought to be achieved both by serving as an example and by US physical expansion. At the basis of the American mission is to be found the pride and the sense of specialty provided by the US accomplishment in being the firsts to form free republican institutions and a profound optimism that led Americans to think that other peoples would have followed their model.

The missionary endowment that characterized the Manifest Destiny suggested that US residents were the people chosen by God for settling in an uncontaminated land far away from Europe and its atrocities, with the assignment of protecting and spreading liberty considering no territorial delimitations for it. Detail, this, that would have echoed throughout the Caribbean first, and in South America later a few decades from here.

The success after gaining the independence, the demonstration that the republican model worked better than the old-fashioned European monarchies, and especially after being spectator of the spectacular series of countries that imitated the American model both in Europe and in the Southern hemisphere, provided US people valuable proof for their beliefs, as they took those historical facts as expression of their predestination.

The Manifest Destiny was taken up by those desiring to annex Texas, the Oregon territory, California, Mexico, and Cuba later in 1850.

The need to build a sense of identity of the North American people also drove both common thinking and political thinking to enemy-othering races like the African and the Latin American, because they were considered "inferior". The passing of the Indians of those decades confirmed for many the continental destiny of the superior white race, broadening cultural

space for the subsequent invasion of Mexico. The same drives that underlaid slavery and Indian conquest fueled the Mexican war.⁵²

During the 1820s Mexican government had approved the entrance of American families who were interested in taking advantage of the cotton plantations of the vast and scarcely populated region of *Tejas*, if they had learned Spanish and converted to Catholicism. Mexicans hoped that with the moving of large amounts of US people in the area, economic benefits would have been granted, but with the passing of the years their conditions were gradually neglected. By 1830s transplanted Americans exceeded in number the *Tejanos* and started seeking independence also because, following the trend of Western states, Mexico had abolished slavery, and therefore their business would have perished. When Mexican government, regretting previous concessions, tried to loosen the bonds between Texas and the United States by stopping the immigration and controlling imports of foreign goods, revolts burst and in 1836 Texas could proclaim independence and establish the border at the Rio Grande. Mexico however did not intend to recognize formally the independence of Texas, and the Jackson administration either before it was sure that its independence could be effectively retained because he did not want it to appear as if the United States had conspired to take Texas from Mexico. In addition, the new republic hurried recognition and financial aides after the war with the Southern neighbor, and the rumored English interest over the state led President Jackson to recognize Texas' independence in 1837, fearing further intrusion from the English in the Caribbean and thus hitting the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. The 1840s debates over the Texas annexation hence saw Northern representatives on one side, abolitionists who feared the integration of one more slave state (a detail that will be echoed during the 1861-1865 Civil War) and a war against Mexico, and pro-slavery Southerners who sought for congressional majority. Internal criticism portrayed the Mexican-American war as a brutal territorial invasion aimed at the conquest of a vulnerable state, and Manifest Destiny as an instrument to legitimize imperialism. They thought that further territorial expansion would have promoted enslavement even more, but anti-Americanism in this occasion, too revealed its utility as it played a functional role in silencing dissent, because they were rapidly watched

⁵² Walter L. Hixson, "The Myth of American Diplomacy, National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy", p. 65

with suspicion and depicted as guilty of moral treason and anti-Americanism. By labeling oppositions as anti-Americans charging them of disloyalty, the foreign policy agenda could be followed without significant obstacles.

Mexico had threatened to engage into warfare if the United States annexed Texas, and even though it did not follow through, relationships were spoiled due also to the dispute on the border with the newly independent state. In 1844 Texas was finally annexed to the United States for several reasons: congressional pressures exerted by businessmen, Southerners, interventionists pushed by Manifest Destiny drives, and the realistic fear for Texas to become a British province.⁵³

Despite peace attempts, in 1846, when the Polk administration managed the greatest territorial expansion of the United States to date with the signing of the Oregon Treaty with Great Britain,⁵⁴ it deliberately misled the Congress and the public by placing US troops right on the Texan-Mexican border with the precise aim to provoke Mexicans and ultimately declared war as to make it seem inevitable.⁵⁵

Two years later, after renouncing to the ambition to annex the entire Mexican territory due to the hesitancy to host as US resident an inferior race such as the Latin American, Washington signed the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo with Mexico, which ceded to *el Norte* approximately 55% of Mexico's prewar territory in exchange for fifteen million USD. Like for the Indian removal, Manifest Destiny targeted for dispossession a rival of such putatively inferior racial stock as to have no legitimate claim to land sought by white men for the spread of modernist progress.⁵⁶

The nineteenth century ultimately was, after the general unrests for the implementation of new political and social systems in the New World and the consequences that bounced back to Europe, the time in which the United States prepared to rise as a world superpower and developed the doctrines that would have influenced its political and diplomatic history until

⁵³ Robert Earl Nelson, "Britain and the annexation of Texas, with particular reference to the slavery question (1836–1845)", pp. 15-18, 40-47

⁵⁴ The Oregon Territory included present-day Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and portions of Montana, Wyoming, and British Columbia.

⁵⁵ Max Pul Friedman, "Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations", p. 25

⁵⁶ Walter L. Hixson, "The Myth of American Diplomacy, National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy", p. 68

nowadays. The fact that the North American colossus posed itself as the advocate for the Western hemisphere coupled with the many differences that existed between the North and the South of the continent inevitably brought to incomprehensions among the two.

As the empire was growing, the United States experienced a maturation of its industrial complex and thus territorial and commercial expansion went hand-in-hand, meaning that the impact of technology on manufacturing and transportation allowed the US the enlargement of its markets.⁵⁷ However, the fluctuating economy, which worsened in the aftermath of the Civil War ended in 1865, resulted in the Panic of 1873, which began a period of twenty-five-year depression characterized by overproduction together with underconsumption, which consequently led to a reduced production and high unemployment rates. The social turmoil that followed urged to be dissipated, and thus national leaders responded increasing exports in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Especially in the Central and Latin American case with respect to US attitude, the role of economics in foreign policy, apart from the doctrines and ideologies already mentioned, proved to be determinant as well as subtle and complex.⁵⁸ The sense of mission, together with the racial hierarchy that existed in US thinking and the specialty which North Americans had self-invested with, served to shape stereotypes of Latin Americans, perceived as politically tyrannized and racially hybridized, apart from being considered capable of violent upheavals.⁵⁹

The crisis that battered down in the US during the late 1880s and early 1890s that brought to a general dissatisfaction and mistrust of beliefs and institutions, along with the economic depression and the rising competition coming from the European markets that had expanded with the colonization of territories in Asia and Africa, created a sense of urgency for the affirmation of US interests. While European powers insinuated institutional control and economic exploitation in weaker lands, the United States, in contrast, came to be the chief-proponent of “neocolonialism”, that is, “a more subtle approach using informal means to achieve identical ends”.⁶⁰ The New Diplomacy that featured US foreign policy of these closing

⁵⁷ Walter LaFeber, “The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898”, p. 61

⁵⁸ Robert Beisner, “From the Old Diplomacy to the New”, pp. 19-21

⁵⁹ Michael H. Hunt, “Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy”, pp. 18, 58-68

⁶⁰ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889”, p. 9

decades of the nineteenth century animated recurrent affirmations of US power and privileges, which culminated in the 1898 war against Spain and with the implementation of neocolonialist policies in the Caribbean region during the following century.

One such hegemonic affirmation, which allegedly resulted in one more cheap shot to Latin America, repeated in 1895 when a controversy with Great Britain over a contended area between British Guiana and Venezuela took place. After discovering gold in the region, in order to protect it Secretary of State Richard Olney made known his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, because being a cornerstone of US foreign policy in the Western hemisphere, any threat of European intervention regularly met with opposition from Washington. By declaring that “Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition”, the United States made the boldest claim until that time regarding the authority of the Monroe Doctrine, obtaining the British surrender to US arbitration on the disputed territory.⁶¹

1895 was also the year in which, in another area of interest of the United States, namely the Caribbean Island of Cuba, insurgents protested against Spanish misgovernment, maladministration, and social and economic disorders. Washington’s intervention in the island’s affairs driven both by the need to expel Europe from the hemisphere and by economic efforts, determined the first step towards the aggressive policy that the United States would have deployed in the Caribbean in the twentieth century.

2.2: The Continent on hold

The march towards independence proved to be all but effortless for Latin American countries, as even if not with the same dynamics, time and intensity, they entered a season of frustrations and turmoils, of disappointed expectations more than objectives achieved. The years that followed the processes of independence indeed were characterized by political instability and economic stagnation, at least as a general inclination, except for isolated cases. Generally speaking, the political issues in the region manifested in the impossibility to impose a new order

⁶¹ Ibid. pp. 11-12

and law, coupled with the incapability to enforce the Constitutions in those states where most part of the *caudillos* were involved in struggles of power, and trades grew, but at great cost. Economically, independence brought the end of external trade monopoly and access to international capital markets in Latin America, and by the middle decades of the century technological innovations created the conditions and the space for the flowering of the incoming globalization. Instead of developing commerce within the region and among the states, Latin American markets oriented towards Europe, with Great Britain as the favorite target for trades. International commerce rose and so did capitals and migration from Europe to the Americas, along with traditions, lifestyles, cultures, doctrines and ideologies that ended up tangling the already complex Latin American social fabric even more. The economical integration of Latin America to the “modern West” placed the US neighbors at the periphery of that center. It gradually became a necessary complement of the what we call the international division of work induced by the industrial revolution, which presented traits of a neocolonial pact. At the origin of the position covered by Latin America in world economy is to be found the primary-export economy based on free market, according to which Latin America specialized in the export of raw materials to Europe, both industrial minerals and agricultural goods. In change, industrial goods from Europe, especially from Great Britain, were imported to Latin America. The extraordinary growth experienced in the newborn nations of the Western hemisphere ultimately led to a series of issues and to vulnerability, because economies were induced to major in the production of goods requested from the global market, often not more than one or two per country, and thus making Latin American economies tightly dependent on foreign markets, while at the same time widening the social gaps because of the unequal allocation of richness that resulted. Soon the Latin American countries fell into debt with the European powers for funds to support their governments and infrastructures, and the already scrawny domestic markets weakened even more.⁶²

Politically, instead, Spanish centralism had produced, as a reaction in the former colonies, the impulse to create federalist governments that ultimately revealed themselves as the reflected impracticability of a stable order and the fragmentation of power that was on the way. The civil unrests that featured the first half of the nineteenth century Latin America were mostly caused

⁶² Loris Zanatta, “Storia dell’America Latina Contemporanea”, pp. 64-67

by discontent because of the exclusion of the indigenous component of the Latin Americans from independence achievements, and the political struggle that encompassed the generality of the former Spanish colonies, which saw the new ruling elites, namely the privileged class of European heritage with little or no non-white ancestry and the only allowed to have access in politics, being divided into two fringes. Liberals fought for federalism and parliamentarianism coupled with the reduction of Church power in order to subvert the old system, while conservatives, in change, advocated for a strong and centered government together with the empowerment of the Church, maintaining that the more the structure of the old system could be preserved, the more the stability. The latter eventually had to accept and to incorporate liberal constitutionalism and popular sovereignty because there was no other way of legitimating power once the monarchical option had been discarded; liberals instead often resorted in demanding support from the State in order to establish liberties in places where history had long denied them.

The challenges that the new republics were facing in the aftermath of independence, indeed, were many: from the ruralization and militarization of power, the regional scattering left in heritage from the dissolution of the colonial apparatus as well as from the destruction of the economic circuits of the *Virreinos* and the captaincies, the conflict of interest of the elites mentioned below, and the world powers' ambitions. As a result, the existing political models such as constitutional monarchy, republicanism, liberalism and conservatism, centralism, and federalism were put into a test in ways that were never entirely pure, with the attempt to honor the corporatist reasoning of the old regime. Privileges, social statuses, commercial monopolies, and the ancient internal disputes that had been suffocated by the viceroyalty system, repeatedly interfered in the ideas of the individual, the citizen, and the unrestricted trade principle.

The main preoccupation became, as a consequence, the preservation of independence not anymore from the Spanish or Portuguese dominations, but in order to avoid dispersion and internal struggles in which were involved the *caudillos* and the intellectuals, which posed pragmatism against theoretical thinking.⁶³

⁶³ Patricia Funes, "Historia Mínima de las Ideas Políticas en América Latina", pp. 38-39

Far from being meaningless, the Constitutions of the 1820s in fact revealed themselves as mere political instruments aimed to institute governments acquired with force and preserved with methods that shifted away from those premised by liberal principles. Indeed, they followed one another and often proved to be inoperative, but those of the first constitutional wave were imbued with romantic liberal optimism, as they were coeval to independence and the struggle to obtain it, and they basically constituted a reaction to an oppressive power and the fear to fall in the clutches of another empire (the United States). They introduced civil and individual liberties, and abolished slavery and the tributes that weighted on Indians, but in general they attributed only a small portion of power to the executive, Parliaments with large influence, federal States, and an extended right to vote.

During the years between the achievement of independence to mid-century, among the most perceptive Latin American intellectuals of the time, being conscious of the wide gap that existed between law and reality and given the inefficiency of the first Constitutions, a second, more realist wave was proposed, which ultimately expressed more centralist and conservatives principles. By resulting in the adaptation of the liberal standards to the social fabric and local traditions, as a consequence, the right to vote was restricted, the initial idea of limiting the Church power had been put aside, which in change became an efficient *instrumentum regni*, and centralized governments were instituted. Even if under the jurisdiction of the Constitutions, the power was retained in the hands of the *caudillos*, charismatic political leaders who exerted their control by imposing it with force, and such power was based on an informal patronage featured by obedience in exchange of protection that much reverberated the *ancient regime*.⁶⁴

The first liberal impulse was characterized by an excessive optimism of the Enlightenment elites with respect to the legislations that were imbued with the new ideas to organize Latin American societies. The second wave of Constitutions, indeed, reaffirmed political centralism while putting aside extremist ideals that were thought to be capable of leading to a “tyranny of the majorities”, preferring traditional thinking and a revision of the principles of equality and freedom.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Loris Zanatta, “Storia dell’America Latina Contemporanea”, pp. 45-51

⁶⁵ Patricia Funes, “Historia Mínima de las Ideas Políticas en América Latina”, p. 39

The reality of the disorganized federalism dominated by *caudillos* was coupled with a racial prejudice that resulted from the encounter between assorted groups who differed by race, ethnicity, religion, and culture. As a consequence, each group ended up ranking the others placing them to the status of uncivilized peoples, but often members of different groups also mixed, creating a hybrid of themselves. What happened in Latin America is that the more different races intermingled, the more firmly they needed to define race and hence race differentiation became an instrument of subordination. Intellectuals such as Simon Bolívar believed that the diversity of Latin Americans constituted an advantage, stressing that they should be proud of such mixed racial historical origins, before falling into mistrust and discouragement by the closing decades of the century: given the continuous fragmentation and dissent, *el Libertador* ultimately ended up, as it has been said previously, calling for rule by authoritative governments until peoples with African, indigenous, and mixed heritages were educated to citizenship. Such communities and the Indian properties henceforth gradually became depicted as an impediment to progress, and were inevitably ascribed to the lower and humbler social ranks. Independence resulted, in the end, in most ways as a catastrophe for the indigenous peoples of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, where they were most concentrated.⁶⁶

The half of the century was also characterized by the growing cultural and demographic disturbance produced by the enormous waves of immigration that flowed from Europe, which ultimately altered even more the racial configuration in the hemisphere. Latin American white oligarchies generally incentivized immigration, exposing both economical and cultural reasons in order to impress progress and ideas such as the work ethic that could counterbalance the typical indolence of *latinos*, and in order to achieve such goal, Latin America, they thought, needed to be “whitened”. Moreover, debates on race typical of the Enlightenment thinking according to which pigmentation differences constituted a short range of climate and geography, were replaced by scientific racism, which ultimately echoed in Latin American whites’ minds leading to disastrous consequences on the social level.⁶⁷

At the same time, independence leaders were gradually disappearing, and a new generation formed by young intellectuals rather than warlords started taking hold.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Teresa A. Meade, “A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to the Present”, pp. 94-95

⁶⁷ George Reid Andrews, “Afro-Latinoamerica 1800-2000”, p. 197

⁶⁸ Loris Zanatta, “Storia dell’America Latina Contemporanea”, p. 54

Romanticism and the search for independent identity that permeated the middle of the century led to the production of civilizations, in Latin American countries, inspired to the forms of the European, as an inevitable process produced by the ongoing presence of the Old World in the Western hemisphere. Facing the extraordinary growth of the emerging industrial modernity of the United States and the urge to find a Latin American identity, the Colossus allegedly served to supply the “otherness” that Latin Americans needed. This probably represented one of the first fractures in the US-Latin American relationship, because if the Northern neighbor was able to serve as a model by championing liberal principles, and was admired for this very reason among those *latinos* who advocated for equality, on the other hand there existed a need to be distinguished and take distance from that neighbor that revealed itself more and more as a menace rather than the helping hand they hoped to receive to emancipate from Europe. In fact, since the first applications of the Monroe Doctrine, for which Latin American countries were never consulted while the United States self-called to protect the entire hemisphere, the sense of inferiority, subjugation and exclusion that stemmed, purportedly forged the root-cause of the ambivalent and complex sentiment that Latin Americans cultivated with respect to the United States, which at last resulted in anti-Americanism. Indeed, as declared by Brazilian José Veríssimo in 1890, people generally admired the United States, but they did not esteem it; “Los admiro pero no los amo”, said Uruguayan writer José Enrique Rodó some years later; the Cuban hero José Martí, in his essay “*Nuestra América*”, disclosed the perception of an America that was of the US citizens rather than of both *latinos* and North Americans, and that its potential was feared to such an extent as to commit to give a persuasive response that would have shaken the Latin American public in order to make it aware about the incoming imperial threat from the United States.⁶⁹ By referring to the role that the Colossus self-invested with during the time of Latin American struggle to achieve independence, Martí stressed the political sympathy that the United States felt for its Southern neighbors that were fighting for emancipation, and explained the dangers that the Southern hemisphere would have incurred, using a spectacular metaphor in which a tiger allegedly embodies the Northern neighbor, while Latin America is represented by the prey:

⁶⁹ Andrew Ross, Kristin Ross, “Anti-Americanism”, pp. 37-38

“It was imperative to make common cause with the oppressed , in order to secure a new system opposed to the ambitions and governing habits of the oppressors. The tiger, frightened by gunfire, returns at night to his prey. He dies with his eyes shooting flames and his claws unsheathed. He cannot be heard coming because he approaches with velvet tread. When the prey awakens, the tiger is already upon it. The colony lives on the republic, and our America is saving itself from its enormous mistakes-the pride of its capital cities, the blind triumph of a scorned peasantry, the excessive influx of foreign ideas and formulas, the wicked and unpolitical disdain for the aboriginal race-because of the higher virtue, enriched with necessary blood, or a republic struggling against a colony. The tiger lurks again every tree, lying in wait at every turn. He will die with his claws unsheathed and his eyes shooting flames.”⁷⁰

Martí sensed so much the US imperialistic drives that, when he expressed his opinion of the first Pan-American conference that took place between 1889 and 1890 writing for the Argentinian paper *La Nación*, he called for an urgency to become aware of the fact that it was the time for Latin America to declare its second independence. Perhaps because Martí lived in the United States during fifteen years, he perceived US capital intentions as well as the weaknesses of the Latin American countries if they did not find a common position over the matter, appealing to the Bolivarian continental tradition, seeking a strict historical and political direction. By linking the outcomes of the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico, which will be analyzed in the next chapter, Martí foresaw the same destiny for Latin America, that would have faced another situation of dependence upon a superior power.⁷¹

The United States hence was perceived as a powerful, greedy nation ready to intrude and exploit in moments in which Latin American countries would be weaker, a country that felt sympathetic with the Latin American struggle to emancipate from the Old World and gain independence, but that right after started yearning for the control of the entire continent. Martí warned Latin American people not only about the US imperialistic aims towards Latin America, but also about the risks of repeating the mistakes of the past, such as “the excessive influx of foreign ideas”, to which Latin Americans were actually constantly exposed to, probably

⁷⁰ José Martí, “Nuestra América”, available online:
http://writing.upenn.edu/library/Marti_Jose_Our-America.html

⁷¹ Patricia Funes, “Historia Mínima de las Ideas Políticas en América Latina”, pp. 132-133

predicting, agreeing with other contemporary intellectuals such as Bolívar among those already mentioned, that the one thing that Latin American countries needed was to follow their own paths to grow as nation-states:

“To govern well, one must see things as they are. And the able governor in America is not the one who knows how to govern the Germans or the French; he must know the elements that make up his own country, and how to bring them together, using methods and institutions originating within the country [...] Government must originate in the country. The spirit of government must be that of the country. Its structure must conform to rules appropriate to the country. Good government is nothing more than the balance of the country's natural elements.”⁷²

So, while the hierarchical constitution of the colonies resisted the democratic organization of the republics in the turn-of-the-century, Latin American intellectuals in the search for a continental identity got closer to the European immigrants that had invaded the continent during those decades and found a point of convergence between their innate spiritual identity and the European literature, language, and philosophy. Such juxtaposition of Latin American and European cultural and spiritual values served to respond to the need, supposedly of both, to counter the emerging North American influence that was about to burst in the Southern hemisphere.

After attending to the exceptional expansion of the United States and its first intrusions in the Caribbean, starting in Mexico, the imperial attitude that characterized the Colossus since the half of the nineteenth century became clearer to Latin Americans with the 1898 war that *e/ Norte* fought against Spain in Cuba. Racial, psychological and cultural factors that permeated Latin American literature of the time ultimately reached its peak with a piece of literature called “Ariel”, which acquired great impact becoming a symbol of Latin American identity in the face of Anglo-Saxon America’s cultural menace for several decades, and it was written by Uruguayan intellectual José Enrique Rodó, who dedicated it to “*la juventud de América*”.

⁷² José Martí, “Nuestra América”, available online:
http://writing.upenn.edu/library/Marti_Jose_Our-America.html

Rodó affirmed himself as the great spokesman of Latin cultural values on the continent, as in his work, published in 1900, he criticizes the utilitarianism typical of the United States, which had translated into the pursuit of a material development that ultimately became an end in itself, as an element to counterbalance the spiritual values embodied by *latinos* and thus finding a personal identity that clashed with the North American. Utilitarianism led, according to the author, to the detriment of the pure civilized values of aestheticism and idealism, both of them supplanted by the discovery of natural science and the triumph of the democratic ideas that tarnished societies by establishing a norm of mediocrity for social relationships. Rodó, indeed, praised Latin Americans by criticizing the lack of high culture typical of the United States, recalling and developing a criticism that was peculiar of the European anti-Americanism that had emerged in the previous century:

“The persistent North American war against ignorance has resulted in a universal semi-culture, accompanied by the diminution of high culture. To the same degree that basic ignorance has diminished in that gigantic democracy, wisdom and genius have correspondingly disappeared.”

Such affirmation, hence, underlined the existing gap between the rich but uncultured North and the impoverished but spiritual South. Aiming to warn of *Nordomania*, attraction to North America, Rodó, referring to the United States, claimed that:

“That powerful federation is effecting a kind of moral conquest among us. Admiration for its greatness and power is making impressive inroads in the minds of our leaders and, perhaps even more, in the impressionable minds of the masses, who are awed by its incontrovertible victories. And from admiring to imitating is an easy step.”⁷³

He thought that holding in high regard the United States would have led to a de-Latinization, and therefore he, following José Martí’s line of thought, spoke about the importance of setting boundaries between the continents of the Western hemisphere in order to avoid the

⁷³ Michael La Rosa, Frank O. Mora, “Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.-Latin American Relations”, p. 28

denaturalization of the “personality” of Latin American nations that would occur if a foreign model is imposed.

While elevating the uniqueness of the Latin American character, he also recognized that “there [was] no distinctive mark or characteristic of the present ordering that [was] worth struggling to maintain”, and therefore he called for a harmonic relationship between the two continents because it was worth, to him, to maintain the dualism as the typical feature of their original composition, recreating the classic myth of “the two eagles released simultaneously [...] in order that each should reach the limits of its domain at the same moment”, believing that the competitive diversity that characterized the Americas would have favored solidarity.

