We study a model of competition among coworkers within a firm, where workers compete for a wage bonus assigned to only a fraction of them on the basis of the level of costly effort they choose to exercise. We analyze it from a learning in games perspective, under both fictitious play and reinforcement learning. The main result we find is an inverted-u shaped relationship between the average level of effort provided by workers and the fraction of them receiving the bonus, with a maximum reached when more than half workers are given such bonus.
A model of competition in the workplace: a learning in games approach.
Spina, Edoardo
2015/2016
Abstract
We study a model of competition among coworkers within a firm, where workers compete for a wage bonus assigned to only a fraction of them on the basis of the level of costly effort they choose to exercise. We analyze it from a learning in games perspective, under both fictitious play and reinforcement learning. The main result we find is an inverted-u shaped relationship between the average level of effort provided by workers and the fraction of them receiving the bonus, with a maximum reached when more than half workers are given such bonus.File in questo prodotto:
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14247/16733