De-risking Piraeus: Chinese Port Investments and the EU Economic Security Turn a Decade after the Acquisition

本论文尝试将欧洲经济安全概念放在中国港口投资的背景下加深理解，并探讨欧盟如何才能在保持外国投资开放的同时，降低在敏感港口中的经济安全风险。 为此，本文首先对欧盟经济安全概念进行分析，其次将此框架用于更仔细地理解中国在欧洲的港口投资。最后，论文以希腊的比雷埃弗斯港为案例，来研究一个具有代表性的中国旗舰港口投资、探讨其和欧盟“去风险”政策互动，并识别这种操作可能带来的潜在威胁。 论文核心结论是：问题并不是对中国投资开放或关闭，而是开放在什么条件下落实、通过何种安排实现。归根结底，风险高低往往不在于中国投资是否存在，而取决于投资进入方式以及进入后可能带来的影响范围。以比雷埃夫斯港为例来研究这种安全变化。论文指出，鉴于港口行业拥有独特特性，因此港口“去风险”政策需要在控制权与航运网络依赖尚未巩固之前采取措施以降低风险。 通过将比雷埃夫斯港其他港口情景对比，在其他港口情境中，外国直接投资审查以及欧盟或成员国层面措施在合同敲定前已生效。本论文表明，预防工具能够有效地限制在关键基础设施中的影响力集中与固化。相反，当这些工具未能及时运用时，去风险就受到合同协议的约束。因此，在风险管理阶段，需要进一步评估哪些脆弱性可以被缓解。

This thesis aims at framing the European economic security concept in relation to Chinese investments in the port sector and examines how the European Union can remain open to foreign capital in strategically sensitive seaports while limiting economic security risks. In doing so, it will first develop a conceptual analysis of economic security in Europe and applies this framework to Chinese port investments. Finally, it will combine the analysis with a specific case-study regarding Piraeus, in order to investigate how a flagship Chinese investment in a European critical node can serve as a test case for the EU’s emerging de-risking project and what threats such an operation might pose. The central concerns analysed show that the core issue is not a binary choice between openness and closure towards Chinese investments, but the conditions under which openness materialises. Taking Piraeus as a testing ground for this security shift, this dissertation argues that EU de-risking in ports needs to reduce risks by taking action before control structures and network dependencies are consolidated, as given the sectoral characteristics of port investments, a reversal of course is heavily constrained. Comparing Piraeus to other ports’ scenarios where FDI screening and other EU- or national-level measures are put in place before contractual agreements are finalised, the thesis shows that preventive tools can effectively limit the consolidation of influence in critical infrastructures. When these instruments are not timely employed, de-risking must be redefined as risk management through resilience, governance safeguards, and continuity planning rather than ownership reversal. In the case of Piraeus, the investment has already become structurally embedded and therefore it must be evaluated which vulnerabilities are realistically mitigable in a risk management phase.