In such a situation of political, social, and economical turmoils and discontent found itself the nineteenth-century Latin America. It was the time in which it started to know itself after being under a three-centuries European dominion, which had inevitably shaped Latin American states, each one in a different manner and in different times. But the process of emancipation had been relentlessly interrupted and overlapped by an imminent Americanization. The need to loosen ties from a system that was becoming more and more obsolete clashed with the modernist proposal of a nation that had liberated from a colonial dominion to evolve as the advocate of democratic and liberal principles never contemplated before, and that was geographically so close. The internal fragmentation of the Southern continent first, and the social fabrics in the single Latin American states then, made progress even more complicated. The power was held by white oligarchies, the *criollos*, which generally resulted modernist in the economics but conservative in politics because they were aimed to maintain their power and privileges. In this way, it was clear that independence movements headed by such oligarchies had been made in their own interest and not in that of lower classes, of which they feared they would take the opportunity to construct a more democratic and egalitarian society, as they had seen doing in the United States. This discrepancy of interests made the leaders of the secessionist military movement unfit for the type of government that the Latin American states needed.⁷⁴

In this way, the North American model had been taken only to favor the classes of power, while neglecting the masses, which, with economical progress and immigration flows from Europe,

⁷⁴ Carlos Beorlegui, “Historia del Pensamiento Filosófico Latinoamericano”, p. 166-7

was growing at full capacity. The incapacity to manage the social turmoils that governments were facing, ultimately turned into disillusion and consequently they tended to blame the United States for failing at democracy.

The positivist wave that shattered on Latin America from Mexico to Argentina crossing the Andean regions allegedly fueled the requests of peace and administration, and therefore the need to set order in Latin American nations led to find a compromise between liberal and conservative elites which shared the organicistic view of societies, that as a consequence resulted all but dissimilar to the European model. But with the change of times and ideologies, also the masses evolved. Next to the popular masses that suffered the discontents of being the great excluded from modernity, can be found a new generation of intellectuals that, during the century and especially in the end of the second half, started championing the ethnic diversity that had resulted from the mishmash of different races and thus constituted the voice of the generalized popular discontent. Besides, these new spokespersons of Latin American essence, committed to respond to the popular need of self-affirmation and self-distinction from the forthcoming threat that came from the North. While warning of the imperialistic soul of North American deeds and criticizing its innate cult for the material, these intellectuals were well aware of the flourishing and diffusion of North American culture in the Southern hemisphere, somehow understanding the fascination that it could instill and the impacts that it could have. Indeed, as a consequence, the sentiments and ideas with respect to the Latin American Northern neighbor manifested as ambivalent and contrasting since the beginning.

The suspicion of United States as too secular, modernist, soulless that emerged among intellectuals, and the emphasis on US imperialism that was shared by European visions ultimately became depicted, especially by the ruling elites, as the source of all Latin American problems, and the sense of superiority along with an attitude of victimization would always characterize Latin American anti-Americanism in the political sphere.

3. WASHINGTON'S POLICIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

While the United States oriented its foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere toward a growing effort to establish a US exercise of hegemony on both the American Continents, it struggled to maintain the European economic interests far from Central and Latin America honoring the Monroe Doctrine. The Central and Southern Continent's states instead floundered in trying to construct their own identity and at the same time they had to safeguard themselves from the ambitions of a Northern neighbor from which they needed help, especially on economical issues, but had to defend from. Since the closing decades of the nineteenth century, American policymakers focused on the Caribbean naval stations and transports across the Central American isthmus, as growing economic interests were directed to the opening of new trade routes towards the Pacific and to the growth of American investments in the Caribbean area. After decades of infrastructure financing aimed to improve commercial routes between Latin American states and between Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States, the turn of the century determined the exceptional explosion and rapid widespread dissemination of US companies in the Southern Hemisphere.

United States naval officer and historian Alfred T. Mahan in 1890 published *"The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783"*, in which he explained that economic prosperity could not be separated from national security. The strategy, according to Mahan, consisted in the deployment of a powerful navy operating in the Hemisphere under US sovereignty, and underlined that the control of the Caribbean and Central America would constitute the beginning of the process.

During the years between the last decades of the nineteenth century and the firsts of the twentieth, indeed, the imperial potential of the United States manifested in the United States' "backyard", namely Central America and the Caribbean, which became the area that historically has suffered the major number of US military interventions during the century. Such initiatives

have been demonstrated after the publication of Mahan's work with the decade-long naval construction program that was implemented.⁷⁵

The economic difficulties that characterized the last decades of 1800s had left profound domestic disorders that allegedly threatened US patriotic thinking. The one thing that could alleviate the United States' pains was foreign aggression, ultimately one of the main reasons that fueled the decision to declare war to the Spanish Empire in Cuba. The slightly weakened sense of unity, the casualties, and the damages that the Civil War had left, and the consequent economic crisis that emerged could only be healed with a reunion of the US states against a common enemy-other: the monarchical, anti-democratic Spaniards.⁷⁶

Once again, gendered discourse coupled with racism and providential destiny, and the urge to expand markets to alleviate discontent at home permeated the drive to war: Americans nurtured their manhood by assuming the responsibility to save the damsel Cuba in what became the "Splendid Little War" for the Americans, and "*el desastre*" for the Cubans.

3.1: The creation of protectorates

Among the most debated subjects in Washington, the Cuban annexation covered a special position for a few years. The 1896 second Cuban insurrection against Spain worried US congress because the existing discontent had been worsened by the 1894 Wilson-Gorman Tariff, which had exasperated economic recession in the island by removing preferential access to US markets for Cuban sugar. The possibility of a separation from Spain and a social revolution would have represented a disadvantageous outcome for American investors in the island's agriculture and business, and, in addition, it would have caused several difficulties for trade. US Secretary of State Richard Olney warned Spain that if the insurrection could not be controlled, US intervention would be expected in order to protect American lives and properties. The 1898 explosion of the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor provided Washington a powerful excuse,

⁷⁵ Brian Loveman, "U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America in the 19th Century", available online: <http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-41>

⁷⁶ Walter L. Hixson, "The Myth of American Diplomacy", p. 100

as President McKinley declared in his war message, for “the forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war”⁷⁷.

Spain initially rejected to withdraw from Cuba and to recognize its independence, and therefore the United States responded by declaring war to Spain. The Spanish debacle ultimately led to the US military occupation of the island, and consequently to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, which obliged Spain to cede Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam. Moreover, the ratification of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty recognized Washington the right to an unshared control over the isthmian zone.⁷⁸

After the Spanish armistice and withdrawal from Cuba, the celebration of militant national identity led Americans to think that if Mexicans and Cubans represented uncivilized peoples unable to self-govern and needing to be “educated”, also Puerto Ricans, Samoans, and Hawaiians did. Moreover, awareness of the importance to maintain social order along with political and economical stability in the Latin American republics started to grow in Washington, which was aiming to reach the national protection it had been pursuing for a long time, starting from securing the Southern borders. Cubans initially greeted US help in fighting for independence from Spain, but they did not take long to perceive the imperialistic motives of the United States.

The island thus became the first among those states called protectorates and a model for applicability in other places in the Caribbean area, namely Puerto Rico, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In Cuba, such arrangements provided limited self-determination, because US military forces exerted direct control over the governmental functions and allowed reduced indigenous and African-Descendant participation. To counterbalance the supposed lack of ability for self-government, the United States entrusted the members of the old colonial elites against *independentistas*, who won 1900 Cuban elections to the Constituent Assembly, which was the office in charge of drafting the Constitution. While critics of US presence advocated for troop withdrawal, American officials held that if

⁷⁷ William McKinley’s War Message of 1898, available online:
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/mkinly2.htm>

⁷⁸ Brian Loveman, “U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America in the 19th Century”, available online:
<http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.001.0001/acrefore-9780199366439-e-41>

irresponsible Cubans rejected pro-US candidates, it only meant that the United States could not trust them to elect the best government. US leaders believed Cuba to be the target of US legitimate strategic and economic interest, but at the same time they worried that disorders in the island would have attracted European intrusions, and, in addition, Cuba constituted an influential area for Americans' plan to build a Central American canal.⁷⁹ In 1901, while US troops had not left the island yet since 1898, the Congress decided to attach a clause to the Cuban Constitution, the infamous Platt Amendment, which recognized Cuban independence while making the island legally and institutionally a US protectorate. It stipulated the conditions for US interventions in Cuban affairs while denying Cubans to pledge a treaty that would allow another nation power to intrude over their affairs. As a consequence, the Amendment authorized the Cuban Northern neighbor the right to intervene basically whenever it was thought it was needed.⁸⁰

Moreover, Cuba was prohibited from incurring a large debt to prevent European gunboats from landing on Cuban shores, and lastly, the United States was granted a lease on naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The Amendment also established that if any of the conditions were violated, American troops would be free to enter the island to restore order.

Cuban nationalists protested against the Amendment as an evident violation of national sovereignty, and therefore Secretary of War Elihu Root responded by disposing two choices: either accepting the Amendment along with its provisions or getting used to an ongoing military occupation. Finding itself in a corner, the Cuban Constituent Assembly in the end had to agree to reduced sovereignty as the best option and attached the Platt Amendment as an appendix in the Constitution.⁸¹

The bill actually gave to the United States the permission to intervene in Cuba in 1906, 1912, 1917, and again in 1920. Only by 1934, because of the rising Cuban nationalism and widespread

⁷⁹ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889", pp. 20-23

⁸⁰ Article III of the Platt Amendment: "The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris in the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.

⁸¹ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889", p. 23

criticism of the Platt Amendment it resulted in cancellation as part of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America.⁸²

Puerto Rico instead became a test case in securing legal sanction for US hegemony in the Caribbean. In 1897 Madrid permitted to Puerto Ricans to draft a *Carta de Autonomia*, which conferred the island complete independence from the Empire. Nonetheless Washington, in its Manifest Destiny impetus, declared that Puerto Ricans should have come under "the beneficent sway" of the United States instead of engaging into risky experiments of self-governing. The island as a consequence unilaterally became an unincorporated territory of their Northern neighbor after being denied all the sovereign elements of the *Carta*, and forced to exchange the peso currency, that had been devalued by the US by 40 percent, with the US dollar.

In 1901 Theodore Roosevelt had become President of the United States. Conservative and reformer, nationalist and charismatic, the new President brought the New Diplomacy to its highest point of significance by promoting in Latin America the capitalist enterprise in order to promote material progress, peace, and stability, while stirring ongoing controversy in the region. In Washington's policy agenda the next step to secure Central America under US control would be the Panama Canal construction. Since 1825, the isthmian area had been one of US interest as a consequence of for its pursuit of continental and commercial empire, and after failing to negotiate with the Colombian government in 1903 for the control of a strip of territory across Panama that was then part of Colombia, the United States found itself with the long-time ambition to construct a canal that could connect the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans to ship goods more rapidly and at a lesser cost. Furthermore, the control over such a trade connection would have bolstered US image both at home and abroad, an aspect that Washington never neglected in its decision-making. Roosevelt then found a way to seize the canal by planning to take advantage on an existing anti-Colombian upheaval in Panama, which was trying to secede from Colombia, and with the help of the French engineer Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla.⁸³ He persuaded US Senate to cough up 40 million dollars to the New Panama

⁸² Walter L. Hixson, "The Myth of American Diplomacy, National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy", p. 110

⁸³ Bunau-Varilla worked for the Panama Canal Company that went bankrupt in 1888, and the New Panama Canal Company, that abandoned the project.

Canal Company under the Spooner Act of 1902, while Roosevelt decided to send troops to protect American lives in Panama. The small piece of territory was finally declared independent and Bunau-Varilla was nominated plenipotentiary ambassador for the United States. Afterwards he allegedly signed a treaty with US Secretary of State without formal consent from Panamanian government: such agreement granted the United States sovereignty rule over a ten-mile zone strip destined to the canal building, that would be completed by 1914 becoming a symbol of Yankee hegemony.

Roosevelt's methods in managing the negotiations to obtain control of the isthmian area ultimately led the Latin American public opinion to accuse the United States of conquering those areas after self-proclaiming to have liberated Latin American peoples from the grip and influence of European powers⁸⁴, thus affirming what intellectuals such as Martí, Bolívar, and Rodó had predicted.

The same year the Panama Canal negotiations ended, Roosevelt, in his annual message to the Congress, pronounced his most exhaustive affirmation of national policy with respect to Latin America. He recalled the Monroe Doctrine offering his personal corollary to underline and reaffirm the unilateral responsibility of the United States to take action to respond to European intrusions in the Western Hemisphere and to intervene in Latin American states to restore order whenever Washington considered they would fall in "chronic wrongdoings". By announcing that US police power would be exerted in Latin America to enforce order, Roosevelt vigorously molded the Monroe Doctrine by transforming it from a policy designed to protect Latin America to one that would justify undisturbed military interventions in the Western hemisphere.⁸⁵

After a short period of time the Dominican Republic became an immediate testbed to manage foreign debts in the Caribbean. The Island, since its independence gained in 1844 from Haiti, had been governed by a dictatorship soothed by revolution, which had its relevant costs. By 1904 Dominican debt had exceeded \$32 million and was distributed in France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany, and after a negotiation between Roosevelt and the Dominican President, a provisional arrangement was implemented. Although never ratified by the Senate, it authorized

⁸⁴ Michael LaRosa, Frank O. Mora, "Neighborly Adversaries", p. 95

⁸⁵ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 30-31

the United States to name a person in charge of collecting customs incomes to be distributed in order to settle the debts, thus enabling US officials to take control of the collection of Dominican custom receipts and to manage a new system of payments to “restore credit, preserve the order, increase the efficiency of the civil administration and advance material progress of the Republic”.⁸⁶

In Roosevelt’s foreign policy agenda, the ambition to control the Antilles covered a special position. As a consequence, in order to strengthen US position in the Panama Canal, drifting away European motives for influencing the area such as financial debts from a Latin American country became of primary importance. After a 20 million-dollar loan to extinguish Dominican debts, indeed, the Congress approved the American-Dominican Fiscal Convention in 1907, which charged the United States with the revision and control of any custom while guaranteeing to not modify its customs tariffs nor increase its public debts without US consent. One year earlier, a Cuban Liberal fringe was protesting against a government that was thought to be coercive and corrupted, creating a perfect occasion for Washington to deploy strong measures. Following what the Platt Amendment established, Roosevelt acted in response to turmoils and disorders by sending marines to occupy the island. After supervising an election which ended up favoring the Liberal party, in 1909 US troops left the Island, and since then the United States became negotiator of local disagreements with almost unlimited freedom to intervene in Cuban affairs.⁸⁷

Nicaragua also represents a history of US gunboat invasions: shifting back to 1904, William Bryan, politician and future Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, proved unable to persuade Washington to build another trans-isthmian canal in Nicaragua. As a consequence, Nicaraguan President José Santos Zelaya started seeking endorsement from Britain, France, Germany, and Japan to compete with the construction of the US canal in Panama, thus defying the US State Department. Washington responded by underscoring the threats that a foreign canal would have caused to democracy and to the best interests of Nicaraguans, and then the administration made a daring attempt to involve Costa Ricans in the issue by exploiting their conflict of interests on a border with Nicaragua, but they ultimately

⁸⁶ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889”, p. 30

⁸⁷ Ibid.

resisted. Five years later, Secretary of State Knox under the Taft Presidency, feeling concerned for the possible European intrusion in Central America and about a dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras, tried to reach an agreement with Zelaya for a permission to send US troops in order to protect American properties in Nicaragua, but he ultimately failed. Consequently, the decision to endorse the rebel forces that strove to oust Zelaya the marines invaded Nicaragua.⁸⁸

The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, through the self-proclaimed international police power, brought to the creation not of colonies, but of protectorates with military intervention as a means to exert control. Such an attitude created widespread discontent among many Latin Americans, mostly the intellectuals, as the prospect of political, economical, and cultural domination was materializing in front of them, and, as a consequence, suspicion of the United States arose in the first displays of *antiyanquisismo*. The atmosphere in which Latin America was imbued was based on the ideals purported by the already mentioned “*Ariel*” written by Rodó and published in 1900, which during those years had spread and gained huge success by entering in the imaginary of a huge number of readers, and generally anti-Americanism of the time tended to be a fight against being part of the United States rather than a fear for absorption from *el Norte*.⁸⁹

The policy of the “*gran garrote*” (Big Stick) manifested in those areas of Latin America in which there could be a source of economical and commercial interest for the United States, and it ultimately marked even more the distinction between the civilized North Americans that paternalistically educated the “uncivilized” by monitoring their elections, controlling their finances, and expanding American businesses in their territories. The corollary also marked the turning point in US behavior and foreign policy toward Latin America, which passed from being territorially invasive taking advantage of the “Big Stick” policy to being more discursive and economically centered with the so-called Dollar Diplomacy, promoted by President Taft and Secretary of State Knox between 1909 and 1913 and aimed to “substitute dollars for bullets”. The policy was modeled on the experience in Dominican Republic, which was retained successful, and therefore this sort of indirect imperialism allowed the United States to create a control zone for security and trade in the Caribbean aspiring to safeguard American financial

⁸⁸ Thomas Leonard, Jurgen Buchenau, Kyle Longley, Graeme Mount, “Encyclopedia of U.S. - Latin American Relations”, p. 110

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21

interests as well as to limit other great powers' influence in the Hemisphere. President Taft felt that US investors would stabilize the unsteady and fragile governments of the region, prone to violence and revolution, by improving their economies and providing incentives for responsible behavior. However, due to opposition at home and revolutionary discontent abroad, the diplomacy was destined to fail and to be later repudiated by Woodrow Wilson.

By 1909, after a few years of disputes between Nicaragua and Honduras for hegemonic ambitions on the region, the United States, aimed to restore order, intervened as both countries called for help and mediation. In December of the same year President Zelaya had shot two US citizens, a fact that determined the end of Washington's relationship with Managua. Furthermore, in order to successfully apply the Dollar Diplomacy specifically planned for both Nicaragua and Honduras, it would have been worthwhile to eliminate Zelaya.

The Nicaraguan President concerned the Taft Administration because he had courted foreign investments, including the United States', and, as it was already mentioned below, he was seeking negotiations for the construction of a transoceanic canal with Japanese and European governments. In addition, Zelaya was attempting to intrude in El Salvador and Costa Rican affairs thus becoming an uncomfortable figure to the eyes of Washington. In the early stages of a revolt against Zelaya, both the United States and Guatemala offered covert support, but when Zelaya executed two US marines serving as officials in the rebel army, Taft ordered intervention. He recognized the rebel leader Estrada's government, which ultimately proved too shaky and thus led to another US intervention to avoid Zelaya's Liberals' success in the eventuality of an election. The US administration provided Nicaragua a loan, a new constitution, and forced the abolishment of monopolies. Such measures resulted unpopular in the country, Estrada lost its influence and was then replaced by his political rival Adolfo Diaz. In 1911 Nicaraguan and US representatives signed a treaty, although it had never been ratified by US Senate because opposed to Taft Administration's connections with corporations. Basically, as a puppet in US hands, Diaz maintained rule over Nicaragua against a revolt to his government and, in addition, a hundred marines were dispatched along Nicaraguan coast that would remain until 1925. Intervening in Nicaragua with the goal of stabilizing the government and preventing a financial collapse, Taft and Knox induced considerable nationalist concern amidst the Nicaraguans, which would reverberate throughout the years. Nicaragua proved to be the classic

case of dollar diplomacy in the Caribbean, as similarly the Taft Administration deployed it in Honduras, Guatemala, and Haiti, where it pushed refunding schemes. During the pre-war years the United States was contending political influence in Central America against Mexico. Aiming the ensuring of an US-friendly government and the preservation of political security in Latin America, Washington intervened directly in Nicaragua in 1911 and again in 1912. From 1912 to 1933, excluding a period of nine months, Washington maintained its troops in Nicaragua.⁹⁰

US experts noted that the roots of unrests and disorders in Latin America proved to be more difficult to manage than what it was expected, and displays of paternalistic attitudes had the collateral effect of rising nationalist discontent in those Latin American republics that despised efforts of “Americanization” from US side.⁹¹

Latin Americans of the Central area felt that imperialistic policies deployed by the United States were taking advantage of their economies and resources because on one side, the condition of debt that Latin American nations were experiencing due to the gaining of independence from European powers made room for the wealthy United States by allowing it to forge permanent chains of dependence with them; on the other, the United States was expanding its business and investments in their territories due to the presence of weak governments that, when brought to power by the United States itself, welcomed US investments and the advantageous labour conditions and materials. Central American discontent basically raised from the disappointment of being deceived by the Northern neighbor that had offered help to emancipate from Europe, only to find out that they were subjected to another, more powerful and influential empire.

3.2: The “Banana Republics” and World War I

The economic sector of the Central American and Caribbean republics in which the United States gradually infiltrated was mainly the agricultural. The widespread banana plantations allocated in Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, and Costa Rica coupled with the growing economic interests and investments of American businessmen such as Minor Keith, who founded the

⁹⁰ Francisco Morales Padrón, “Historia de unas relaciones difíciles (EEUU-América española)”, pp. 160-161

⁹¹ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889”, p. 32

United Fruit Company in 1900, constituted the origin of the creation of the complex relationship between Washington, the Latin American governments, and their elites. Such republics became generally known as “Banana Republics” as referring to “poor, and unstable countries with widespread corruption and a submissive relationship with the United States”, as a result of the harsh exploitation of Latin American lands and labor force by American banana corporations like the Cuyamel Fruit and the already mentioned UFCO.

The first half of the twentieth century saw some of the most infamous dictatorships installing in the Western hemisphere: they were strong, military men who were able to maintain power by repressing and subjecting the agrarian working class and any kind of opposition while favoring local landowners and foreign investments. The overwhelming production and distribution network created by the United Fruit Company in the region was structured in such a way that it would have made the Latin American republics even more chained to a relationship based on favoritisms, unequal negotiations, and conflict of interests. First of all, the American fruit corporations committed to the creation of subsidiary companies specialized in the construction of infrastructures such as railroads, naval ports, telegraphic connections, and export infrastructures where they had never existed before. The rulers of the Central American republics were yearning to modernize their nations, and therefore they found a solution to their backwardness problems in the UFCO’s subsidiaries. While the infrastructures were built and the communications in the region were improved, the acquisition of lands for banana plantations constituted the next step toward a new kind of imperialism. The main reason why Latin American republics tightened relationships with the United States was that local governments, finding themselves plunged in heavy social turmoils and deeply indebted, started welcoming foreign capitals hoping to modernize and improve their economies in order to reach national stability and retain power. But the alliance between US multinationals and right-wing dictators that was originating from this exchange of interests proved to be quite feeble, because it depended on the UFCO’s success in generating economic stability. If so, dictators allied with landowners and American investors against the working class’ demands, but if it failed to provide economic steadiness the dictators were willing to break the alliance with no second thoughts and to manage the agricultural sector in such a way as to increase national incomes over the banana production. In the eventuality in which the American

corporations resisted, Latin American governments partnered with the labor force against the multinationals. The collision of the US economic imperialism with Latin American nationalist governments was worsened by the intrusion in each other's affairs among Central American governments, which only fueled unrests.⁹²

During the first decades of the century, Central American governments and planters tended to adopt, towards the United States, a policy of accommodation. It manifested with the support of US companies by means of the repression of the nationalist labor movements that were protesting against their work conditions. Moreover, in countering the working class' rebellions, the Latin American governments could count on the military presence of the United States, ready to intervene whenever it was required to maintain order, and, as a result, the governments became increasingly repressive while poverty was striking most part of the masses. Operating as if Central America and the Caribbean were its natural extension, the United States created an environment that allowed the United Fruit Company to expand a business in a tariff-free trade system where the US dollar dominated thanks to the huge loans provided to soothe the Latin American debt, thus offering the corporations a number of favorable conditions as to grow overwhelmingly in the producing areas.⁹³

Honduras was the first larger banana exporter country and constitutes an example of how the United States, the fruit multinationals, and Central American governments managed their interests by crushing the local masses of workers. General Manuel Bonilla ruled the region from 1903 to 1906 before being ousted by a military coup that placed General Miguel Dávila in power. Bonilla had granted the first concession to the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company to build railways and expand banana plantations, but once Dávila came to power he rapidly restricted land concessions to foreign investors, and as a consequence Bonilla responded with a rebellion that was being financed by the head of Cuyamel Fruit Company. With Bonilla back as head of State, tax benefits and land concessions generously flawed, and therefore nationalist

⁹² Marcelo Bucheli, "Good dictator, bad dictator: United Fruit Company and Economic Nationalism in Central America in the Twentieth Century", University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business, available online: https://business.illinois.edu/working_papers/papers/06-0115.pdf

⁹³ Marcelo Bucheli, "Bananas and Business: The United Fruit Company in Colombia, 1899-2000", pp. 24-46

opposition automatically originated from the working class. In 1919, they protested against the government's benevolence towards UFCO and strove to obtain wage increases. Aiming to avoid further unrests, the United Fruit decided to shift on tactics: instead of acquiring the lands by means of railroad concessions, it started purchasing them directly from private owners.⁹⁴

In Guatemala, until before the Great Depression, there existed a strong relationship between the government and the United Fruit, also because from 1898 to 1921 only General Manuel Estrada Cabrera ruled the country. Estrada, winning elections fraudulently and deploying military repression, granted the United Fruit a concession system that peaked in 1904 with a 99-year privilege over the construction of a railroad that connected the country basically from coast to coast, and another banana production concession in 1906.⁹⁵

In the small Panama US leverage was more solid than anywhere else, to the point that even if the United Fruit had obtained land concessions before 1903 when Panama was still part of the Colombian Republic, once it became independent it granted even more concession to the company. In 1904 a United Fruit subsidiary obtained the concession to build telegraph lines that linked different cities in Panama and the Americas, while the government committed not to build any other telegraph line for fifteen years thus exacerbating Panama's dependence upon *el Norte*.⁹⁶

Minor Keith, the founder of the United Fruit Company, managed to develop a special relationship with Costa Rican government, as he married the President's daughter. In 1900 the United Fruit obtained a land concession to build railroads thus creating the space for the monopolization over the banana production. Privileges to United Fruit rapidly became a subject of debate in Costa Rica, and eventually led to the election of Ricardo Jiménez in 1910, who had gained popularity because he promised both workers and planters that he would have changed the relationship with the American corporation. Being Costa Rica crashed by foreign debt, a United Fruit loan offered a sufficient reason to neutralize opposition and in this case, too, the nationalist-rooted upheavals stemmed from the labor unions. When in 1914 Alfredo González

⁹⁴ Arturo Taracena, "Liberalismo y Poder Político en Centroamérica", p. 235

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-215

⁹⁶ Humberto Ricord, "Panama y la Frutera (Análisis de una confrontación económico-fiscal)", pp. 11-14

was elected, he implemented a series of reforms which included a tax raise to landowners and foreign corporations. Three years later he was overthrown by a coup, and substituted by a temporary figure that changed the concessions system making it more favorable for the United Fruit.⁹⁷

When Woodrow Wilson, a “committed reformer with messianic instincts”, became President of the United States in 1913, he was determined to change the existing foreign policy, especially in Latin America, in one that could fit the Progressive era that the world was about to enter: he believed in international harmony and mutual respect for rights and obligations, and aspired to find a collaborative relationship with the “sister republics” of the Western hemisphere.⁹⁸ One thing that distinguished Wilson from his predecessors was his solid belief in the right to self-determination of all peoples throughout the world and in their right to choose the shape their own governments, but only as long as it was a democratic one, thus actually contradicting himself. To protect democracy meant, for the President, first of all to help secure democracies in the unstable Latin American republics after years of struggles against their own corrupted governments, European powers, and also against the imperialistic policies of Roosevelt and Taft. Wilson started by revoking the Panama Canal Act in 1912, which excluded a large part of US ships from the payment of tariffs to cross the Canal, and signed a formal apology treaty with Colombia for Roosevelt’s interference in the Panamanian revolution in 1903. In 1917 Puerto Rico achieved territorial status and its residents became US citizens, but these were actually the only successes Wilson achieved in Latin America.

