Cookie-based web authentication is the most widespread practice to maintain the user's web session. This mechanism is, inherently, subject to serious security threats: an attacker who acquires a copy of cookies containing authentication information may be able to impersonate the user and conduct a session on their behalf. Recently, browser-side defenses have proven to be an effective protection measure against these types of attacks. In existing approaches, all such defenses ultimately rely on empirical client-side heuristics to automatically detect authentication cookies to eventually protect them against theft or otherwise unintended use. In this thesis, we build upon a conference paper published at WWW' 14 to overcome its limitations. Specifically: (1) the results of such a document are based on a gold set of only 327 cookies collected from 70 websites. In this work, we extend our analysis to a much larger dataset of approximately 2500 cookies gathered from 220 popular website according to the Alexa ranking. (2) we implement a faster and more accurate authentication token detection method for which our gold set is constructed, including full Javascript support. (3) we confirm a popular literature assumption according to which the number of authentication cookies registered by Javascript is negligible. (4) we formalize a novel measure of protection used to evaluate further effectiveness of previous heuristics from the literature, as well as our approach. (5) we adopt a different machine learning approach to deal with new challenges that, mainly, arise from a larger dimension of the dataset and from the distribution of its instances. The results of our work, ultimately, provide a more in-depth sight of how web authentication is implemented in practice and what kind of security measures are adopted throughout the Web.

Understanding Machine Learning Effectiveness to Protect Web Authentication

Casini, Andrea
2014/2015

Abstract

Cookie-based web authentication is the most widespread practice to maintain the user's web session. This mechanism is, inherently, subject to serious security threats: an attacker who acquires a copy of cookies containing authentication information may be able to impersonate the user and conduct a session on their behalf. Recently, browser-side defenses have proven to be an effective protection measure against these types of attacks. In existing approaches, all such defenses ultimately rely on empirical client-side heuristics to automatically detect authentication cookies to eventually protect them against theft or otherwise unintended use. In this thesis, we build upon a conference paper published at WWW' 14 to overcome its limitations. Specifically: (1) the results of such a document are based on a gold set of only 327 cookies collected from 70 websites. In this work, we extend our analysis to a much larger dataset of approximately 2500 cookies gathered from 220 popular website according to the Alexa ranking. (2) we implement a faster and more accurate authentication token detection method for which our gold set is constructed, including full Javascript support. (3) we confirm a popular literature assumption according to which the number of authentication cookies registered by Javascript is negligible. (4) we formalize a novel measure of protection used to evaluate further effectiveness of previous heuristics from the literature, as well as our approach. (5) we adopt a different machine learning approach to deal with new challenges that, mainly, arise from a larger dimension of the dataset and from the distribution of its instances. The results of our work, ultimately, provide a more in-depth sight of how web authentication is implemented in practice and what kind of security measures are adopted throughout the Web.
2014-10-31
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14247/21702