The Cyber Influence Game: Electoral Interference under International Law and Human Rights

The thesis aims to contribute to the scholarly conversation on advancing the development of Cybernorms in cyberspace, particularly by considering the interaction of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention at the intersection between information operations (encompassing logical and physical layers, with military applications) and cyber-influence operations (disinformation driven by AI), which target national decision-making processes. The framework is applied to the domain of electoral interferences for more analytical clarity, as elections are among the clearest expressions of collective deliberation. As a matter of fact, elections, given their complexity, as encompassing both technological and human elements, with the latter existing at individual and collective levels, allow for a critical reconsideration of principles of customary international law, specifically the notion of coercion and elements for unlawful intervention. Disinformation and information operations have evolved into highly coordinated efforts that produce cumulative effects. These campaigns now extend far beyond the physical and logical layers of cyberspace, deeply penetrating the social fabric of societies. Their proliferation, especially since watershed events like the 2016 United States Elections and the Brexit Referendum, underscores the urgent necessity for robust cyber-norms that can effectively address these multidimensional threats. The ultimate goal is thus to trace a preliminary degree of predictability in international dynamics in favor of cyber-stability through preventive and protective measures. To achieve the above mentioned aims, the analysis incorporate the following steps: (1) Framing the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty and their interaction in cyberspace, to better adapt them for operations that are under the threshold of the use of force but with possible coercive effects, underlying nuances and limits of the traditional paradigm; (2) Present a preliminary model for tactical-strategic interactions of ‘cyber-influence campaigns’ with application to low intensity operations during elections, namely cyber-espionage and disinformation; (3) Filling legal gaps in establishing State Responsibility for Non-State actors in cross-border operations, specifically disinformation. Principles of State Responsibility will be considered along with the concept of due diligence extrapolated from the environmental law regime, in order to define possible non-material harm, thus to better inform adverse cumulative effects, beyond a conflict scenario. The application in the domain of electoral interference follows a brief framing of political rights as codified by different human rights treaties and instruments, by then extracting the very two conditions that allow the sustainability of democracies as information ecosystems, which are right to freedom of expression and right to privacy. This framing enables to expand on what coercion could amount to in the digital era by connecting these rights to self-determination, in their ‘collective’ dimension. This part of analysis will specifically focus on the right to privacy as ‘enabling right’ and pre-condition of the formation of ‘free will’ in a political context. Under this framework, due diligence will be expanded further by connecting it to extraterritorial human rights obligations within a functional approach, connecting it to potential transboundary harm in case of disinformation. Finally, a future research trajectory is proposed, considering the right to privacy and operationalization through data protection for disinformation by connecting cyber-resilience with cybersecurity measures, fundamental in open-ended information ecosystems.