Soon after taking office, before the Southern Commercial Congress in Alabama, Wilson spoke about foreign affairs stressing his and US intentions to “spiritually unite” with the Latin American republics at the threshold of the inauguration of the Panama Canal, that would have physically separated the Americas. The President declared that those countries involved in the concessions system and Latin American states in general were going to see “an emancipation from the subordination [...] to foreign enterprise” because “you cannot be friends upon any other terms than upon the terms of equality [and] of honor”, and directed US actions so as to

⁹⁷ Arturo Taracena, "Liberalismo y Poder Político en Centroamérica", p. 220

⁹⁸ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", p. 42

“show ourselves friends by comprehending their interest whether it squares with our own interest or not.”⁹⁹

By exposing such a strong will to cooperate with the Southern neighbors, the address actually drew the lines of a new involvement in Latin American affairs, as the concern over European economic privileges in Latin America, thought to be threatening self-determination, led Wilson to seek alliance in order to pursue the long-time intent to roll back European hands from the hemisphere. Two months later, Wilson approved the Federal Reserve Act, which authorized US banks to install branches in foreign countries aiming to free US commerce from British banks.¹⁰⁰ Latin Americans initially enthusiastically greeted the new President’s intentions, as they hoped to finally have gained the right to self determine and elect their own governments without the interference from Washington, but shortly after Wilson’s promises proved to be groundless as Washington once again showed a different agenda, which became a motive for bitter resentments. The following year the Great Powers of Europe engaged into World War I, which had, on Latin American countries, a double impact: on one side the flow of capital and goods had been obstructed, and on the other, the only alternative model that proved powerful enough to counter the inevitably growing US influence in the hemisphere that Latin American intellectuals were hanging upon, was dismantled. It could not be acceptable to take as mentor-nations those European countries that failed in finding agreements among themselves and tragically transformed their own continent in a bloodbath. Conversely, trade between the United States and Latin America increased by more than 100 percent in the years between 1914 and 1917, also because the United States substituted European powers in purchasing raw materials and providing capitals.

By isolating the Hemisphere in response to war in Europe, Wilson wanted, getting inspiration from Colonel House, to create a collective security that could be able to guarantee territorial integrity, political independence, and democracies, but ultimately resulted in incoherence. With the triple aim of restoring order, maintaining political and economic stability in the

⁹⁹ President Woodrow Wilson, “Address Before the Southern Commercial Congress in Mobile, Alabama”, October 27, 1913, available online: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65373>

¹⁰⁰ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889”, pp. 43-44

Caribbean, and protecting US investments, President Wilson was forced to put his belief in self-determination apart in Central America, as the United States engaged in the so-called “Banana Wars”, in which local masses fought such *guerrillas* for national liberation from the Americans. The establishing of US economical exploitation and surveillance, and the creation of a relationship of dependence of the Caribbean republics upon the United States coupled with the working classes’ discontent for misrule and corruption had altogether played a consistent role in fueling Latin American anger.

Haiti for example, which was a potential naval base for the United States, experienced political turmoil in 1915, and its stability therefore became essential for the United States to avoid foreign rule in the island. The Marines occupied the island between 1915 and 1934 in order to prevent the rise of anarchy. Similarly, an upheaval in the Dominican Republic in 1916 required US intervention. The Wilson administration justified such actions that evidently clashed with what the President had declared on grounds of wartime necessity and claimed that a supposed economic interest in the area from an ascendent power such as the German had to be prevented. To protect both the island and US assets there, Wilson signed the Haitian-American Treaty, which conferred to the United States the complete control of Haitian finances and the right to intervene militarily whenever it was considered necessary, and forced the Haitian legislature to choose a presidential candidate who had to be previously selected by Wilson, a decision that exacerbated even more the unrests in the island. In 1917 Wilson provided Haiti a new Constitution that allowed foreign land ownership, basically a legal permission to exploit the whole Haitian territory and resources. Haitian legislature not only rejected such Constitution, but also began drafting a new anti-American Constitution that would be later forcefully dissolved by the United States.¹⁰¹

Policies of racial segregation, forced labor and press censorship that followed one another fueled a peasant rebellion between 1920 and 1921, and the Wilson administration responded by centralizing power in Haiti. After this, the island remained generally stable thus creating a growing wealth disparity within the residents.

¹⁰¹ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889”, pp. 47-49

The Great War and the economic disaster that followed had placed the United States as the world leader, surpassing Great Britain. Commercial trades between the United States and Central America were improved and grew constantly during wartime. President Wilson had full hands during his two-mandate presidency in managing the maintenance of order and stability in Latin America, especially in the Caribbean, conducting the countermeasures during the 1915-1917 Mexican Revolution, and orchestrating the final moves of the World War and the subsequent peace treaties in the following couple of years. Pan-American initiatives that spurred from the Wilson administration aiming the securitization of the Hemisphere were disappointed by the Pan-Hispanic alternatives in response, which came mainly from Mexico and Argentina. The appeal of a Latin American unity against the United States was becoming an object of attraction for the poor and oppressed working class, heads of state, and intellectuals. The US entry into War had generated different reactions in Latin America: Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela, Uruguay, and El Salvador remained neutral, while Cuba and Panama declared war. After initially breaking relationships with the United States, in 1917 also Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua entered the conflict, expecting to be rewarded afterwards. While in conflict, the United States was also preparing peace. In doing so, with respect to Latin America, hegemonic and paternalistic stances seasoned the discourse, as according to a report the United States self-declared as the major influence in peace negotiations, thus excluding those “sister republics” about which President Wilson talked about. The 1918 statement of Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which, apart from proposing the creation of the League of Nations, advocated for republicanism, democracy, free trade, and international cooperation as necessary elements for the maintenance of peace, and it also put into evidence the importance of the right of national self-determination. The latter met with Latin American criticism that grasped the incoherence and inconsistency between Wilson’s declaration and his imperialistic practices in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, the main contradiction that stood out was the impossible juxtaposition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Fourteen Points: a self-proclaimed continental police power could not be practiced while declaring appreciation for self-determination principles.

After being largely marginalized at the Paris conference, where the United States dominated the process, Latin American mistrust grew exponentially. What annoyed Latin Americans the most during the peace conference was the insistence of US leaders in stressing the call for formal international recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, and found in response bitterness and suspicion from a Mexican unofficial observer and Mexican President Carranza, who depicted such measure as unacceptable for Latin Americans.

3.3: Toward the Great Depression and the Good Neighbor Policy

In 1920, after a two-period Presidency ruled by a democrat, the election of Warren Harding brought Republicans back in rule thus shifting the approach to foreign policy, especially toward Latin America. By supporting peace, order, and liberal capitalism, they disagreed with those military measures aimed to support other countries, and preferred the implementation of accommodation policies and international law instead. The aftermath of First World War created a set of conditions that revealed favorable for the United States to definitively rise as the World Superpower and widened the benefits in the hemisphere in general, also because Great Britain declined in trade and finance, thus dismantling the possibility of showing economic competition there. With Germany and the other European Powers, too, out of the game, concerns of further European intrusions were removed, and as a consequence there were no justifiable grounds for the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to intervention. During the decade prior to the Great Depression, US investments and capitals flowed in Latin American republics at a frightening rate, and by 1926 US banks had expanded as much as sixty branches in Latin America. Governments not only gladly hailed foreign investments, but also greeted economic advisers to take hold on the economic grievances of their countries.

Uncertainties on whether to deploy interventionism in Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua became a subject of debate because, despite the creation of protectorates in the Caribbean was aimed at the upholding of peace and order, it only generated nationalist reactions and *guerrillas* instead. Therefore, the Republican administration urged the withdrawal of US Marines from such territories, but not without encountering a few difficulties. Under the administration of President Calvin Coolidge, the United States managed to

successfully remove troops from the Dominican Republic in 1924, but in Nicaragua, after a military presence that endured since 1911 finding no opposition from an elite that had all the interest in retaining power, the troops withdrawal in 1925 allegedly constituted one of the factors that caused the outbreak of a civil war. It was an elite struggle for power that opposed Conservatives and Liberals, the latter being financially and militarily supported by Mexican President Plutarco Calles. US Secretary of State Kellogg threatened to deploy the use of force if Mexico did not give up the spreading of revolutionist ideals in Nicaragua. Kellogg regarded the Mexican interference as part of a Bolshevik scheme that was about to widespread in the region, thus anticipating a fear of the Left that would characterize policy drives in US administrations in the following decades. Augusto Sandino, a Nicaraguan indigenist and anti-imperialist, embodied the nationalist spirit in response to the continuing US meddling and started a *guerrilla* warfare that would last six years. He strove to get rid of the Yankees, and finally in 1932 US troops were successfully removed, but special relationships with Washington were broken (because of a US State Department's decision in response).

Generally speaking, although the idea of the right to intervene militarily to protect US citizens and property abroad was regarded as authorized by international law, during the 1920s Washington preferred the use of economic incentives to maintain US influence in Latin America, thus opening the era of the "Good Neighbor Policy" initiated by Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1930s.¹⁰²

The 1920s, also called "the Roaring Twenties", were a period of great prosperity in the United States during which the nation's total wealth doubled between 1920 and 1929. Economic growth was accompanied by the spread at an international level of American innovations such as music, films, goods and automobiles which, being largely imported by a significant number of Latin American states, allowed a subtle infiltration in Latin American lives through US objects, culture, and lifestyle.

The policy of the Good Neighbor was aimed to the restoration of good relationships between the United States and the "sister republics" of Latin America by means of cooperation and trade rather than of military intervention in order to ease the discontent and nationalisms that were

¹⁰² Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 52-65

scattering across Latin America creating instability. Very committed to the Latin American case, newly elected President Hoover toured into Central and South America to manifest the friendly disposition of his administration toward Latin Americans. He held public orations around Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil advocating nonintervention and emphasizing his belief in mutual understanding and respect among the nations of the Western Hemisphere, referring to them as “neighbors”. During his trip, Hoover in some countries bumped into displays of dislike and hostility such as demonstrations, but in general he was positively welcomed by the officials of the countries he had traveled to. Shortly before Hoover’s departure from the United States, the Chilean paper *El Mercurio* published an article that basically expressed its hope for the President to understand that imperialism was tarnishing the United States itself, as “it enrages the countries that suffer from it directly” and creates jealousy and mistrust elsewhere, expressing the general discontent of Latin American countries, both the Central and the Southern.¹⁰³

Hoover, confident of his own actions, refused demands for military intervention to help soothe upheavals in Latin America, and prohibited US diplomats and businessmen to interfere politically. Such attitude provides good reasoning to affirm that Hoover can be said to have initiated the first steps of Good Neighbor policy, but the 1929 Great Depression that flawed from the reckless speculation that led to the rise of stock prices caused commercial breakdowns and political disorders in Latin America, smashing the existing economical and political scenario. Being dependent on exports, Latin American economies had always been vulnerable to market changes, and the Depression exacerbated the already lowered demand for primary goods, which made exports ruinously fall between 1928 and 1932. Mexico, Cuba, Bolivia, and Chile suffered the hardest hit. Latin American governments in general suffered heavy disorders that brought to the overthrowing of the ruling regimes and the emergence of new personalities that often took the power by violent means. In most Latin American countries, especially the Central, the liberal crisis caused by the lack of governmental competence to manage the growth of the mass society produced by modernization, brought to emergence of members of professional institutions such as the National Guards, organized by US Armed Force, who

¹⁰³ Michael LaRosa, Frank O. Mora, “Neighborly Adversaries: U.S.-Latin American Relations”, pp. 102-103

substituted the weakness of representative institutions with the use of force. The truth is that such strong figures did not gain more success than the former oligarchic administration in gathering consensus, and therefore they imposed it with coercion and by prosecuting opposition. Political unity, regarded as balance and peace among social classes, and spiritual unity, meaning the adherence to the eternal national identity, became an object of primary interest for the Armed Force, which presented itself as depositary of such values to the extent that it became the most ardent hotbed of nationalism. The search of identity found, indeed, inspiration in the old-fashioned organicistic model of the past to counter the cosmopolitanism exported by the United States.¹⁰⁴

The 1930 promulgation, with Hoover's approval, of the Smoot-Hawley Act, a tariff provision that intended to safeguard US agricultural production by imposing what has been said to be the highest import tariffs that the United States had experienced, allegedly caused the Great Depression to burst and the consequent intensification of the anti-American reaction in Latin America. In 1936, indeed, the Cuban paper *El Mundo* affirmed that "insistent and ferocious protectionism had built a Chinese Wall between the United States and the republics of Central and South America".¹⁰⁵

Moreover, as a result of the Depression both the United States and Europe found themselves with no surplus, and therefore the unavailability of foreign loans caused Latin American governments to start acting by violent means as the existing debts and the consequent interest rates remained unchanged.¹⁰⁶

Because of the technological improvements and the social challenges, the 1930s saw, as a matter of fact, the modernization of the military fringe in several Latin American countries, which brought the elites to professionalize the military by creating academies that taught patriotism and nationalism. The seizure of power of such officers aligned with the upper classes

¹⁰⁴ Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", pp. 102-106

¹⁰⁵ Michael LaRosa, Frank O. Mora, "Neighborly Adversaries: U.S.-Latin American Relations", p. 104

¹⁰⁶ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 72-74

created centralized and repressive governments in order to obtain political stability and social order with the precise scope of attracting foreign investors that could heal their economies.¹⁰⁷

In Central America and the Caribbean stood out figures such General Tiburcio Carías in Honduras, General Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, Federico Tinoco in Costa Rica, Rafael Trujillo in Dominican Republic, and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua.

In 1932 Carías, after a presidential campaign financially supported by the United Fruit Company, was elected President and retained power for over sixteen years. The fall of coffee exports, banana prices and consumption, in addition to the wage reduction implemented by the US multinational with the support of the Honduran government, brought to the strike of the working class. Carías, who saw in the corporation the only way out for the economic crisis in Honduras, sided with the United Fruit and therefore officially forbid the Communist Party and silenced opposition with prosecution.

Ubico instead took power in 1931 and distinguished himself for the heavily racial policies: he created a set of laws that imposed forcible labor for local landowners to all propertyless Indians and legalized murder of the rebellious. Ubico and the United Fruit cooperated to such an extent that the government facilitated the company with real estate tax exemption and the control of the port of Puerto Barrios, and Guatemalan landowners had, in general, a positive relationship with US businessmen during the 1930s. Just like his Honduran colleague, Ubico feared Communism because it would have undermined the upper classes' privileges, and therefore he repressed its supporters or people suspected as such. His rule would last until 1943. Unlike Guatemala and Honduras, Costa Rica had a tradition in constitutional democracy, which could manage a modest negotiation on land properties with the United Fruit in 1934. During the 1930s and well through the 1940s the Communist Party originated a nationalist opposition to the US corporation, but never managed to gather a significant number of followers.¹⁰⁸

In Dominican Republic in 1930 dictator Rafael Trujillo, the leader of the US-created National Guard, retained power both as official president and as commander-in-chief for over thirty

¹⁰⁷Javier A. Galván, "Latin American Dictators of the 20th Century: The Lives and Regimes of 15 Rulers", p. 11

¹⁰⁸ Marcelo Bucheli, "Good dictator, bad dictator: United Fruit Company and Economic Nationalism in Central America in the Twentieth Century", University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business, available online: https://business.illinois.edu/working_papers/papers/06-0115.pdf

years after ousting his predecessor, inaugurating one of the bloodiest era in Caribbean history, also regarded as the “Era Trujillo”.

Nicaragua’s painful history instead continued with the presidential elections previously agreed with the United States in 1932, that brought to power the Liberal Juan Sacasa in 1933. Anastasio Somoza, an emerging strongman who had been nominated leader of the National Guard and Minister of War under US Ambassador’s pressures, allegedly ordered the killing of General Augusto Sandino, and after Sacasa lost popularity due to the mismanagement of the economic crisis, in 1936 he forced Sacasa to resign and assumed the presidency initiating a dynastic, repressive, and violent dictatorship.¹⁰⁹

Franklin Delano Roosevelt became President in 1933 and remained in power extraordinarily for three periods. In 1928, when his predecessor was elected, Roosevelt had published an article called “Our Foreign Policy” in the journal *Foreign Affairs*, in which he praised Wilson’s efforts to end the Dollar Policy and to heal the wounds that it created in the US-Latin American relationship. He expressed his awareness of the unpopularity of the United States in the hemisphere in that moment by affirming that

“never before in our history have we had fewer friends in the Western Hemisphere than we have today [...] and in the sixteen Republics of Central and South America the United States Government by its recent policies has allowed a dislike and mistrust of long standing to grow into something like positive hate and fear”

Such declaration admitted somehow that the United States had its part of responsibility for the mounting hatred in the Central and Southern continent. He underlined the importance of the respect of other sovereign republics and their governments, defining some of them as rich and civilized, transforming in this sense US rhetoric since then. Moreover, he adds that if one Western nation fell “upon evil days”, it could use a helping hand from the United States to restore order, providing that it would be better if joined by other nations to study the problem,

¹⁰⁹ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889”, p. 63

aiming to put an end to unilateral US intervention, conceived as the main cause of Latin American dislike, and advocating cooperation among nations.¹¹⁰

Shortly after the new administration took office, Cuba started experiencing heavy unrests due to the economic depression and the Hawley-Smith tariff, which made Cuban sugar exporters lose 25% of the US market and dropped sugar production by 60%: as a consequence, wages were reduced and unemployment rates grew. US citizens and businessmen in the island sought protection, but under the Hoover administration nonintervention dominated foreign policy. To most Cubans however, nonintervention meant support for corrupted President Machado from US side, and therefore it constituted one more reason for discontent. In 1933 Roosevelt sent the assistant secretary of state to mediate the strife, but in order to avoid the possibility of another US military intervention, the Cuban army ultimately exiled Machado. The provisional government that had been put in office, headed by a friend of the US assistant secretary of state, only lasted three weeks as it was ousted by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista's noncommissioned officers' army, which fought for better working conditions and higher wages. The Provisional Revolutionary Government that had been proclaimed, with Batista retaining effective power, implemented reforms such as women's suffrage, protection for workers, eight-hour work days, and the abrogation of the Platt Amendment. Fearing the spreading of Communism and revolution, Washington was unwilling to intervene, and therefore preferred an agreement with Sergeant Batista, who deviated military support to Carlos Mendieta in 1934, who represented a more adequate figure for the United States.

Roosevelt's Secretary of State Cordell Hull declared, at the Montevideo Pan American conference of 1933, that no state had the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another, while basically denying such statement by affirming that intervention would have been used if required for US citizens and property protection, accordingly with treaties and international law. The principle of nonintervention however, embraced by the Roosevelt administration, ratified equality among the nations in the Western Hemisphere and decreased Latin American suspicion of the United States.

¹¹⁰ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy", available online: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1928-07-01/our-foreign-policy-0>

As a part of the plan to heal the deep wounds created by the depression, the New Deal, the set of economic programs to put Latin American economies back on its feet, ultimately revealed itself centralized and politically paternalistic. The reciprocal trade agreements that were signed between 1933 and 1945 amounted to fifteen, eleven of those being ratified before 1940, thus proving US will to cooperate. It intended to be based on mutual respect among nations and for rights and duties, and advocated for common comprehension, but many Latin American nationalists, still, perceived reciprocity negatively, as they thought it could constitute a way to perpetuate economic dependence on the Colossus. Displaying a certain degree of paternalism, in a statement during a press conference in 1940 Roosevelt declared that the new approach with Latin American countries would be that of granting them “a share of decision-making authority in inter-American economic concerns”. Such attitude however can be explained by the risk US businesses were exposed to, given the nationalist economic policies that Latin American governments were willing to adopt.¹¹¹

The policy of the Good Neighbor proved to be functional also in gathering the nations of the Western Hemisphere to counter the Axis Powers during World War II. The new war allegedly altered previous diplomatic, economic, military, and political agreements, and single Latin American states responded to the conflict in different ways, for different purposes.

The general trend in the development of inter-American relations was the improvement of cooperative measures, and, as a result, after the Pearl Harbor attack, except Chile and Argentina all the Latin American states either declared war on the Axis or restricted relations with it. The series of inter-American conferences held in Lima, Panama, Havana, and Rio de Janeiro sanctioned the “continental solidarity” that was needed in the war years by highlighting the unity and friendship that characterized the republics of the Western Hemisphere. Rather than focusing on such abstract notions, however, Latin American leaders sided with the United States basing their decisions on political and economical purposes. In addition, fear of a Nazi or Japanese attack made US capacity of rewarding and penalize clearly advantageous. The Caribbean and Central American republics, seeking economic improvements and political backing to counter internal opposition, by declaring war were rewarded with compensations:

¹¹¹ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889”, pp. 76-90

Colonel Fulgencio Batista won the elections in 1940 supported by the army, and, once in office, provided the island US economic and military assistance; Haitian president Lescot made official declarations of hostility to Nazis doctrines, while Trujillo raised the Dominican Republic to a police state of the Western Hemisphere; Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala aligned with *el Norte*. All of them received aides for their economies and police forces.

Wartime propaganda against the Nazis employed by Washington basically consisted in the highlighting of the affinities and similarities created with the historical unity of the nations of the New World, reverberating a discourse of the previous century, and stressed the distinction between the European dictatorships and the democratically oriented republics of the Western Hemisphere, thus minimizing the presence of the centralized regimes ruling most of Latin American Countries. Believing that cultural and intellectual mutual understanding would be followed by economic and military cooperation, Roosevelt in 1940 created the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and placed Nelson Rockefeller at the head of it. With the purpose of promoting and strengthen Pan-American relations, the Office intended to avert revolutions in the Hemisphere and fight the Axis through radio broadcasts, newspapers, and movies.

