This thesis examines how governance regimes shape the corporate entrepreneurship (CE) strategy configurations of incumbent firms. It addresses the contextual thinness identified In the CE literature by linking firm-level entrepreneurial activity to differences in institutional environments. A comparative, qualitative-dominant mixed-methods design is applied to China, the United States, the European Union, and India. Governance regimes are assessed across five institutional dimensions: the role of the state, the financial system, regulation and coordination, market-supporting institutions, and ownership and corporate governance. CE is examined through four mechanisms: intrapreneurship, corporate venturing, strategic partnerships, and corporate venture capital. The findings identify distinct configurations across the four cases. China reflects a state-led configuration with a stronger internal and state-aligned orientation. The United States reflects a market-driven configuration supported by deep capital markets and external mechanisms such asCVC and acquisitions. The European Union reflects a regulated and coordinated configuration characterized by structured collaboration and institutionally embedded renewal. Finally, India emerges as a hybrid configuration combining market-oriented mechanisms with concentrated ownership, relational coordination, and continued state involvement. The comparison also shows that the same CE mechanism can take different organizational forms across institutional settings. The thesis therefore contributes a comparative framework that explains how governance conditions influence both the relative importance and the form of CE mechanisms. Therefore, extending CE research beyond firm-internal explanations and providing a clearer link between institutional context and strategic choice.
Corporate Entrepreneurship Strategies and Governance Regimes
GALARRAGA JIMENEZ, MARIA PAZ
2025/2026
Abstract
This thesis examines how governance regimes shape the corporate entrepreneurship (CE) strategy configurations of incumbent firms. It addresses the contextual thinness identified In the CE literature by linking firm-level entrepreneurial activity to differences in institutional environments. A comparative, qualitative-dominant mixed-methods design is applied to China, the United States, the European Union, and India. Governance regimes are assessed across five institutional dimensions: the role of the state, the financial system, regulation and coordination, market-supporting institutions, and ownership and corporate governance. CE is examined through four mechanisms: intrapreneurship, corporate venturing, strategic partnerships, and corporate venture capital. The findings identify distinct configurations across the four cases. China reflects a state-led configuration with a stronger internal and state-aligned orientation. The United States reflects a market-driven configuration supported by deep capital markets and external mechanisms such asCVC and acquisitions. The European Union reflects a regulated and coordinated configuration characterized by structured collaboration and institutionally embedded renewal. Finally, India emerges as a hybrid configuration combining market-oriented mechanisms with concentrated ownership, relational coordination, and continued state involvement. The comparison also shows that the same CE mechanism can take different organizational forms across institutional settings. The thesis therefore contributes a comparative framework that explains how governance conditions influence both the relative importance and the form of CE mechanisms. Therefore, extending CE research beyond firm-internal explanations and providing a clearer link between institutional context and strategic choice.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
GALARRAGA_MARIAPAZ_905184.pdf
non disponibili
Dimensione
831.73 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
831.73 kB | Adobe PDF |
I documenti in UNITESI sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14247/31287