Wartime direct economical consequences however hit Latin American states first, disintegrating for the third time in twenty-five years the traditional export-led model due to the closing of markets with the Old World. As a consequence, mistrust for the export trade as a means to achieve Latin American economic growth became an issue and a source of disillusionment. In response, governments tended to concentrate on industrial development and became increasingly imbued with nationalism.¹¹²

Historians debate on whether Pan-American achievements, such as economical, military, and political compliancy and cooperation with most of Latin American countries constituted the achievement of the hemispheric unity long advocated or an illusionary plan meticulously reasoned by the United States in order to have the guarantee the free access to Latin American resources and to retain hegemony over the Americas.¹¹³ However, if all skepticism is neglected,

¹¹² Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin american Relations Since 1889", pp. 91-104

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101

a cultural intersection between the United States and Latin America did take place, and it allegedly brought to an “Americanization” that would be part of the cause of hatred.

3.4: Cold War and Hot Wars

Following the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1945, Harry Truman took office. During his presidency, the Good Neighbor policy started to slowly perish as the postwar period collided with the deteriorating of relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, posing their rivalry on hegemonic grounds such as the shape and orientation of the postwar world. National and hemispheric security, historically a cornerstone of Washington’s policies, acquired even more importance and urgency in the aftermath of Second World War, as the Colossus was facing a rising world superpower that represented the antithesis of what the United States embodied. While the United States advocated a free-trade system in a free and liberal-democratic world, Joseph Stalin chained Soviet war domains closing them with an “Iron Curtain”. Creating regional collective security and constructing liberal-capitalist systems in more countries as possible, became of primary concern for the Truman administration. By focusing attention on European allies supporting them with the Marshall Plan to avoid the risk of a Soviet expansion, Washington overlooked Latin American nations regarding them merely as military and political allies, but no special financial plan was implemented to repair their economies, neglect of which would cause discontent and heavy reactions, considering the extent to which they depended in the United States. In addition, the new secretary of state Edward Stettinius did not demonstrate much interest on Latin American issues, actually subverting relationships with respect to the work that had been done under the presidencies of Hoover and Roosevelt. Collective security was built by means of the creation in 1947 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal assistance (the Rio Pact), which was signed by twenty Latin American states, and a political institution named Organization of American States (OAS) the following year, with the same member-states, which claimed to coordinate hemispheric policies, but the passing of time demonstrated that more than coordinating it controlled them. Central American and Caribbean states felt marginalized, neglected, and disillusioned by the scarce reward after backing the United States during the war. Communism and revolution

rapidly became the alarming bell for the United States, as mounting fear of the spreading of such ideals in the hemisphere drove US policy-making for decades. President Truman advocated the United States interest in assisting people in pursuing freedom from external coercions, thus shifting the Monroe Doctrine from a hemispheric to a global level.¹¹⁴

As the Good Neighbor policy was fading under Truman and Eisenhower, however, while Latin American nations sought economic relief and independence, and democratic governments, the United States urged to maintain order and displayed a special interest in maintaining leftist movements, representatives, or suspected as such far from the Hemisphere. In pursuing such objectives, Washington committed to the expulsion of every Latin American president who developed social policies that discouraged foreign investments, protected national industrial complex, commerce, and society. Thus, contradicting a set of values that had characterized the United States since its birth such as democracy and freedom, Washington preferred, now more than it did during the previous decades, to endorse dictatorships that annihilated those social policies that allegedly could have changed Latin American economies and societies for the best. The first state to suffer this particularly harsh policy was Guatemala, where the CIA endorsed a military *Junta* with the aim to overthrow a left-wing, populist, but non-communist government in 1954. Shifting back in 1944, after fourteen years of repressive ruling, Ubico was ousted during the 1944 indigenous revolution and replaced by the installation of a military *Junta* which, among other reforms, legalized labor unions. In 1945 Juan José Arévalo was elected president with free and democratic elections, and after implementing important social and sanitary reforms was succeeded by Jacobo Arbenz in the new elections of 1951, who won against Ubico's friend Miguel Ygidoras. Arbenz, after being basically ignored by the Central American republics about his proposal to create a federation of Central American states aimed to emancipate their economies because the United States had labeled him as subversive and communist, he carried out a policy of income redistribution and economic nationalism that manifested with an agrarian reform that would have burst Washington's reaction. By 1954 he had created a port that competed with Puerto Barrios, which was controlled by UFC, and had redistributed 50% of lands, and therefore, while relieving his people, he spoiled the

¹¹⁴ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 114-121

relationships with both the United Fruit Company and Washington, thus leading the United States to use intervention justifying it on economical and political grounds, as the UFC was experiencing business losses and Arbenz was depicted as a threat to democracy and freedom. UFC protested claiming an excessively high payback for the lands expropriation, but after Arbenz righteously refused to pay the amount, the Eisenhower administration approved a secret operation to overthrow the Guatemalan president, the infamous "Operation Success". With the cooperation of Nicaraguan president Somoza, Soviet weapons had been placed in the Nicaraguan coasts that allegedly would have been found by Nicaraguan fishermen only to accuse Arbenz of plotting with the Soviet Union, thus creating an alibi for Washington to intervene. The Guatemalan president, finding himself cornered, asked for help to the UN Congress but received no response. The National Armed Force betrayed him, and as a consequence he was obliged to renounce to the presidency. He was rapidly substituted with US ambassador in Guatemala, who nullified many of Arbenz' reforms and murdered leftist insurgents for the satisfaction of Washington, UFC, and Guatemalan conservative elite, and ultimately named Carlos Castillo Armas, a colonel of the Guatemalan military academy who had previously been exiled after a failed attempt to oust Arévalo, as the new president. Only during the *golpe* to which Castillo Armas participated supported by the CIA, more than 13000 people were jailed because suspected to be communist, and starting from 1954 with the Castillo Armas government the agrarian reform was abolished, the policies that favored the indigenous were cancelled, and leftist movements were censored and persecuted. Three years later he was murdered by his personal guard under unknown circumstances, and was succeeded by Miguel Ydigoras in 1960, who agreed with the United States to initiate a military training aimed to constitute an army that would take part to the *Playa Girón* invasion in Cuba. Those who denied participating were called communists and persecuted.

Speaking about Cuba, Fulgencio Batista, the Cuban chief of the Armed Forces who took power by overthrowing the *Partido del Pueblo Cubano* that had obtained the majority of votes, was endorsed by Washington from 1952 to 1959. Since the first year of his dictatorship, a group of young Cubans exiled in Mexico, among which took part Ernesto Guevara, Raúl Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos, inspired by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and the democratic influences of Guatemala, initiated the socialist revolution that would have led to the consequent

insurrection. By creating other *guerrilla* groups joined by a large number of Cuban citizens, on the first day of the year 1959 they managed to oust Batista and place Fidel Castro as president. Unlike what happened in Guatemala with Jacobo Arbenz, Castro once in power leant on an irregular army formed by countrymen who were faithful to the new regime, and as a consequence he deposed the National Army hence assuring the failure of the US invasion of *Bahia Cochinos* ordered by the Kennedy administration in 1961, a fiasco that would have caused the success of the Cuban Revolution and the change in the interventionist policy implemented by the United States.¹¹⁵

In November of 1960 John F. Kennedy had become President, and the following year he had taken control of a clandestine CIA training program to prepare Cuban exiles for an invasion of the island, as the Soviet head of state Nikita Krushchev advocated for an alignment of communist and nationalist states in the Third World. Kennedy in response, aiming to destabilize Castro by means of the promotion of a program inspired by Eisenhower's ideas about providing economic aides and modernization in Latin America, namely the Alliance for Progress, proposed an extensive project to meet Latin American's basic needs which included a health conditions improvement, the eradication of illiteracy, and the provision of dwellings, lands, and jobs. The project however stumbled as Latin American economies grew at a slow pace, unemployment increased and agricultural productions dropped during both periods of Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, his successor. As a consequence, elites retained power and allied with the army officers' rulers.¹¹⁶

Castro was determined to implement a pro-Soviet set of reforms first, and to commit to the building of a continent-wide revolution against the United States then. A new theory of anti-Americanism blossomed from the revolutionary field, as *latinos* perceived that they found themselves in a condition of impoverishment and that their failure to develop economy was due to the fact that they had been at the mercy of US imperialism since the time they became independent from European powers. Anti-americanism thus was no longer a feature of regional

¹¹⁵ Ignasi Toribio Chiva, "La Guerra Fría en América Central y el Caribe: Rebelión", available online: <http://rebellion.org/docs/164495.pdf>

¹¹⁶ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 172-173

ideology, but was becoming the centerpiece of a mass ideology instead, which appealed to a large amount of Latin American people, elites and rulers excluded.

The protection from the communist threat and subversion, becoming the cornerstone of US foreign policy more than ever, was due to US leaders fear of the spreading of *guerrilla* wars instigated by both Castro's successes and his will to expand Revolution and wars of national liberation incentives. Being the maintenance of order and the elimination of communism in the Hemisphere the principal Washington's concern, military expenses to pursue this goal increased by 50% during the Kennedy mandate. Army officers were taught with techniques of riot control, psychological warfare, and repression. The high level of friction caused by the tightening of an economic blockade from US side culminated in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which produced the expectation of a nuclear war. Coupled with the Bay of Pigs fiasco, such complications constituted the US failure to separate Soviet communism threat from Cuban nationalism, thus exacerbating tensions. Moreover, as Kennedy publicly addressed his decision to deploy US warships around the island in response to the Castro-Krushchev missile arrangement, in Cubans' view, US President had described them as mere marionettes manipulated by the Soviets for their alleged international communist conspiracy.¹¹⁷

Meanwhile the Dominican Republic was experiencing its own amount of complications: the repressive and violent government of president Trujillo, which continued when he left office in favor of his brother, ended in 1961, when he was shot. A few months before his murder, Trujillo had plotted the assassination of president Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, a declared opposer of Trujillo's government, a fact that shocked both the public opinion and the OAS (Organization of American States), which decided to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican dictator. Being an uncomfortable figure for Washington because of his incapability to maintain peaceful relations with other Latin American countries and due to his heavy-handed and excessively bloody measures, he had lost US protection and had produced embarrassment since the Eisenhower period. In the following year, leftist and founder of the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* that previously countered Trujillo's administration Juan Bosch won the first democratic elections after a dictatorship of his predecessor that lasted

¹¹⁷ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 176-181

thirty years. Obviously, Washington's response did not take long to manifest: counting on the support of the Dominican army and elites, the CIA ousted one more Latin American president that had gained power by means of democracy, promulgated a new constitution, and that had implemented social reforms such as the defense of the working class' rights. After two years of exile, Dominicans strongly advocated Bosch's return, and noticing the enthusiasms in doing so, the United States promptly invaded the island sending 23000 Marines allegedly to avoid a communist threat, thus allowing Joaquín Balaguer to take office. He instantly reviewed the constitution eliminating the limits to land concessions and favoring foreign investments. Labor unrests and political dissent were controlled with a harsh repression inspired by Trujillo's techniques, using censorship to elide facts helped by the conservative and powerful Catholic Church of the island. During the first eight years of Balaguer ruling, more than 4000 people belonging to leftist parties were prosecuted and murdered.¹¹⁸

After the disarray produced within the Dominican crisis, the Alliance for Progress stumbled and was perceived to be destined to fail. The Johnson administration promptly blamed Latin Americans for the non-functioning of the project because of their unwillingness to commit in a cooperative system with the United States, and as a consequence, the *latinos* became disillusioned with *el Norte* once again. They felt that the ongoing subordination and neglect from US part had produced nothing more than advantages for the Colossus at the expense of their countries, which remained exploited and underdeveloped.¹¹⁹

President Johnson had taken office after the premature death of John F. Kennedy in 1963, and unlike his predecessor, he showed a lack in both expertise and interest in Latin American affairs. When it came to manage issues about sovereign rights in the Canal Zone he had to face Panamanian nationalists, who fought the imperialist behavior of the United States since the Hay-Burnau-Varilla Treaty of 1903. Racial discrimination and low wages fueled ambitions to claim sovereignty over the Canal and an equal share of the huge incomes it produced. Discontent manifested in student riots in 1959, but President Eisenhower regarded them as mere extremists. Panamanian President Roberto Chiari proposed the drafting of a new treaty

¹¹⁸ James D. Cockcroft, "América Latina y Estados Unidos: Historia y Política País por País", pp. 406-408

¹¹⁹ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889", p. 193-194

in 1962, but Kennedy preferred to procrastinate the issue. In 1964 President Chiari broke diplomatic relations with *el Norte* after President Johnson, too refused his request for negotiation. A few months later both Johnson in the United States and Marco Robles in Panama were presidential candidates, and therefore, sharing the common goal to win the elections, they opted for a practical agreement that centered more on economic advantages rather than on sovereignty issues: after both of them became presidents they drafted three treaties in 1967 which ultimately resulted unequal, as they reaffirmed US right to protect the Canal Zone and assumed US license to expand the canal or even build a new one, while it conferred limited sovereignty to Panamanians. Such provisions provoked nationalist turmoils and protests, causing the impossibility of ratification for the following decade.¹²⁰

The ruling of the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua instead constituted an example of long-lasting stability that endured since 1936. By torturing and prosecuting dissidents and by creating the *Partido único de Los Somoza*, Nicaraguan government maintained US interests intact. The country represented the manifestation of the maximal expression of the landowner oligarchy, as the working class and the rural masses resulted oppressed by poverty and famine in the beginning of the 1970s. After the Somoza family kept international financial aides after the 1972 earthquake to itself neglecting both the upper and the middle and lower classes, general discontent arose assuming revolutionary traits inspired by Sandino's nationalist and anti-US ideals. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, son of Anastasio Somoza, implemented a policy of terror by suspending constitutional rights thus allowing the National Guard to repress any form of protest.¹²¹

In 1977 James "Jimmy" Carter was elected President, and, by taking distance from the geopolitical foreign policy design that characterized his predecessor's administration, specifically of President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who had shown little or no interest in Latin American affairs, he strongly advocated the importance of the respect of human rights condemning the Somoza's family atrocities.¹²² In 1979 Somoza was ousted by

¹²⁰ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 185-187

¹²¹ Ignasi Toribio Chiva, "La Guerra Fría en América Central y el Caribe: Rebelión", available online: <http://rebellion.org/docs/164495.pdf>

¹²² Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", p. 203

Nicaraguan nationalists with the collaboration of the Organization of the American States, which sent troops to arbitrate the power transition but resulted unsuccessful. The Reagan administration made sure that the National Guard remained undissolved, and during the first period of the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* presided by Daniel Ortega, along with the CIA Washington organized an irregular army that had been instructed in a US military academy based in Honduras and Costa Rica: the so-called *Contras*, a counterrevolutionary fringe aimed to overthrow the FSLN and substitute it. The civil war that resulted, largely financed by Carter's republican successor Ronald Reagan during the 1980s, ultimately could destitute the *Frente* and placed the leader of the *Unión Nacional Opositora* Violeta Barrios Chamorro in office, allowing the George H. W. Bush administration to remove the blockade implemented by Reagan and to maintain a relative peace in Nicaragua.¹²³

The Carter presidency's emphasis upon ethical integrity and human rights that called for an opportunity to create an open and cooperative North-South relation, had temporarily soothed Latin American misgivings produced by the previous administration led by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who were more focused on the East-West struggle regarding Latin America as an "annoyance" and merely a ground on which Communism could not be afforded.¹²⁴

Historically, US presidential addresses over hemispheric matters had been spoken in an accommodating and understanding tone, encouraging cooperation and sensitiveness. Jimmy Carter represented a case in which such approaches were actually applied in some measure, as after a dozen years of impasse, negotiations over the Canal Zone control assumed priority. Carter sought a positive repercussion in Latin America by ratifying the Torrijos-Carter Treaties that set the termination of US control over the Canal in 1999, but found opposition of the conservative fringe in Congress, which was led by Ronald Reagan, that regarded such compromise as a loss of national glory. Despite the elimination of an important element of Latin American discontent and dislike towards the Colossus and the consequent possibility to restore a good relationship with Central America specifically, and Latin America in general, under Reagan's influence it resulted as incompetence in the managing of foreign relations.

¹²³ Ignasi Toribio Chiva, "La Guerra Fría en América Central y el Caribe: Rebelión", available online: <http://rebellion.org/docs/164495.pdf>

¹²⁴ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 195-196

The Central American overview of the 1970s displayed political leaders conciliating the peasants and working class' organizations seeking economic improvement due also to the 1973 oil crisis in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Panama, while Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador showed how the traditional elites responded to US interests by means of repression of dissidents. The incessant violence that characterized the area during the twentieth century, indeed, reached its peak during the last years of the decade.¹²⁵

The Reagan administration ascribed less importance to the defense of human rights and focused more on discrediting those regimes that showed inimical attitudes towards the United States while supporting and cultivating cooperation with military rulers, placing security doctrines in Central America and the Caribbean as a top priority. After the "Vietnam syndrome" that allegedly debilitated US image, the President committed to the revival of US hegemony by creating the so-called Caribbean Basin Initiative, which promoted free-market initiatives as the best means to achieve economic growth. Such program provided moderate aid and lowered export tariffs to the United States for those nations willing to perform free-market measures, while proposing no proportionate reward for existing pro-US regimes.¹²⁶

After more than four decades of Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced antagonism among the Great Powers in the Western Hemisphere. As a consequence, given that the supposed menace to hemispheric security terminated, US policy with respect to Central America and the Caribbean shifted in favor of democratization thus leaving both right-wing, anticommunist groups deriving from US support and nationalists in confusion. The Bush administration took the lead of the Reagan initiatives upon the Caribbean Basin integrating a new Free Enterprise Initiative for the Americas which incremented financial aides and opened the possibility to draft agreements and negotiations on free trade as a reward for those nations that would display willingness to comply with Washington's preferences in economic affairs.¹²⁷

The violent trend adopted by Central American right-wing rulers supported by the United States in order to contain the Communist threat during the second half of the twentieth century destroyed such states morally, physically, and economically after decades of persecutions,

¹²⁵ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 203-214

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 222-224

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 234

killings, and neglect of human rights. Starting with the 1959 Cuban revolution all the way through the 1980s, Washington was felt to have failed in the understanding of Latin American social movements as other than Soviet proxies. In other words, any nationalist or socialist upheaval aimed to improve the working-class conditions were regarded as merely Communist or anti-US rather than representative of a deep discontent caused by the economical impoverishment produced by the fulfillment of US hegemonic and economic goals.

4. THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AMERICA BETWEEN DEFAULT AND IMPOSITION

The countries of South America, being geographically and culturally remote from the United States if compared to the Central American, suffered a lesser amount of interventionism from US part mainly because national security was, for the United States, the principal motive of intrusion in order to protect its hegemony and power, and therefore they generally presented neither dangers to nor convenience for the Colossus. Differences of power however there existed, as Argentina and Brazil, for example, until the first decades of the twentieth centuries presented themselves as US competitor, both for economics and for hegemonic ambitions in the region, before falling in the net of dependency, while weaker South American states were more easily subjected to US imperialism. As a consequence, the closer were the states, the greater the alarmism for possible European economic interests or ambitions of leadership in the Hemisphere that could threaten national security. The 1811 No Transfer Resolution¹²⁸ and the Monroe Doctrine, the two main foreign policies that drove US leaders' decision-making in order to contain European pretensions in the Hemisphere were seen, in the South American states, as a possibility to ally with the Colossus during their emancipation processes. The United States instead, maintained a careless attitude toward the Southern states during the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth, displaying more commitment only during the Second World War and the Cold War to protect the Hemisphere from possible fascist, leftist, and revolutionary influences and the spreading of such ideals in other Latin American states. Until then, for the United States South America only functioned as a raw-material provider that had to be maintained stable in order to perpetuate US exploitation by means of finances and other economic incentives.

US reluctance for intervention and semi-neglect of South American states such as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil featured the relations with the United States for the most part of the twentieth century, producing reactions that differed from those

¹²⁸ The first US statement that opposed any transfer of territories of the Western Hemisphere from one European power to another in order to secure the hemisphere from possible European pretensions.

created in the Central area of the Continent. Wherefore episodic or inconsistent attentions from the Colossus did not cause the swinging perceptions between pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism to the same extent of those produced in Central America and the Caribbean, a far less fluctuation of opinions prevailed instead. There were cases in which some Southern states lamented US meddling, while others complained about disregard, but generally such perceptions remained much more stable.

4.1: US economic ambitions versus South American skepticism

The end of the nineteenth century, starting with the Panic of 1873 that flowed from a bank crisis in Europe, brought the United States to enter into a twenty-five years period of periodic economic recession, featured by overproduction coupled with underconsumption. Such situation led US leaders to seek to wane the impact of economic depression by boosting sales in the world market, including in the Latin American. During the First International American Conference held in Washington of 1890 the first manifestations of mistrust of the Colossus emerged, as after US Secretary of State Blaine proposed to mediate a dispute between Chile and Peru for a nitrate-rich province the Chileans had seized during the War of the Pacific, and he found Chilean opposition. In addition, Argentina refused an US-suggested union tariff policy because it preferred to partner economically with Great Britain, being the European empire the Argentinian long-established capital supplier, while considered the United States more as a market competitor: by giving priority to Great Britain, the Argentinians could respond to the growing power of the Colossus.

Chile and the United States instead shared the ambition to pursue a dominant position in the Hemisphere. Relations had got off with the wrong foot especially after Chile won the War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia, that ended in 1882 because of apparent US support for the Chilean counterparts, and, in addition, during a 1891 civil war in Chile the Colossus had backed the ousted President when the congressional majority claimed the privatization of nitrate deposits in the region, causing a growing anti-US sentiment in the country.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 6-11

Between 1902 and 1903 President Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt was put to the test when he had to face the so-called Venezuela crisis. The country had fallen into debt with some European powers (Germany, Italy, and Great Britain) and had failed to regard an ultimatum that had been posed by Germany, which, in response, instituted a naval blockade and landed troops in the Venezuelan coasts. The last thing Washington hoped for was that the collection of European debts became a pretext for European states to install military bases in Latin America. Roosevelt, actually coining the famous phrase “speak softly and carry a big stick”, managed negotiations with Germany coercing with threats of use of force, proposing a unilateral condition: if the Germans did not accept arbitration as the means of resolution, Washington would have engaged into warfare. Ultimately the method proved to be successful and Germany withdrew.¹³⁰

When, during those same years, the arrangements for the Panama Canal led to US meddling in Colombian affairs, negotiations between a Colombian diplomat and Washington over the price for renouncing sovereignty in Panama became difficult because the civil war during which US leaders exploited Panamanian nationalists had shattered Colombia, and the amount proposed by US leaders for compensation did not satisfy Colombian expectations. In addition, the conservative Colombian President was not willing to concede a part of Latin American land to the Yankees, provoking President Roosevelt’s bother and paternalistic reaction which exacerbated existing relations.¹³¹

The main focus for the United States, however, was localized in the Caribbean basin and in Central America, in which US leaders were committed to the installation and expansion of business and economy, hegemony, and political influence, concentrating military interventions in the area by creating protectorates. Washington basically took for granted the South American countries, which merely constituted, to them, a land rich in raw material to exploit and to insert in the export-led model. Between the end on the 1800s and 1914 Argentina, Brazil, and Chile experienced a profit increase due to the rapid growth of exports of raw materials and agricultural commodities, especially Argentina, which featured the highest living standards in Latin America. The Argentinians were ruled by a pact amongst oligarchies (the *Partido*

¹³⁰ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889”, pp. 24-26

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27

Autonomista Nacional) until 1916, and its national peculiarity resided in the extraordinary number of European immigrants that gave shape to its society and culture by making it homogeneous and essentially more urban than other South American countries. Argentina actually displayed a good example of democracy, as after the implementation of the *Ley Saenz Peña*, which ascribed the mandatory and universal suffrage to the Argentinian citizens, both native and naturalized, a political radicalism became dominant, characterized by a strict observance of the National Constitution. The democratic experience of Argentina that lasted until 1930, however, featured a juxtaposition of political party (the *Unión Cívica Radical*) and nation in a reciprocal relationship that resembled to that of the Peruvian Apra (mentioned and explained below), meaning that national spirit implied the belonging to the UCR, which aspired to represent the whole nation.¹³²

Economically, instead, the privileged liaison that Argentina had with Great Britain, which integrated the South American country to its capitalism, accentuated the differences with respect to the other South American states.

Brazil was dominated by an oligarchic pact that, starting from 1889, alternated the presidencies of the two most powerful Brazilian states, São Paulo and Minas Gerais, that gave rise to the *Republica Velha*, which would last until 1930 and found its political expression in the 1891 Constitution that sanctioned the federal disposition of the country and the wide autonomy of the states that were part of it. Economically, Brazil acquired the leadership in the cultivation and exportation of coffee, which was the main cause of its economical modernization, rapidity of which allegedly would shock the Brazilian regime leading to urban workers' unrest and turmoils among the army officials for the difficulty posed by the absence of a strong political barycenter.¹³³

Chilean, Venezuelan, Peruvian, and Colombian economies, too, relied upon monocultures and exports and therefore they became increasingly appealing for US businessmen who invested in Venezuelan petroleum, in Chilean and Peruvian mining, and in Colombian plantations. During the Wilson administration, the main interest regarding South America resided in the will to roll back European stakes by advancing plans of economic integration, especially with the so-called

¹³² Patricia Funes, "Historia Mínima de las Ideas Políticas en América Latina", pp. 147-148

¹³³ Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", pp. 74-76

ABC countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which were the most developed countries of the Southern continent. Such countries in 1914 decided, during an US-Mexican crisis produced by the US seizure of Veracruz, to reunite in a conference in order to mediate such crisis by diplomatic means in order to avoid a war between the North American states. Such diplomatic management led to no conclusion, but made US leaders enthusiasts of Hemispheric participation in maintaining peace, and the South American states aware of the importance of cooperation among themselves, and they consequently signed in 1915 the *Tratado del ABC* in Buenos Aires. Brazil, since the first years of 1900s had started tying special economic relations with the Colossus aiming to compete with the Argentinean rise, and such privileged relation was also sanctioned by the high-ranking consideration the United States had about the country, regarded as politically and diplomatically more deserving than the other South American nations. With President Wilson, diplomatic parity came to the inclusion of Argentina and Chile, too.¹³⁴

Applicability of the Monroe Doctrine in South America manifested, during the first decades of the twentieth century, in economic terms as US main interest was to expand trade and business in the area by supplanting European investments. In doing so, the United States established national banks branches in the Southern Hemisphere, liberating US trades from ties with British banking institutions, thus gradually infiltrating in South American commerce and gradually substituting Europe.

To honor such initiatives, President Wilson took the hint of Colonel House and regarded Roosevelt's policies of the Big Stick as the main cause for the difficulties in tying stronger economic relations with Latin America, and by the end of 1914 he drafted a proposal, the Pan American treaty, which entailed advocacy for Hemispheric security, territorial integrity, political autonomy, and republicanism. In sketching such dispositions, Wilson enlisted the ambassadors of Argentina and Brazil, who manifested sympathetic responses, and the Chilean, who grasped the incoherency of such proposals because, they thought, defense of republicanism could have undermined or limited national sovereignty and possibly favor US intervention.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 44-45

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47

In addition, Wilson's management of the Mexican Revolution that led him to order a punitive expedition to capture Francisco Villa after he attacked the US town of Columbus, created the eventuality of an imminent war. Argentina offered its mediation upon the conflict, but US leaders ultimately refused, causing the undermining of Wilson's goodwill and reliability in Latin America and the collapse of the Pan American pact.¹³⁶

The Great War played a fundamental role in removing European ties in Latin American economies, as it impacted on them in several ways, culturally and economically. The consequent obstruction of trades that impeded imports of goods and capitals from the Old World created the space for the United States to infiltrate as the prime purchaser of materials and the principal supplier of finished goods. With the growing economic relations and aiming to avoid further European competition, Pan American initiatives remained an important issue for the United States, finding Argentinian opposition, which preferred an orientation toward a Latin American unity against the Colossus, while, in change, the Brazilians supported such ideas. US entry into warfare in 1917 produced diverse reactions in the Southern continent: while Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Venezuela, and Uruguay remained neutral, Bolivia and Ecuador broke relations, and Brazil declared war. Argentina especially caused concern and suspicion among US leaders because of its sympathy for German nationalism, but the Wilson administration averted a revival of British economic ambitions in South America in 1918 by suggesting international engagement in encouragement of free trade, non-aggression, and republicanism, thus protecting US hemispheric and economic interests.¹³⁷

Wilson's foreign policies in the aftermath of the Great War, which included the creation of the League of Nations, produced bitterness and mistrust among Latin Americans. Familiar with the paternalistic and superior attitude typical of the United States, neglect of Latin American countries during the peace negotiations along with the failure of Wilson's Pan American initiatives created urgency of a shift in US foreign policy.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 51

¹³⁷ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 52-54

4.2: South American disenchantment with liberalism

During the 1920s the Good Neighbor policy started to take shape while in South America US imports doubled, mainly in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, whose governments welcomed US investments to compensate the weakened capital surplus from European markets, but this was no costless outcome. South Americans had to accept US supervision over their custom houses and banks, a maneuver that stressed the intrusive nature of the Colossus in managing Latin American finances.¹³⁸ Chile provided nitrate and copper, Venezuela owned oil reserves, Brazil had coffee plantations, and Argentinians provided beef and agricultural products, and the other single-crop agricultural systems of the other South American countries, despite the substitution of European capitals with the North American suffered a hard hit since the Panama Canal was inaugurated a few months before the beginning of the Great War, because foreign investors became increasingly attracted by Asian and Central American trade potential. As a consequence, even if business with the United States increased, internal economies of the Southern Hemisphere did not develop as it was expected, and the oligarchical setting of governments, perhaps unable to install political modernization efficiently, began to stumble.

The peculiar characteristics of Argentina led its elites to cultivate hegemonic ambitions at a regional level, thus making the South American country a US rival, also due to the fact that before the Great Depression the Argentinian was ranked among the ten richest economies in the world. Speaking of the Great Depression, which shattered the already weakened Latin American economies, the 1930s were featured by a shocking decline in trades, and the fermenting nationalisms in Europe such as the affirmed Bolshevik Revolution and the German and Italian fascisms, also constituted a shift in US foreign policy with respect to South America, thus ending the complacency and neglect of South American politics.

The rise of totalitarian, anti-liberal ideologies alarmed US leaders because they could appeal Latin American countries in a ripple effect of large proportions, and thus undermine US interests and hegemony in the whole hemisphere, and as a consequence direct attention was posed in the Southern continent, too.

¹³⁸ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", p. 61

The 1930s were also a period of deep change in South America, with distinctions from state to state, as the oligarchic regimes that had ruled since independence from Europe began to sway due to the mounting demand for democracy or, rather, for participation from the new urban and working classes that had emerged, but also from elites unsatisfied with the existing situation, leading both to the fall of radical parties such as the *Unión Cívica Radical* in Argentina, that took power in 1916 and was everything but pluralistic, and the rise of fresh political parties created a few years before such as the *Partido Liberal*, that supported the reformist Chilean President Arturo Alessandri, the movements that fought the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez in Venezuela, and the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (Apra) in Peru. Such parties and movements expressed the popular expectation of a democracy capable of giving representativeness to the pluralistic societies that characterized the South American states. During the 1920s, the Argentinian one-party regime ruled by UCR had rolled back the oligarchic elites from political power, but not from the control of the economy. The tensions created by such division of powers and the lack of pluralism that ruled the country culminated in the 1930 *golpe* that inaugurated a series of armed interventions in the Argentinian politics during the twentieth century.¹³⁹

The *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*, born in 1924 from the aspirations of the Peruvian Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre while he was exiled in Mexico, deserves a further explanation because it yearned to become a supranational organization that included the middle classes, and its main focus was the fight against United States' imperialism. By exalting what its leader called the "Indian-American union", the movement advocated anti-imperialism and the nationalization of lands, but what distinguished it from other movements was the fact that it represented an alternative between capitalism and Communism for its intense nationalism, a typical trait that anticipated the birth of populisms in the Southern continent, that will be explained more exhaustively in the following chapter.

At the national level, Apra promoted a political and institutional system that paid attention to the demands of the productive classes, attempting to fuse together elements of liberalism and socialism. If until then the state represented the interests of a minority of the population at the service of foreign business, Haya proposed to nationalize such interests through economic and

¹³⁹ Patricia Funes, "Historia Mínima de las Ideas Políticas en América Latina", p. 149

politic representativeness of the working classes. Despite the powerful nationalistic appeal, however, the continuing revolts in Peru impeded the success of Apra until the 1940s.¹⁴⁰

The decline of liberal regimes however, did not pave the way for representative democracy, but rather for centralistic and authoritarian regimes. In those countries where social and economical backwardness dominated, and the elites were stronger, the authoritarian response prevailed; in those in which modernization had advanced more, the characteristics of the advent of the mass society emerged. Being inevitably inspired by the Marxist theories that flawed from Eastern Europe since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, in 1929 the leaders of communist parties reunited in the *Conferencia Comunista Latinoamericana* in Argentina causing US concern.¹⁴¹

Brazil's history until then is characterized by the difficulties created by the federalism that tangled the divisions of power. Political meddling of the military, federal anarchy in the Brazilian states, and the feeble economy exacerbated by World War I also worsened the civilian-military struggle that endured around twenty years, which reached a peak of violence with the fall of coffee prices and the loss of foreign markets in the 1930 Great Depression. Debts with foreign countries and mismanaged fiscal policies brought Brazil to risk bankruptcy, which brought to the establishment in power of the governor of Rio Grande do Sul Getulio Vargas, who, after a supposed fraudulent presidential election in which he had lost, guided a revolt of the federate states of Rio Grande and Minas Gerais against the oligarchy that was ruling the capital had seized power as provisional president. After abrogating the 1891 Constitution, Vargas, imbued with populist ideals, was then elected in 1934 and ruled Brazil committing in the attempt to give cohesion to the laboring classes and implementing the general suffrage.

4.3: The turn of the 1930s and the Good Neighbor Policy

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President in 1933, he had to face the hemispheric economic consequences of the depression, and by implementing the Good Neighbor Policy his administration intended, by means of the ratification of reciprocal trade agreements with Latin

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 152

¹⁴¹ Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", pp. 82-85

American states, to mitigate the general discontent and turmoil that pervaded the Southern continent. US leaders thought that if the Latin American economic situation improved, cooperation would result as a consequence. What they were not prepared to, were the nationalist and reformist incentives that were appealing South American governments, as it happened in Brazil under the regime of Getúlio Vargas, who cultivated an economic nationalism that manifested in the promotion of industrialization and the protection of internal markets. During the Vargas regime, which endured until 1945, the *brasillianidade* was emphasized revealing aversion toward democratic liberalism and pluralism by means of repression, especially of the communist party that in 1935 attempted a coup and of the *Ação Integralista Brasileira*, a party of fascist inspiration of which Vargas however shared some ideals. In 1937 Vargas installed a dictatorship that he called “*Estado Novo*”, by closing the Parliament and prohibiting the creation of political parties, with the support of the Army and the Catholic Church, thus displaying similarities with European fascisms such as press censorship, the closing of the Parliament, imprisonment and torture of dissidents.¹⁴²

Vargas, acting on the basis of economic imperatives, cleverly played his cards by signing a trade agreement that reduced tariffs with Germany in 1934 and one with the United States the following year, confident that the Roosevelt administration, characterized by a noninterventionist attitude, would not meddle in Brazilian affairs in order to avoid the exacerbation of fascist influence in the continent.¹⁴³

A second test for the Good Neighbor Policy came with the Bolivian reaction during a dispute over taxes and royalties of a subsidiary of the US Standard Oil Company. When Bolivians asked for a loan regarding it as an anticipation of tax payments from the Company, the Standard Oil refused causing the cancellation of the contract and the seizure of the Company’s properties in the country. A solution was found only in 1941 when a supposed pro-Nazi fringe failed to oust President Enrique Peñaranda del Castillo, and the Roosevelt administration responded with economic and military supplies and managed to both distance the Nazi threat and convince the

¹⁴² Loris Zanatta, “Storia dell’America Latina Contemporanea”, p. 109

¹⁴³ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889”, pp. 82-83

Bolivians to pay for a compensation to the Standard Oil, thus demonstrating the success of the Policy.¹⁴⁴

The Standard Oil Company faced issues also in Venezuela after the death of dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, who had ruled since 1908. When substituted with reformist Elazar López Contreras, who had introduced the eight-hour day and menaced to reduce US benefits that included low taxes and high profits, Washington's preoccupations emerged. Being Venezuela the leading petroleum exporter in the world, the Venezuelan leaders acknowledged their country's dependency on petroleum exports, and intelligently decided to avoid the risk of getting in trouble with Washington by excessively cutting the profits: the petroleum resources remained under private control, but now they were dominated by higher taxes and royalty payments.¹⁴⁵

The Argentinian response to the economic crisis instead consisted in a conservative restoration of the country implemented by the left-wing *Partido Socialista Independiente*, which brought to the presidency General Augustin Justo, who ruled the country from 1932 to 1938 after seizing power and ousting President Hipólito Yrigoyen with a coup. The Socialist Party, even if it presented itself with leftist connotations such as the focus on a working-class control of the economy and the nationalization of industries and raw material deposits, during the 1930s ended up distancing itself from socialist doctrines by taking the power by authoritarian means.¹⁴⁶

After the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack, and after advocating hemispheric solidarity with a series of Pan American conferences, every Latin American country decided to side with the United States, except for Chile and Argentina. Their strong European ties, especially with Germany and Italy due to the elevated number of immigrants, coupled with a historical hatred of the Colossus and internal political problems that manifested in the unstable and repeated changes of government, impeded a coalition with the Northern neighbor and, as a consequence, they refused to sever relations with the Axis preferring neutrality instead. US leaders' greatest

¹⁴⁴ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 85-86

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91

¹⁴⁶ Osvaldo Graciano, "Dossier: El partido socialista independiente en el gobierno de Agustín P. Justo: la gestión de Antonio de Tomaso en el Ministerio de Agricultura", available online: http://www.scielo.org.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2314-15492013000200002

concern was a possible Nazi subversion in Latin America, as in 1940 a large number of German colonists were living in South American countries hence rapidly creating suspicion of being political affiliates of the Third Reich and of spreading fascism in the continent. Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Ecuador broke relations with the fascist Powers instead, because they expected a US reward in the War aftermath. Economic incentives drove most of South American states to adopt pro-US war policies, but US leaders, too, considered trade incentives when they decided to construct and develop air and naval bases in a Brazilian defenseless region that could potentially attract a German invasion. President Vargas intelligently grasped the advantage of receiving military aid from the Colossus and accepted the US maneuver. Fearing a sudden war in the Atlantic, Chile ultimately adopted pro-Allies positions by breaking relations with the Axis under the presidency of Juan Antonio Ríos, who acted to avoid international complications such as economic and political isolation, given the existing unrests in the country that generated much concern in his administration.¹⁴⁷

The Second World War economics worsened the export-led model because it lowered European demand and damaged trades with the Old World for the third time, and as a consequence inward-oriented economic policies for industrialization development boosted by growing nationalisms constituted a response to the disillusionment of the Latin American exporter role in world trade favoring an import-substitution industrialization approach.

4.4: The victory over fascisms, Latin American populisms, and Cold War Policies

The Allies victory over fascisms allegedly generated a flow of democratic demand in Latin America, where socialist and left-wing parties that had lived in shadow until then because they were being repressed, increasingly became more anti-fascist than revolutionary. Chile, Uruguay, and Colombia displayed good credentials of democracy by 1944, and during the following years such tendencies multiplied. Even in Argentina the military regime ceded to the mounting participation demand by indicting the presidential elections that brought to power Juan Domingo Perón in 1946. But the democratic dream shared by the South American

¹⁴⁷ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 95-100

students, working classes, and intellectuals was soon dissolved by an authoritarian restoration at the doorstep of the outburst of the Cold War during the 1950s: the same Armed Forces that had formed the reformist officials a few years earlier began to manifest dictatorial features. Also in Chile and Brazil, despite publicly retaining their democratic regimes, Morales and Vargas, respectively, locked their governments down by adopting harsh measures to contain communist parties and labor unions. Moreover, as Cold War ideologies grew, the United States shifted from an anti-fascist to an anti-communist attitude, thus displaying a peak of interest toward the Southern countries not just in economic terms. Democracy basically failed to install in such nations, partly because of Cold War US politics that pushed for a limitation to representativeness due to the ideological clash between capitalism and Communism, partly because of the persistency of the organicistic imaginary and the tendency to exert a monopolistic power that strongly excluded pluralism, coupled with the weakness of representative institutions. As a consequence, violence, corruption, and instability featured the populist regimes that committed to the elimination of political inclusiveness. During the decade that followed the end of Second World War, indeed, only Chile and Uruguay retained a modest model of representative democracy, while in other states such model took different ways.¹⁴⁸

The complex relations between the United States and Argentina worsened with Argentinian neutrality during the war, because the Southern American country regarded Pan American initiatives as mere tools that served to boost US domination in the Hemisphere. Being less dependent on US surplus coupled with political affinities with Germany, Spain, and Italy due also to the large presence of European immigrants, US leaders perceived the choice to remain neutral during the conflict as an Argentinian pro-Nazi preference, and suspected the country to be a potential fascist influence in the region. When the Argentinian foreign minister asked for military assistance through the US Lend-Lease program, Secretary of State Cordell Hull skeptically viewed it as a payoff to achieve other objectives. The emerging high-ranking official Juan Domingo Perón, perceiving a US disrespect of Argentine honor, responded by opposing any compromise with the Colossus, leading to the US diplomatic nonrecognition of Argentina's new government hoping to obtain its support of the Allies, but such attempt ultimately failed.

¹⁴⁸ Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", pp. 121-123

However, in order to maintain an appearance of hemispheric solidarity, the US-Argentine problems were resolved with public censorship of the issue, and finally in 1945 Argentine declared war to the Axis for US leaders' satisfaction as the only means of setting things right, under US pressures. Despite the Argentinian government obeyed to international and US requirements, it kept being regarded as a pro-fascist enemy state.¹⁴⁹

The delicate years of the Cold War brought Washington's policymakers to intensify control over Latin American reform-minded governments in order to safeguard US strategic and economic interests, even at the expense of democracy, as the Colossus showed support of reactionary dictatorships remaining basically regardless of their democratic credentials and good governance in order to maintain the status quo, as State Department member and father of the "containment" policy George Kennan declared in 1950, the United States could not endorse democracy at the expense of its own national security. The United States suspected every reformist or social democrat to be a communist sympathizer and, as a consequence, endorsement of reactionary and authoritarian regimes generated the conditions of applicability of radicalism and violence. By the first years of 1950s, any government that showed nationalist or reformist connotations met with US reaction.¹⁵⁰

Hence, the Monroe Doctrine was back on the map of US foreign policy, especially after the Rio Pact that established mutual assistance, hemispheric unity and continental security, and, in addition, it was shared and welcomed by Latin American leaders. The failure of US leaders in providing financial aides to Latin American countries coupled with US attempts to influence Latin American politics and social changes by seeking to direct them in a way that served the Colossus' interests and satisfied Cold War policies, however, made relationships even more complex because it became evident that the United States was acting only in accordance to its personal agenda.¹⁵¹

The administration of Dwight "Ike" Eisenhower, which endured from 1952 to 1960, displayed difficulty in separating Latin American nationalisms, reformers, and domestic revolutionaries

¹⁴⁹ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 114-115, 118

¹⁵⁰ Michael LaRosa, Frank O. Mora, "Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.-Latin American Relations", pp. 109-110

¹⁵¹ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889", pp. 124-125

from Soviet-fashioned communists, influencing US leaders to think that Communism constituted a danger at the global level. The CIA director Allen Dulles thought that communists had infiltrated in Latin American countries exciting hatred towards the United States and seeking to eliminate the domination of the Colossus in Central and South America. In addition, the President's concern was based on nationalisms, which he believed that could produce a potential communist expansion in the continent. US leaders regarded Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela, Victor Haya de la Torre of Peru, and Getúlio Vargas of Brazil as inadequate political figures and unable to conduct business efficiently, and, overall, they saw them as incapable of managing extremists, including communists. Sinking South American economies led their leaders to seek US assistance: when in 1954 Ambassador Muniz of Brazil asked for an economic plan for Latin America that could resemble the Marshall Plan implemented in Europe, Washington rejected such request because of incompatibility with established preferences and prerogatives, and responded by encouraging free trade and private investments. Sidestepping civil liberties and human rights, Ike Eisenhower gladly approved the overthrowing and exiling of Juan Domingo Perón in 1955, substituted by a military regime that ousted the leader of *peronismo*, the doctrine that sought to create a Latin American front against the United States' influence that will be analyzed in the next chapter. Endorsing military despots allied with the Colossus in the anti-communist strife, the military aid proceeding from the United States and the training of Latin American officers and soldiers in those years resulted as one of the most expensive budgets in the region. Alarm for Communism and anti-Americanism intensified in 1958 when Vice President Richard Nixon toured South America, because protests, riots, and upheavals welcomed the US representative especially in Montevideo, Lima, reaching a tremendous violence in Caracas also due to the recent ousting of President Marcos Pérez Jiménez, a strongman formerly manipulated by Washington. the Vice President attributed the responsibility of such outcomes to communist radicals, even though the CIA director Allen Dulles had found no evidence of connections with Soviet influence. Unable to retain consensus and to relieve economic grievances, during the second half of the 1950s the populist regimes such as Vargas, Perón, Jiménez, and Pinilla failed to remain in office. The new Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek, shortly after the Caracas anti-American incident on which we will come back to in the next chapter, made a clever proposal to US

leaders: he claimed a reexamination of US policies that linked US Cold War imperatives and Latin American economic needs by stating that a solution for Latin American underdevelopment would have led to a more efficient resistance to the communist subversion. Ike Eisenhower's administration refused such plan, but decided to create the American Development Bank in 1960, displaying a more accommodating approach, despite the firm belief in the expansion of free trade and enterprise coupled with the exclusion of economic nationalism that confirmed the deep divisions and scarce comprehension between the United States and South America. Kubitschek, as a consequence, started expanding Brazil's international connections, and the "unwritten alliance" between Brazil and the Colossus progressively faded as the two nations displayed more and more divergent orientations: Kubitschek became advocate of Third World interests, endorsed disarmament, and welcomed diplomatic and economic involvement with communist states. Such inclinations persisted during the office of Kubitschek's successors, the democratically elected Janio Quadros in 1960, and João Goulart who became President the following year because of Quadros' resignations. In a few years, Brazil became an uncomfortable presence in South America, and Washington ultimately reacted by organizing covert actions to support antigovernment fringes. Brazil was experiencing a period of heavy turmoil such as rural upheavals, strikes, and protests because of the economic crisis, and for such reason Washington saw the possibility of an imminent communist success in the country. The last two years of the Eisenhower period actually did not have much impact, and the Castro takeover of Cuba in 1959 would have changed US approach for the following thirty years.¹⁵²

Castro's revolutionary triumph elicited US aversion toward Communism, and, while retaining special attention on Central America by focusing on the containment of revolution in the region, President Lyndon Johnson increasingly regarded the communist threat as a contagious disease, and consequently decided to renew the Kennedy's Alliance for Progress ideals, and attributed the responsibility of managing economic assistance to Latin America to Thomas Mann in 1964. By inaugurating the so-called "Mann Doctrine", the United States committed in the implementation of practical solutions instead of moral factors with the promotion of

¹⁵² Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 139-157

economic growth in concomitance with the protection of US business interests, and in the avoidance of direct intervention while continuing the fight against the communist threat. Such Doctrine achieved particular importance in Brazil under the military dictatorship of João Goulart, as since the Second War's broken promises of reward in financial aides after the Brazilians had directly engaged into warfare against the Axis to support the Allies had generated discontent. The ideological clash took shape precisely in this instance, because while the Brazilians had claimed a capital inflow from the United States in order to boost domestic industry and give relief to economic gaps, from the United States' point of view Brazilian demands originated from nationalistic assumptions, and thus more appreciation for the capitalistic model and the free enterprise was suggested. After Goulart estranged the political right supporters, the Johnson administration promptly proceeded by maintaining a low-key posture, providing arms and aides to governmental dissidents in the successful coup of 1964, before installing a military dictatorship under General Humberto de Aleancar Castelo Branco. With the new government created with the help of the Colossus, constitutional privileges were put on hold, and any individual regarded as a potential threat to national security was even denied the citizenship: among those emerged former presidents Kubitschek, Quadros, and Goulart. The military dictatorship that was installed in 1964 was destined to endure until 1985 shared by five strongmen including Branco that engaged in policies of political centralism and market capitalism.¹⁵³

Starting from 1969, the Republican pair formed by the newly elected President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, manifesting political realism traits, pragmatism, and a preference for practical solution rather than abstract formulations, openly demonstrated scarce or no interest in Latin American affairs. "What happens in the South has no importance" were the words pronounced by Kissinger, regarding North-South relations as annoying when interfering with the more important East-West struggle.¹⁵⁴

The Nixon-Kissinger attitude however had to change when dealing with Chile during the first years of the 1970s, as reformist tendencies rang US alarm bell for a communist threat in the

¹⁵³ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American relations Since 1889", pp. 187-191

¹⁵⁴ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American relations Since 1889", pp. 195-196

Southern continent. During the 1960s Chile had become a fundamental part of the Alliance for Progress favored by President Eduardo Frei Montalva, who was backed by the CIA financial funds, and showed support for the United States by implementing accommodating policies based on democratic capitalism. Such figure however became disliked among US leaders because of his inclination to favor labor and tax reforms and independency in foreign relations. When in 1970 Frei's office ended, the Nixon administration felt relieved. Hardly hit by the economic crisis in the aftermath of the Second War, Chile was oppressed by a high inflation due to the heavy dependence upon copper exports, specifically those managed by US corporations. During the presidential elections, one of the candidates generated US apprehensions, namely Salvador Allende Gossens, a Socialist party member with Marxist preferences who, by the way, excluded personal linkages with communist doctrines, even though he did not reject leftist support because he advocated radical changes such as the redistribution of lands and incomes and the nationalization of copper enterprises, extractive industries, and banks. Secretary of State Kissinger, annoyed by the rise of such threatening character, predicted no more free elections in Chile if Allende won the presidential race. Once he took office, Allende publicized US responsibilities for Chilean economic troubles and dependency because of exploitation and the supposed cooperation between foreign capitalists and national elites, and found ideological connections with Vietnamese nationalists, Cubans, Democratic Germans, and the Chinese, installing diplomatic relationships with their countries. Moreover, he regarded the OAS as a US hegemonic instrument that served the Colossus' interests, and, as a consequence, he saw in the liberation from US yoke as the only solution for a Chilean recovery. The implementation of nationalization policies caused US punishment: Nixon drastically reduced international credit through the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, obstructing Allende's plans to finance his economic programs, but, in spite of such decision, he did not refrain from sending aides to the Chilean army. Food scarcity, urban upheavals, strikes, and rural protests culminated in the 1973 coup d'état that caused Salvador Allende's assassination. Uncountable debates have been made about a possible US meddling in the coup and the consequent Allende's death, but what is sure is that by financing the army and destabilizing the government by subtle means causing its capitulation, the Colossus had its amount of responsibility for the unhappy outcome. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, a conservatory

and reactionary General, was nominated head of the military *junta* that took power, remained in office until 1990 and became famous for his bloody repressive means that brought to the torture, imprisonment, disappearing, and murder of thousands of opponents or suspected as such. Heavily criticized for his neglect for human rights, Pinochet committed to the securitization of Chile from Communism, and arranged for favorable agreements with US corporations in the country.¹⁵⁵

The decades featured by the heavy disregard of human rights in Latin America also included the Argentinean dictatorship under Jorge Rafael Videla, going down in the history of the country as the most obscure and violent period.

In 1976, while Isabel Perón, wife of former President Juan Perón, was losing power because of mismanagement of the high inflation that increasingly undermined Argentinean economy, the Commander in Chief of the Army nominated by her, Jorge Rafael Videla, seized power forming a triumvirate with Emilio Massera and Orlando Agosti. Owing his military formation to the Military Academy financed by the United States, he cultivated anti-communist tendencies since a young age, and engaging in the containment of leftist threats, once in office he suspended the Congress and surrounded himself with regime supporters. He denied legality to labor unions and political parties and formed a military government destined to endure until 1983. By waging a policy of terror in his own country, the so-called “*Hitler de la Pampa*” implemented an authoritarian policy based on a bloody repression, for the most part in clandestinity by means of disappearances (remembered as the *desaparecidos*, that are estimated to be among 10000 and 30000 during Videla’s regime) in order to avoid international isolation as it happened for Chile. While maintaining a normal appearance encouraging free-market economics, the strongman persecuted labor militants, students, artists, intellectuals, and social and political activists relentlessly violating human rights.¹⁵⁶

Vexed by Videla’s behaviors, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance halved foreign aides in 1977, but Argentine leaders responded with allegations of US meddling in their domestic affairs. President Jimmy Carter, who placed great importance in the respect of human rights, decided

¹⁵⁵ Mark T. Gilderhus, “The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American relations Since 1889”, pp. 198-200

¹⁵⁶ Loris Zanatta, “Storia dell’America Latina Contemporanea”, pp. 180-181

to cut off loans through the Inter-American Development Bank and established trade punishments.

In his battle for the advocacy of human rights President Carter had bothered the Brazilian government because he had called it repressive and defined it a dictatorship, and when in 1977 the State Department denounced the country's human rights abuses, President Ernesto Geisel annulled a military aid agreement with the United States that existed since 1952. Carter also disliked the Pinochet administration, to which he proceeded with the cutting of financial aides, but no remarkable goal was achieved as relationships remained poor.¹⁵⁷

During the following decade, the United States posed most of its attention in the East-West struggle after a set of diplomatic clashes that resurged Cold War tensions in the Middle East and in the Caribbean basin. The Reagan administration focused on the restoring of US image and committed in solving problems outside South America, and by the end of the 1980s Latin America in general had lost geopolitical and strategic importance for the United States. The end of the Cold War era generated incentives for the establishment of democracies, even though the shift from authoritarianism to pluralism, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru was not easy also due to the permanence of the economic models that perpetuated social inequalities in the continent.

US leaders probably had underestimated the overwhelming set of issues that South American society and economies posed while overestimating their capabilities to cope with them, also because the demographic boom that grew faster than their economies during the middle years of the century was largely neglected. Confirming once more that military organizations could be strategically functional in the maintenance of stability, Washington constantly followed US political and hegemonic scopes as well as the economical. The United States wanted to exploit South American resources and US investments, and at the same time insisted upon the implementation of capitalistic doctrines failing to understand that internal development probably did not occur because the Colossus rendered nationalizations impossible. For international politics purposes, Washington also failed to canalize financial aides in the right

¹⁵⁷ Mark T. Gilderhus, "The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889", pp. 206-208

direction, namely to the booster of South American internal industries, and preferred to support South American armies instead, seeking alliances with accommodating elites and therefore using subtle and indirect means to manipulate South American governments. By ignoring South American working classes' needs and rights, the Colossus generated US-hatred, but South American governments that cooperated with it surely played a fundamental role in the production of continent-wide discontent. The lesser and more indirect intervention perpetrated by the United States in the region however did not generate the dislike and anti-US sentiments that were more typical of the Central American countries, on which the next chapter will be focused.

5. ADMIRATION AND HATRED, A SWING THAT MOVED OVER TIME AND SPACE

In the complex relations between the United States and Latin America, Latin Americans manifested, in different ways and measures, periods of high admiration counterbalanced by periods of heavy dislike of the United States, inevitably depending on the Colossus' attitudes and behaviors in the different regions of the Central and Southern continent. To be sure, anti-Americanism is a phenomenon that can be more specifically ascribed to Latin American countries because the United States historically has never had more economic, political, and cultural linkages with any other region in the world, but to assign a singular definition of Latin anti-Americanism would be impossible for two main reasons: on one hand, its intensity changed over time, while on the other it differs geographically from country to country, as some countries even showed of pro-American tendencies, and it also diverged from Central America to South America. In addition, to ignore the difference between the perception of the United States of Latin American governments and that of Latin American masses would be a huge mistake, also because history proves that there were occasions in which the ruling elites cooperated with *el Norte* aiming to share the benefits (economical and political) of the alliance with the Colossus, but at the expense of the Latin American peoples, who righteously expressed their discontent. US direct interventionism in Central America and its neglect of the economies of South American nations generated discrepancies between what Latin Americans thought of the United States itself (what the US *is*), and what the United States *does* (US foreign policy actions and doctrines), which inevitably influenced Latin American thinking, rendering it ambivalent and difficult to comprehend. The foreign policy measures adopted by Washington produced a kind of sentiments that most of the times had little or nothing to do with Latin Americans' opinions about what the United States *is*, and precisely this issue will be analyzed and discussed in this section by discussing the public responses in different states and by observing public polls questions and answers.

As a general tendency, anti-Americanism has always responded to precise instigations from the United States' part, because, as showed in the analysis of the history of relations between the Colossus and Latin America in the previous chapters, in times during which US leaders adopted friendly and cooperative attitudes, mostly by means noninterventionism and economic

incentives as for example during the Good Neighbor policy of the 1930s, upheavals and hatred used to decrease in force and intensity. However, by giving a look at history one can find that the first appearance of the adjective “anti-American” dates back to 1773, in concomitance with the imminent birth of the United States, and it was used to characterize a doctrine maintained by the colonial representatives of Great Britain.¹⁵⁸ The Colossus-to-become, to respond to such dissent of their actions, tended to label as “anti-American” any discordant attitude with respect to its own, oppositions, and divergent ideals, thus creating a powerful justification to keep following foreign policy priorities while neglecting the deep reasons for such grievances. Moreover, the natural juxtaposition of “America” and modernization during the nineteenth century, given the United States’ exceptional ascent, generated the difficulty in separating the anti-Americanism as referred to US deeds and the anti-Americanism that is characterized by a “particularized hostility towards the US, and a generalized hatred of American society”, making anti-Americanism an alibi for the Latin American different vision of society and its inability to cope with the modernization processes.¹⁵⁹

There were times in which both the cultural and the political aspects that gave reason to animosity coincided, but for the most part the literature, the mass upheavals, the rural protests, the manifestations, nationalisms, and leftist preferences constituted reactions in response to US imperialism and foreign policy decisions in general. There were also periods in which political parties were formed advocating a national and regional liberation from the Colossus as one of their cornerstones, while intellectuals focused on the exaltation of the more spiritual and profound Latin American indigenous, revealing deep-seated resentment toward the *Yanqui* by criticizing US materialism, lack of culture and consequently inferiority with respect to the *latino*.

One can argue that in such times anti-Americanism acted in a functional way to an extent that made it become a cultural phenomenon tightly linked to the construction of national and

¹⁵⁸ Alan McPherson, “Latin American Anti-Americanism and U.S. Responses: Venezuela 1958”, available online: <http://www.driskellcenter.umd.edu/programs/2002-2003/conf/washla/papers/McPherson.pdf>

¹⁵⁹ Definition of anti-Americanism by Max Paul Friedman, seen also in Chapter I

regional identity, as during the first decades after gaining independence from the European powers the sense of identity lacked in Latin America.¹⁶⁰

Most importantly, by examining the anti-imperialism that the Latin American intellectuals criticized, the first part of the chapter will highlight how criticism was often coupled with expressions of admiration and esteem of the United States, mostly for its economical, political, and social successes achieved, which led to the elevation of US society as a model for Latin Americans, thus revealing the ambiguity that features Latin American anti-Americanism. Moreover, the way in which anti-US sentiments were manipulated for political purposes will be analyzed and discussed, along with the White House response to the different kinds of anti-Americanism.

5.1: Historiography of Anti-Americanisms in Latin America

Anti-imperialism has permeated every anti-American momentum in the history of relations of the United States and Latin America. Since the Latin American emancipation from Europe, ambiguity in the opinion of Latin Americans about their Northern neighbor characterized anti-US perceptions, as during the 1820s the creoles elites shared a great admiration for those men who founded and shaped the United States, praised the Constitution, and consequently hoped to collaborate with the United States as peers in the aftermath of independency processes. The Argentinian Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, for example, after touring the United States, promoted imitation of US society among his countrymen during the middle years of the nineteenth century, by exalting the economic development and the political innovations proposed by the North American colons. Such expectations that Latin American elites had invested in the United States however failed to be realized, as the racist and imperialist expansion of the Colossus began to manifest more clearly.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Arlene B. Tickner, Carolina Cepeda M., José Luis Bernal, “Anti-Americanismo, Pro-Americanismo y Sentido Común en América Latina”, available online: <http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/fi/v55n3/0185-013X-fi-55-03-00805.pdf>

¹⁶¹ Alan McPherson, “Yankee No!: Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations”, pp.11-12

The phased disillusionment of Latin American expectations from the United States marked, since then, one of the basic grounds on which much resentment was generated, because every time that Latin American countries invested a kind of hope on the Colossus, be it of cooperation, be it for economic help, such hopes were irremediably broken.

Latin American anti-imperialist discourse began to gain consistency and visibility especially after the 1898 Spanish-American war to liberate Cuba, the last Spanish colony, from the Iberian Empire. In the previous decade however, back in 1889, the first Pan American Conference in Washington was the very first occasion in which Latin Americans openly expressed wariness about US economic and political advancement: two Argentinian representatives, namely Roque Sáenz Peña and Vicente Quesada, manifested a strong opposition to Washington's diplomatic interests in the continents, and, as a consequence, both of them campaigned a first anti-American symbolic imaginary. Sáenz Peña criticized the Monroe Doctrine and its pretension to retain "America for the Americans" by responding "*América para la Humanidad*", while Quesada expressed his bother for the US grandiosity and self-confidence by publishing in 1893 "*Los Estados Unidos y la América del Sur: los yanquis pintados por sí mismos*".¹⁶² The very first appearance of opposition to the North American imperialism was, then, of elitist production, which means that it was the Latin American ruling elite the first to understand US hegemonic ambitions in their countries, as they menaced to undermine their dominion and power. In 1891 was also published the famous "*Nuestra América*" by the beloved Cuban writer, philosopher, and politician José Martí, in which he predicted the United States' hegemonic ambitions over the hemisphere and advocated a Latin American unity to counter such expansionist impetus. Between the end of the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century, the literary production that took inspiration from the Rousseauian tradition of Enlightenment liberalism, expressed a typical Spanish Catholic distaste toward the Anglo-Protestant "individualism" shared by European anti-Americanism. Their animosity toward what they described as the utilitarian, sterile, Machiavellian, sneaky United States, characterized by political and economic drives, was in deep contrast with the more genuine, humanist, aesthetic, intellectual and spiritual republics of Latin America. Such literary proliferation that came from almost every Latin

¹⁶² Martín Bergel, "El anti-antinorteamericanismo en América Latina (1898-1930): Apuntes para una historia intelectual", published in the periodical *Nueva Sociedad* N. 236, available online: http://nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/3815_1.pdf

American country generated a fervent critic to the United States' incoherence for not matching its actions to its ideals, and was voiced by writers such as Brazil's Eduardo Prado, Mexico's Isidro Fabela, Venezuela's Rufino Blanco-Fombona, Bolivia's Franz Tamayo, Cuba's José María Céspedes, Guatemala's Máximo Soto Hall, and Colombia's José María Vargas Vila.¹⁶³

But anti-American motives began to proliferate in Latin America later in 1900, when the members of the community of modernist writers that was born in the Western Hemisphere, starting from the Uruguayan and French-literature-inspired professor José Enrique Rodó, who published his famous masterpiece "Ariel". By taking inspiration also from both the Cuban hero and advocate of Latin America José Martí, Rodó manifested in his writing a representation of the United States that would have nurtured the imaginary of thousands of readers in the continent, proposing an image of the United States that was neither exemplar nor to attain to. In such imaginary, US society was ruled by utilitarianism and lusted for material wealth that made it vulgar and superficial, while lacking erudition, sentiment, and aesthetic understanding, which, by contrast, characterized Latin Americans. Rodó however, while criticizing the North American way of life featured by the exhausting search for means forgetting the ends, stressed the importance to maintain the inherent differences between the Northern culture and the Southern in order to preserve identity, and warned against the *nordomanía* that threatened to infiltrate in the Latin American nations by highlighting the dangers of imitation, which would be easy to fall into, starting from admiration of the Colossus. Like José Martí however, Rodó promoted a kind of understanding and appreciation between the North and the South:

"America must continue to maintain the dualism of its original composition, which re-creates the classic myth of the two eagles released simultaneously from the two poles in order that each should reach the limits of its domain at the same moment."¹⁶⁴

Apart from the literature imbued with a cultural mold featured by racial connotations that distinguished the hispanic-indigenous from the anglo-saxon, typical of the end of the

¹⁶³ Greg Grandin, "Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas", available online: <https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article/111/4/1042/26788/Your-Americanism-and-Mine-Americanism-and-Anti>

¹⁶⁴ Michael LaRosa, Frank O. Mora, "Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.-Latin American Relations", pp. 27-34

nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, the growing North American interventionism also generated anti-imperialist denunciations characterized by political implications. Among those figures who condemned US behaviors stood out the Argentinian Manuel Ugarte, who wrote his first anti-American article “*El Peligro Yanqui*” en 1901. Ugarte promoted, like his predecessors such as José Martí, Simon Bolívar, and the same Rodó, a Latin American union to resist US appetite of conquest as the only means to preserve Latin American lineage. He warned of the *peligro yanqui* as a slow, gradual, and widespread penetration in the Latin American nations by means of commercial and moral influences, and, moreover, he added that even if the South American countries were geographically further than the Central Americans with respect to the United States, every nation that succumbed to the Colossus’ domination drawn *el Norte* nearer to them.¹⁶⁵

The Nicaraguan journalist, poet, and diplomatic Rubén Darío was one of the few arielists of the Caribbean and also a champion of ambivalent perceptions of the United States. He was part of the outraged group of Latin American intellectuals who resented US incursions represented by President Theodore Roosevelt’s “Big Stick Policy”, as he published the sarcastic poem “To Roosevelt” in 1904.¹⁶⁶ Darío resented US wrongdoings and meddling driven by hegemonic impetuses such as the intrusion in Panamanian affairs by supporting the Panamanians revolution that aimed to secede from Colombia in order to annex the territory of the Panama Canal and the proclamation of the President’s Corollary of the Manifest Destiny, which basically justified the use of US military force to “police” Central and South America. Darío’s bother manifested in the characterization of the United States as a greedy and powerful trespasser in the innocent Latin America:

“You are the United States, / you are the future invader / of the naive America that has Indian blood, / that still prays to Jesus Christ and still speaks Spanish.”¹⁶⁷

Darío, like many intellectuals of his time, criticized US abuse of its power and feared that further interventions in the Southern continent would have introduced the capitalistic system in Latin American society, corrupting it. He was skeptical about the new economical model much

¹⁶⁵ Manuel Ugarte, “El Peligro Yanqui”, published in El País de Buenos Aires, available online: <http://constitucionweb.blogspot.it/2010/11/el-peligro-yanqui-manuel-ugarte-1901.html>

¹⁶⁶ Alan McPherson, “Yankee No!: Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations”, p. 13

¹⁶⁷ “To Roosevelt”, Rubén Darío, 1904

publicized and promoted by *el Norte* because he thought that it would have consequently installed a rich-poor dichotomy that would have impoverished even more the Southern countries.

Darío however also manifested divergent ideas, as two years after the publication of the ode to Roosevelt he produced the poem “Saluting the Eagle” subtitled “May this grand Union never end!”, in which he genuinely advocated cooperation between the Colossus and Nicaragua in view of the Pan American Conference in Rio de Janeiro of that year, manifesting Darío’s hope for a union of the two Americas. In the poem, he addressed directly to the Eagle, the US symbol and lauded the Colossus for its strength and power for creating the United States. In the poem, he encouraged a friendly relationship between the two Americas: “Eagle, the Condor exists. /He is your brother in great heights. /The Andes know him, and know, /Like you, that he looks at the sun. /May this grand never end, /Let the two of you join in a plenitude/of harmony and strength.”¹⁶⁸

By personifying Latin America with the Condor, and by calling it “brother” of the Eagle, Darío seemed to picture Latin America as asking to the United States for collaboration, almost as if the aggressive policies that *el Norte* was perpetrating did not exist. Moreover, he believed that the United States could help Latin America by “[giving] us the secret of the way you labor in the North”¹⁶⁹ praising, like José Martí did, the North American work ethic that brought the United States to embody modernization, thus highlighting the fact that Latin Americans instead had not coped with modernization yet.

The common line of Latin American intellectuals of the epoch is the production of durable themes that can apply to the different momentums of the United States-Latin American relations, as such arguments proved to be part of the ambiguous and tangled general anti-US sentiment across Latin America. Even if it was favored and promoted by a large part of the Latin American intellectual elite, the desire for a friendship e cooperative relationship with North America was punctually disappointed, as every time the United States presented itself with the intention to hold out a helping hand to Latin American countries, it was found having economical and political personal motives.

¹⁶⁸ Rubén Darío, “Selected Writings”, pp. 124-125

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

Indeed, the decades that followed those publications proved to be the years during which, as it was analyzed in Chapter III, the growing US power in the region peaked with the creation of protectorates in the Caribbean basin and the relentless US Marines incursions in central American countries. Indeed, US strong commitment in the control and the maintenance of order over the Latin American economics and politics resulted correlatively greater than it has ever been in any other area of the world.¹⁷⁰

Since their first manifestations, which were on literary grounds in this case, another feature ascribable to these embryonic anti-US reactions resided in the disunity of protest movements. The resentment of the masses lamenting the US companies' exploitations of the banana plantations in the "Banana Republics" or the copper reserves in Chile, were far from being coeval or organized, and therefore found themselves isolated instead. In addition, the ruling elites were busy finding the most accommodating policies to preserve their positions and privileges.

The relevance with the European culture became convenient and functional for Latin American educated elites in order to find a model to attain to in the effort to identify the United States as the inferior Other. However, this trend inevitably changed in the aftermath of the carnages of the First World War, as after assisting to the European empires self-detriment the Old World values became gradually less appealing to Latin Americans. The Great War, the Leninist reasoning flawing from the Russian Revolution, and the Mexican Revolution that demonstrated the power that mass organizations could achieve led to the intensification of both the US commitment in the hemispheric protection and the economic expansion, especially in Central America and the Caribbean resources and markets. Latin Americans responded with the creation, apart from Arielism, of other similar resistance factions such as indigenism, Sandinism, Communism, and populist developmentalism.¹⁷¹

The 1920s were the years during which such tendencies were born, and grew starting from the indigenism proposed in the perhaps most exhaustive work of Mexican José de Vasconcelos, "*Raza Cósmica*" of 1925, which can be defined as a mixed-race manifesto that, by attaining to social Darwinism theories, advocated the flowering and survival of the mixed-race groups in

¹⁷⁰ Barry Rubin, Judith Colp Rubin, "Hating America: A History", Chapt. 5

¹⁷¹ Alan McPherson, "Yankee No!: Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations", pp. 14-15

the coming era, and elevated the *mestizo* as a figure whose past deserved to be elevated and celebrated. Anti-Americanism in Vasconcelos' masterpiece was bright and clear, as it was consistently resentful of anything that came from the United States, from its rational pragmatism, to the emancipated women, Protestantism, and anti-intellectualism that made Latin Americans think that power and success came from the lack of virtue. Despite the *indigenismo* had gathered artists, educators, literates, and indigenous leaders, social divisions remained, thus drastically reducing its potential. The dozens of continuing US military invasions in Central America and the Caribbean basin that endured since 1898, caused the fleeing of Nicaraguan Augusto Sandino, who organized a resistance movement later named after him, the *Sandinismo*, which depicted US Marines as "barbarian invaders" who cooperated with US businessmen. Sandino promoted the necessary liberation from the Colossus' racist and paternalistic imperialism that considered the *latinos* as inferiors, and in his writings he described the Marines' behaviors as devilish and moved by dark passions, thus manifesting a fervent anti-US sentiment that compelled the North American intrinsic essence, not only its deeds.¹⁷² Sandino conspicuously was able to bring anti-Americanism in the martial fringes, as his *guerrilleros*, even if poorly organized, reached international celebrity for evading the Marines from Nicaragua by taking advantage of their familiarity with their territory, at the disadvantage of the North Americans. Sandino brought originality to anti-American tendencies by mobilizing exploited peasants, rural workers that feared lands loss from US companies, and gained consensus among intellectuals such as Ugarte and Vasconcelos, too. Once again nonetheless, the deep social divisions, both internal and external, overtook Sandino's efforts to create a united anti-American front. In addition to this, local elites had allied with the United States to safeguard their businesses, and the commander of the Nicaraguan National Guard Anastasio Somoza betrayed and murdered him, initiating a decades-long dictatorship thoroughly backed by Washington. Sandino's efforts however were not useless, as the six-year struggle against the Marines and the much-publicized success of their expulsion in 1927 had produced regional suspicion and hatred toward the United States.¹⁷³

¹⁷² Augusto César Sandino, Sergio Ramírez, "El Pensamiento Vivo", Vol. I, pp. 163-164

¹⁷³ Alan McPherson, "Yankee No!: Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations", pp. 16-18

Anti-imperialism became then, by the middle of the 1920s, the main cornerstone of Latin American popular and intellectual dissent and hostility for the United States, and as long as the Colossus expanded its hegemonic and economical influence in the hemisphere, such tendencies never stopped growing, gradually becoming a visible part of the cultural dimension of Latin America, especially the Central region. During this period, anti-US ideologies materialized in political and intellectual aggregations that sought more organization, because, as it was explained in Chapter III and IV, the aftermath of the Great War had left Latin American economies devastated and their reliance on US aides to boost industrialization became disappointing, spurring cross-continental hatred. Such political formations that were born in South America and grew widespread in the hemisphere embodied the large expectations of democratization, representativeness, and plurality that could take shape in a new and institutionalized political system. Among them stood out the *Unión Latinoamericana* leaded from Buenos Aires by the intellectual José Ingenieros and the politician Alfredo Palacios and, above all, the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA), that was born in 1924 in Mexico and intended to create a continental front of radical anti-imperialistic policy. Headed by the Peruvian Victor Haya de la Torre while he was exiled, he aspired to unite the nationalisms that connected most of Latin American states as a reaction to US deeds, from Central America and the Caribbean to the Andean region. The APRA's social base included the middle classes and some proletarian fringes, and it exalted the recovery of the Indian-American roots as well as the nationalization of lands and mines, while campaigning for a general anti-imperialistic universal front.¹⁷⁴

Haya during the last years of the 1920s had also gained the sympathy of some US intellectuals and professors that criticized their own country's imperialism in the hemisphere, and consequently he was invited to conferences and debates in several universities. One day, welcomed by a multitude of journalists and reporters when he landed in Boston, when he was asked about whether he equated anti-imperialism to dislike for the United States itself, he answered that the *apristas* were not enemies of US people; that if US citizens were better

¹⁷⁴ Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", pp. 84-85

informed about the real situation of Latin American peoples, they would side with them, and that *apristas* were enemies of the imperialistic policy.¹⁷⁵

Socialism, too, became part of the anti-American stream during the first half of the twentieth century. Inspired by the reasoning of the Mexican and Russian Revolutions, it appeared to represent a possibility for consistent change because it advocated representativeness and mass organization, and it could possibly constitute a bulwark and a voice for the poor and the working classes. Such social rank could now give reason to US hegemonic impulses on economic grounds, and as a consequence imperialism became explainable not just in random terms, but as a craved resultant of the deliberately planned capitalistic drives. Socialism acquired academic connotations that led to the application of Marxist theories to provide an explanation for Latin American social and racial inequalities. Peruvian journalist, sociologist, and politician José Carlos Mariátegui, often called “the first Latin American Marxist”, applied the Marxist theories for the case of Peru in particular and for Latin America in general. In his “Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality” published in 1928, among other themes he focused on the connection between the fight for socialism and the struggle against imperialism, yearning for the creation of a revolutionary socialist party in his country. He became the main figure in the development of the Peruvian Communist Party and was nominated its general secretary, apart from helping in the organization of union of workers.¹⁷⁶

Socialism nevertheless, like indigenism and Sandinism, by the middle of the century had slowly faded as a national or international connective tension also because debates between the two Russian leftist representative figures, namely Stalin and Trotsky¹⁷⁷, had generated discrepancies and confusion among socialists in Latin America, who, as a consequence,

¹⁷⁵ Luis Alberto Sánchez, “Haya de la Torre o el político. Crónica de una vida sin tregua”, p. 146

¹⁷⁶ Lance Selfa, “Mariátegui and Latin American Marxism”, International Socialist Review, available online: <http://isreview.org/issue/96/mariategui-and-latin-american-marxism>

¹⁷⁷ The most important disagreement of the dispute was the extension that communist revolution should have. While Stalin supported socialism in only one country because if it failed in other nations, it could survive in the Soviet Union, Trotsky believed in world revolution as the means by which capitalism could fall and the Soviet economy could be restored. The success of Stalin and the consequent Trotsky estrangement had consequences in the communist fringes worldwide.

Evan Centanni, “Main Political Differences Between Stalin and Trotsky”, available online: <http://classroom.synonym.com/main-political-differences-between-stalin-trotsky-8948.html>

accounted for only a few links with international socialist movements by the outburst of the Cold War. Members of the Latin American Communist parties had halved between 1947 and 1952, and, in addition, trade with leftist countries amounted only to a 5%.¹⁷⁸

Not all criticism of the time however blamed the United States. The Chilean educator, writer and poet Gabriela Mistral recognized that local problems mattered much more than what it was thought in the developing of the unhappy situation of Latin American countries, but she righteously never denied US faults, displaying once again the ambivalence of Latin American feelings. Indeed, she focused part of her works on the need for higher preparation and harder work as core factors for Latin American upswing on one hand, while promoting a Latin American unity against the Yankee menace on the other.¹⁷⁹ In her *"El Grito"*, published in 1922, she supported the need to counter

"the invasion of blonde America that wants to sell us everything, to populate our lands and cities with her machinery, to use our resources that we don't know how to exploit", and added that "He [the United States] is winning because of our fault [...] for our torrid weakness and for Indian fatalism. He is crumbling us by virtue of some of his qualities and because of all of our racial vices. Why do we hate them? Let us hate what is in us that makes us vulnerable to his will and his opulence."¹⁸⁰

The noninterventionism implemented with the Good Neighbor Policy that covered the 1930s and part of the 1940s, perhaps gave the Latin Americans the space to understand and deeply analyze the economical implications of US imperialism and, overall, the results that it had achieved. Realizing that the social asymmetries had been produced mainly by the US policy agenda, the general reaction in Latin American countries was an inward look at local problems and a need for unification and order.

The fourth popular-based anti-American tendency is indeed constituted by the combination of populism and the developmentalism, that characterized the non-authoritarian political parties

¹⁷⁸ Peter H. Smith, "Talons of the Eagle", pp. 132-134

¹⁷⁹ Barry Rubin, Judith Colp Rubin, "Hating America: A History", Chapt. 5

¹⁸⁰ James Hiestler, F. Toscano, "Anti-Yankee Feelings in Latin America, An Anthology of American Writings from Colonial to Modern Times in their Historical Perspective", pp. 95-96

that evolved between the first decade of the century and the 1950s.¹⁸¹ The populist hint of such parties was given by the existence of charismatic leaders able to attract the masses and the middle classes by listening to the cause of their discontent and by committing to the improvement of Latin American economies, the elimination of corruption, and, most importantly, such figures incited and promoted nationalism.

The first traces of populism appeared during the 1930s, gained success mostly due to the promise of wealth redistribution policies, because the main dissatisfaction of the working classes came from the economic crises that the exporter-led model suffered, causing the growing awareness, among Latin Americans, that their markets and resources were at the dependency of foreign economies. Consequently, the necessity to promote industrialization and the development of internal trade was the answer to people's demands and the key-factor to obtain consensus. Becoming what could be defined as illiberal democracies, populisms were based on the centralization of power institutionalized by the mass consensus, and devoted to social justice, ascribing democracy more to social relations than on politics. Typical of populisms in Latin America was the idea that they were representing the peoples in its complexity, intended as cohesive and homogeneous, united by a communal history and identity and that shared both an internal and an external oppression that undermined their integrity. Such oppressor was often identified with the United States, its imperialism, and its pretension to install liberalism and modernization in their countries, that ultimately dismantled their nations, regarded as organic communities. As a general trend that associated the different populisms of Latin America, that covered the continent from Argentina to Ecuador, from Brazil to Peru and Cuba, and, to a lesser extent, reaching Chile and Uruguay, the absorption of power monopoly in the name of the people was made possible by means of the denial of legitimacy of dissenters.¹⁸²

Leaders such as Argentina's Perón, Costa Rica's Figueres, Guatemala's Arbenz, Brazil's Vargas, and Venezuela's Betancourt dismissed President Roosevelt's political economy by implementing land reforms, the building of infrastructures that, as it has been specified in the previous chapters were owned by US subsidiaries, and improvements to the working

¹⁸¹ Alan McPherson, "Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations", p. 19

¹⁸² Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", pp. 107-108

conditions. Populisms however displayed major ambiguities with respect to what they thought of the United States. Hence, while retaining a strong resentment because they saw that the accomplishment of Washington's foreign policies did not generate the same economic benefits in Latin America in comparison to those in the United States, and such animosity was boosted by the ongoing superiority and arrogant attitude of US leaders, characterized by the racism and paternalism that permeated both policy and discourse. Despite such motives however, the hatred was mostly generated by the fact that United States still represented a model of success, as anti-US advocates were now lamenting the asymmetries that North-South relations produced, focusing on foreign policies, but at the same time they were not criticizing US operate in the achievement of its own success.¹⁸³

Perhaps the noninterventionism that was put into practice in the name of the Good Neighbor Policy during the Roosevelt's presidencies made anti-Americanism less anti-imperialistic and more ambivalent, focusing more on the sense of exclusion and inferiority generated by the Monroe Doctrine, molded and adapted to every strategic occasion in which it was invoked while excluding a peer-treatment of Latin American countries, on the export-led economic model that made Latin Americans totally dependent on foreign markets, and, finally, on the disillusion of the promises of reward made by Washington during the World Wars after Latin Americans had offered their support by aligning with the Colossus. Those countries that felt more unrepresented and mere instruments in the hands of the United States to serve its economy and its foreign policy agenda, resorted in populism while maintaining a relatively positive idea of their Northern neighbor. By the middle of the century, in other words, positive and negative images of the Colossus could be easily balanced in a same spectrum.

Especially after World War II, the doses of nationalism that were added to the anti-American mix since the 1930s made political anti-Americanism stand out, as Latin American countries became increasingly aware of the fact that the Colossus had taken advantage of their resources and had always failed to treat them as equals. Argentina's Juan Domingo Perón for instance rendered resentment for the United States one of the main ingredients of his policies: despite declaring *peronismo* an alternative way among Communism and "Yankee imperialism", the ongoing US suspect on Argentina as the Latin American shelter of the Nazis coupled with US

¹⁸³ Alan McPherson, "Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations", p. 19

politic meddling led the Argentine candidate to present himself as anti-US, thus winning the 1946 elections.¹⁸⁴

Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, a declared anti-Peronist, deeply resented Perón's anti-Americanist rhetoric during the presidential campaign in 1945 and had defined his project for Argentina as driven by "neurotic nationalism". The following year, just before Perón was elected, US State Department had published the "Blue Book", in which documents showed Argentinian collaboration with the Germans during World War II in a desperate effort to influence voters, thus leading Perón to use the slogan "*Perón o Braden*" after grasping the responsible of much animosity.¹⁸⁵

US Press and magazines, in change, also exploited anti-Americanism to influence opinions, as when it came to report Perón's ongoing disputes with the United States, the focus of such publications was on the features of the "hate-the-Yankee" trend in Argentinian campaigns, among labor unions, in the press, and amidst ambassadors.¹⁸⁶

The first years of the Cold War however increasingly changed Latin American perspectives, as in the eyes of Washington populisms and reformism did not constitute a "third way" as it was for Latin Americans, but rather were automatically equated to Communism, and therefore they became a sort of Chimera from which the Western Hemisphere had to get rid of.

During the 1950s, to give reason of Latin American economic stagnation and of the economic dependency that had characterized the Central and Southern continent since the colonial times, had been explained with the developing of the "*Teoría de la Dependencia*", elaborated under the leading figure of the Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America Raul Prebisch. The theory argued that there was a causal link between the economic activity of rich countries and the failure to develop of the poor. In substance, basing his assumptions on the Marxist views, Prebisch thought that the most powerful nations in the world, became rich at the expense of the poorest, an argument that became functional to blame the United States for Latin American economic grievances. At the time the theory was

¹⁸⁴ Brendon O'Connor, Martin Griffiths "Anti-Americanism: Comparative perspectives", p. 89

¹⁸⁵ Michael LaRosa, Frank O. Mora, "Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.-Latin American Relations", p. 116

¹⁸⁶ Alan McPherson, "Latin Anti-Americanism and U.S. Responses: Venezuela 1958", available online: <http://www.driskellcenter.umd.edu/programs/2002-2003/conf/washla/papers/McPherson.pdf>

developed, Marxist outlooks were having a discreet success throughout Latin America in the Cold War context, but in the eyes of US leaders, discrediting the capitalistic system meant automatically to discredit the United States itself. Dependency theorists argued that poorer countries did not have the possibility to develop because the international system, described as exploitative and characterized by the dominance of some countries over others, was preventing them from prospering, and because the system was designed to serve the interests of rich peoples and wealthy countries. The theory advocated an alternative approach to development based on a major participation of the state in the economies by means of imposing trade barriers, protectionist measures, and stimulate inward investment while endorsing the nationalization of key industries. Such methods however found applicability and consensus from the populist regimes of the time only in South America, especially the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), because their economic power and capital availability was greater in comparison with the Caribbean countries, and their internal trades were sufficiently developed to nourish industrialization.¹⁸⁷

South American countries in particular resented the United States neglect of their economies, because instead of receiving capitals to boost industrialization, Washington canalized financial aides only to the military sector, because it clearly better served its interest of Cold War policies that were aimed to contain Communism, even by supporting repressive dictatorships only because non-communist, while failing to provide basic financial aides and thus exacerbating poverty and causing several upheavals, apart from the fact that this was a clear example of how much the United States did not honor the values it had much promoted. The consequent explosion of anti-American reactions, allegedly the worst of the century, marked the lowest point of US-Latin American relations in history.

The United States nevertheless did not pay much attention to anti-Americanism during this time, especially in Latin America. In 1957 the US magazine *Newsweek* reported a map of the world showing opinions people had on the United States, and demonstrated that basically everywhere, with the exception of East Asia, the US entertained good or great relationships. Save for the fact that in such map Latin America did not even appear. Any Latin American

¹⁸⁷ Loris Zanatta, "Storia dell'America Latina Contemporanea", pp. 125-126

president that manifested negative dispositions to US policies received little attention from US leaders, who considered them influenced by European tendencies.¹⁸⁸

Such harsh reactions peaked in 1958, when Vice President Richard Nixon, during a tour in South America, found bitter reactions debating with students in Peru and Uruguay, that stoned him. When he arrived in Caracas, as Alan McPherson described, “For twelve minutes the crowd rocked the vehicles, bashed them with sticks and iron bars, spat on the windows, and shouted at the passengers”. The United States then became aware of the power that the masses could gain in expressing their animosity, due to urbanization, the growing influence of political middle-class representatives, the discomforts produced by repressive US-backed dictatorships, and Cold War tensions in general, that paved the way to insurgences of such an extent as to hit a US representative. Moreover, Venezuelan hatred was motivated by the recent ruling of General Pérez Jiménez, an anti-communist and US-backed dictator that implemented bloody repressive policies. The Colossus now knew that dissent could not be silenced by signing treaties of minor importance or by dispatching the Marines anymore, because anti-US sentiment became more coherent, motivated, and less disunited.¹⁸⁹

Before the Nixon’s stop in Caracas, positive receptions however outnumbered the negative ones, as there were protests in every country the Vice President went to, but they were made by small groups that did not show the hostility seen in Venezuela. US leaders however discredited anti-American manifestations justifying in on Latin American lack of information in political culture’s grounds. The chief of Peruvian police in Lima had even suggested the Vice President not to show up, but he did not follow the advice and ended up being stoned by students. As Nixon returned to Washington, still, many rejected to think that anti-Americanism was becoming appealing in Latin America and simply banished it to a subset of Communism.¹⁹⁰ Perhaps the case that displayed the highest peaks of ambivalence in anti-Americanism, Cuban anti-US sentiment that burst in 1959, less than a year after the Caracas incident, when Fidel Castro seized power with a coup that represented the most effective expression of hatred

¹⁸⁸ Alan McPherson, “Latin Anti-Americanism and U.S. Responses: Venezuela 1958”, available online: <http://www.driskellcenter.umd.edu/programs/2002-2003/conf/washla/papers/McPherson.pdf>

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

toward *el Norte*. The long history of Cuban resentment dates back to the 1901 Platt Amendment application and to the unexpected invasion from an ally that had helped the island to become independent from Spain, treating them as unable to self-govern, and reducing them to obedience. The strong economic ties that linked Cuba to the Colossus and the large presence of US citizens produced ambivalent sentiments toward the United States, as the deep meddling had generated a strong “americanization” of the island, while obviously causing resentment for territorial and economical abuses. Such ambiguity that held the Cuban feeling toward the Yankee cleverly managed and embodied by Fidel Castro, is to be traced in Cuban’s personal relationship with the United States. As Professor Alan McPherson argues, Cuban anti-Americanism “urged the Cubans to admit how dependent they were on [the US] for their very sense of themselves as a nation; reversing that dependence meant redefining “Cubanness” itself.” Ambivalence, besides, was a calculated attitude of the Revolutionary leader Castro. By acting enough to bother the United States without fueling hard countermeasures, Castro represented, by means of policies and rhetoric, the duality of the Cuban anti-Americanism, that separated, as the Cuban President underlined, US society from US government. Cubans did not disdain US citizens, on the contrary: they admired them, loved their culture and habits, and consumed their goods; US economic and politic mistreatments and humiliation of the Cubans, instead, fueled animosity that burst in 1959. Moreover, anti-Americanism proved to be an efficient instrument to gather consensus: Castro, by embracing both a liberal democratic resentment and the revolutionary fringe of anti-US militants was able to gain support from the Cubans. He also manifested both negative and positive bias for the United States and in this way, he met most Cubans’ ideas and gained backing from them.¹⁹¹

After the Nixon’s visit in Latin America, however, US policymakers resorted to use the United States Information Agency (USIA) to draft a list of Latin American complaints and dispositions toward the United States, and discovered that a large part of resentment was caused by economic motivations, while others revealed to be emerging from personal issues. Latin Americans lamented US neglect of their problems, its lack of comprehension of the religious and cultural differences, they felt still offended by the Marines incursions of the past and the

¹⁹¹ Alan McPherson, “Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations”, pp. 38-50

racist policy and discourse that had always been present in Washington's attitude toward them. In the end, such grievances were regarded as unjustified and illogical.¹⁹²

As Alan McPherson notes, the list appeared to indicate an inadequacy of US self-criticism of its own conduct. Such lists, in addition, did not distinguish between criticisms of US policies and US society, thus demonstrating how much US leaders thought that anti-American attitudes constituted merely a bias. The truth is that if the United States questioned its imperialism, it would have meant to undermine US power and influence worldwide, and therefore such option was never contemplated.¹⁹³

Initially confused by Castro's policies and ambiguous dispositions, after October 26 in 1962¹⁹⁴, US leaders began to regard Cuban anti-US sentiment as a disease, and equated manifestations of ambivalence to insanity. Others understood deep anti-Americanism as an illogic and continuing resentment occasionally mitigated depending on the convenience toward the United States.¹⁹⁵

Opening a decade of violence in Latin America, the Nixon incident in Venezuela actually triggered a series of protests and reactions expressing the resentment toward the United States. In addition to the different but at the same time similar anti-Americanism of the period, one that particularly bothered Washington was the publication by Juan José Arévalo of "The Shark and the Sardines" in 1961. In 1954, as it was explained in Chapter III, CIA-trained Guatemalans overthrew the US-suspected to be communist Jacobo Arbenz. Resentment for such maneuver and for US disregard for the exploitations from the United Fruit Company in the country, was expressed by former President Arévalo in such book, that combined economic anti-Americanism with the critic of one of fundamental US values, namely the frenzied business, all-about-money mentality. The masterpiece painted the United States as a shark that

¹⁹² Joseph Silberstein to Terry Sanders, 14 May 1958, folder Vice President Nixon's Trip, available online: <http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1958-60v05/reference/frus.frus195860v05.i0010.pdf>

¹⁹³ Alan McPherson, "Latin American Anti-Americanism and U.S. Responses: Venezuela 1958", available online: <http://www.driskellcenter.umd.edu/programs/2002-2003/conf/washla/papers/McPherson.pdf>

¹⁹⁴ During the Missile Crisis, after a set of US covert actions in Cuba to overthrow the Communist Revolution leader, Castro arose nuclear tensions by sending a personal telegram to Nikita Khrushchev affirming that a US attack on specific Cuban targets was imminent.

¹⁹⁵ Alan McPherson, "Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations", pp. 65-66

with its money, power, and ferocity interfered in the good servant sardines's affairs, which represented the Latin American states. In this instance, such anti-Americanism also constitutes a critique and an expression of discontent of US economic imperialism and political meddling, as like Arévalo declared, he was no anti-US because he felt no special dislike for the United States, but rather simply expressed his indignation for the overthrowing of an elected president maneuvered by Washington. In this occasion, too, instead, the United States found in anti-US sentiment a powerful allegation in order to maintain Arévalo distant, as US policymakers and press labeled him as anti-American for being reformist when he was in office and for impeding his candidacy in the scheduled 1963 Guatemalan elections.¹⁹⁶

An anti-Americanism that can be defined as "conservative" manifested in Panama in the anti-US Panama Riots in 1959 and 1964. By the beginning of the 1960s, Panamanian elites expressed more than ever their long-time resentment for their heavy dependence on furnishing goods and services to the Canal Zone, the area in which US citizens, the "Zonians" lived and where US interests were most concentrated. Panamanian bitterness is to be traced back in 1903, when with the Bunau-Varilla Treaty the United States self-assured control over the Canal Zone, subsequently it grew with the Zonians' racist and humiliating attitudes toward the non-elite Panamanians, and reached its peak by the end of 1950s and in 1964 because of a dispute over the planting of a Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone, that for the US would have meant to admit a sort of Panamanian sovereignty over the Zone. The conservative anti-US sentiment however was the dominant trend in Panamanian anti-Americanism, as elites initially held protests back from the streets. The economic dependency that increased over the century becoming one of the most intense in Latin America, had created a mass-based anti-US attitude that however remained ambivalent because both the elites and non-elites had largely benefited from the Canal's return. Much of this ambivalence also came from dependency coupled with racial issues, that first emerged during the 1920s by criticizing more how the United States behaved rather than the presence of the Colossus itself. The elites, convinced that letting the masses lead the protests would have brought to the obtaining of only modest concessions, decided to maintain a low-key anti-Americanism. US citizens living in the Canal Zone, moreover, had a

¹⁹⁶ Max Paul Friedman, "Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations", p. 151

special role in the policy decision-making as they insisted with US leaders upon the importance to remain inflexible against even minor changes in favor of Panama. To avoid both domestic opposition and Panamanian bitterness, they preferred to maintain a halfway attitude toward the issue, by playing a pragmatic diplomatic game. Protests sparked in 1959 in a march into the Zone aimed to peacefully plant Panamanian flags to claim sovereignty, but the crowd grew exponentially and showed signs with “Yankee go home” or “death to the Gringos” inscriptions, and the riot ended with US Marines intervention and Eisenhower’s concession to Panamanians to obtain a titular sovereignty by planting the flags, thus scoring the elites’ victory. Papers and magazines in Panama portrayed US police with dogs and demons attacking the vulnerable Panamanians, leading US policymakers to regard those elites as manipulative of mass anti-Americanism aimed to extort grants from Washington, but at the same time they did not accept rebellious behavior from such a tiny state that owed much of its wealth to US protection, thus concluding that Panamanian elites were blaming the United States for their alleged discontents as if it was a sort of scapegoat. Consequently, Washington preferred to procrastinate the issue. A second upheaval took place in 1964 when the Zonian governor decided not to fly flags at all causing the US students of the Canal Zone to plant a US flag to express their refusal of the national humiliation that could be generated by showing equity with Panamanians. Panamanian students responded with a riot that lasted four days: the conflict was no mere student conflict among teenagers, it actually was a battle between two societies. Protests extended to Panama City, and violence against US citizens and symbols became remarkable, as even businesses that only seemed Yankee were bashed. Thomas Mann, after drafting a personal list of Latin American grievances against the United States, found that most of them concerned economics, thus displaying a scarce interest in political and cultural aspects of anti-US sentiments, preferring resilience as a strategy that became widely accepted among US leaders, who refused to renegotiate the 1903 treaty causing the breaking of relations. The presidential elections in Panama during that same year demonstrated how anti-Americanism can be politicized, as President Chiari, advocating the status quo of the elites, helped his cousin Marco Robles to win the elections by using the press to depict Robles’ adversary, who sought to settle for a just deal with the White House, as pro-Yankee and as “the candidate of the *gringos*”. By the end of the year however, the Mann-Johnson pair, bothered by the

manipulation of elite's anti-Americanism, could outmaneuver Panamanians by stating that a new canal would be built, and after that, Panamanians would have gained sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Resilience and vagueness won over anti-Americanism as Washington cleverly played on Panama's dependency on US funds and the Robles administration's fear of further nationalist upheavals. By fooling the Panamanian elites after understanding the implications that connected conservative anti-Americanism and mass anti-US upheavals, the Johnson administration diplomatically played on its deep knowledge of local politics in Panama. The 1964 riots however, showed the United States the wide range of varieties of anti-Americanism and their inherent links with specific social and political assets of every Latin American country.¹⁹⁷

The different shapes that anti-Americanism took throughout history and from country to country show both similarities and differences. If there is a common cause for every anti-US sentiment, however, is to be traced in personal feelings with respect to US imperialism, both politic and economic. The repeated political interferences perpetrated by the United States to help oust uncomfortable statesmen and install pro-US rulers, the economic penetration by means of US companies that perpetuated dependency while impeding internal development and industrialization, the exclusion of Latin American countries from international or hemispheric decisions, and the failure to provide rewards for Latin American support of the Colossus during the World Wars, all of them discussed in chapters III and IV, without a doubt caused bitterness and a predisposition to liberate from the United States. Personal but general resentment, indeed, constitutes the common ground of anti-Americanism, be it from statesmen or from the masses. Politicization of anti-US sentiment, furthermore, proved to be the favorite and most effective means by which Latin American presidential candidates used to gather consensus and support from the masses, such as Perón, Vargas, Castro, and Chiari. In the same measure, the United States took advantage of anti-Americanism to label cumbersome Latin American presidents and justify the measures implemented to oust them or simply to provide a valid reason to intervene.

¹⁹⁷ Alan McPherson, "Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations", pp. 77-116

If between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth anti-Americanism was more culturally based, by means of the stressing of the differences between North and South highlighting the Latin American moral superiority, one can argue that in this instance, too, anti-US sentiments has served as a feature for Latin American self-identification in a moment in which Europe, that since then had been the Latin American mirror, started failing as a model, and rendered Latin American identity as a counterpart of the North American. Nonetheless, ever since the first manifestations of dislike for the United States, a sort of admiration for the aims achieved and the grandiosity gained has always been a hint in the literary production of the time. Only during the 1920s anti-Americanism became more organized and concrete, also because urbanization and growing awareness made clear that US interference was impeding a set of processes in Latin America, that otherwise would have taken other directions and produced different outcomes. Moreover, the distinction between critic and resentment of US policies and admiration for US lifestyle and habits became clearer also due to the large consumerism of US-made goods. But it was not until the mid-century that anti-Americanism became so much politicized. On one side, Latin American leaders took advantage of the phenomena to manipulate local masses and challenge US decision-making, while on the other the United States used anti-Americanism to rapidly silence dissenters behind the excuse according to which with great power comes great responsibility, and an amount of hatred was justified by the fact of being a world Superpower.

Forasmuch as anti-Americanism presents so many varieties and nuances, the definition of anti-Americanism that we are taking into account, namely “a negative predisposition towards the United States as a whole and what it represents, which incorporates the personal sphere and feelings, and goes beyond pure criticism over policies or government decision-making”, or “any hostile action or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States”, thus highlighting the attribution of anti-Americanism to a mentality and an attitude that translates into the hatred towards what the United States is and is made up of, embracing its totality, in this and in the next part of the Chapter it is demonstrated that such anti-American cases have been extremely rare.

5.2: Anti-Americanism and empirical challenges

After analyzing the different meanings anti-Americanism can incorporate, the historical implications generated by the complex relation between the United States and Latin America that was shaped by US policies and the relative variegated Latin American responses, it is also worth considering the available empirical information on the foundation of opposition to the US as well as of the positive dispositions, in order to give reason to the ambiguity that features the anti-American phenomenon.

Measurement of anti-US sentiments are provided by investigation on public opinion polls such as those made by the nonpartisan fact tanks *Pew Research Center* and *Latinobarómetro Corporation*, which, although they are unable to separate the shades and angles or the intensity of single individuals' anti-US sentiment, they do empirically expose the multifaceted and variegated phenomenon of anti-Americanism.

By observing the public opinion data of the years between 2000 and 2010 it can be deduced that, like political sciences experts Andy Baker and David Cupery argued in their academic article "Anti-Americanism in Latin America: Economic Exchange, Foreign Policy Legacies, and Mass Attitudes toward the Colossus of the North", "mass sentiments toward the United States fall on a continuum from vehemently anti-American to vehemently pro-American".¹⁹⁸

Using the following survey questions from the Latinobarómetro survey data series taken from a 2008 report¹⁹⁹ as a measurement of anti-Americanism, it shows anti-US sentiment during the recent past calculating the percentages of favorable opinions of the United States in eighteen Latin American countries (Dominican Republic, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Guatemala, Paraguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Argentina) and offering a point of reference for the understanding of the spread of *Antiyanquismo* across the hemisphere.

¹⁹⁸ Andy Baker, David Cupery, "Anti-Americanism in Latin America: Economic Exchange, Foreign Policy Legacies, and Mass Attitudes toward the Colossus of the North", available online: <http://spot.colorado.edu/~bakerab/LARR%20Baker%20and%20Cupery.pdf>

¹⁹⁹ Latinobarómetro Informe 2008, available online: http://www.latinobarometro.org/docs/INFORME_LATINOBAROMETRO_2008.pdf

The question was: “I would like to know your opinion about the following countries. Do you have a (1) very good, (2) good, (3) bad, or (4) very bad opinion about the United States?”




Figure 1. Source: Latinobarómetro 2008

Figure 1 shows the percentages of favorable opinions of the United States in the surveyed Latin American countries in 2008. Surprisingly, the Latin American nations holding the most favorable opinion of their Northern neighbor are those belonging to the Caribbean area, which were the most targeted by United States military interventions, political, and economic meddling that caused the most brutal bloodbaths in the region: the Dominican Republic (88%), Honduras (75%), El Salvador (73%), Nicaragua (69%), Colombia (68%), and Costa Rica (67%), which show

that 7 citizens every 10 surveyed have a positive opinion of the United States. The main difference that stands out is the fact that favorable and unfavorable opinions are generally divided geographically, as in Central American countries sympathetic attitudes dominate, while unfavorable trends characterize the South American. The lowest rates of positive disposition are recorded in Argentina (only 32% of favorable opinions), Uruguay (40%), Venezuela (41%), Bolivia (45%), Guatemala (56%), Mexico (57%), and Brazil (57%). In addition, the figure shows that Latin America as a whole shows a 58% of positive assessments towards the Colossus, which means that more than a half of Latin Americans like the United States.

Andy Baker and David Cupery found a connection between geographical distance, which has been calculated from the middle point of the United States and the single capital cities of the surveyed Latin American countries, and anti-Americanism examined between 1995 and 2010. Figure 2 shows that the closer a Latin American country is to the United States, the more positive the opinions.²⁰⁰ This finding could possibly help to give reason of the concentration of favorable opinions on the United States in Central America and the convergence of negative attitudes in the Southern continent found in Figure 1.

If we intersect both graphic results, a correspondence can be noticed as Dominican Republic, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica appear as both the closer and the most favorable, while Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Argentina are both increasingly distant from the US and display a more unfavorable disposition toward it.

²⁰⁰ Andy Baker, David Cupery, "Anti-Americanism in Latin America: Economic Exchange, Foreign Policy Legacies, and Mass Attitudes toward the Colossus of the North", available online: <http://spot.colorado.edu/~bakerab/LARR%20Baker%20and%20Cupery.pdf>




Figure 2 Anti-Americanism in eighteen Latin American countries as a function of distance from the United States, 1995–2010. Three-letter codes are scatterplot points for a given country in the corresponding year. Codes are World Bank country-name abbreviations.

However, as Baker and Cupery underline, geographical distance from the United States is “a theoretically unspecified variable”, and therefore it should not be taken as indisputably true. They also found a positive connection between the cross-national variance in anti-Americanism and single states’ economic linkages with the United States. By regarding the economic exchange as aides, investments, remittances, migration, and trade, they concluded, as international relations theories teach, that economic connections between states improves cross-cultural exchange and mutual appeal, while mutual doubt and stereotyping reduce.

The countries that entertain strong economic linkages with a superior economic power such as the United States, in addition, are found to be less willing to foment anti-US sentiments because the elites, being the main stakeholders of economic return, tend to fear economic consequences if relations with the superpower is weakened, and thus such supposition could explain Central American pro-US tendencies at the turn of the twenty-first century.²⁰¹

If considered together, the geographical distance variable and the economic relations variable suggest that the closer is a country to the Northern commercial partner, the lower the costs of international transactions and the more people emigrate, and therefore benefits are major with respect to those of Southern countries.

Economic ties, by enhancing cultural exchange also prove, in the Latin American case, that United States' popular culture is positively greeted, as shown in Figure 3.

Being the United States the main importer of finished goods in Latin America since the nineteenth century, regional-wide consumerism of US products rates very high, and if we consider that economic and culture interconnections between the United States and Latin America are more intense than in any other world region, we can argue that US popular culture is very appreciated in Latin American countries, as Figure 3 demonstrates that generally, apart from Bolivia, where the dislike percentage exceeds the like percentage, and Peru, approval of US culture rates high, especially in the two Central American surveyed countries (Honduras and Guatemala), while Argentinian rates remain relatively low.

²⁰¹ Andy Baker, David Cupery, "Anti-Americanism in Latin America: Economic Exchange, Foreign Policy Legacies, and Mass Attitudes toward the Colossus of the North", available online: <http://spot.colorado.edu/~bakerab/LARR%20Baker%20and%20Cupery.pdf>

	Like (%)	Dislike (%)	Don't Know/Refused to Answer (%)
Venezuela	78	20	2
Honduras	71	25	4
Guatemala	70	26	5
Brazil	69	29	2
Mexico	60	30	10
Peru	46	43	11
Bolivia	39	54	7
Argentina	52	38	10

Figure 3. Latin Americans opinions on US Popular Culture

Source: 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Survey

Figure 4 however, show that although US popular culture is generally appreciated, the spread of US ideas and customs is disliked.

	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Don't Know/Refused to Answer (%)
Venezuela	44	52	4
Honduras	44	53	4
Guatemala	40	53	7
Peru	37	50	13
Brazil	30	62	8
Mexico	22	65	13
Bolivia	22	73	5
Argentina	16	73	11

Figure 4. Latin American's opinion on the spread of US ideas and customs

Source: 2002 Pew Global Attitude Survey

Cross-data of Figure 3 and 4 suggests that while US culture is appreciated, which means that Latin Americans actually like the United States' society and culture, there is antipathy toward the spread of it, hinting that the United states is liked, but its behavior is not.

Figure 5 instead demonstrates that what is most unappreciated by Latin Americans is US government's policies, as when the surveyed have been asked whether they thought if the United States could solve world's problems and increased the poverty gap.

	Doesn't Solve World's Problems (%)	U.S. Increases Poverty Gap (%)
Venezuela	85	48
Bolivia	76	74
Mexico	74	55
Guatemala	69	55
Honduras	67	45
Argentina	65	67
Brazil	65	60
Peru	60	55

Figure 5. Latin American's opinions about the U.S. solving the world problems and increasing the poverty gap.

Source: Pew Global Attitude Survey 2002

Such percentages include those who answered "too much", "too little", or "nothing", reflecting that generally it is thought that US government does not act judiciously as to solve the world problems but widens the gap between the rich and the poor instead. Being Latin America a region that includes developing countries, poverty has always been a pressing issue to most Latin Americans, and polls reflect discontent with the US role in solving such problem.²⁰²

²⁰² Amanda Miralrio, "The Latin American Consensus", McNair Scholars Journal: Vol. 11: Iss. 1, Article 9. Available online: <http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1185&context=mcnair>

The history of the relations between Latin America and the United States proved to be largely painful, and pain precisely was the fertile ground that permitted the proliferation of the anti-American sentiment throughout the decades. Latin Americans felt that they had played a fundamental role in the building of the United States' greatness, especially on the economic and hegemonic level, and that the treatment they received from *el Norte* did not compensate what had been taken away from them.

After all, Latin America has been repeatedly victimized and exploited by the United States' interference more than any other region of the world, and over the past couple of centuries the Colossus of the North has taken over territories, colonized and occupied independent countries, posed bans on trade, intruded in states' economies to accumulate profits from debts, managed *golpes*, deposed democratically elected leaders while endorsing brutal despots, and financed a large amount of violence across the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, being the United States the main representative of the capitalist system, it became automatic for Latin Americans to blame *el Norte* for their impoverishment first, and impossibility to develop then. Criticism of the United States evolved out of some cultural and historical processes, as the repeated wrongs to which Latin American countries were subjected to allowed the proliferation of rejection of US norms with concrete motivations, such as resistance to the imperialism through a culturally imbued hate toward *el Norte* that was manifested with literature by the intellectual elites, then with the creation of anti-US-oriented political parties and associations, the spread of nationalisms during the first half of the twentieth century, and by means of violent upheavals during the Cold War.

Latin American anti-Americanism also included issues of national identity, that, as it has been discussed in the first part of the chapter, were resolved using United States' largely stereotyped characteristics as counterpart for the regional and national self-identification. Economic development, or the lack of it, which has largely been thought to be the result of United States imperialism, whether constituting a blame or not, played a fundamental role in fomenting anti-US sentiments. On one side, the Central American states have been bled dry by US companies' exploitations, while on the other, South American countries were simply integrated in the export-led model, but the continuing requests of financial aides to develop national industrial

complexes were largely ignored or denied because of the White House foreign policy agenda. The economic pitfalls experienced in the region, which being deeply dependent on foreign markets sensed economic crises more than others, along with US military interventionism marked the moments in which anti-Americanism reached the highest levels.

The responsibility of US economic and foreign policies and abuses in the hemisphere in fueling anti-Americanism is demonstrated by the fact that during the years in which inter-American cooperation grew, anti-US sentiments decreased, as it happened during the period of the Good Neighbor Policy. Also in the aftermath of the Cold War, when East-West tensions decreased with the consequent loss of strategic interest in Latin America, anti-Americanism decelerated. Apart from being volatile and swinging, whether short-lived or convenient, anti-Americanism is and has been mostly ambivalent. As it has been shown in the discussed literary productions, the statesmen and political leaders' declarations, and the analysis of public opinion polls, anti-American sentiments depended upon diverse variants, but rarely included personal hatred for US society, lifestyle, customs, and values. What it has been resented is the incoherence displayed by Washington in its incapability to represent those values it much promoted and publicized, but they did not reject ideals themselves. As a matter of fact, Latin Americans never hid their admiration of the United States for its greatness and democracy, as they never hid their deep discontent for its foreign policies, either.

In the light of the analysis of the anti-American phenomena, it can be said that it served many masters and that it has the power to reveal aspects of Latin American domestic policies as well as of the United States.

CONCLUSION

Anti-Americanism presents itself as a concept that, apart from being difficult to define, displays a set of facets that make it a complex phenomenon and confuses its applicability in most cases. Born among the European elites that coined the term during the second half of the eighteenth century, it acquired a special significance that reverberates until nowadays, although in different shapes but for similar reasons, in the twenty-first century version of the anti-American wave that rose from the Middle East after September 11, 2001, reinvigorating its academic and political interest.

In order to explain such multifaceted concept, different definitions from scholars and academics have been taken into consideration as well as the historical implications that have made anti-Americanism what it is and what it represents. Although there is no unilateral and precise definition of this phenomenon, an aspect that limits its own understanding and analysis, the academic debates that have been made over the matter starting from the 1980s however provide some guidelines that serve to design a general characterization of a concept that has been largely discussed over the past decades. The most common definition of anti-Americanism is that of a particular stance, mindset, or attitude that manifests as a negative predisposition toward the United States; it includes both the personal and the emotional sphere becoming a deep-seated hatred that goes beyond mere criticism of governmental decision-making or foreign policies, because it encompasses US identity and what it represents, its society, lifestyle, values, and culture. If such definition is taken as accepted, then, by analyzing the history of Latin American anti-Americanism, it can be said that it rarely fitted the totality of the mentioned characteristics, and it displayed an exceptional ambivalence instead. In order to understand such ambivalence, in this work has been considered the fundamental contribution offered by Political Science academics such as Max Paul Friedman, Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, because it allows to distinguish a righteous criticism of Washington's policies from unfair bias of the United States, a distinction that explains large part of Latin American anti-US sentiments, and the misuse of the term that has been made by labeling Latin American postures and reactions that diverged from the United States' as anti-American.

For this reason, and to resolve this tangled enigma, also Alan McPherson's visions have been taken into consideration as they explain anti-Americanism as a variegated phenomenon that can be discussed in pluralistic terms, sorting it in different kinds of anti-Americanisms that differ in their nature, reasons, and scopes. Whether variegated and changing over time and geography, cultural or short-lived, politically instrumental or grounded in specific reasons, anti-Americanism has surged in every Latin American country, but while it existed nearly everywhere in the Western Hemisphere, so did pro-Americanism. Ambivalence, which is identifiable with the main feature of anti-US sentiments emphasized in this work, survived every shape and form such sentiments took, as criticism of Washington's foreign policies, imperialism, and its disregard for international institutions and norms has, in the large majority of the times, been manifested separately from hatred of US lifestyle, culture, values, and identity. Indeed, while in only a few occasions a full-scale hatred toward the United States has been shown, overall straddling the nineteenth and twentieth century because of the shock brought by US cultural and political innovations, its rise as a world power, and the persisting European intellectual influences in Latin America that fueled a hatred targeted at the US identity, culture, and society, most Latin American governments however have sought and still continue to seek close ties with Washington, by encouraging the drafting of free-trade agreements, immigration arrangements, and security assistance. Moreover, many Latin American intellectuals and diplomats have, at times, since the first decades of the eighteenth century, regarded US people with admiration and as a social model to attain to, appreciating them for their freedoms, their stamina, their policy ideals, and their work ethic, while criticizing US imperialistic tendencies. In other words, in order to give cohesion to such a differentiated and abstract approach as anti-Americanism, the Latin American states, while denouncing US political and economic power and its behavior, they also espoused North American culture and political ideologies, and esteemed its society, thus creating a confusing and mixed disposition toward the United States that nevertheless has always separated the admiration of US people from criticism of the US government. The salient aspect that this work intends to highlight is, then, that Latin American anti-Americanism, even if variegated, has often been characterized by a rejection of the United States' policies and intrusiveness that has been tempered by admiration and a sort of envy for its greatness and for the societal and economic goals

achieved, but to come to such conclusion there is a set of implications that need to be taken into consideration.

Part of the reasons why anti-US sentiments are difficult to explain resides in the fact that the United States has historically embodied wide and powerful concepts such as modernism and capitalism and, therefore, at times it can be easy to fall into incomprehensions, as when criticism targets a specific system it can automatically target the nation that most represents it, as in the case of the United States, creating confusion.

Furthermore, the United States and Latin America share a unique history of enigmatic relations that resulted from the similarity of conditions in which both US citizens and Latin American peoples found themselves. They both lived in the New World dominions of the mighty European empires, but they cultivated different, if not antithetic destinies. The divergent outcomes of their emancipation from Europe and the subsequent different outlooks that built US identity with respect to the Latin American, produced the first and most visible contraposition among the Pilgrim Fathers' heirs and the Hispanic Americans, namely the imperialistic attitude that became inherent of United States' distinctiveness and the anti-imperialistic stances of the Latin American countries, that also reached enough significance as to become part of the regional identity. It has been demonstrated in this work that the foreign policies, the racist and paternalistic outlooks, and doctrines that have been developed, adopted, and often abused by the United States in the diplomatic relations with Latin America since the 1820s, such as the Manifest Destiny, the Monroe Doctrine and its relative corollaries, the Big Stick and the Dollar Diplomacy, the New Diplomacy, the Good Neighbor Policy, and the Cold War policies, to cite only the most salient, all have a causal connection with the swinging Latin American anti-US responses to the Northern neighbor, and they allegedly can answer the question that has been posed in unison by US citizens after the 9/11 attack: "why do they hate us?"

The most detectable historical period analyzed that prove the fact that anti-US manifestations largely depends on Washington's policies is ascribable to the Roosevelt three presidencies and the few years that preceded them, which from the beginning of the 1930s to 1945 included the most efficient cooperation between Latin Americans and Washington largely due to a great reduction of military interventionism and an improved goodwill in restoring diplomatic

relations. Moreover, as in the data of public opinions polls over Latin American disposition toward the United States collected during the last decades, anti-Americanism only exists at a paltry level.

One more difficulty in the understanding of anti-American tendencies, however, resides precisely in the differentiation between what the United States represents and the way it behaves, as most of the times the Washington administrations have demonstrated to have failed in honoring that same set of values of which the United States had self-made the advocate, such as democracy and the right of self-determination of the states. The theft of sovereignty and the massive economic interventionism of which Latin American countries were victims at the hands of the United States after it had self-declared as the world mouthpiece of democracy and freedom, in fact, constituted the main reason for resentment and hatred. US failure in being coherent makes it difficult to mark the line that separates deeds and identity, and, as a consequence, it contributes to the ambivalence and incomprehension of anti-American reactions and whether they targeted Washington's policies or the fact that such policies came from Washington. Latin Americans have been uncomfortable with US unilateralism and forced interventions since the mid-nineteenth century, which often manifested in the US deposition of Latin American democratically elected presidents in order to install statesmen that best served US interests, and therefore they have righteously opposed the use of force aimed to promote a kind of democracy that until nowadays finds hard realization in the region. The United States' incongruity rendered US foreign policies unreliable, and therefore what the Latin Americans have desired and needed from the United States since their independence are, indeed, efficient economic linkages such as free-trade accords and to be treated as peer states, not as mere raw material storages to take advantage of. Hence, the economic exploitation that fashioned US neo-colonialism in Central and South America has often been blamed for Latin American underdevelopment, but further discussions need to be made over the matter because it would be interesting to understand the ends and the motives of the role that Latin American elites played.

However, it is perhaps precisely the fact that Latin Americans sense that the United States has never taken the region into serious consideration out of Washington's strategic interests, and that it has always regarded the region as its backyard the main cause of the residual

resentment, also because the White House actually only shows involvement and attention to those developments in Latin America that supposedly constitute direct challenges to its interest and that could possibly deviate US hegemony in the hemisphere, such as were nationalisms, the fear of the spread of Fascism or Communism during the twentieth century, or the opening of market trades with China in the recent decades.²⁰³ Hence, on matter after matter, history has demonstrated that Latin American statesmen and officials were hardly consulted during the many Pan-American or international conferences, and when they were, they felt that their opinions carried little or no weight in the decision-making processes. Disillusionment and disenchantment toward the United States, in fact, first when the Monroe Doctrine was declared and implemented and about which Latin American representatives had no say, and then, especially in the after war periods, reward promises were broken and Latin American officials were basically ignored at the peace conferences despite their participation to conflicts, anti-US sentiments aroused as a consequence, but hinting at the same time a tireless hope for cooperation, especially for economic reasons.

Another aspect to be considered is the strong and typical US resilience to anti-Americanism that provided further contribution to the bolstering of resentment, as in the face of foreign criticism the United States relentlessly relegated the Latin American various forms of dissent as either unjustified or as an inherent part of the game of being a world superpower, which is a condition that supposedly renders a nation as both accountable of criticism and a gratifying target to defame. As a symbol of modernization, capitalism, and power, the United States regarded foreign criticism and anti-Americanism itself as a strategic scapegoat for the evils and grievances in Latin American countries. Such posture was sharply expressed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom when he wrote to Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning Gerard Smith in 1958, after the Caracas incident:

“Our failures are principally psychological, we should not, through excessive reluctance to enter into the argument or a feeling of guilt, appear to accept the prevalent Latin American argument that it is entirely our fault that they have failed to solve their problem.”

²⁰³ Peter Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?” available online: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2006-01-01/washington-losing-latin-america>

Such attitude often fashioned US leaders who held the idea that Latin Americans were simply blaming the United States for not coping with their domestic problems, and at the same time in this way they managed to avoid allegations of misconduct.²⁰⁴

In addition, as noted by Max Paul Friedman, Washington's inability to accept foreign criticism or to distinguish it from anti-Americanism demonstrates US lack of self-judgement and can arguably become, as it has been for over a century and a half, a limit in both the installation of positive relations with Latin America and in the improvement of foreign policy with other states.

All of these aspects of the relations between the United States and Latin America have created different kinds of anti-Americanism, that, whether differentiated by the many nuances exposed, they have been discussed in this work to demonstrate that the United States has become more and more a universal presence across the centuries that is both dismissed and admired, both by governments and by peoples.²⁰⁵ Today there is little hope that the relations between the United States and Latin America can improve, because the region probably will remain, as history teaches, peripheral to present US foreign policy concerns, namely the war on terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the rebuilding of relations with the Middle East, and consequently Latin American social and political tensions caused by the relations with the United States are unlikely to vanish. Virtually every Latin American government, despite the disagreement and discontent with US policies in the region, want to bolster their economic relations with Washington and would gladly receive US financial aides to improve and develop their national industrial complexes, but it is most likely that disenchantment with the United States will persist.

²⁰⁴ Alan McPherson, "Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in US-Latin American Relations", p. 37

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 170

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